YouSaid · the spoken record

Al-Qaysi

lines on the record: 98
first: 2001-06-28
most recent: 2001-06-28
sittings or episodes: 1
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The United Kingdom and United States circles that advocate this new regime claim that the objective is to free trade with Iraq from all restrictions, and even to expand it, and to prohibit only illegal trade in dual- use materials. However, the details show the misleading nature of that claim. I shall address that point later. The fundamental content of these drafts entails a de facto new regime for blockading Iraq. There is no easing of sanctions.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The second is that extending the programme for one month is hardly sufficient to implement its two wings: the export of oil and the import of civilian goods. Iraq's stance is not new; in the past, it rejected resolutions 1275 (1999) and 1280 (1999). Resolution 1275 (1999) extended the programme for two weeks, while resolution 1280 (1999) extended it for one week in order to give the Security Council the opportunity to achieve consensus on resolution 1284 (1999). As a result of our position vis-a-vis resolution 1352 (2001), we ceased exporting oil under new contracts as of 4 June. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom and the United States did not abandon their attempts to ensure the implementation of the new smart sanctions regime. On many previous occasions, Iraq has declared that it will not deal with such measures in any form whatever.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“When the ninth cycle of the oil-for-food programme was almost complete and it had become clear that agreement on an acceptable draft resolution, as proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States, was impossible, the Security Council adopted resolution 1352 (2001) on 1 June 2001, extending the oil-for-food programme for one month. A paragraph was inserted that was to be a foothold for new arrangements, based on the concept of the Anglo-American draft, to be implemented for 190 days following the end of the first period. Iraq has refused to deal with that resolution for two fundamental reasons. The first is that it uses the oil-for-food programme as a cover to push through the Anglo-American formula on smart sanctions.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“This concept of revitalization began to take form shortly thereafter, when talk began on so-called smart sanctions, which were claimed to be a lessening of sanctions on people and a strengthening of sanctions on the Iraqi Government. Kindly do not forget that the new United States Administration opened its file in dealing with Iraq with an act of aggression on the night of 16 February 2001. In May, during the United States presidency of the Security Council, as usual, the United Kingdom expressed the United States position in the form of a draft resolution in the guise of the humanitarian oil-for-food programme, whose ninth cycle was to end on 3 June. Since then, draft resolutions and proposed amendments have come and gone in the Security Council and the permanent five have been working essentially to find an acceptable formula.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“They were placed there to ensure that any suspension, if it ever took place, would have no substance and no benefit for Iraq, as well as being an arbitrary restriction of Iraq's sovereignty over its economy and resources. Again, the situation remained unchanged. However, the international campaign to lift the sanctions on Iraq and to end the crime of genocide being perpetrated against the people of Iraq continued and escalated. With the coming to power of the new United States Administration at the beginning of this year, American officials began to state that the sanctions regime against my country was faltering, that it was full of holes, like Swiss cheese. They also stated that one of the major concerns of the new Administration was to revitalize the sanctions against Iraq.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The timelines show the intention of the United Kingdom and the United States to perpetuate the illegal no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, acts of military aggression, the illegitimate American intervention in internal affairs and the overt attempts to change the national political system in Iraq. We also made it clear that in substance and in form that resolution is a mere illegal rewriting of resolution 687 (1991). We also made it clear at the time that the stringent, vague conditions surrounding the concept of suspension - a new and rather illusory concept, as I have stated - were new conditions not stipulated in previous resolutions.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Indeed, it was an attempt to mislead international public opinion, because the concept of suspension in the resolution was new - a concept that required a long and complicated series of new and unclear conditions, which could have been interpreted in many ways. So the resolution had no guarantee that suspension would in fact take place. Furthermore, the timelines in the resolution were very long, artificially long. These timelines, the Council may recall, were laid down to follow the progress and development of elections in the United States of America.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Following the end of the activities of the Amorim groups and the debate on their reports, the United Kingdom, clearly supported by the United States, made strong efforts to submit a new draft resolution, and that took several months. As a result, resolution 1284 (1999) was adopted on 17 December of that year. On 19 December 1999 Iraq declared that it would not deal with that resolution because it did not respond to Iraq's legitimate call for the lifting of the embargo, and it made no mention whatsoever of the aggression against Iraq and the daily breach of its sovereignty by the imposition of no-fly zones by the United Kingdom and the United States. Iraq stated that the true objective of the United States and the United Kingdom in the resolution was not to lift the embargo.