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UK PARLIAMENT · SITTING

Sir Julian Lewis

MP for New Forest East · Conservative · United Kingdom

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

I will share with the House one particular case that is representative of many. My constituent, Mrs Gillian Pothecary, lost her husband almost a year ago. She wrote to me in July about her valiant but so far unavailing quest to obtain a civil service widow’s pension.

CIVIL SERVICE PENSION SCHEME · 2026-09-15 · READ IN HANSARD

She said: “Mrs Pothecary’s…case falls under the commitment to be fully resolved by early September at the absolute latest. Capita has assured me that her case is on their escalation log and has been flagged for priority handling.” I rang up Gill just before coming into this debate and—you’ve guessed it, Dame Siobhain—she has not yet recei…

CIVIL SERVICE PENSION SCHEME · 2026-09-15 · READ IN HANSARD

As the Minister seems to have run out of supportive Back Benchers, I shall endeavour to ask him a helpful and easy question. Accepting that it will be some years, to put it mildly, before we can eliminate our dependency on oil and gas, does he accept in principle that we are more secure if we exploit our own domestic oil and gas resources…

SAUDI EAST-WEST OIL PIPELINE · 2026-09-15 · READ IN HANSARD

I warmly endorse almost everything the Secretary of State has said today, and I genuinely congratulate him on his appointment. In my first speech in this House almost 30 years ago, I promised to support Labour Governments as long as they supported the nuclear deterrent, the conventional armed forces and NATO.

UKRAINE AND RUSSIA · 2026-09-10 · READ IN HANSARD

On Monday, just as campaigners from the New Forest and Waterside were handing into Downing Street a 32,000-signature petition against the appalling and unfair outcome of local government reorganisation affecting our area, the welcome announcement was made by the Government that the local government reform proposals for Hampshire and three…

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE · 2026-09-10 · READ IN HANSARD

We are now in a situation that is worse than that at the height of the cold war, so the comparison we have to make is between what we are spending now and what we spent during the cold war, which was, in modern calculating methods, between 4.5% and 5.1% on defence. So let us not talk about increases to 2.7%.

UKRAINE AND RUSSIA · 2026-09-10 · READ IN HANSARD

The complete record

Every one of 3,750 lines we hold for Sir Julian Lewis, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 61 of 75.

  1. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Douglas Chapman), who is a consistent and thoughtful opponent of Trident. Fortunately, however, I do not have to mirror those views. The views I am expected to put forward are clearly marked as my own, and they have been pretty much the same for 35 years, half of them outside this House and the remainder inside this House. On my having been elected to chair the Defence Committee, something may have come as a bit of a surprise to people who looked at the list of the five hon. Members from the Labour Opposition who were kind enough to nominate me to that role. One was the shadow Armed Forces Minister, the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), and that is hardly a surprise. However, at the other end of the spectrum, I was fortunate enough to enjoy the support of the current Leader of the Opposition.

    TRIDENT · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  2. Thank you very much, Madam Deputy Speaker, for permission to speak in this debate. I apologise to the House for the fact that because I was chairing a public sitting of the Defence Committee I could not be here for the opening speeches. For that reason, too, I have deliberately refrained from making any interventions. Although the issue of strategic nuclear deterrence is very divisive, we can all agree that the calibre of the speeches on both sides of the House—and on both sides of the argument—has been very high indeed. If the Chairman of the Defence Committee had to mirror the views of its members, I would probably spend just over 90% of my time arguing passionately in favour of the nuclear deterrent and just under 10% of it arguing equally passionately against it, because we have, and are delighted to have, on the Committee the hon.

    TRIDENT · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  3. The fourth argument is that because the United States is our closest ally, if the continent of Europe were ever occupied and the nuclear forces of the United States had not been used, an enemy might feel that they could attack us with nuclear weapons with impunity.

    TRIDENT · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  4. Let us consider what might have happened if in 1982 a non-nuclear Britain had been facing an Argentina in possession of even just a few tactical nuclear bombs and the means of delivering them. Would we then have dared to use our conventional forces against its inferior conventional forces? The third argument is that the United Kingdom has traditionally played a more important and decisive role in preserving freedom than other medium-sized democracies have been able, or willing, to do. Democratic countries without nuclear weapons have little choice but either to declare themselves neutral and hope for the best or to rely on the nuclear umbrella of their powerful allies. We are a nuclear power already, and it is also much harder to defeat us by conventional means because of the existence of the English channel.

