YouSaid · the spoken record

Alarcon De Quesada

lines on the record: 116
first: 1992-05-21
most recent: 1996-07-26
sittings or episodes: 2
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Indeed, it would be extremely useful to examine the verbatim record of the meeting of the Council of ICAO at which the information I am speaking of was discussed at considerable length. Nowhere, either in the preliminary report of May or the final report of June, is there any reference to the investigation team having directly, personally interviewed any witness from either vessel, the Majesty of the Seas or the alleged United States fishing boat, supposedly named Tri-Liner. The investigators say that when they went to Miami in April, they spoke with individuals from an aircraft involved in the incident. At the ICAO Council meeting, Mr. Frostell, the head of the investigation team appointed by the ICAO secretariat, indicated that they had not spoken with any member of the Tri-Liner crew and that they had not visited that vessel.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Destroy all others." (spoke in Spanish) Perhaps that version too was destroyed, because one need only look at the ICAO report to see that what was submitted to ICAO was a transcript, supposedly as official as this earlier one provided by the United States, but with six minutes missing. The first six minutes of the radio communication, which are present in the February document, have disappeared in May when at last the information is generously handed over to the investigation team. And it happens that those six minutes relate specifically to the location of the aircraft that penetrated Cuban airspace and to the location of the vessel Majesty of the Seas. There is mention of eye-witnesses from the Majesty of the Seas and the Tri-Liner. I invite members of the Council to consider the text of the report carefully.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“2.3.7.4) Three basic elements - radio communications; eyewitnesses from vessels, or, to be more specific, one vessel, Majesty of the Seas, and an alleged fishing boat which allegedly would have been in the area; and the combination, the mutual relationship between the location of those two vessels - together with the radio communication would allow for the most reliable estimate. Allow me to indicate some important issues relating to those three elements. As I said, we shall be distributing a document, distributed by the Permanent Mission of the United States of America on 27 February, distributed here in this City of New York, here in this United Nations building, with this peculiar warning on each page of the document: (spoke in English) "This is the authoritative version of these transcripts as of 12.00, 27 February 1996.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“In paragraph 2.3.7.3, they explain they arrive at it by means of a combination of: "the communications recording provided by the United States", (S/1996/509, annex, appendix B) which was disclosed here in February but which there was concealed until May, "in particular the reference to a large passenger ship and a fishing boat". (Ibid.) The investigators add that those three elements "supported the view that the shoot-downs occurred near those vessels". (Ibid.) The following paragraph states that "Eyewitness accounts obtained from the Majesty of the Seas and the Tri-Liner were mutually supportive" and that "the position of the Tri-Liner relative to the Majesty of the Seas, and the resulting estimated locations of the shoot-downs could therefore be considered to be the most reliable position estimates." (para.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“However, as many Members of the United Nations, albeit not Security Council members or members of the ICAO Council, may be interested in knowing something about the reasons why the investigation developed in this way, why the report to the Council of ICAO was made in the way that it was, and why that Council reached the decision to which I have already referred, I would like to comment on at least a few of the central points relating to the allegedly proven data which I referred to at the beginning of this statement. I would invite Security Council members to look at page 77 of the investigation team's report. They will see there how the members of the team explain how they analysed the question of the place where the incidence occurred and the elements they used to calculate or estimate that location.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“The ICAO Council declined, and not on a whim, to endorse the investigation team's report; it was no coincidence that it refused to endorse it, but simply transmitted it to this principal organ of the United Nations, as what the President of the Council of ICAO defined the collective ruling, the collective view of the States members of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization, as reflected in the resolution the Security Council has received, and not in any other document.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“And on 20 June, no less than the Under-Secretary of State of the United States, speaking from nowhere less than the White House, distributed to anyone who might be interested a text of what it was assumed would be the investigation team's final report - which no one in Montreal had yet received - and indicated to the media in advance what, in his view, was going to be the decision of the United Nations: (spoke in English) "Sentence first - verdict afterwards". (spoke in Spanish) That weekend the members of the ICAO Council finally received the investigation team's report, and were able to discuss it on 26 and 27 June. As a result, it was agreed to send the resolution before the Council, which was the result of discussion among the members of that specialized agency of the United Nations.