YouSaid · the spoken record

Al-Qaysi

lines on the record: 98
first: 2001-06-28
most recent: 2001-06-28
sittings or episodes: 1
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I have taken more than two hours. I thank you very much, Mr. President, for your patience, and I thank the members for their patience. But I reserve my right to respond to any right of reply that might be exercised, because I am well equipped to go ahead even with further details, revealing even more names, regardless of what the impact will be.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“We have around us so many Garfields, it seems, and they are getting even fatter. So it is facile to blame Iraq. The Ambassador of Canada even blamed my President for the non- achievement of the humanitarian objectives of oil for food - the oil for food which has come to be the fat pot for so many parasites. I hear from my United Nations colleagues that a mission to Iraq is one of the most cherished and sought-after assignments by United Nations Secretariat staff. Why? Is Iraq the French Riviera? Or is it the beautiful seashores of Jamaica? It is hot now. Is that why? It is the money, gentlemen. Could commissions be taken by United Nations officers? Are they not being used to renovate buildings? Why are there requests for visas for carpenters and mechanics? Do we not have them locally? Well, the story is long.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“I am talking about the transfer of Iraqi funds from one account to another by the banks entrusted by the United Nations with these tasks - and the Iraqi Central Bank does not know a thing about these transfers? About when the transfers were made, to whom, to which branch, on what value date so as to calculate whether the money has gone and where? A supplier concludes a contract, and the contract is approved and he ships his goods, and the goods arrive, and he is supposed to be paid. These are the rules of the Memorandum of Understanding. Why is payment not made promptly? Why are there delays in payments by the banks that go on, in certain cases, up to thirty days? Take thirty days of funds withdrawn and put in another account? Calculate the interest. Where does that go?”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“I know for a fact - and I will name names if need be 4 that a report was written by the Coordinator and all of the directors of the specialized agencies, offices and programmes in Iraq, signed collectively, outlining an assessment of an in-the-field view of the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and was sent via the Secretariat to Ambassador Celso Amorim. We recently learned that he did not receive that report. Yes, Mr. Sevan. Just raise your head in disagreement. You have no other option but to do so. I am willing to cross swords with you in public. Incidentally, you are not the one who embargoed that report. So do not be rash in disagreeing. Why do I speak with this intensity, for which I apologize? Because it is my job to deal with this on a daily basis. These are the facts as I see them.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Having said this, I cannot consider that international civil servants are immune at all times from pressures, from personal interest, from wanting to live better or from just wanting to survive and keep their jobs. So in United Nations resolutions, when so many matters are put in the hands of international civil servants, and when you do not have control over them, and the main party is not even allowed to get into the business of clarifying the situation to the Council formally on the record, Council members will end up committing grave acts of injustice in the name of international legitimacy at a time when you will be far off the mark.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“When there is a balance of power in the world, it is reflected in the work of organizations. When the world loses the balance of power, it is reflected in international organizations. But if we are not prepared to recognize at least that power politics and arrogance of power are not reflective of the Charter as our forefathers envisaged it, and if we go on just simply repeating like parrots, "international legitimacy, international legitimacy, international community, international community", we will not be doing a disservice to the United Nations as an Organization - we will mainly be doing a disservice to our own respective nations, States, Governments, backgrounds, futures and hopes.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“All members of the Council have in their Missions the Blue Book published by the United Nations on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. That book has a ISO-page introduction. Go to paragraph 100 of that particular document. You will see an argument very fitting to the American and British case, regarding the false claim that the no-fly zones are legal under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). The way this was done was, instead of putting in paragraph 1 of resolution 687 (1991) in full, it was chopped in half. The half that serves Iraq is not mentioned. Such is the impartiality of international civil servants. I have nothing against international civil servants, by the way. But it is also true that any international organization is a reflection of the state of international relations at any particular moment.