    TRIDENT · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  5. That point leads directly to the question of what it means to say that we are “using” Trident. Those of us who believe that the possession of a deadly weapon is the best method of stopping other people who possess similar deadly weapons from using them against us, say that Trident is in use every day of the week, and if ever the button had to be pressed, it would have totally failed in its purpose. My second argument is that it is not the weapons themselves that we have to fear but the nature of the regimes that possess them. Whereas democracies are generally reluctant to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear dictatorships—although they did against Japan in 1945—the reverse is not true.

    TRIDENT · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  6. The atomic bombing of Japan is a perfect example, not only because the Emperor was forced to surrender, but because what of might have happened under the reverse scenario: if Japan had developed atomic bombs in the summer of 1945 and the allies had not, a conventional allied invasion to end the war would have been out of the question. The debate should and will go on, and I congratulate SNP Members on giving us the opportunity to take part in it today.

    TRIDENT · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  7. My hon. Friend is exactly right. There is no question but that the Trident nuclear system is entirely autonomous. Indeed, nothing—not the Americans, not any form of cyber-bug—can possibly intervene if, heaven forbid, the worst happened, the United Kingdom were attacked in part or in whole and the submarine commander had to open the dreaded letter written by the Prime Minister. The fifth and final military argument is the most important of all. I put this to people when they try to say, “Well, you’re inflicting cuts on our conventional capability.” The argument is that there is no quantity of conventional forces that can compensate for the military disadvantage that faces a non-nuclear country in a war against a nuclear-armed enemy.

    TRIDENT · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  8. The hon. Gentleman’s argument is like saying that just because the antidote to one deadly disease is ineffective against other deadly diseases, we should not have the antidote.

    TRIDENT · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  9. I am glad my hon. Friend has brought this sort of politics into the debate. All this reminds me very much of the darkest days of the cold war, a policy of containment and the fact that the then Soviet Union had different factions—modernisers and hardliners. Can we not hope that a policy of containment in the case of Iran might lead eventually to the emergence of a modernisers’ victory, albeit slowly and perhaps over decades?

    IRAN: NUCLEAR ISSUES · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  10. On Syria, I have been in close touch with Mr Peter Ford, a former ambassador to Syria who likewise sees the regime there as brutal, or perhaps worse than brutal, but as authoritarian rather than totalitarian. In a choice between freedom, authoritarianism and totalitarianism, we all choose freedom, but sometimes the choice is only between authoritarianism and totalitarianism. The Government want us to choose neither. That is not Churchillian. Churchill knew the difference, and faced with totalitarianism or authoritarianism, I know which choice I would make.

    IRAN: NUCLEAR ISSUES · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  11. I think that Iran is a strong candidate for a society which, if contained and prevented from doing something too terrible, has the prospect of developing in precisely the way described by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset, such that it comes back into the comity of nations and does not go further and further into extremism that is exported. The extremist Islamist creed is a fascist, totalitarian creed. Iran, like the Stalinists, has the potential for being held in check and allowing a modernising trend to emerge. I was interested in what the Chairman of the Committee said when he cited a former ambassador to Iran as evidently someone who thought that there was hope of positive development.

    IRAN: NUCLEAR ISSUES · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  12. I look at Iran and say to myself, “Here is a prime candidate for containment”, because Iran is an authoritarian society, and parts of it may be described as totalitarian, but certainly the impression I get from people who talk about it and know about it is that it is far short of the sort of extremist totalitarianism that features in the concept that underlies ISIL or, I must say, the reality that underlies the society of Saudi Arabia, which is supposed to be our ally. When I look at these different societies, I ask myself which are the most likely, if we can contain them, or keep the lid on them, to develop and evolve—just as our own society, over 500 years or more, developed and evolved—in a modernising direction.

    IRAN: NUCLEAR ISSUES · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  13. When I look at the recommendation that we heard from the Defence Secretary in answering a Defence question only yesterday—that our aim, by bombing, will be to get rid both of Assad and of the Islamist danger of ISIL—I ask myself how this is different from the generalship of the first world war which could perhaps have been excused for the Somme but certainly could not have been excused for Passchendaele the following year. If one does the same thing over and over again and expects to get a different result, then one is insane, and if one does something that worked in the past, then one might get a better result. For Russia, what worked in the past was a combination of deterrence and containment.