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The Council remained for a while unable to act in any way whatsoever, and the United Kingdom and the United States were exonerated of any responsibility. At the same time, Iraq's rights were being totally ignored. And efforts quickly resumed to cover up the illegitimacy of the Anglo-American acts and to address the situation. Let me recall the Canadian proposal to create bodies. The Amorim groups were created to undertake an initial review of the two dossiers - disarmament and the humanitarian situation. Then a third group was added by a Kuwaiti effort, supported by the United Kingdom and the United States, on the issue of missing persons and the return of property.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“I must again go back to the background of the issue. It seems that some choose to forget and others to ignore the background. It may be recalled that when the Security Council was taking up the reports of the Secretary-General and the former United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 16 December 1998, the United States and the United Kingdom surprised the Council and the entire world by waging aggression against Iraq. Thus ended the Security Council's deliberations on the comprehensive review of Iraq's compliance, aimed at certifying that Iraq had been effectively disarmed in order to then lift the sanctions, which was the very proposal submitted by the Secretary-General on 6 August 1998.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“I would like to remind, in detail, all those who have blamed my Government as the cause for the failures to achieve the humanitarian objectives to recall the opinion expressed by the second of those groups created by the Security Council under Ambassador Celso Amorim to take up the humanitarian situation in Iraq in 1999. He said: "the humanitarian situation in Iraq will continue to be a dire one in the absence of a sustained revival of the Iraqi economy, which in turn cannot be achieved solely through remedial humanitarian efforts." You may find the exact text in Security Council document S/1999/356, annex II, paragraph 58. That was the very last paragraph of the Amorim report. This clearly means that the cure is the lifting of the embargo. Let us take up how the Security Council has acted since then.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“We formally call on the Security Council to undertake, as expeditiously as possible, an external audit of the accounts of the Iraq Programme, as well as the agencies, offices and committees linked to the oil-for- food programme since its inception. Such an audit should be undertaken by an external financial auditing organization known to be qualified and neutral, chosen in consultation with my Government. In a letter dated 3 April 2001 from my Government's Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General (S/2001/324), my Government called for such an audit. To date, we have received no reply. Therefore, we are calling formally on the Security Council to do so. Such a programme, with the shortcomings to which I have referred, cannot possibly create an effective regime that would satisfy the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“It is worth stressing that we certainly did not fail to refer to many of these aspects in dozens - indeed, hundreds - of letters to the Secretaries-General and in many contacts with the office of the coordinator of the Programme in Iraq and the oil-for-food programme in New York; so far, we have not seen any serious move to bridge these discrepancies. We formally call on the Security Council today to undertake an appropriate investigation into these matters. We call for the results to be published, so that they may be available to the members of this Organization and international public opinion.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Why do these reports not refer to the field reports? Why are they not mentioned in the reports of the Secretary- General? These detailed examples upon which we stumbled, either by analysing documents or by hearing the flapping ofa loose tongue, deserve denunciation, at the very least. Undoubtedly, many such examples are institutionally covered up in order to keep us in the dark about our financial revenues. Our purpose in raising these few examples is not, frankly, to cause controversy. Rather, the objective is to reveal the facts that we have discovered in our experience with the humanitarian programme, a programme that we expected at least to put an end to the deterioration in the living conditions of our peoples under the unjust embargo.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Merely to explain a financial sheet form, an accountancy application form. This was the purpose of sending all of the financial officers of the agencies who work in Iraq. As Governments or as members of the United Nations, can you accept the fact that a secretary from Paris was dispatched to Baghdad to replace a secretary who was granted a one-month holiday abroad? This happens in the so-called humanitarian programme. Have you not noticed that the reports of the Programme's office in Iraq have not mentioned, since 1999, any detailed schedules concerning the various financial transactions in different phases and how these sums are disbursed? Why have they not been mentioned? Could the reason be perhaps that we and others concerned have begun to refer to their contents and to the many shortcomings of the Programme?”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“That same person remained in New York without work for six months. Is it fair that purchases are imported and that purchasing offices are established abroad at a time when those materials can be provided at lower cost in Iraq? And you are speaking about the cash component? Is it acceptable that the procurements handled by some of the agencies responsible for northern Iraq are less efficient and more costly than their counterparts in the Iraqi Government working on acquisitions for the southern and central provinces? Is it acceptable that the policies of personnel interest are subject to no monetary control which is what occurred over the Easter holidays this year when the financial officers of the Programme and the agencies in Iraq were dispatched to Geneva. For what purpose?”