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Now I will discuss a recent event, one that should be really fresh in the minds of Security Council members. Correct me, please, ifI am wrong. There was a meeting of informal consultations which was held a few days ago in which Mr. Zarif and Ms. Davis of UNMOVIC were requested to present a report to the Council on whether some of the items that I mentioned in the lists being discussed by the Council were the subject matter of contracts that had been allowed in the past by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 661 (1990). They did not present that report. Why? The Council has clout with States; it does not have clout with international civil servants? I do not want to go any further with this. But, if I am forced to, I will name names.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“After the release of the contract, the Committee sent a letter to the Ministry of Health and said that the contract was thereby cancelled. This is the worrying health situation in Iraq: a blood gas analyser to be used for the services I have outlined. If pressure is employed to release contracts, some are released, while others are put on hold. If one is released, outside pressures are applied to cancel contracts. And so on and so forth. You get a dentist's chair, but you do not get the other equipment needed to use it. When you leave it in storage while waiting for the rest, because the other contracts are not yet released- ah! - Iraq is not carrying out the distribution. Along comes the suggestion of an integrated approach - batches of contracts put together - and then other problems appear. And so forth and so on.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“It is the policy of putting contracts on hold, and the tendentious - or I should say the dirty - interventions on certain occasions causing goods not to reach Iraq. I shall provide just one example. There was a contract for the supply to Iraq of a blood-gas analyser. The seller is the French branch of Bayer. That contract was put on hold for a year and a half. We needed the analyser badly for heart operations and for children who were suffering from diarrhoea. Consequently, contacts were initiated with the Secretary-General. The Office of the Iraq Programme was approached. The Coordinator was approached. That collective approach got the contract released from the hold that had been put on it. Did we get it? No. Why not?”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The list is entitled "Status of arrived articles for the eight phases, until 19 June 2001". It is done in terms of percentages or ratios. The total amounts of items received are as follows: phase I, 85.73 per cent; phase 11, 89.21 per cent; phase 111, 81.79 per cent; phase IV, 80.88 per cent; phase V, 79.67 per cent; phase VI, 58.24 per cent; phase VII, 41.02 per cent; and phase VIII, 1.09 per cent. That is the value of items for the health sector, the status of the goods received. I also have other charts copies of which I shall provide members, concerning deaths due to the embargo, whether of children or of mothers. I shall further circulate charts on the effect of the embargo on the nutritional status of children, on infectious diseases and on communicable diseases. What is the reason for this situation?”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“He confirmed to me that before the end of phase IX, perhaps before the preparation of the report - and the Secretariat did not rectify this - he had signed contracts in the health sector not merely for the amount allocated to it in the memorandum of understanding or the distribution plan, but had even gone over and above that amount. I am sure that, if I checked with other Iraqi authorities, they would tell me what I know for a fact: that they have done the same thing. So that criticism is not in order. But if members are interested in the health of the Iraqis - and we have heard so many noble representatives speak here about the health of the Iraqis, and we thank them - let us look at some facts. The Minister of Health provided me with a table, which I shall circulate to members of the Council as soon as possible.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“There has been talk with reference to the Secretary-General's report that Iraq has not speedily concluded the contracts for phase IX, and that that has prevented the Programme from getting so many billions of dollars. According to paragraph 15 of the report of the Secretary-General, document S/2001/505, not a single application under the health, water and sanitation, and oil sectors has been received. Before I came to this meeting, I lunched with the Minister of Health of Iraq, who was here for the special session of the General Assembly on HIV/AIDS.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Every three dogs have the services of a pickup truck, a trainer and two guides, and every five dogs have a veterinarian. Lately, we heard, the dogs have been suffering from some sort of inertia, so they brought bitches to them so that they could allay their sexual desires. But the puppies are being sold on the market in the North. What is an individual Iraqi's share of the humanitarian programme, calculated on the basis of the value of goods received? The value of that share includes not only food, but also health services and everything else. That share is $125. So a dog's food is 10 times the share of a human Iraqi, on the basis of goods received.