    IRAN: NUCLEAR ISSUES · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  14. The first concept is deterrence, and the second is the one to which I referred in my intervention on the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash)—that is, containment. I look at the various societies in the middle east, because I no longer think that by bringing down dictators we will get pluralistic democracies; and I no longer think, therefore, that if we bring down Assad, we will get a better result than when we brought down Saddam Hussein or Muammar al-Gaddafi.

    IRAN: NUCLEAR ISSUES · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  15. We believed what we were told, but there was another reason too why people like me spoke and voted in favour of the removal of a particular dictator, Saddam Hussein—we hoped that what would emerge from the removal of such a dictator would be some form of modernisation and democracy. What actually re-emerged was the thousand-year-old hatred between Sunni and Shi’a, particularly between those who line up with Iran and those who line up with the Sunnis. Churchill’s grand alliance meant that he had to line up with Stalin in order to avoid the greater threat posed by Hitlerism. By happy coincidence, we have found ourselves with two debates in the same Chamber on the same day about the two concepts to which, above all, in my personal opinion, we owe the fact that we did not end up with world war three.

    IRAN: NUCLEAR ISSUES · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  16. I will take the liberty of trying the patience of the House by pointing out something that we have probably heard many times before: when Churchill decided to speak up for Joe Stalin and Soviet Russia, he was reminded of his long-standing aversion to the Soviet system and his claim that Bolshevism should have been strangled at birth. His instant response was, “If Hitler invaded hell, I would have at least a good word to say for the devil in the House of Commons.” How does that relate to the sort of societies we are looking at in the middle east? Once upon a time, this House had a choice about how to behave towards those societies. In particular, very much in the afterglow of the ending of the cold war, we were told that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. My party was in opposition.

    IRAN: NUCLEAR ISSUES · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  17. When Winston Churchill wrote his multi-volume history of the second world war, volume 3 was entitled “The Grand Alliance”. What was the grand alliance? It was the coming together of three very different powers, at least one of which was utterly incompatible on normal criteria with the other two. The three powers were, of course, the British Empire, as it still was, the United States of America and Soviet Russia. Churchill was the prime example of someone who knew how to do what one must do in an imperfect, evil and dangerous world when a conflict breaks out. He knew how to choose in an undesirable dilemma which was the lesser of two evils.

    IRAN: NUCLEAR ISSUES · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  18. The behaviour of such a regime, awful though it is, is no more awful than the behaviour of Stalinist Russia. In fact, Stalinist Russia was responsible for innumerable deaths, yet did not produce world war three, which might easily have happened in the nuclear age or, even if nuclear weapons had not been invented, might perhaps have been more likely to happen in the aftermath of world war two. Where am I leading with this line of argument? It will soon become apparent, because some of us on the Conservative Benches are, according to reports in the paper, being exhorted—I have not been exhorted on the subject myself—in relation to the dilemmas of the middle east, to be more like Churchill than Chamberlain. While I was listening to earlier contributions, a memory stirred and I took the opportunity to check. The memory was correct.

    IRAN: NUCLEAR ISSUES · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  19. I congratulate the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee and all its members on securing this important debate on the Floor of the House and on their contributions. I am particularly pleased to have a brief opportunity to take up where my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) left off. I regard the deal with Iran as a positive development. I also regard the regime in Iran as thoroughly undesirable and potentially dangerous, but thoroughly capable of modernisation and reform if handled correctly by the international community. I entirely concur with the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), a fellow member of the Select Committee on Defence whose presence I greatly value, on the terrible way in which Christians in particular, Baha’i faith members and other minorities are treated.

    IRAN: NUCLEAR ISSUES · 2015-11-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  20. History gives us practically no examples of a determined enemy surrendering in response to conventional air bombardment, so what ground forces are credibly and seriously fighting ISIL/Daesh in Syria, other than some unpleasant Islamist groups, the Kurds—in a limited area—and the Syrian Government army?

    ISIL · 2015-11-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  21. T7. I personally agree with the Government that ISIL/Daesh must be crushed in Syria as well as in Iraq, but the Secretary of State has made it clear that he wants to see the Syrian army forces defeated, too. We are reportedly being told to be more like Churchill than Chamberlain. Does the Secretary of State recognise that Churchill’s great strength was that he knew when to recognise which is the greater and the lesser of two evils, and that is why he was willing sometimes to fight alongside unsavoury allies against a common deadly enemy?

