YouSaid · the spoken record

Arias

lines on the record: 1,107
first: 1999-09-11
most recent: 2023-02-07
sittings or episodes: 176
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“They have a large cargo bay, and the cylinders can be easily pushed out. Let us turn to the hypotheses that, as some have proposed, the cylinders were delivered by surface, manually placed or launched from adjacent buildings. Why have those three hypotheses been discarded —”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“The cradle was still attached and was of the same design as that at location 2, and was also similar in design to the those in the previous incidents I already mentioned. The relatively faster degradation of the cradle indicates that a corrosive chemical substance remained on site for a period of time, indicating that the valve was not ruptured and released the chlorine little by little. The first instance of corrosion could not have been caused by natural humidity. It took place at a slower rate than at location 2, through the slow release of gas from the cylinder. Both cylinders were designed with multiple straps, handles and a set of wheels to facilitate loading and unloading them from aircraft. They were especially designed to be delivered by air. Mi-8 or Mi- 17 helicopters are particularly suitable for dropping that kind of cylinder.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“The white colouration that could be seen in the first photos that we have of the cylinder was formed by frost on its surface, which is consistent with the auto- refrigeration phenomenon, having occurred upon the rapid release of a liquefied gas from the cylinder. The white colouration disappeared the next day, uncovering the original yellow colouration. It is a very well-known phenomenon. The metal cradles were detached upon impact and suffered heavy corrosion as a consequence of the released chlorine gas, which is highly corrosive to metals. At location 4, the other building that was inhabited, the cylinder and the cradle showed deformations that were studied and underwent calculations through dynamic simulations by experts.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“At location 4, the valve of the cylinder did not rupture, and the cylinder released the gas more slowly. What can we see from the results of the study of the cylinders at location 2? The cylinder was visibly deformed. The cylinder was blackened by soot. Immediately after the incident, part of it was white-coloured, and the following day it was yellow. The metal cradles attached to the cylinder were detached and very corroded. Two circular metal plates are visible in the photos. One was recovered by the Fact-Finding Mission. Why is everything I said relevant? How do we explain those observations? The deformation of the cylinder is due to the strong impact against the top of the building. The black soot was caused by the fire that ignited after the incident.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“The images we had were subjected to imagery analysis to obtain the metadata extraction and corroboration of that metadata extraction by several different experts. Three munitions specialists were consulted, and a specialized forensic institute was in charge of conducting the study. I should say that similar cylinders were found in the incidents in Latamenah, an attack that as Council members know took place on 25 March 2017, and in Saraqib, on 4 February 2018. Those incidents are related to the first and second report of the IIT. The cylinders are very similar because the attack, logistically speaking, was similar. At location 2, which is the building where most of the people were and where the 43 fatalities occurred, the valve of the cylinder ruptured and released chlorine gas in big quantities in a very short period of time.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“On 9 July 2021, the Syrian Arab Republic informed the Technical Secretariat that the two cylinders had been destroyed. They were destroyed 60 kilometres from the place where the OPCW inspectors had deposited them in the custody of the Syrian Arab Republic. The IIT requested information related to the destruction, including why those two cylinders were located 60 kilometres away — far away — from the place where they had been deposited and sealed with the agreement that the cylinders would not be touched, unsealed or removed except with the written permission of the Technical Secretariat. Since we could not access the site, but did have access to a lot of information, the IIT decided to work on that information. The information was basically imagery and the expertise of top institutions and persons in a number of places.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Despite resolution 2118 (2013) — which states in paragraph 7 that the Security Council decides that the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations by providing their personnel with immediate and unfettered access to and the right to inspect all sites in discharging their functions — the IIT could not access the sites because the Syrian Arab Republic did not issue the team members’ visas. That means that the IIT had to work on the basis of other information. We have pictures, but we should say that we had a lot of information because of the fact that the mission had access to the site just about three weeks after the incident, when it took more than 100 samples and many photos and videos.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Mr. Arias: I do not mind continuing to respond. With regard to the question concerning the two yellow cylinders found in Douma and the different hypotheses that have been put on the table, I took notes on the question and can respond. As Council members know, the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) was unable to access the site of the two locations of the incident in Douma.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“It is important for the Council to know that I am very proud of the Technical Secretariat’s members and their work. And in this instance, I am particularly satisfied with the team led by Ambassador Oñate-Laborde, a high-ranking diplomat and lawyer. Perhaps he would like to complete the discussion of my methodology.