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“On the very eve of the closing of the most recent session of the ICAO Council, that body was finally able to fulfil the Security Council's request to examine and report on this incident. Something strange happened. If the ICAO Council met on 26 June, many members of the Security Council were probably able to read in the United States media as early as 20 June what the United States had already determined was going to be the conclusion of the Council's consideration of the report, which in fact it did not yet possess.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“In other words, they had to continue to wait for the United States to provide this basic data, which one presumes should have existed since February, and the ICAO Council had to delay its meeting until 6 June. On 6 June, the only thing the ICAO Council could do was to defer once again its consideration of the report, which had not yet been completed because they had not yet received all the information which they were awaiting from the United States side. The Council therefore had to delay this until the very last week of its session. The session even had to be extended one more week to accommodate the situation, to see whether it would be possible at last to obtain United States cooperation.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“As members can see, ICAO had set a certain date for receipt and consideration of the investigation report, but when that date passed, it had to indicate that it had not yet received from the United States of America the transcriptions of radio communications, or any radar data, or any information on measures adopted regarding earlier violations of Cuban airspace, in spite of the fact that it had been said, and has been repeated, that measures in fact had been taken before 24 February. As a result of that situation, on 6 May, the Council of ICAO had to agree to extend the investigation deadline by an additional month, and it asked its team to continue to work.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“The list of information to be provided by the Government of the United States continues: radar data from the customs coordinations centre of the United States; radar data from the incident registered by the Caribbean regional centre in southern Florida; radar data from the Miami ARTCC and air force installations in Florida; radar data recorded by United States navy air traffic control in Key West; radar trace of a plane that was north of the 24th parallel on that date; and information on the degree of observance of measures adopted regarding prior incursions into Cuban airspace.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“For anyone who wishes to see them, our delegation has copies of these transmissions, which the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations distributed in New York, in this very building, to the press of this country on 27 February. None the less, on 6 May that information had not been submitted to the ICAO investigators. We will subsequently be able to consider why that was so.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Paragraph 3.2.4, page 4, of the 6 May provisional report of the ICAO also states that further contacts and talks were being held with regard to the submission, inter alia, of information that it proceeds to list. I shall not read this out, as it is almost a full page long. I shall merely highlight the issues to which, by 19 April the United States had not responded: transcriptions of communications from land control - this refers to the interceptor planes. On 6 May the ICAO said that it was still awaiting submission by the United States of the transcription of communications between land control and the interceptor planes.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“The provisional report says that on 30 March 1996 the Cuban authorities had completely responded to all the requests made by the team. This is followed by an account of all the requests made, with which Cuba had complied by 30 March 1996. The preliminary report also states that the ICAO investigation team visited Washington between 2 and 4 April. It returned to Montreal, and then went back to the United States - to Miami, Florida, where the team remained from 14 to 19 April. The investigators do not say anywhere in the report - and they would not be able to do so - that the United States was in full compliance with their requests, as Cuba had been.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“This report shows that on 19 March - 13 days after the Council of the ICAO adopted its resolution regarding the investigation - the same communication was sent to the Government of the United States of America and to the Government of the Republic of Cuba. It was accompanied by a list of requests for information from the relevant authorities, and of requests for action to be taken, in the United States or in Cuba, with a View to the preparation of a report. In that same communication, a request was made for the relevant authorization to visit the two countries to allow the work to proceed. The Republic of Cuba responded immediately to this communication by inviting the ICAO investigation team to visit Cuba whenever they wished. The team arrived in Havana on 24 March 1996, five days after that communication was sent.