YouSaid · the spoken record

Alarcon De Quesada

lines on the record: 116
first: 1992-05-21
most recent: 1996-07-26
sittings or episodes: 2
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“One delegation, long before the meeting of the Council and the meetings of ICAO, insisted on repeating its lies and distorting the truth without replying to specific questions: where are the witnesses? Where is the recording? Is it the one that was distributed in February, or the mutilated one given to the ICAO in May? Where is the truth, my dear friend? Why have you, the defenders of the truth, put so much time and effort into hiding it? And somebody expressed surprise that we recalled the brilliant work of Lewis Carroll. The specialized agency of the United Nations, ICAO, dedicated four long meetings in two days of work to the consideration of the report, which was conducted by civil aviation specialists. They did not do what members of the Council, in a couple of hours, under pressure and manipulation, have been capable of doing.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Mr. Alarcen de Quesada (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): I do not want to take up much of the Council's time, and it is not necessary. We did not need a Council meeting to do what the representative of the United States believes the Council has done. On 20 June, even before the report of the investigative team was issued, we heard exactly the same words from the White House. Until yesterday the Council had an opportunity to take a decision consistent with what it said in February. As one representative very recently recalled, nine members of the Council put forward ideas that would have been completely along the lines of the conclusions of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“In the end, on 27 June, I believe that the ICAO Council, as I said there, managed to preserve its prestige. It managed to prevent its credibility being damaged by the manipulative attempts it had to confront. It is up to this Council now to act. It is up to its members to respond on behalf of the credibility and prestige of this organ.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“I heard the representative of your country, Sir - the representative of France to ICAO - draw attention to the fact that, independent of or beyond the specific issue to be considered by ICAO at that time, what was before the ICAO Council was above all the question of the prestige and credibility of ICAO. This subject, which was first raised in the discussion by the representative of France, was reiterated on many occasions by most members of the ICAO Council. I regret that the verbatim records of all that was said there are not available to members, and that no steps have been taken to make them available. Of course, my delegation is quite prepared to provide to anyone who might be interested in the whole truth of events in Montreal with this information, which of course we have in our possession.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“This, I might mention in passing, does not mean only violations of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba - which might be of interest to the United States - but also means threats to the safety of citizens of the United States, who are the majority users of the international air corridors over the Republic of Cuba; to United States aircraft, which represent the majority of the aircraft flying over Cuba; and to United States passengers, who represent the majority of those who use the airlines that fly over the territory of the Republic of Cuba. A month ago, the ICAO Council considered this question and adopted the decision contained in its resolution. I recall very vividly the moment when consideration of this subject began.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“We hope that all the States that defend 3 bis and that want to see it enforced will cooperate with us so that this article, and its just purposes, can be truly applied in practice - not used simply so that a State that has not ratified it and does not comply with it can utilize it demagogically, exhorting others to accept it. I repeat that very soon the Council of ICAO will be called upon at the request of Cuba to examine this crucial question of the improper use of civil aviation in this region that unites us and separates us, specifically violations of international civil aviation and its norms.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“The Republic of Cuba wishes to offer to all of them the possibility of showing that they genuinely, and not only rhetorically, adhere to article 3 bis. The Republic of Cuba proposes, and is already taking the relevant steps, to ask the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization to analyse, at its next session, problems related to the abuse of civil aviation in our region and to the improper use of aircraft registered as civil aircraft in the United States, in contravention of the Chicago Convention. We hope that the Council of ICAO will agree to discuss this issue, which would mean an analysis of the necessary conditions for compliance with the provisions of this article in one specific part of the world.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“But the end of the paragraph is truly a bad joke: "and to comply with all the provisions of the article pending the entry into force of the Protocol" (ibid.). Has the United States really been applying the provisions of article 3 bis? Has it ever truly applied any part of this article? Is it going to do so now? Is it going to change its policy? Is it going to take genuine measures to prevent the deliberate use of aircraft that are registered as civilian by the United States but that are dedicated to violating the rules of international civil aviation? I should like to say the following: I know that some delegations that are members of the Council - not all, because a number of States here have not ratified this article - attach great importance to this issue.