    TOPICAL QUESTIONS · 2015-11-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  22. The Defence Select Committee will be assessing the SDSR against a checklist of the threats and vulnerabilities that were published in our report at the weekend, but I am sure that most Members will find at least some relief in the plugging of gaps such as naval aviation and maritime patrol aircraft, and especially in the emphasis on flexible and versatile armed forces to deal with our inability to predict crises before they are upon us. Will the Prime Minister say a little about press reports concerning the pay of armed forces, and will he indicate when the maingate contracts for the successor to the Trident submarines will be brought before the House for debate and decision?

    NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE · 2015-11-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  23. GCHQ and our other security agencies have, unfortunately, all too much to do without delving into the personal communications of innocent citizens, but will the Home Secretary reassure the House that any abuse that occurred of such intrusive powers would, under the new legislation, constitute a criminal offence?

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS: POLICE/SECURITY SERVICES · 2015-11-16 · READ IN HANSARD

  24. No coherent military strategy against Daesh/ISIL in Syria can be formulated unless and until the Government face up to the unpleasant fact that they will have to co-ordinate their efforts with those of Russia. Would a useful first step be co-operation between the Russian security services and ours in this field, despite our reservations and concern about Russia’s behaviour in other parts of Europe?

    PARIS TERRORIST ATTACKS · 2015-11-16 · READ IN HANSARD

  25. Do I take it from my right hon. Friend’s earlier remarks that, although previously serving members have been told they will not be put back on this committee, no substitute names have yet been put forward? If that is true, it would suggest that it is more about removing certain people than there not being room for them to serve again.

    COUNCIL OF EUROPE · 2015-11-16 · READ IN HANSARD

  26. May we take it that, given the eminence and integrity of all three right hon. and hon. Members, there has been no question of any of them having been informed by the Government that their previous service on that body was in any way deficient?