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“If members read the letter, they will see that the demining programme would make taking out any mine the most expensive venture in the world, because the paraphernalia that surrounds the location and demining process causes it to be so. We are not against demining in the North, but the world standard relating to the cost of demining, as estimated by disarmament bodies, is around $2,000 per mine, while the cost of demining through the United Nations project is around $21,000 per mine. The figures speak for themselves. The quantity of food imported for 28 dogs utilized in the demining programme in the North for the period July 1999 to June 2000 was 11 tons. The price was around $33,000. As the number of dogs was 28, the value of each dog's share was $1,143. By extrapolating that share on an annual basis, it comes to $1,248 per dog per year.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Well, I am not going to belabour that point because we have fully addressed that question in a letter sent by us to the Secretary-General, and it was circulated as a document of the Security Council in document S/2001/324. In that letter we gave the Council in detail the numbers of visas that we have granted and the numbers of visas that the Office of the Iraq Programme sometimes requests from Iraq, including those requested for irrational purposes, as if giving and requesting visas were the only consideration, and that were the only way to achieve the objectives of the humanitarian programme. One hundred forty visas are requested for so- called international experts to work in the electricity programme in the North, and 103 visas are requested for so-called international experts to work in the demining programme in the North.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“What worrying evidence is there? An article pops up in the press talking about Iraq rearming in this field and that field, only to be discredited about three or four weeks later. If we are going to go into a cycle of allegations followed by the disproof of allegations, will there be any end in sight to this whole exercise? If Mr. Butler goes to the extent of saying that even antiperspirants contain certain ingredients that can be extracted and mixed with a certain chemical that exists in hairspray and you can produce biological weapons in your bathtub, to that extent of audacity I say no. Oh yes. Some are concerned about visas. The Secretary-General's report is concerned with visas and obstructing visas.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Do you want us to forget how, in 1998, when we were discussing the proposal for a comprehensive review with the Secretary-General and we cooperated fully, and when the Secretary- General sent a paper to the Council on how the arrangements for that comprehensive review were going to be conducted, the British Ambassador jumped into the arena and used the Council and pushed it to write a letter to the Secretary-General, putting terms and conditions on the comprehensive review - for one reason only. Because Kofi Annan's paper put the burden of proof on any side that alleges that Iraq still has weapons of mass destruction. The British letter that was sent and approved by the Council switched the burden of proof. Even that was not enough. They had to strike at Iraq in December 1998 to kill it completely. So now we hear about worrying evidence.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“It is no good for them now; even their own officers, whom they used to employ in the United Nations Special Commission, said that Iraq is qualitatively disarmed, it is no good now. Now there is another direction. The British Ambassador said in his statement that they have worrying evidence that the Iraqis are re- arming. Show it, Mr. Ambassador. Where is that worrying evidence from? Put it on the table. Let the Council discuss it with Iraq.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“"All together during the week, the Committee released from hold 24 contracts worth $45.5 million, while placing holds on 37 new contracts valued at $98.6 million." So the Council releases $45 million. The Council holds $90 million. What guarantee do we have that this is not going to happen? How will Iraqi trade be free in the interest of alleviating the suffering of the Iraqi people, as the proponents of the smart sanctions draft say they are so keen to achieve? There is really one good thing about this whole proposal submitted by the United Kingdom and pushed by the United States. Not a word about the no-fly zone? Why the no-fly zone? I know what they will say: It is to protect your neighbours from your threats. It is to contain you because you have a tendency to renew weapons of mass destruction.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“What guarantee do we have that at the end of the day the policy of putting contracts on hold is not going to continue? I have a paper here - not an Iraqi paper - a United Nations paper. It is a weekly update from the Office of the Iraq Programme, covering the period 16- 22 June 2001. I quote from that paper: "Despite the 661 Committee's further release from hold of four additional humanitarian supplies contracts on the condition of close end- use monitoring by United Nations observers in Iraq, which contain '1051' list items, the total value of contracts placed on hold by the Committee rose slightly last week. It now stands at $3.2 billion, still representing 14.7 per cent of the value of all contracts circulated to the Committee. The release contracts were for sewage pipes, foot-and-mouth disease vaccine and intelligent pigging.