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Should the Council also provide military aircraft to persons who will violate the rules of civil aviation? Should it appoint ambassadors to accompany the provocateurs? Should it tolerate, allow, promote, incite these activities? With what moral authority can the United States talk about something that it systematically violates day after day? Paragraph 7 urges "all States that have not yet done so to ratify as soon as possible the Protocol adding article 3 bis to the Chicago Convention" (S/1996/596, para. 7). Will the United States do this? Will it set an example? Has it already taken the steps to ratify the Protocol? Since it is the only author of this draft resolution, one would assume that one who exhorts, one who asks the entire world to do something, would itself be prepared to follow through. At best, this is possible.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“That body rejected the suggestion repeatedly made by certain parties that it endorse the report, and it rejected it because of the great number of inconsistencies, contradictions and gaps the report contains. The Council would be asked, in paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, to reaffirm the principle that "each State shall take appropriate measures to prohibit the deliberate use of any civil aircraft" (S/1996/596, para. 5) and so on. The author is the United States. What real significance would it have if the Security Council accepted this formulation by a State that clearly has taken no measures whatsoever to prohibit the deliberate use of civil aircraft in a way inconsistent with the aims of the Chicago Convention? What are the "appropriate measures"?”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“The United States concealed information, falsified data and impeded the analysis, and, in addition - using procedures that are truly regrettable - tried to make consideration of this item before the Security Council as difficult as possible. The Security Council now has before it a draft resolution that, in its first operative paragraph, would endorse the conclusions of the ICAO report and the resolution the ICAO Council adopted. In other words, members would endorse the conclusions that the Council of ICAO refused to endorse; it asks that the Security Council approve the conclusions of a report and at the same time the resolution of the body charged with studying it.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“- to allow them to fly directly over the capital of the Republic of Cuba, and then to say later that the very specific information they had ended here, that the last minutes were either erased or disappeared, or that their sophisticated technological methods were not able to specify what happened in the last stages of these flights. But these authorities were fully aware of the initial stage of the flight and, as everything had been prepared in advance, not only did they do absolutely nothing, but it almost seems as if they were waiting with their arms crossed - and with the radar shut off, of course - for the incident to occur and be announced, so that they could become the great champions, before the Security Council, of international law, of civil aviation, of humanitarian principles, and so on.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Where are their warnings to those flights? Where is the signal that they should turn back, that they should land or that they should fly where they had the right to do so? Did it ever occur to you, Madam Ambassador, that flying without authorization over an area they had not been authorized to overfly could have endangered the life of any United States citizen who might be using that same airspace in a lawful way? Did it ever occur to you that for an hour and three quarters, these persons disregarded the United States authorities, who were vigilant, who had been warned and who were documenting this - why?”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Three quarters of the time, an hour and 45 minutes. Where? Over Cuban territory, in Cuban airspace, or over United States territory in United States airspace? What did the United States do to avoid an incident, or the playing out of an incident? There is a violation here, Madam Ambassador: from the moment of take-off the authorized flight plan was ignored. It was ignored throughout the flight. It was ignored for an hour and 45 minutes. And the experts in interception manuals - those who know the most, those who pontificate, those who advise the rest of the world as to what mechanisms to use in order to peacefully and smoothly avoid incidents - why did they do nothing? Where are the radio communications from any of those authorities - their own version? Where are they? What did Opa Locka say? What did Miami say? What did Key West say?”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“It has nothing to do with the authorized route. Instead of descending by the east coast of Florida, they crossed the Florida peninsula to Key West and from there moved south, then west - all of this within the region under United States air traffic control - and then follow a straight line to the capital of Cuba. I repeat: the two lines are from the United States; they are their information - the request they made and what they actually did. Consider for a moment some timings. At 1.15 pm. they took off from Opa Locka; at 2.55 pm. they were almost at the 24th parallel. There was still some distance to go. They have been on route for one hour and 45 minutes, three quarters of the time of the whole incident, from the take-off from Opa Locka to the shootdown of the planes and the return of third plane.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“The information was repeated on the eve, and they knew what was happening throughout the incident. I invite members to turn to page 5 of the ICAO report. It is a voluminous report and it is not easy to read completely. However, page 5 is at the very beginning. It is the first map which appears in this report. It is a map drawn from United States information. It simply shows the Florida peninsula, the Florida strait, the outline of the Republic of Cuba, and two lines. One is the planned route. The planes would have flown down the eastern part of the Florida peninsula towards the centre of Cuba and then would have moved to the west to return to Key West. That was the planned route, the route for which they were given authorization to take off from Opa Locka on 24 February. The other line is the actual route, the one that they actually took.