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“During this meeting, the work of the IIT and the Technical Secretariat has been put in question. It was said that the work was falsified and that we produce lies, and so forth. I have to react to what I heard from one delegation. We read the comments, and we listen attentively to what is said. In all the documents of the Technical Secretariat, no one will ever find a single inappropriate comment with regard to any person, State or institution. We respect everybody. In all our documents, it can be seen that we read, we listen, we analyse, we report and, accordingly, respecting everybody, we deliver. It is very unfortunate that this is not always reciprocated. I want to tell the Security Council that I cannot and will not accept personal discourtesies of the kind I have heard today in this Chamber and read in the past.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“I have in front of me a list of at least 20 international bodies that use the same method — the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine; the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia; the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya. I can continue reading. I can give the Council a copy of the text I have, but the most interesting thing is that, among other information from important legislation and organizations, I have here articles 376 and 431.1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, which also refer to reasonable grounds to believe in cases of inquiries of investigations. That is the standard method, and the method we have been using.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“I have to say that the Technical Secretariat cannot bend the facts we find to accommodate some people’s or States’ perceptions of reality. We work only on the basis of facts. On the other hand, it is very clear that we work on the basis of reasonable grounds to believe. The theories that have been discarded were discarded because we found that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that any other hypothesis put forward so far was credible. Once and for all, it is clear that the concept of reasonable grounds to believe is the standard approach used by international investigative bodies.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Corroboration also takes place in the context of supporting elements already previously supported or confirmed by other means. Ambassador Oñate Laborde already mentioned that in his briefing. The IIT works on the basis of that method. Together with his team, he has been gathering as much information as possible, and the IIT has indeed gained access to a great deal of information of diverse natures and origins in the course of almost two years of investigation. The IIT has assessed the credibility and authenticity of that information and has analysed and studied it, supported by the best experts. It finally identified when such corroboration, as just defined, could take place, and that is the only way to investigate. Sometimes the idea of reasonable grounds to believe has also been questioned.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Ambassador Oñate Laborde will complete my information, but I want to say something that must be said here in the Chamber. The methods of the IIT follow the highest standards regarding the procedures generally accepted by international organizations and best practices of fact-finding bodies and commissions of inquiry. We follow the method of corroboration. But what is corroboration? I want to clarify what corroboration is in the investigation of an international case. In the context of the work of the IIT, and, more generally, in all the units of the Technical Secretariat concerned, the definition of corroboration is the action of confirming whether information of diverse natures and origins supports a finding, theory or statement. It is about adding support and credibility to such findings, or to an idea previously presented.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Accordingly, the Technical Secretariat will continue to implement the mandates that it receives, because the role of the Technical Secretariat is not to interpret or evaluate the decisions of the Conference or the Executive Council. The role of the Technical Secretariat is to implement them in the best way that we can, and that is what we do. The decision was adopted according to the rules. The IIT was set up by the Technical Secretariat according to the rules. I must recall that any decision of the Conference or the Executive Council of the OPCW is legally binding for both States parties and the Technical Secretariat. That is in relation to the legitimacy of the OPCW. The methodology of the IIT regarding its investigations was also called into question.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“The decision adopted on 27 June 2018, on the basis of which the IIT was established, was adopted by the Conference in accordance with the rules that are clearly set out in the Convention and the Conference rules related to the procedure. It was adopted by a vote of member States. I recall that there are 193 States members of the OPCW. As was mentioned here several times, the decision was adopted in line with a very well- established position of the international community, namely, that the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable. Subsequent to the adoption of that decision, the Technical Secretariat carried out the mandate entrusted to it under the Convention and by the Conference.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“The legality and legitimacy of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) have been called into question. Article VIII, paragraph 19, of the Chemical Weapons Convention provides that the Conference of the States Parties shall consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of the Convention. It also provides that the Conference may make recommendations and take decisions on such questions, matters or issues raised by a State party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council, and the Conference can do that on its own authority. It is for the Conference to decide on its own competence, as set out in rule 64 of its rules of procedure.