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“A presidential statement was adopted in which the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was asked to examine this incident and to present its conclusions to the Council, with the Council's promise that it would consider them without delay. The Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) met in Montreal on 6 March and adopted a resolution asking its Secretary General to conduct an investigation and submit the results 60 days thereafter. On 6 May 1996 - 60 days later - the Council of the ICAO met to examine this document, the provisional report on the progress of the investigation regarding the shooting-down, and so forth.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“XII) (spoke in Spanish) That message has dominated attempts made by the United States of America since February to manipulate information and falsify data to make it practically impossible, or at least as difficult as it could be, to analyse the 24 February incident and the circumstances and conditions that produced it. That effort has been accompanied by an intense publicity campaign seeking to pass sentence in advance, just as everything possible was done to prevent the truth from becoming clear. Out of respect for the members of this body and for all of the representatives to this Organization who are not members of the Council, but to whom the Council must answer, I would like to clarify several issues. In the spirit of issuing the sentence "sentence first, verdict afterwards", this Council was convened hastily in February.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Mr. Alarcon de Quesada (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): At the outset, allow me to express my satisfaction at seeing you, Sir, presiding over the Council's work this month. I wish to thank you for your words of welcome and for the courtesy you have extended me during the time in which we have been in contact as we prepared for this meeting of the Security Council. I also wish to express my thanks and appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Elaraby, to whom I owe a debt of gratitude for his cooperation last month. It was also on a July afternoon - according to the story, on a day warmer than today - when little Alice heard a clear-cut, inexplicable warning from the Queen: (spoke in English) "'No, no!' said the Queen. 'Sentence first - verdict afterwards". (Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, chap.”
1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source
“Is it suggesting that we forget an act of sabotage because those who were travelling in the aircraft were dark-skinned; that we ignore Sabotage against an aircraft because it had been leased by a third-world country? What is it suggesting? Is it suggesting that we resort - or you resort - to the same moral duplicity of proclaiming themselves as the great warriors against terrorism and also spend 15 years hiding from the world what they know about two terrorists and about a criminal activity of such magnitude? I think that, even though 15 years have elapsed, the way remains open for the United States at last to cooperate and abide by the norms of international law, and not to continue to react in the alli-too-familiar classic American Mainer: "Read my lips".”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“On that subject, the new Permanent Representative of the United States will have the opportunity to give the explanations he wishes before the General Assembly, where the item is already on the 'agenda and will soon be taken up. With regard to the complaint I have brought before the Council regarding a matter which happened 15 years ago, the records will speak for themselves and indicate that I have mentioned events that occurred much more recently than 15 weeks ago. In fact, these events have continued to occur as recently as 15 days ago, and even in the past 15 minutes, before the Council started this meeting. But what is more important is that for 15 years the United States has not allowed justice to be done with regard to that case. What is the American side suggesting?”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“Mr. ALARCON de QUESADA (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): First of all I apologize for having had to indicate in this manner my wish to speak again. I shall be very brief. I wish first to say that, with regard to the final part of the statement of our colleague from the United States, it is surprising that, having begun by complaining about our drawing the Council's attention to something which should not be before it ~ and I do not know if this was part of his set of instructions from Washington - he then deemed it necessary to refer to another matter which is not before the Council for consideration. I am not going to go into a discussion of the economic blockade against Cuba; that was not the reason behind our request to the Council.