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Basulto and other pilots of the organization called Brothers to the Rescue would fly towards Cuba with the purpose of creating a political incident: one week before, 17 February. This is repeated to him on 23 February, and on 24 February, at 7.45 a.m., he is told that that flight with that purpose will take place. Are the United States authorities really so innocent? Do they really possess the moral authority to present themselves as zealous defenders of the law, as concerned for the lives of others, as the active promoters of security in international aviation, as having the authority to give advice to everyone on how to behave with regard to these possible incidences? Or are they the authority responsible for the occurrence of this incident? They knew about it beforehand. They informed Mr. Houlihan at least one week earlier.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“In this document, which sets out the discussion with the administrative judge of the National Transportation Safety Board, there is a very specific description which complements the investigation team's assertion that the United States expected an incident on 23 February. Not only is there the indication given on the thirteenth. Several United States civil aviation officials give testimony to this judge to the effect that there is background that dates back even earlier. One of these officials, Mr. Houlihan, on page 1796, says that one week before 24 February - in other words, on 17 February - he was called to a meeting in which he was warned that on 24 February, that is a week later, Mr.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Hays was appointed Director of the Office for Cuban Affairs and among his assignments was also to accompany the planes, which most likely bore North American insignia, which most likely were going to violate Cuban airspace, which most likely were going to commit sabotage. Does the United States really believe it can convince anyone that it has done anything at all to discourage or prevent these things? No, Cuba does not accuse the victims, it does not turn the victims into the guilty. The main culprit is the Government of the United States of America. The main responsible party is an Administration which has been unable, not just to comply with international law, an obligation it must feel it has, but even to ensure respect for its own aviation rules and regulations.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Dennis Hays, who until last summer was the Director of the State Department Office for Cuban Affairs. Senator Dodd, a cultured and informed political figure, had been told or had found out that the Miami press had said that Mr. Hays also flew with Brothers to the Rescue. He had also been a crew member of those airplanes when serving as Director of the Office for Cuban Affairs. Senator Dodd asked about this before the Senate, at a level which I imagine must be taken seriously in the United States. Following a detailed explanation, Senator Dodd asked: (spoke in English) "Did you ever fly with Brothers to the Rescue?" Mr. Hays responded: "Yes, Sir. I believe it was in late '93 and '94. My redecessor had also flown with them". (spoke in Spanish) It is a tradition. Mr.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Why take away someone's licence just so that you can refer to it in the Security Council? The policy is not to prevent these incidents, but to promote and encourage them. I have already spoken of the trip taken by the editor of the Miami Herald. But what about the trip taken by Ambassador Dennis Hays? Who is Dennis Hays? I do not know if he is already an Ambassador or if he is still in the process of being confirmed by the United States Senate. And there, on 8 May 1996, before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where they were considering his possible confirmation as Ambassador to some Caribbean country, Senator Christopher Dodd, a well known person in North American politics, expressed alarm at information he had, that this was Mr.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“He added that he was not charged by the FAA with any violation. He also explained that after arriving at Miami he saw on television that a number of planes, among them his own, were flying above Havana, obviously within the 12-mile zone, because they were physically over the capital of the Republic of Cuba. We have reached a total lack of respect for the truth. I do not see it in the text, which seems to be final; it has changed many times. But even yesterday, an earlier United States draft text stated that one plane had penetrated Cuban airspace on 13 July, even though the United States Government knows that there were at least eight planes, and even though the pilots of those planes themselves have said so. They refer to the injustice done to Mr. Basulto.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“He says that in July 1995, given that the violation was publicized and well-known, he received a very explicit response from the head of the group: he had to do what he had to do - and he did it. Mr. Smith interpreted this to mean that he was wittingly going to ignore rules and regulations and violate Cuban airspace. This was a man who was warned year after year by the authorities. But he had no reason to believe that any punishment would be meted out. The testimony of Mr. William Schultz, a member of the Brothers to the Rescue group, appears on pages 1839 and 1840. Speaking before the administrative judge of the United States Transportation Safety Board, he says that he too had violated Cuban airspace. He flew over Havana on 13 July. He also says that he took with him a journalist from Channel 10, Miami, and a cameraman.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“The United States inspector, Mr. Charles Smith, supervisor of the office of the Miami district of the FAA, refers to meetings which he held in 1992, 1993, 1994 and, of course, in 1996, with people from this group, to try to convince them not to violate international law or United States regulations, and to warn them that they were committing offences which could be and should be punished. Ambassador Albright said that steps had been taken before 24 February. Some inspectors or local authorities with a sense of responsibility, aware that those violations also put other United States travellers at risk, may have talked to those individuals. What does Mr. Smith say?”