    COUNCIL OF EUROPE · 2015-11-16 · READ IN HANSARD

  27. May I urge my hon. Friend not to use the word “target”? It is in fact a minimum. Those countries that are below the minimum may have it as a target; those that have always been above it should not be ringing the church bells just because we have decided not to go below it.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  28. It would be unsuitable for me at this stage to go in any detail into the question of the extent to which creative accountancy may be involved in fulfilling that pledge, because one of the first two inquiries of the new Defence Select Committee is to examine that very issue.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  29. Parties, not least our former coalition partners the Liberal Democrats, refused demands for a referendum—on the Lisbon treaty, I think—because they felt that it was avoiding the real question, which was: “Should we stay in or leave the European Union?” But, strangely enough, when they had the opportunity to support having a referendum on staying in or leaving the EU, they opted to oppose it. It is that sort of cynicism, frankly, that makes it necessary for my hon. Friend to persist with his Bill, although, fortunately, the people who reneged on their pledge to have an in/out referendum are no longer in a position to hold the Government to ransom. It was indeed the work of many hon. Members on both sides of the House, but not least that of my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot, that ensured that the Government finally gave the 2% pledge.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  30. It is a sad state of affairs that the word of politicians in government is no longer sufficiently trusted so one feels one must enshrine something in law in order for the electorate to believe that a promise will be kept. My hon. Friend referred to two previous examples, one of which was to do with overseas aid. In that case, it was indeed a target to be met, not a minimum to avoid dipping below. The other was the referendum—the in/out referendum, let us be precise about it—on our continuing membership of the European Union. That is possibly where a lot of the scepticism crept in, and why trying to get commitments nailed down in law originally took hold. I distinctly remember in earlier debates about European treaties that referenda were demanded.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  31. It is possible to argue that my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth) has already achieved one of the main aims of the Bill, because he originally chose the subject and sought the sponsorship, readily given, of people like me in support of his Bill before the Government gave their welcome pledge to meet the minimum 2% commitment not only for the year ahead but for the remainder of this Parliament, year after year after year. However, I believe he was right not to let the Bill drop, just as I believe that I was right to continue to sponsor it after becoming Chairman of the Defence Select Committee. The reason that is right is that we must not assume that pledges given at one stage in the political and economic cycle will be good for ever after.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  32. Not that I would ever think for one moment that the Government Whips Office would encourage people to expatiate excessively on this important subject, but just in case they might be tempted to do so, I wish to make that task as difficult as possible and will therefore conclude my contribution to the debate.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  33. It is a measure of the situation in which we find ourselves today that, as I said in earlier interventions, we are apparently supposed to be ringing the church bells in triumph that we are not going to dip below the NATO minimum. Because of this undercutting of belief in what politicians do, compared with the commitments that they give, I think it is important that this Bill should go through. I therefore propose to set a good example to other right hon. and hon. Friends by keeping my remarks brief, because I would not like us to find that we were running out of time for the Bill to make the necessary progress that it needs to today.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  34. As a Member of the shadow Defence team, I was quick to point out that the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan were supposed to be met from the Treasury reserve funds, and that if they were stripped out of the picture, Labour was actually spending more like 2.1%, which was inadequate. I continued to make that point in speeches in the House over quite a long period—some would say an excessively long period. What worries me about the debate on defence expenditure generally is that we are being subjected to the management of expectations. There should never have been the slightest doubt that this country would continue to meet the NATO minimum. We had always done so, and we never even had to think about doing it because we had always surpassed that level quite comfortably.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  35. That prompted concern among a number of us that the commitment to the NATO minimum was in jeopardy. I well remember how, during the long years of opposition, we used to excoriate the Labour Government for playing fast and loose with the figures relating to the GDP spend on defence. In particular, I remember one statement that Tony Blair made, I think in 2007 when he was coming to the end of his 10-year period in office as Prime Minister. He made a speech on HMS Albion, in which he said that, taking defence expenditure as a whole over the preceding 10 years of the Labour Government, it had remained roughly constant at about 2.5% of GDP if the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan were included.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  36. Around the time of the Wales summit, the Prime Minister made a statement about the importance of urging our NATO allies to meet the 2% minimum, and I decided to seize the opportunity to show my full support for those on my Front Bench by asking him an easy question. I got to my feet and the Prime Minister gave way graciously, as he always does. I asked him whether he would like to give the House an assurance that, as long as he remained Prime Minister, there would be no question of this country dipping below the 2% minimum. Rather to my discombobulation—[Hon. Members: “Sorry?”] I thought that would attract a bit of attention. Rather to my discombobulation, I was told that, although the commitment was being met that week and that year and was going to be met the following year, after that we would just have to wait and see.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  37. It is unsatisfactory that we as a country cannot feel comfortable that defence occupies a sufficient role in our league table of commitments to spend from the public purse. As I said in an intervention, however, the endeavour of my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot to ensure that the commitment is enshrined in law carries with it the risk that what should be a minimum will become a target. It is true to say that, from time to time, some of us on these Benches who take a particular interest in defence have been less than totally helpful towards those on the Front Bench when we have felt that their commitment to defence had fallen short of what it should be.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  38. Earlier, I described in detail what happened to the defence budget when it was in decline. Over the same period, our welfare budget ballooned, our education budget ballooned, and our health budget ballooned as percentages of GDP. I am not criticising that in any way, but it is rather extraordinary that that pattern of steep decline in spending on defence as a national priority has been allowed to occur, given the extent to which we have remained engaged in the carrying out of military activity from time to time on the world stage. Embodying the proposal for 2% in law is a worthwhile endeavour because it will send a signal that any Government who wish to renege on the commitment will have to unpick the legislation in order to do so.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  39. During one of the public hearings that we have held so far, it was pointed out that it is not enough simply to look at the amount of defence investment that we make, because it is possible to spend a lot of money on the wrong things and still end up with inadequately structured armed forces. If I may dip into history, I suspect that the Maginot line occupied a rather large chunk of the French military expenditure budget in the period leading up to the second world war. It was not a very good investment. It is, of course, difficult to quantify outcomes when it comes to the appropriateness of the way in which money has been spent, but even if spending a lot of money on defence is not a sufficient condition for the achievement of good defence outcomes, it is certainly a necessary condition.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  40. Friend the Member for Aldershot in his excellent speech—that a country with our level of commitments and responsibilities certainly ought to be thinking about spending 3% of GDP on defence. The situation in terms of the threats that we face has become increasingly fraught. I, for one, was very surprised that only a year after the 2010 strategic defence and security review made what I think was an 8% cut in the defence budget, we were already keen to engage in an additional conflict in Libya, the wisdom of which has subsequently—and, in my view, rightly—been questioned. But whichever side we take in that particular argument, it follows that if we are in the business of still wishing to intervene, we must certainly be in the business of making the appropriate financial investment.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  41. Then, perhaps, we shall see that we should not be struggling to get on to the deck; on the contrary, we should be asking ourselves why we are engaged in achieving such a very modest aim. Between 1955 and 1960, the percentage of GDP that we spent on defence varied from 7.2% to 5.9%. Between 1960 and 1969, it varied from 6.1% to 5%. From 1969 all the way until 1980, it varied from a high of 4.8% in 1975-76 to 4.2%. As recently as 1980-85, it varied from 5.1% to 4.7%, and in 1985-90, it varied from 4.6% to 3.9%. Even after the end of the cold war, in the period between 1990 and 1995, it varied from 4.1% to 3.2%. Not until the financial year 1994-95 did the figure dip below 3%. I would argue—and this was foreshadowed by my hon.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  42. No, frankly, I do not think we are. That comes back to the fact that this is not a target that we have to hit precisely. This is a minimum—in my opinion and from my point of view, an inadequate minimum. It is much easier to land the helicopter on a deck when the deck is quite an enormous one: all we have to worry about is putting the helicopter down on some part of that enormous deck. We do not have to worry about which part of the deck we manage to alight upon. Therefore, should we end up spending, for example, 2.5%, 2.8% or 3%, we shall still have fulfilled the purposes of the Bill. At this point, it may be convenient to reflect on what the size of the deck of that carrier has been in decades gone by.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  43. I am a little surprised at the vagueness of the Opposition today. I thought the position was absolutely clear—namely, that the Opposition are committed to continuous at-sea deterrence and the continuation of Trident under the Successor programme, because that was the position adopted by the Labour party and endorsed by its recent conference. The decision was taken not to change the policy. If a free vote is necessary for the Opposition, it will be the Leader of the Opposition who has to take advantage of it, not the people who believe in Trident.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  44. Given that the Minister mentions the Type 26, which I would loosely describe as a replacement frigate, will he take this opportunity to confirm, now that we have just the six Type 45 destroyers, that there is no question of going below the total of 13 Type 26 frigates, thus keeping our total of frigates and destroyers at 19—itself a huge reduction from the 35 we had in 1997?