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Can any Government in the world accept the non-informing of the Iraqi Central Bank or provide it with any information concerning the banking operations relating to Iraq's resources - to the tune of billions of dollars? The Iraqi Central Bank has no inkling of what happens in United Nations banking operations concerning Iraqi resources, even though the Memorandum of Understanding stipulates the appointment of a liaison official from the Central Bank to be apprised of this information and coordination. We did this. That person goes to the Bank, where they tell him he is not allowed to enter. They say he has to come back with United Nations approval. So then he goes to the United Nations, which tells him that it is not permitted because it is a question within the purview of the Secretary-General.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Is it acceptable to members of the Council that that greed knows no limits: buying vehicles, paying administrative costs, purchasing equipment? Is it acceptable to members of the Council that Iraq should be forbidden to make use of administrative material and equipment used by the Programme - purchased with Iraqi money - including vehicles and computers, even after the Programme no longer uses them, and even though the computers are destroyed on orders from New York when they have been replaced with new systems? Iraq's request to use the old computers has been rejected. Could you accept the fact that the resources of the programme are utilized to rent personal housing for some of the directors of the agencies in Iraq?”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“In addition to all that I have mentioned, I want also to refer to some grossly inadequate conditions surrounding the implementation of the so-called humanitarian programme of which not all members may be aware. Is it reasonable that disbursement under a programme whose revenues total billions of dollars, billions of euros, should be subject to no external audit by neutral certified auditors from outside the United Nations system? Is it conceivable that the agencies responsible for implementing the Programme should be permitted to charge a commission in return for that implementation, and then use that commission to cover all their activities, both those related to the Programme and those totally unrelated to it?”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“We have seen inadequate financial management, as revealed in the report of the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on just part of the Programme (A/55/436). We have also seen the failure of the demining programme and of the electricity sector programme in the three northern governorates. The Programme's officers and other United Nations officials have also violated their obligations under the memorandum of understanding. Those examples, with full details, were submitted during the first round of the dialogue with the Secretary-General last February. The relevant documents have been distributed to members of the Council.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“We have seen the United States and the United Kingdom persist in their policy of putting contracts on hold on imaginary pretexts. We have seen contracts dealt with in a selective manner, objectionable bureaucracy in the way that contracts are submitted, delays in preparing letters of credit, late arrival of goods, and an accumulation of moneys allocated for operational and administrative costs of United Nations operations and for covering the expenses of the former United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) - even though there are currently no operation costs to be covered. Vast sums are removed for the reparations fund. The principle of good performance in international commercial transactions has been disallowed.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom, along with some other representatives who spoke after them, accused the Iraqi Government of being the principal reason for the failure to achieve the programme's desired goal. They claim that we are the cause. I shall later revert to this point as well. As I said, many things have prevented the attainment of the humanitarian objectives of the oil-for- food programme. These include the complexity of the measures adopted by the Security Council for the implementation of the memorandum of understanding, and interference by the United Kingdom and the United States in its implementation. We have seen unfairness in the distribution of revenues from the sale of Iraqi oil.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The arrangements set out in the memorandum of understanding have passed through nine phases as of the end of June 2001. The Iraqi Government has complied with its provisions as a provisional measure, as stipulated in resolution 986 (1995), to ease the suffering of the Iraqi people, which is caused by the blockade. But it must not be forgotten that the Iraqi Government has continued to call for the total lifting of the blockade. In that context, the Iraqi Government has cooperated with United Nations agencies in discussing and identifying the needs of the sectors covered in the distribution plans, in the hope that those urgent needs of the Iraqi people would be met, at the proper time within each phase. But many things have prevented the attainment of the humanitarian objectives of the oil-for-food programme.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“My Government considered its conditions and provisions to be completely unbalanced, which led us to reject it. As a result of contacts begun by the previous Secretary- General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on 6 February 1996, lengthy negotiations ensued between Iraq and the Secretariat with a view to reaching an agreement on implementation of the provisions of the programme set out in that resolution in a balanced manner that would preserve Iraq's sovereignty, security and dignity. The required memorandum of understanding was signed on 20 May 1996, in spite of United States objections and obstacles to negotiations. I know what I am talking about here: the United States has submitted 32 amendments to the final text of the memorandum of understanding since my Government came to an agreement with the Secretariat.