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“It was referred to in an earlier text of the draft resolution the Council is likely to adopt today, and concerns an aircraft that entered Cuban airspace on 13 July 1995. Everyone knows that this is a lie. Everyone knows that this is an unacceptable mockery of humanity. It even mocks the Security Council: the text refers to a plane in July 1995 for the simple reason that what happened that day was made public. It had been announced many months earlier, and had been covered by United States television. As he said, "I am being accused of that, but eight other aircraft were flying with me on that day." That is an interesting detail from the 5 July meeting. However, there are other points of interest which the Council should take into account. The report also refers to measures taken earlier by the United States.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Curiously, at that same meeting, Mr. Basulto seemed to be pre-empting the United States Ambassador to the United Nations by making statements that seem to us to be very relevant. The United States presents its great, heroic, tough act of suspending a pilot's licence as an example of the vigorous application of its laws. On page 1785 of that document Mr. Basulto himself pointed out the inconsistencies of the United States Administration. He indicated that his licence had been suspended for 82 days after 24 February, but that during that period he had flown his plane and absolutely nothing had been done about it. He also said that the United States Government, in the allegations it made when suspending the licence, referred to another incident - the only one that the United States Administration accepts.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“But there is much more, and an attempt is being made to keep it carefully concealed. I have another United States document, dated 5 July 1996. I do not have all of it, as it is very long and has thousands of pages. It is a document of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), an entity which is often referred to in the press. On 5 July it examined the matter to which Ambassador Albright referred: the suspension of the licence of a pilot. It was originally suspended indefinitely, but the suspension has now been reduced to 150 days, which means that, if there is no change in the situation, that person will be able to fly again by October. At 8.35 pm. on Friday, 5 July, the NTSB held a meeting before an administrative judge of the Board, to consider the question of the suspension of Mr. Basulto's licence.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“I shall read from the report of the group of investigators, which, since it is within quotation marks, I must suppose to be information provided by the FBI to the investigation team. It reads as follows: "'Twelve of the contacts were related to the Brothers to the Rescue. These reports include discussions of possible plans to smuggle or airdrop weapons into Cuba, and other plans to violate Cuban airspace'." (5/1996/509, annex, appendix B, para. 2.6.9) The explanation that the Council has just heard tries to suggest to listeners that the situation was accidental, surprising and unprecedented, a situation in respect of which the Government of the United States had been taking measures prior to 24 February, as it had some information about possible violations. The report of the investigation team says something to this effect.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“From aircraft such as those of this group, actions of sabotage have been and are being planned against installations of the Republic of Cuba. In this connection, let us consider page 83 of the report, which describes contacts between the United States authorities and Mr. Juan Pablo Roque, who had connections to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and who worked with it, providing information beginning in the summer of 1993 and ending in November 1995. It is logical that the FBI should have informers in various places, including among that group; I would imagine that there are many of them even now. The FBI must be awash in information. This person provided the Bureau with information on the group to which he belonged.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“But I can say that there has been no other case before the international community of premeditated activities undertaken by an organization that is involved not in civil aviation but in illegitimate activities that not only violate international law, United States regulations and Cuban sovereignty, but are also related to very serious crimes against the Cuban people. Cuba has had long experience in opposing actions taken against it and its people by small aircraft operating from United States territory. Cuban sugar fields have been burned by small aircraft. Cuban cities have been attacked from small aircraft. Explosives have been hurled from small aircraft. Sabotage has been carried out from small aircraft. Biological substances have been introduced into our country from small aircraft.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Frostell, who said that, indeed, this plane was still at Opa Locka and that it still bore United States military insignia. It is true that the "F" is a bit faded; it would seem that it is beginning to wear out, but you can still see it. It still belongs to Brothers to the Rescue and at any time could be used for acts of provocation against Cuba. I do not know if members can recall earlier situations in which this Council or any other international body has considered any incidents related to international civil aviation.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“In other words, this is not merely a type of plane that is used by the military; it is not, as the Congresswoman claimed, just that similar aircraft were to be found in airports in Florida ever since the end of the conflict in Central America; Mr. David Lawrence Jr. actually flew in the one bearing the marking N24328, from which the United States Air Force marking had not even been erased. That is one thing. Another is that, today, 26 July, at 4.25 p.m., this aircraft is at the Opa Locka airport in Miami. It still bears the markings of the United States Air Force; it still belongs to Brothers to the Rescue and may be involved tomorrow, the day after, or at some point in the future in one of that group's operations. On 26 June 1996, at the meeting of the ICAO Council, what I have said here was acknowledged by Mr.