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“This is the alleviation of the suffering of the Iraqi people. Regarding the talk about the cash components in other sectors, such an arrangement would place Iraqis into two categories: a category in the north and a category in the south. Any local production, when bought, and any cash component being spent in that particular field, would be used to remunerate and to punish, by taxing all Government policies, whatever objective they may have. We are not the only ones who are saying that that particular provision is ill-advised. My information is that even some United Nations officials find that provision ill-advised. We are being told that the list that is going to be attached to the resolution is really not a denial list; that it is just a review list. So the Security Council really has to accept it.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The oil market is discussed in general, and the prices of Iraqi crude oil are evaluated in the light of the values of the other crude oils. Iraqi crude oil prices are set in relation to price of crude oil in other markets, such as Brent, West Texas Intermediate, Oman, and Dubai. Then, after taking into consideration transportation costs, quality deferentials, and other relevant factors, the price is set. What the British proposal would lead to is an intervention in the pricing of Iraqi crude oil, which would entail the complete destruction of the relationship between supplier and buyer. The end result, which is not mentioned in the resolution, is to use Iraqi oil as leverage, because it will be under tight control, and to transform the oil market and maintain it at all times as a buyer's market rather than a seller's market.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Ambassador, are not going to be the ones who will employ that particular facility you give them under the resolution to play havoc with oil prices at the international level, and even to the extent of possibly intimidating the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with regard to their pricing policies. You do not have such guarantees. You are not providing any flexibility to Iraq to choose its customers. And you know, with oil, it is a specific and specialized industry, it is not any customer that counts. How do we sell oil now under the Memorandum of Understanding? Specifically with regard to the price? Around the end of each month, Mr. President, the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) communicates with the United Nations oil overseers by fax and telephone.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“In the present system under the memorandum of understanding, there are oil companies that register with the United Nations and those companies are the ones that buy. Paragraph seven of the United Kingdom's draft is very vague, but at least it is clear that companies will be selected according to certain criteria, and they are the only ones who are allowed to deal in Iraq's oil. Do we have any guarantee that those companies are not going to be fat cats of Western origin and be the only ones allowed to buy Iraqi oil? Do we have any guarantee that those companies, Mr.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“I may be wrong, my information says you have not. Second, in the draft that is being discussed and proposed, and in the ideas going around this table, there is no reference whatsoever to this particular question. What does that mean? What we see in the draft, drafted to improve Iraq's trade with the outside world, provided no money goes to the Iraqi Government, is that it is the lot of the Iraqi people, which is the concern of the Security Council, the British, and the Americans. They are so paternal. All of a sudden they turned in favour of the Iraqi people. We are grateful. So they brought forth the idea that they will select the companies, according to certain criteria, which will be able to deal in Iraqi oil. No other companies are allowed.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“In that particular report, there is a recommendation that 600 million euros should be transferred to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil via the Rafidayn Bank in Jordan from funds accumulated during the ninth phase of the Memorandum of Understanding, and that a further 600 million euros should be transferred in a similar manner in the following phase, making the total allocation equivalent to 1200 million euros. First, the British ambassador tells us they are ready to agree to this proposal, but notes with regret that Iraq continues to block the implementation of the cash component elsewhere in the Iraqi economy. Now, what is the connection between the oil industry and the rest of the Iraqi economy? Why did you not clear it for the oil industry? Why is it not cleared yet by the United Kingdom? Have you?”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Paragraph 50 of Security Council resolution 1330 (2000) allowed funds of up to 600 million euros to be used to cover the costs of the local expenses of the Iraqi oil sector. A team visited Iraq during the period March 18 to April 2. Our experts worked with the team, and they conducted extensive site visits. The team presented its report to the Secretary-General at the end of last May. The Secretary-General presented that report to you, and it is now in the document S/2001/566 of June 6.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“'In good faith' in the sense that these proposals are being presented within the framework of resolution 1284 (1999), and that this approach is in response to calls made by the international community to alleviate the plight of the Iraqi people. And they say it is only the Government of Iraq that is responsible for achieving that particular goal, the alleviation of the plight of its people. Before he said that, he talked about the cash component in the oil sector and how the intention really was to help Iraq take it up, but Iraq did not. Iraq did not take the cash component in other sectors. As you know, the cash component in the oil sector was approved by the Security Council.