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“This is the position of United States and the United Kingdom officials who constantly ask, "Why does Iraq complain? It has the humanitarian programme." Much has been said about that, including during the first part of this meeting, on Tuesday, 26 June; I shall return to this point later. It was repeated by a number of representatives following Tuesday's statement by the representative of the United States. Let me address this question by retracing its background, for it appears that we live in an age when people forget things - or pretend to forget them if it suits their interests at any given moment. Resolution 986 (1995) was adopted on 14 April 1995, on the basis of a United States effort cloaked in the guise of a draft resolution submitted by Argentina.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The main conclusion, in this context, is that the Council has not fulfilled its obligations towards Iraq. It does not respect its powers and functions as spelled out in the Charter, which have been entrusted to it by the Member States on their behalf, in keeping with the purposes and principles of the Charter. This has all resulted from the policies of the United States and the United Kingdom aimed at my country - policies that run counter to the principles and provisions of Security Council resolutions. Therefore, action is required by the Security Council, not by Iraq. It should be recalled that the Security Council has not disregarded the negative impact of the continuing embargo against Iraq. They refer to the adoption of the humanitarian programme adopted by the Council, according to Security Council resolution 986 (1995).”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“This is attributed also to the policies of two permanent members of the Security Council - the United States and the United Kingdom. This constitutes a flagrant violation of the official ceasefire under resolution 687 (1991). In the final analysis, this can be considered the destruction of the basis for the resolution and all that ensues from it. Did the Council rectify this serious situation? This is a gross violation of the fundamental concepts of the Charter. Is it not a strange contradiction that Iraq would be asked to abide by Security Council resolutions at a time when two permanent members of the Council do not abide by resolutions adopted by the Council vis-a-vis Iraq, despite the fact that those two countries were the two main promoters of the above- mentioned resolutions?”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Indeed, since December 1998, Anglo-American aggressive operations have continued without cease, including supporting, financing and training terrorist groups in a bid to destabilize Iraq and threaten its territorial integrity. In this regard, there is a basic contradiction. The Security Council continues calling on Iraq to comply with its resolutions. Despite that, the Security Council has shown no reaction to the coercive no-fly zones imposed by the United Kingdom and the United States on Iraq without any Security Council resolution authorizing these two countries to carry out these aggressive operations. These aggressive acts of the United States and the United Kingdom contradict the official ceasefire stipulated by resolution 687 (1991). The Security Council also remains silent concerning the aggression that is committed against Iraq.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“However, these aspects have been completely neglected by the Council, despite the fact that it is the duty of the Council, according to the Charter, to take steps in this regard. The no-fly zone in northern Iraq was imposed in 1991 and in southern Iraq in 1992. The latter zone was expanded in 1996. In addition, since the official declaration of the ceasefire under resolution 687 (1991), the United States of America has perpetrated three acts of aggression against Iraq: in January 1993, in June 1993 and in September 1996. The United States and the United Kingdom have carried out two attacks: one in December 1998 and one in February 2001.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Thus, a temporary measure has been transformed into a permanent measure, despite the absence of causes, in a manner unprecedented in the annals of this Organization. There is no doubt that this state of affairs could not have lasted this long without American hegemony over this world Organization, particularly the Security Council, as has been attested by various circles within and outside the United Nations - official and unofficial, political or otherwise- including United States and United Kingdom circles. I will come back to this point later on. In addition to the above, there are aspects of the relationship between Iraq and the Security Council that have arisen outside the purview of Security Council resolutions.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“I wish to say to the Ambassador of Canada that when he referred to the concept behind Article 24 - that the Security Council acts on behalf of the Members of the United Nations - he omitted to say that that particular commitment on the part of the Council has to be performed in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. In other words, the Security Council is not an absolute authority. It is an authority bound by the purposes and principles of the Charter. This condition is the underlying foundation of the concept of entrusting the Security Council with the task of the maintenance of international peace and security on behalf of the collective membership. What is the final result? Continuing the embargo against Iraq at a time when the causes for imposing this embargo have been absent for years.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Through this position, the Security Council could have demonstrated to Iraq and the international community respect for its own resolutions and not for a position vis-a-vis the Iraqi Government. However, this still has not occurred. The Security Council continues to adopt a static and extreme position, and from time to time it imposes new obligations on Iraq as a result of the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom, which stem from political objectives of their own and have no relation to the objectives and common interests of the international community. The United Nations Charter assumes that the Council would cherish this collective interest because the Council works on behalf of Member States, in keeping with the purposes and principles of the Charter.