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“One might have thought that this man would be incarcerated or that judicial proceedings would be initiated against him with the same kind of energy and vigour manifested in the Security Council so often since January. But f regret to have to say that if anyone believes that that was done, he is guilty of naivete. On 8 April 1992, very close to the date on which the Security Council saw fit to meet, "Radio Reloj", a radio station in Miami, transmitted an interview with this same gentleman, who again spoke about new attacks against Cuba carried out in April - not April of the last century, but April of this year - after the Security Council had said that”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“Later, on 24 and 31 January 1992, we sent notes to the United States Government reiterating our position and providing that Government with all the information in the hands of our authorities concerning this criminal act. We are speaking of the end of January 1992 - the time when the Security Council was meeting at the level of Heads of State and, among other things, was stating that it was going to eliminate terrorism everywhere in the world. More or less at the same time, a gentleman in Miami was openly proclaiming himself to be the organizer in the United States of terrorist activities against Cuba. Cuba brought this to the attention of the United States.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“On 23 January 1992 - 13 days Miami, that he had been the head of that operation, that he had directed it, and he announced that he would continue to engage in such activities, On the same date - 23 January 1992 ~ the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Cuba sent another note to the Government of the United States drawing its attention to the fact that Mr. Antonio de la Cuesta - the person who, according to persons who had infiltrated into Cuba, had been the head of the infiltration - had now announced that publicly in Miami. We expressed our opinion that the United States should do something about this Clear violation not only of international law but of United States law as well.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“On 10 January 1992, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Cuba sent an official note to the United States Interests Section in Havana. Among other things, it contained the name, address and telephone number of each member of that terrorist commando group and the names of those persons who had directed them from the United States, as well as the locations of the camps which, according to them, had been used for this action; one of them had its headquarters on 40th Street and 37th Avenue in Miami, and another at a farm in Homestead, That note was sent on 10 January 1992.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“In this one it asked publicly and openly for financial contributions or other types of material assistance to enable it to continue its terrorist operations. Anyone in the Council who is fascinated by this idea can send assistance to Post Office Box 42067, Miami, Florida 33142. Announcements such as that one, and many others, appear daily in the United States press. One article published in Miami is entitled "Terrorists At Large In Miami" ~ the Spanish title contains a "Cubanism", which indicates that the author of the article is possibly a Cuban. What the title really means is that these people do what they please, whenever they please and however they Please. But, unfortunately, there is even more. On 29 December 1991, another terrorist commando group landed in Cuba and was captured.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“Aldo Lopez, who was identified at that meeting as one of the military chiefs of Alpha-66. Mr. Lopez explained to all those who might be interested in joining in these activities that training was continuing for persons between 15 and 50 years of age at a camp called "Rumbo Norte". Mr. Lopez, who, according to the Diario de las Americas, had served in the United States Army for six years, added a very interesting phrase. He assured everyone that "the problems with the authorities of the county had been solved". So there seem to have been some problems with the local authorities; but it was publicly announced in Miami that the problems had been solved and that the training and preparation for terrorist activities against Cuba could continue. One month later - on 20 September 1991 - another announcement by the same group was published.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“on that day in the headquarters of that terrorist group, tolerated by the American authorities in broad daylight. 'hese headquarters are located 408 S.w. 22ng Avenue in the city of Miami, Among other things, they explained what they did with the ship after the attack: the ship was anchored at a marina in Homestead, Florida. They aia not hide it under the sea; they did not have to do anything strange or exceptional: these are activities which they carry out with total impunity on United States territory. The same group, Alpha-66, at a later date - 30 August 1991 - held a public meeting in Miami, a kind of general assembly of all its members. At that meeting, among other things they announced that they had 100 well-trained men, and that military training was continuing. This was stated by a Mr.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“It would be terrorism if we attacked in the United States those who said they would travel to Cuba. But once they are in Cuba, they have entered a war zone." That was published in Miami on 23 July 1991. Despite the best anti-terrorist efforts of the present American Administration, and despite its desire to fight these acts, we know that these statements were not followed up- One might say that these are mere threats published jn a newspaper. But let us look at certain details. On 4 January 1991, a terrorist group based in Florida made an announcement, published in the Diario de Las Americas in Miami on that day, to the effect that there would be an attack against Cuba. It aid So not in secret but at a press conference held at 11 a.m.