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“An allegation has been made, that found in the statements by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and those who followed suit, that it is the Iraqi Government who prefers to have the status quo continue at the expense of the suffering of its own people. What if that is so? Why have we been working with the United Nations since 1991? Regardless of judgements as to how hard we have been working, what we have achieved, et cetera? Why have we not stopped working throughout those years I am referring to? On the question of granting visas, people have been talking a lot in favour of that but, let us not forget: the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom tells us that his approach is really being presented in good faith.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“So what guarantee is there, when you have resolution 1284 (1999) formally like this - cooperation in all respects in order to achieve progress. What progress is that when the resolution contains the provision that if even a minor official in the field says that there is no progress, then the suspension is suspended. Renewing the suspension needs discussion and approval in the Security Council; yet one report of even a petty official automatically cuts it off. So how do we deal with that? Is it not a fact that some members around this table consider that there are many ambiguities in that resolution that need to be clarified? Some of them are permanent members. Is this going to bridge the gap, really?”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“When the report was submitted to the Security Council, Butler reported that Iraq did not cooperate fully, whereas the IAEA reported that Iraq provided the highest possible level of cooperation. Why did Butler report that Iraq did not cooperate fully? Because of five incidents out of 427. By any calculation, the five incidents out of 427 represent 1.17 per cent; that is to say, cooperation was provided to Butler 98.83 per cent of the time. By any standard that should have at least been considered to be quite sufficient to say "Thank you, Iraq", and for the comprehensive review to get under way. What we got in return was five days of intensive bombing by the United States and the United Kingdom to derail the whole process.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“To carry out enhanced and ongoing monitoring and verification regimes to be implemented by Iraq and to settle remaining disarmament issues; and ultimately if the new Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report that Iraq has cooperated in all respects and made progress on all the outstanding issues then we get suspension. I say "Welcome". Let us see on the basis of the record how this works out, on the basis of your own entities' records. The Council will recall that when Butler and his team and the IAEA were readmitted to Iraq to do certain inspections in order to report to the Security Council on whether Iraq was cooperating so that the Council could get under way with the comprehensive review, the two combined teams carried out 300 inspections of a total of 427 sites.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Why has the suspension on Libya not yet become a lifting? We have to wonder why; or are we even prevented from wondering? When we consider resolution 1284 (1999), our position in that respect and with respect to smart sanctions, the one that I am outlining today, is not an emotional position that is coming out of an irrational mind, an accusation those with ill will against Iraq try to vilify us with. It was a well-considered position based on objective analysis as to what it has entailed and what it will entail. I will give just one example in order not to take too much of the Council's time. That resolution requires inspectors to return. To do what?”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“I am sure that everyone here understands what I mean by reasons of personal interest. We are being told that these new arrangements have to be finalized by 3 July because they represent the bridge between the humanitarian programme and resolution 1284 (1999); and that resolution 1284 (1999) had a humanitarian component but it was not enough, so we have to improve it. We have heard so many Ambassadors here today and talking about the improvements introduced by the Council in resolutions 1302 (2000), 1330 (2000), etc. Thank you very much for the improvement. On what? Let us see what improvement was made in those resolutions and in resolution 1284 (1999). Iraq has to comply with resolution 1284 (1999) on weapons and has to cooperate on the oil-for-food programme. Once that is done sanctions will be suspended, then lifted. So easy.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“We heard that it is the Government of Iraq that is responsible for not getting that programme to its ultimate objective, and I have been addressed, personally or as representative of my Government, by speakers blaming my Government and calling on it to cooperate. Some even went to the extent of quoting from reports of the Secretary-General to that effect, and they mentioned the question of the visas, the question of opening letters of credit, the question of delays in concluding contracts and whatnot. Do they really know the facts? When someone speaks in this Council on behalf of a Government, they have to be relatively sure of what they say, not be ill-informed and just speak in alliance to produce a statement for God knows what ulterior motives or reasons of personal interest.