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“However - and whatever may be the position of certain members of the Council concerning Iraq's implementation of its obligations - this is a question on which we do not have identical views in the Council. The fact remains that what Iraq has implemented, and with whatever reasonable percentage, is large enough to prompt the Council to have adopted, many years ago, a clear-cut resolution that would at least reduce the embargo on the basis of paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991), or implement at least paragraph 22 of the same resolution. In view of paragraph 21, which refers to the two concepts of imposing or lifting the embargo, it is not imaginable that those who authored this resolution did not aim at a certain specific meaning of the term "reducing" the embargo. Therefore, the mention of this term is futile.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Unless the Council in due seriousness takes all necessary measures to deal with weapons of mass destruction possessed by Israel and with programmes for possessing such weapons by Iran, the Council will remain guilty of using double standards and selectivity that run counter to the United Nations Charter. There are many detailed examples. The point which I want to emphasize from the beginning is that Iraq did not spare any effort to implement the obligations imposed on it, in the hope that this would lead to the Security Council taking a position that would be in keeping with its clear obligations vis-a-vis Iraq, just as has been spelled out in the Council's own resolutions. I have emphasized that Iraq has implemented all the obligations imposed on it by Council resolutions.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The purpose is to perpetuate the blockade imposed on Iraq, in spite of Iraq's tremendous efforts, through which Iraq has essentially and qualitatively implemented its obligations. This has been recognized by elements of UNSCOM. who were the basic driving force behind the impediments and the crises. This has been published since the autumn of 1998. It is regrettable that the Security Council has totally neglected the application of paragraph 14 of resolution 687 (1991). The Council did not take any measure of any sort to implement this paragraph. Disarmament cannot take place in a vacuum.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Suffice it to say on this occasion that the Special Commission has, in a very clear and unequivocal fashion, adopted a conduct that is translated into placing obstacles, fomenting crises, distorting the concepts of work and emphasizing matters that have nothing to do with weapons dossiers or with those questions that were either secondary or complete, in addition to politicizing technical matters and continuously changing the tasks, thereby prolonging the process by creating all sorts of different considerations. I wish to state that detailed explanations of these indications can be found in the document that we have submitted. There is no doubt that the United States- United Kingdom objective was clear. Perhaps today it is even more clear, after the admission of certain elements of UNSCOM, which began to come out in the autumn of 1998.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“In the field of disarmament, whose various subjects have gained special importance, Iraq had to grapple with problems that are not related to the requirements of implementing the obligations spelled out in resolution 687 (1991). As events unfolded over eight years, it became clear that the two bodies charged with this task- that is, UNSCOM. and the IAEA- have served as an instrument to realize United States and United Kingdom policies. In the former UNSCOM there was a large number of persons which for years went about their work on instructions from the United States and not according to the requirements of Security Council resolutions. The register is long, detailed and complicated.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“In light of the fact that it takes place within the framework of a humanitarian programme, which was adopted as mentioned by resolution 986 (1995) and subsequent resolutions on this matter, this has been adopted as a temporary measure out of concern for the serious nutritional and health situation of the Iraqi people and the danger of its further deterioration. Is such deduction in this programme, whose nature is spelled out in Security Council resolutions- just? Why did these deductions reach that magnitude? Because certain influential members of the Security Council have imposed the highest possible level of deductions for this purpose.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“In addition to the foregoing, I wish to mention - based on official information available to us, thanks to our contacts - that the sum total that was deducted from our oil revenues for the reparations fund, from the start of the oil-for-food programme in 1996 to 30 May 2000, has reached 12.6 billion dollars, whereas the amount received by Iraq from the resources for humanitarian goods, which we have actually received, is 12.8 billion dollars. Is this reasonable? In the light of the criteria for deduction, which were spelled out in paragraph 19 of resolution 687 (1991) as being the needs of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity, taking into account foreign debt service and the needs of the Iraqi economy. Is this deduction just?”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Is this natural? A claimant calls for a certain sum, whereas that body gives him double the amount and an additional $37 million. Another example among many concerns the failure of the secretariat of the Compensation Commission to verify these claims. Certain United Nations Member States, such as Sri Lanka, India, Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, have noticed that in 575 cases the Commission has compensated claimants twice for the very same claim. These are some examples of the political nature of the reparations regime imposed on Iraq, which, we believe, is a vindictive punitive measure whose whole purpose is financial gain and not the administration of justice.