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  45. Do I therefore understand that when the SDSR comes out, we will know for certain that there will be no reduction from the total of 13 Type 26s?

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  46. I was not intending to intervene, but I cannot resist an invitation like that. This was an outstandingly good event. I am hoping that it may be possible to bring the same presentation—not only the cockpit simulation of the Lightning II, but the presentations by the representatives of many of the firms involved in the supply chain—to illustrate to hon. Members that hard power has economic value, as Lord Sterling is always trying to tell us in the other place.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  47. There is, in fact, one other aspect of the F-35 programme that I had not realised until recently: the potential for expansion in a crisis. When the assembly line is operating at its peak in America, it will produce one of these aircraft per day. If ever, heaven forbid, we found ourselves in sudden need of a large number of extra aircraft, that joint capacity between British industry and American industry will enable us to fulfil our needs.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  48. I am sure that we all believe the Government entirely when they say that they will stick to the 2% up to the next general election, but can the Minister not see that passing this Bill would make it much harder for any Government of any complexion after the next general election to resile from the minimum spend because the legislation would have to be repealed first? While he is making an excellent case for all the good things that Britain does in NATO, can he assure the House that that case will not take him another hour and 15 minutes to outline, because it would be a terrible shame if we ran out of time before we had an opportunity to see whether the House wants the Bill to go into Committee?

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  49. I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, especially as I know how keen he is to get through the rest of his comments rapidly. However, I think his argument is the reverse of the truth. The difficulty with putting into law something that was a target that we had to strain to meet was the danger that having put it into law, we would end up having to make inappropriate expenditure in order to fulfil the commitment in law, whereas that does not apply to this objective. As there is and should never be any question of us dipping below the 2%, we will not have to distort our spending; we will just be giving the assurance that we need to give to the country and to our allies that we will never fall below the 2% minimum, and it is strange that there was ever any doubt that we would.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD

  50. I am very sorry that the Minister doubts the account that I gave him in my contribution to the debate earlier, when I said that by asking the Prime Minister whether we would always meet the 2% as long as he was in office, I was not casting doubt at all. I was expecting him freely and readily to say yes, of course we would, and he did not. That is why the doubt crept in.

    DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (NATO TARGET) BILL · 2015-10-23 · READ IN HANSARD