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“This information is public, of course, because everyone in Miami knows about it. It was also made known to United States authorities. On 23 July 1991, The New Herald in Miami published an article with a revealing title: "Notice of Violence During Games in Cuba". it interviewed one gentieman, Eduardo Macaya, who, among other things, made threats against foreigners and tourists travelling to Cuba that were very reminiscent of the threats and language used by Mr. Bosch in the 1970s, which later culminated in the crime committed against the Cuban airliner. He said: "Tourists and anyone doing business with the Cuban Government are heretofore considered military objectives. Crimes against them will not be considered acts of terrorism because the country is in a state of war.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“understand this case in the light of current events, I question the impunity with which someone connected to the United States was able to commit a crime 15 years ago. Anyone interested can find proof of the fact that, in the United States of America, terrorist activities are Promoted and organizea against Cuba. on 14 October 1990, to give but one example, we captured in Cuba an expedition from the United States. The members of that expedition were all residents of the Miami area in Florida and declared at their trial that the person who trained and directed them was Mr. Rolando Nieves, a resident of 2881 N.W. Sth Street in Miami, postal code 33125. These persons acknowledged that they had been trained there, that they had boats, explosives and weapons, and that this was something which they did quite freely.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“Elsewhere in his testimony 'the police official from Trinidad and Tobago explained that, according to the accused, all that they had done had been immediately communicated to their immediate chief, Mr. Posada, and their ultimate superior, Mr. Bosch, Tobago authorities. One of them, Mr. Ricardo, had specifically declared himself to be a CIA agent and had named his boss within the CIA hierarchy as Mr. Luis Posada Carriles, consider that, from the very outset, they had decided to pursue a cover-up that has been maintained ever Since. By adopting this attitude, the United States encourages the repetition of such crimes, It merely perpetuates the Policy of aggression it has followed against Cuba for many years, a policy that is currently being stepped up.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“Hernan Ricardo, on 21 October 1976, gave 4 statement to the Trinidad and Tobago Police Commissioner, who had alerted him before witnesses that anything he said could be used against him during the legal proceedings; not only did he say it, but he also handed it over in writing afterwards. He was asked whether anyone had given them guidance or directed them to place the bombs in the Cuban airliner, to which Mr. Ricardo said yes and added - which I shall cite from the testimony of Mr. Ramdwar - that he had been a CIA agent and working for Luis Posada Carriles. Mr. Ramdwar explained afterwards that Mr. Hernan Ricardo had explained to him the structure of the CoRrU terrorist group and that Mr, Bosch was the leader of that group.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“There is one further reason that might lead anyone to believe that, over the past 15 years, the United States should have deemed it necessary to make some clarification, having failed to provide the information to the Venezuelan court. In the document of the Venezuelan court, there is one point to which I should like to refer. That document contains a statement made by Mr. Dennis Elliot Ramdwar, Deputy Police Commissioner of Trinidad and Tobago. Mr. Ramdwar went to Caracas and took part in the judicial proceedings as a witness. Among other things, he submitted the results of the investigation conducted by the authorities of Trindidad and Tobago with regard to this crime. As Mr. Ramdwar explained, orally and in writing, when he interviewed one of the two individuals accused of sabotage by the court, Mr.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“He was helped to find a safe Place to live, and was given a job: in this country, with its millions of unemployed, a foreign terrorist obtained not one job, but two, his Salaries paid by American taxpayers, At this very moment, he is being allowed to exhibit his paintings, to publicize his exhibitions in Miami, to appear in the place where the exhibitions are being held, and to receive the proceeds from the sale of his art. Can one really say with any degree of seriousness that the Government of the United States has nothing to do with this matter or with the responsibilities of Mr. Bosch and Mr. Posada Carriles? There is even more.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela, who addressed the General Assembly, conveying with firmness, dignity and clarity the repudiation by the people and the Government of Venezuela of this act of sabotage, called on us and others to help by providing any information we had. Specifically, at 3 press conference held in this very building in November 1976 President Perez stated, inter alia: "T cannot make any specific statement on the possible responsibility of any United States Government agency with respect to Cuban terrorism, put I think it is the duty of the United States to dispel ali the doubts that are continuously expressed in the international and the United States press concerning the participation of official agencies in connivance with those terrorist groups". as was shown before the Senate, when he escaped from prison.