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“She was very explicit and active, making many statements and taking a number of initiatives. It would seem that she was successful, because on 19 July of that year the Miami Herald published a report on its editorial page, written not by just any journalist but by Mr. David Lawrence, the editor of the Herald. In this account, Mr. Lawrence tells us of a trip he took with the group known as Brothers to the Rescue, the group in question. Like any good journalist, he accompanies his account with photographs, including some of the plane that was used. In one, the marking "N2432S" is quite sharp; in another, four letters are clearly visible on its wing: "USAF".”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“In other words, it is a plane designed and developed equally for tasks or missions of a military nature. You can find a similar description in any United States military aviation handbook, in which the O2 is nowhere referred to as a civilian aircraft but only as one of the models that is used for certain military tasks, as it has been by the United States Government. The mission that was being carried out had nothing to do with international civil aviation; the equipment used can also have military purposes, according to the United States' own handbooks. But there is more. Three years ago and earlier, in 1992 and 1993, in Miami, a United States Congresswoman from Florida organized a major campaign to petition the Pentagon to provide several Cessna 337s or 02s to the group that participated in the incident of 24 February.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“I have spoken of the aircrafts' mission, but more than this is at issue. All the aeroplanes used by the group responsible for the 24 February flights are of a single model, the Cessna 337. But, as anyone who is at all familiar with the subject of aviation knows, this Cessna model, and no other, happens to have a dual-purpose design: civil and military. If anyone interested in aviation should look through Jane's All The World's Aircraft, a fairly widespread publication, they will find in any of its editions a description of the Cessna 337 - or, according to its United States Air Force designation, the 02. It is known as the 337 when it is used to carry passengers, cargo or mail, and as the 02 when used by the United States military in Viet Nam and Central America.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“These authorities should be concerned with true civil aviation and with seeing that there is no abuse in that area, because their own aircraft are the ones that use the airspace the most and their nationals are the ones who fly through there - hundreds of thousands of passengers a year, all enjoying the technical aid and cooperation of Cuban authorities. There has never, ever been a single incident involving a United States civil aircraft, out of the hundreds that pass each day through these corridors linking Cuba with the United States. It should be the principal concern of the United States Government - especially now, but at all times as well - to see to it that nothing violates, endangers or distorts genuinely civilian international communications in this zone, so near to its territory.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Neither their use nor their mission related to the transport of passengers, mail or cargo; they had nothing to do with international civil aviation and a great deal to do with its abuse, a great deal to do with putting at risk the thousands of aircraft that truly are of a civil nature - most of them United States aircraft - that have the right to navigate that airspace, that have full cooperation from Cuba for that purpose, and that should have the due attention of the United States authorities.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“As is stated in an ICAO secretariat document, prepared at the request of its Council precisely to help make this fundamental issue as clear as possible: "The use of the aircraft in question is the determining factor" - I repeat: the use of the aircraft in question is the determining criterion - "and not other factors such as the registration and the markings on the aircraft ..." In other words, the first question would have to be, what was the use of the aircraft involved in the incident of 24 February? That needs to be defined before trying to apply to them the legitimate concern for the protection and development of international civil aviation, as the United States side arbitrarily insists on doing.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Furthermore, the United States delegation is trying to persist in that same effort at manipulation and confusion as regards the supposedly civilian nature of the aircraft involved. I must make a few clarifications in this respect. I do not believe I can improve upon what ICAO itself believes should be the criteria for deciding if an aircraft has civil status or not.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“It does not seem to me difficult to understand the way in which the United States handled the data and the information that it was obliged to provide, the way in which it manipulated or concealed the information, the way in which it adulterated the radio communications, the way in which it did not facilitate contact by the investigators with the supposed witnesses of the supposed fishing boat that supposedly was in the area, but that no one saw and with whose crew members no one spoke - all this in order to be able to claim that the incident took place somewhere other than where it actually did - in other words, to present the case as if it were a question of destruction over international waters and not, as was the case, well within the territory of the Republic of Cuba.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“The United States should explain the level of care and seriousness used in the work of their federal agencies, since despite being warned by Washington that a flight should be recorded because there might be an incident on it, and then, once the incident had taken place at exactly the installation closest to where the events occurred, the one that was involved in the incident - because one can see in the report that planes have to fly over Key West and could possibly land there at any given time - simply erased its data. Furthermore, as the report states, no United States radar data proved useful in describing the final minutes of that flight, that is to say, the final minutes of the incident.