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“I assume that this transaction and its results are well known to you, because you are all members of the Bureau of the sanctions Committee. This is not the sole example of the injustice inflicted on Iraq by the reparations regime. Allow me to add two more examples, noting that we had submitted a larger number of examples in our dialogue with the Secretary-General last February. The Bureau, in the case of Government claim number 41, which was submitted by the Kuwaiti Prisoners of War and Missing Persons Committee, has approved compensation in the amount of $153.5 million, whereas the Kuwait Committee, that is, the claimant, has claimed compensation of about $58.5 million. This means that the sum of the compensation decided by the Compensation Commission is equal to $37 million above and beyond double the amount claimed by the claimant.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Those who wish to go back and study this matter can look at the work and deliberations of the International Law Commission. This is a United Nations commission, and thus a reparations regime has been established upon political bases, not on the basis of legal considerations and the necessary way of dealing with matters in keeping with natural justice. The United States has and continues to be - and this has been declared by its responsible spokesman - the driving force behind this legally illegitimate regime. Among the flagrant examples of this is the comprehensive package agreed upon by the five permanent members, which was approved by the Council on 27 September 2000. This package granted the Kuwait Oil Company a compensation of approximately $16 billion.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The Security Council as a political body, according to this mechanism approved by resolution 687 (1991), has decided to replace the judicial function with an administrative, political process controlled by the Council, in addition to its legislative function, which is to legislate the mechanism of reparations. Thereby, the Council has totally disregarded the well-entrenched criterion of defining State liability in international law. I said that international law has been approved as the sole criterion for the question of reparations in resolution 687 (1991). This has occurred in spite of the fact that the Council does not possess this power pursuant to the United Nations Charter. The Security Council does not have the power to intervene in the implementation of the liability principle according to the Charter.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The evidence, in the form of the records of the Demarcation Commission, is within the Secretariat and is mentioned in the paper submitted to the Secretary- General in the February session. This document has been circulated to the Council. With regard to the question of reparations, the Security Council has, in paragraph 16 of resolution 687 (1991), admitted that international law is the sole criterion for paying compensation. However, the Council has established for this purpose an unprecedented and astoundingly punitive mechanism based on administrative principles and rules that lack equality or respect for the correct application of law.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Iraq has faced all forms of unusual measures, including very perverse changes in the rules and the scope of work; indeed, changes in the very obligations imposed on Iraq as they appear in resolution 687 (1991). For example, the Security Council has involved itself in an unprecedented manner in the question ofthe borders between Iraq and Kuwait, not only through the formula for the delimitation of boundaries, but also through the imposition of the principles and manner of the demarcation of borders. This did not suffice. The Secretariat has been used as an instrument of pressure on the Chairman of the Demarcation Commission so as to attain the result sought by the United States and the United Kingdom: the injection of the borders question into resolution 687 (1991).”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Iraq has returned all the Kuwaiti properties that it could find, and has pledged to return any other material that may be found in the future. A reparations regime has been imposed on Iraq, from which compensation sums are deducted. Iraq has returned all prisoners of war and has fulfilled and continues to fulfil the duty of cooperating in investigating the fate of missing persons. Finally, Iraq has implemented the special demand to condemn all forms of international terrorism. In addition to the harsh nature of the obligations imposed on Iraq, which has been manifested in many situations by flagrant violations of international law and of precedents in relation between States, another important fact appears in the context of the implementation of the above-mentioned obligations.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Iraq has recognized Kuwait's sovereignty and territorial integrity, its independence, and its borders as delineated by the United Nations. Iraq has cooperated with the United Nations and fully implemented its commitments concerning the deployment of United Nations observer units. It has also implemented all the requirements of paragraphs 7 to 13 concerning disarmament, in addition to other relevant resolutions, especially resolutions relating to ongoing monitoring and to the import-export mechanism. This was recognized by a number of reports of the Special Commission (UNSCOM) and some of its principal elements after the unmasking of the subversive role played by this Commission, especially during the chairmanship of Richard Butler.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source
“I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for granting my request to be the last speaker. First of all, I should like to extend my congratulations to you on the manner in which you have presided over the work of the Council for this month. (spoke in Arabic) The Security Council is meeting this week to discuss my country's situation in relation to the Security Council. I wish at the outset to reaffirm that the obligations imposed on Iraq under relevant Security Council resolutions are extremely harsh and go beyond customary legal measures to restore international peace and security. In spite of this, Iraq has implemented all the obligations enshrined in the relevant Security Council resolutions. The provisions of the principal resolution - resolution 687 (1991) - have been fully implemented, as required.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336Resumption1 (2001) · source