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“Perhaps they do not know, but Obviously it would not be very hard to find out if they wanted to, If one looks at this case objectively, I think one must conclude that the United States possessed and still possesses information and evidence concerning the act of sabotage perpetrated against the Cubana airiiner in 1976, information it has never made public but has kept secret - despite its legal and ethical obligations; despite the fact that the International Civil Aviation Organization called on all States to act with vigour and resolve in this matter so that the guilty might be duly punished; and despite the fact that the Venezuelan authorities requested all in a position to do so to provide any useful information.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“I do not recall hearing of a Single such Nazi who painted, exhibited his Paintings and received the proceeds from their Sale -~ with every step the Subject of public announcements and public comment, and with the authorities Proceeds were exported disclaiming any knowledge of his whereabouts. In this case, perhaps, they were not exported any great distance: Mr, Posada might even be in Miami.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“, The interview gives the impression that he has a good opinion of his own work; yet he seems to mass-produce paintings which, he Says, are sent to Miami, where they are exhibited Publicly and sola - at a higher price, he acknowledges, than they are worth in terms of their artistic merit. ana the money goes to him. So Miami imports paintings by a terrorist and sends him the money from the sale of those paintings, These are not postcard-size daubings, and they are not turned out in small numbers; they are mass-produced. The interviewer Speaks of the most recent show in Miami, where Posada exhibited 160 works for which he received $20,000 - by his own admission an excessive sum, Are Posada Carriles's whereabouts such a Secret? Is he one of those old murderers, one of those Nazis who suddenly turn up after decades of hiding?”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“He lives in an undisclosed location, in a house the journalist described as very well protected, even well armed. Mr. Posada speaks of his support staff and his security staff, who protect him at home, and whenever he goes out into the city where he lives. He speaks also of having had several very costly plastic-surgery operations. In short, he does not give the impression of an abandoned, lost soul in some corner of the planet. He goes further, explaining Something that is known from other public Sources: he is ~ wonder of wonders - an artist, a painter on top of everything else. The CIA has created poets? it seems also to have created painters. Posada Carriles, long-time explosives expert and assassin, is now a painter.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“Posada is now - a matter to which I shall return - they will at least acknowledge that they aid indeed know his whereabouts a few years ago: he was apparently an official in their own Department, and his proposals reached even the White House. Subsequently, Mr. Luis Posada Carriles crops up again, in an interview with a Miami weekly publication, Tropic, which is a supplement to the Miami Herald. We are not speaking of prehistory here: the supplement was published on 10 November 1991, only a few months ago. Mr. Posada describes his life in great detail; he speaks of many of the matters to which I have referred this afternoon, and he has interesting things to say about his present situation. The journalist describes that situation: this man is not living in hiding in the depths of some cave.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“Posada Carriles is at the moment - and I will return to this later - they certainly did know his whereabouts a few years ago, when he happened to be an employee of that same State Department and was even sending proposals to the White House itself. This was a practical proposal because, 4£ Posada Carriles was working both for the White House, on illegal programmes, and for the State Department, on legal programmes, he would, I imagine, have been receiving two salaries. But the proposal was to merge the two programmes - which everyone had assumed to be the case from the start. I hope that when the State Department spokesmen claim not to know where Mr.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“Owen's testimony before the United States Senate, Luis Posada Carriles was the Support Director for 'the NHAO Programme in San Salvador. Further, in a memorandum dated 28 March 1986 ang Submitted to the congressional hearings, Mr. Owen submitted to Mr. North a Proposal that we must acknowledge, notwithstanding other grounds for criticism, to have been a wise one. The Proposal was signed by Owen and Posada Carriles and sent by them to Mr. North at the White House. Thus, Posada Carriles was working for the White House on illegal programmes and for the State Department on legal programmes and receiving two Salaries. I imagine that that proposal was to merge the two programmes, Something everyone assumed had been done from the beginning. So that when the State Department's spokesmen now allege that they do not know where Mr.