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“What was submitted was the 21 May news that the Key West installation had erased its radar data, had eliminated it, and that it had done so within 15 days of the incident, around 6 March - almost immediately after the staff of that installation was advised that an investigation was being conducted and that someone would be coming to ask for that specific data. I do understand why even information as categorical as the elimination of data was not made known to the investigation team until 21 May.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Council members can look in the introduction to the report and see - and I will read the paragraph word for word - that it says: "Additional information was requested, and was provided on 21 May 1996 by the authorities in the United States regarding the mission of the P-3 Orion aircraft, and radar data from Naval Air Station at Key West, CARIBROC and NORAD's SEAD sector". (S/l996/509, annex, appendix B, para. 12) The report goes on to explain exactly what was submitted as regards the radar data of the Key West Naval Air Station.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“The following paragraph says that on 23 February, the various United States communications control centres received instructions - warnings - from the authorities to the effect that certain flights that were to take place the next day should be appropriately documented. In spite of this, not a single one of these installations was in a position to provide any data whatsoever by 19 April, when the investigation team went to the United States. According to the report, on 21 May meetings were held anyway in Montreal between representatives of the Government of the United States and the investigation team to see if the team might at last be able to obtain the remaining data.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“The radar situation is no less interesting: two months after an incident occurred, the United States authorities were not yet in a position to provide any data from any of their radars, despite the fact that, as the report itself indicates, the United States authorities had been warned a day in advance, on 23 February, that on 24 February there would be a flight or flights that should be properly tracked and logged by all radar installations. Paragraph 2.2.2 of the report says that in the early afternoon of 13 February - 13 February, 11 days earlier - the Department of State's Office of Cuban Affairs contacted the FAA's Office of International Aviation Office, informing it that something might occur in connection with these flights and that they should be alerted.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Given that, as even the United States indicates, what they were permitted to hear in May was clearly different from what existed in February - that the transcription was lacking six minutes - I do not see why we should have any greater confidence in other parts of the version which the investigators were only permitted to hear, the original tape of which was never submitted by the United States Government. Those are the ins and outs of the radio communications. As to eye-witnesses, I have already indicated what the report itself says.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“The ICAO investigation is over; the discussions in Montreal are over; the Security Council is about to conclude its work; and the ICAO investigation team is not able to change what it said in Montreal and what is stated in the report: that, from the United States side, they listened to - merely listened to - a cassette, inserted into a tape player in the presence of representatives of the Government of the United States, who were, as the report tells us, the custodians of that cassette.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“The transcription clearly demonstrates the difference from what had earlier been transcribed and distributed in February: six minutes had been eliminated, plus other, less important, differences between the two United States versions. As to Cuba, the report states that by 30 March Cuba had submitted not only its radar data but also its radio communications. It had also made it possible for the team to interview any witnesses it wanted. We also submitted to them the original tape on which the Cuban side had recorded these radio communications. In addition, we submitted the equipment that had been used to make those tape recordings. It is now July.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“With regard to the communications recording, I wish to point out something which is contained in the report and which was the subject of considerable discussion at the ICAO Council meeting: the mystery of this document - far from being made clear through the efforts of the investigation team - became increasingly complicated in the course of the investigation. I refer here to the February version; the May version of the recording was not actually submitted by the United States to the ICAO secretariat. They state clearly that in May they had the opportunity to listen to what the United States said was a recording of these radio communications, which were subsequently transcribed.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Hence, there has not even been any proof of the very existence of the alleged fishing boat supposedly known as the Tri-Liner. Yet in the portions to which I have referred, the report makes use of the versions provided by so-called eye-witnesses from that fishing boat to establish its position in relation to the Majesty of the Seas - whose existence no one denies - to attempt to estimate the possible location of the downing. To make matters even more obvious - since the questionable situation faced by the team is so clear from this portion of the report and from its conclusions - they state that they were unable to provide independent proof of the location of the Majesty of the Seas.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source