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“We heard what any fair-minded person would not let pass without reply. (spoke in English) From these two representatives collectively - I realize that I am taking too much of the Council's precious time, but allow me with your indulgence, Mr. President - we heard - according to the United States - that a better name for the "oil for food" is "oil for development", because such a term more accurately reflects that even today the Iraqi regime could redevelop the country using the oil-for-food programme. Similar notions were also propagated by the representative of the United Kingdom.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The Council must pay attention to the hypocritical policy of double standards pursued by the United States and the United Kingdom by comparing its role in supporting the Zionist entity against the Palestinian people, starting with the settlements on the Palestinian territory then continuing with the suppression of the glorious Palestinian uprising. The uprising and Iraq's steadfastness against the hegemony of the United States have become the motto of all Arab peoples. I am not talking about Arab Governments, but they, too, have started to feel that this is the only means that would advance their nations in order to join the mainstream of human civilization. Yesterday we heard much from the representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, and a long list of speakers followed.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“(spoke in Arabic) What is required now, therefore, is to rectify the dangerous situation affecting Iraq, so that Iraq can indeed feel that the Security Council is dealing with it in a just, balanced and evenhanded fashion instead of fighting with it and issuing orders to it, so that those who have a hidden agenda against Iraq can take a particular course of action. The siege imposed against Iraq must be lifted, and indeed it will. The sovereignty of Iraq must be respected and all interference in the domestic affairs of Iraq must come to an end. The grievances of Iraq must be addressed fairly. These elements will ensure security, peace and stability in the region.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“It is not that Iraq continues to be a threat to its neighbours, or that the problem stems from the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq. The powers and functions under the Charter are clear and are fully explained in jurisprudential and judicial references. International legality, as represented by Security Council resolutions on many issues, has become the subject of ludicrous comments in many reference books. Those reference books talk about (spoke in English) the appropriation of international legitimacy by the United States and the privatization of the Security Council by the United States. Those who are using such terminology are eminent American international lawyers from the very respectable University of Michigan. This is the arrogance of power.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Those who shift the blame onto the national Government of Iraq must remember that this regime is the very same one that brought to the country the highest level of development ever, as acknowledged by the international organizations concerned. They must also recognize that what they refer to as the faltering of the sanctions regime represents in reality a concrete reflection of the lack of conviction of the majority of the international community. This does not represent their collective goal. We are confident that the old imperialist, Zionist and colonial schemes to contain the situation are bound to fail. It is no secret that the issue as a whole has nothing to do with the implementation of Security Council resolutions.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“No sooner was resolution 687 (1991) adopted than Sir David Hannay made a statement to the press saying that this would help topple Sadaam's regime. Similar statements were made by President Bush senior. If one reads Ian Johnston's study, which was published by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), on this very question- on how resolution 687 (1991) was brought about- one can find it there, in black and white. But perhaps the Council does not have time to follow these things. It is so busy in that small room, consulting separately from those who should be working with it as its main partners. (spoke in Arabic) The United States, its Zionist ally and those who follow them and are influenced by the old colonial mindset are promoting all of these games.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Of course, the reason behind all of this is not difficult to comprehend. (spoke in Arabic) From the very beginning, the goal of imposing and perpetuating such a harsh and unjust embargo against Iraq was political - simply put, the goal was to change the national political regime in Iraq. Every single person in this Chamber is aware of this. That goal is not the collective objective of the members of the international community, as represented in the United Nations. (spoke in English) Those who speak on behalf of the international community are simply uttering a falsehood here. They do not represent the international community in this policy. Toppling the Government of Iraq is not the collective interest of the membership of the United Nations. It is not in the resolutions of the Security Council.