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“A short time later, however, additional information appeared that is perhaps even more imteresting than the foregoing. The United States Senate released the information that Posada Carriles not only directed an operation that was illegal from the American standpoint but that he was also in the employ of the American State Department, which, we must assume, aS 4 branch of the Government, does work within clearer parameters. According to Mr. Robert Owen, at the time Mr. Posada Carriles was working under his direction as well. Mr. Robert Owen was then the Director of the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO), a programme authorized by the American Congress to deliver humanitarian - not military - assistance to the contras. According to Mr.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“Felix Rodriguez even spoke of meetings between himself and the then Vice President George Bush and described a number of violations of American laws and norms he had committed, but there was one point, and one point only, on which he refused to give any explanation to the Senators. That point was reached when it came to provide an answer to the precise question of the notes Mr. North had kept in his diary about the $50,000 that Mas Canosa had given to him and regarding the precise relationship between that sum of money and Mr. Posada Carriles's escape from the Venezuelan jail. Hence, I can imagine that someone might say to me that, after all, those were relationships between Mr. Posada Carriles and the possibly clandestine basement of the White House in Washington, where the laws of that country were not being strictiy obeyed.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“According to a United Press International dispatch dated 4 September 1988, a correspondent of that news agency interviewed three Cuban exile leaders in Miami and two former assistants of Mr. Posada Carriles, all five of whom said that Mr. Mas Canosa had given the money to finance Mr. Posada Carriles's escape from jail. Furthermore, according to that American correspondent, (spoke in English) "A federal law enforcement official said he received reports alleging Mas's involvement, but declined to elaborate further." (continued in Spanish) It is interesting that in his lengthy statement before the Senate Committee, Mr.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“Luis Posada Carriles turned up again in a way that has led many to believe that the matter went far beyond any Specific activities he may have been conducting in San Salvador. Soon, Mr. Felix Rodriguez, an officer of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) working with Posada Carriles in San Salvador, admitted to the United States Senate. that he had taken Part in the operation conducted to get Mr. Posada Carriles out of his Venezuelan jail and into his new activities in Central America under the direction of the White House basement, And there was even more information: According to Cuban-American character residing in Miami called Jorge Mas Canosa; at the time the former needed money to obtain Mr. Posada Carriles's release from the Venezuelan jail.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“Posada Carriles was not only very active in the struggle against communism - in this case it would be more accurate to say against the peoples of Central America - but that he also worked under the orders of a man whose offices were in the very basement of the White House. Of course, at this time, although the affair did have Some repercussions in the press, an attempt was made to conceal the information and no appropriate investigation was mounted to try to determine what Mr. Posada Carriles was doing in San Salvador conducting activities under the guidance of Oliver North. As time went by the American Senate, as we all know, held a series of hearings to look into certain irregularities in the conduct of American foreign policy, particularly with regard to the contras, and in the course of those hearings Mr.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“MacFarlane, who was national security adviser to the President at the time, warning him about the enormous consequences that might ensue for American policy in Central America as a result of this incident and the undesirable facts it might bring to light. Indeed, so important was this matter that Mr. North's memorandum also alerted Mr. MacFarlane to the fact that President Reagan - who was on his way to Iceland for a summit meeting - had been informed of it prior to his departure and of Mr. North's plan to hire the best attorneys in the world with a view to avoiding any relevations as a result of Mr. Hasenfus's accident in Nicaragua. This is the first time that we have any indication that Mr.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source
“John Tower - who had been a United States Senator - to look into any possible infringements of the law that might have occurred in relation to assistance to the contras during the time such assistance was prohibited by American law, as well as to look into other matters related to the issue. Curiously, this book, which says practically nothing specific and which has been so carefully prepared and worded, does make one slip, which occurs in very small print at the end, in the section on notes. There, we find information which tells us that no sooner had the incident with Mr. Hasenfus's piane occurred than Mr. Oliver North sent a memorandum to Mr.”
1992-05-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3080 (1992) · source