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“If anyone reads it, and I invite members to do so, would they be so kind as to tell me whether they understood any of it? It is just a whirlwind. So when I say that right from the very beginning, sanctions were imposed in a way that is not sincere and honest, I mean what I say. Education was under sanctions. Information was under sanctions. Has such a thing ever been heard of in the annals of the United Nations? This was not done even in the case of Rhodesia or South Africa. Why was it done in the case of Iraq? Nothing for the brain - only medicine and food, in special humanitarian circumstances. Even under the humanitarian programme, no allowance is made for the brain, for culture, for information, for the fabric of society, for industrial, agricultural and scientific advancement - for what is needed to run a State.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The Security Council has from the very beginning dealt with the Iraqi people in an unfair manner with respect to food, medicine and some civilian humanitarian requirements. (spoke in English) Resolution 661 (1990) seemingly talks about exceptions to sanctions. What were these exceptions? Let me remind the Council: medicine and food, in special humanitarian circumstances - food, in special humanitarian circumstances. When the Legal Counsel was requested to provide a legal opinion on the meaning of the term "special humanitarian circumstances", so that the Security Council and the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) would know what that entails, the Legal Counsel at the time, Mr. Fleischhauer, produced a mind-boggling three-page legal opinion.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The Anglo-American plan, the French ideas and proposals and any attendant concepts will entail a full expropriation of the fate of the Iraqi State and people in all fields - politics, economics, development, trade, industry, finance and society. Therefore, our rejection of such plans and their ultimate objectives rises, in our view, to the level of struggle for national independence, whatever the sacrifices involved. The so-called smart sanctions are but a new facet of neo-colonialism. We utterly refuse to be transformed into a mere consumer society - a society that eats but does not think, enjoys but does not produce - and for whom? For foreigners. This position of ours, I can assure the Council, is not just rhetorical. It is a genuine position.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“"You see, you have a benefit." (spoke in Arabic) Finally, confusing the new punitive regime of smart sanctions with the oil-for-food programme means that the Security Council's commitment to Iraq to lift the embargo imposed under resolution 687 (1991) has been replaced by an ongoing programme that is claimed to be humanitarian and of help to the Iraqi people. We totally reject any such formula. There must be no illusion whatsoever concerning the firmness of our position on smart sanctions. We do not believe that any State or any sane person can expect another State to participate in a project, the ultimate objective of which is to end its existence as a sovereign entity.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The other is related to a legitimate right of Iraq as a member of international organizations, the denial of which right by the United States and its allies seeks to isolate Iraq politically from the work of those organizations. Resolution 661 (1990) does not cover the payment of those contributions. (spoke in English) Such payments are a financial transaction that was not prohibited under resolution 661 (1990) so as to enable Iraq to pay it in the first place. It is an obligation that accrues as a result of Iraq's membership of the United Nations. If anyone should be concerned about this, it is first and foremost the Secretary-General and his Legal Counsel. Now, it is being given to us as if it were a donation or a gift.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Furthermore, this new regime takes control of all Iraq's financial resources, places them under United Nations control and disburses them without any role for the Iraqi Government. Moreover, this does not affect Iraq alone. The regime attempts to control all the dealings of Iraq's neighbours and subjects them to many restrictions in order to close the vise around Iraq. The new regime is overtly misleading because it contains measures relating to civilian flights and to the payment of Iraqi contributions to international organizations. The first issue was imposed on Iraq on the basis of the principle of force - the simple might of force.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The so-called free trade with Iraq claimed for civilian goods has been subject to many restrictions and conditions, as well as oversight by a number of bodies - including UNMOVIC, the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990), the Office of the Iraq Programme and the Security Council as a whole - in a way that rewrites the conditions and mechanisms of the Memorandum of Understanding between Iraq and the Secretary-General, which has been implemented for nine full cycles. The new regime pushed by the United States and the United Kingdom rewrites Security Council resolutions, in particular paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1990), resolution 700 (1991) and resolution 1051 (1996).”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source