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Bustani was the Director-General who left the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 21 years ago, and he has no knowledge of the substantive affairs with which we are currently dealing at the Organization. With regard to my briefings to the Security Council, it is always a great pleasure for me to speak before the Security Council. I have addressed it five times. This is the fifth time that I have been here in four and a half years. My predecessors were never at the Security Council as frequently. But, when I address the Security Council, it is when there is something really new and substantive that can complete the very good reports and very good briefings given on monthly basis by the High Representative. Let us now turn to more substantive questions.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Mr. Arias: It was said that the briefing was empty. Everything is related to a report that has 124 pages, which is comprehensive, extensive and accurate, and the statements by the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Japan, Ecuador, Switzerland, Ghana, Brazil, Albania, China and the United States of America demonstrate that the meeting is truly substantive. A certain ambassador questioned the responsibility of the Director-General. I want to say that the Director-General is delivering, but he is delivering on the basis of the mandates that he received, together with his team. The mandates are given by the policy-making organs; they are not received from a single ambassador or Permanent Representative. My so-called predecessor was mentioned. The delegation said that Mr. Bustani was my predecessor. Mr.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“The report is now in the hands of the Security Council, and it will be up to the United Nations, the OPCW and the international community in general to take further steps or actions — those that members will deem necessary. I very much appreciate the opportunity to brief the Council. I will now hand over to the Coordinator of the IIT.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“The States parties to the OPCW and Members of the United Nations have to decide on the next steps. Since the day I took office as Director-General of the OPCW, in July 2018, I have been making every effort to engage the Syrian Arab Republic to find ways to address and resolve various issues related to its chemical weapons dossier. In relation to the mandate to identify the perpetrators, despite my several attempts to engage the Syrian authorities, the authorities have refused to recognize or engage with the IIT. It should be recalled that all mandates given under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the decisions of the OPCW policymaking organs concerning the Syrian chemical weapons dossier remain binding on all States parties and on the Technical Secretariat.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“The building is ready. The Technical Secretariat will use all of the Centre’s new capabilities to ensure that knowledge, capacity and skills are kept and developed in the organization for a better implementation of the Convention. Before I conclude, I wish to recall a few essential points. The IIT is part of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW and is not a judicial body, special court or tribunal. The IIT does not have the authority to assign individual criminal responsibility. Its mandate, provided by the OPCW Conference of the States Parties, is to establish the facts and identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons. However, through its work, the OPCW provides the international community with materials and evidence that will assist accountability mechanisms in their task.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“It is worth mentioning that the IIT attaches the utmost importance to the quality of its work, despite the difficult conditions, which have included numerous and sophisticated cyberattacks, a massive spread of disinformation about our work and sometimes even disrespect of some staff members, in addition to the restrictions imposed by the coronavirus disease pandemic, which are very familiar to all of us. Lessons have been learned and continue to be learned. Just as with all the missions of the Technical Secretariat in Syria — the Declaration Assessment Team, the Fact- Finding Mission and others — the Technical Secretariat will continue to ensure that the knowledge, skills and expertise acquired remain embedded in all of its relevant units. The construction of the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology was just been completed.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“I also want to remind the Council that corroborating consists in gathering as much information as possible, analysing all the elements, comparing them with one another and against all scenarios and arriving at incontestable conclusions. All views were considered and put up against the facts. Many relevant units of the Technical Secretariat provided valuable support to the Team in the course of its activities. The IIT report was prepared with strict respect for the independence of the Team’s investigation and on a clear need-to-know basis. I can guarantee that the investigations were performed under the sole authority of the IIT Coordinator and that the substantive results were completely respected.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“That standard consists of a comprehensive and consistent combination and corroboration of all the information and evidence collected as a whole. The IIT’s conclusions are based on an overall assessment and a thorough analysis of all the various and numerous pieces of evidence received and collected. It is the corroboration of all those elements — the testimonies of victims and witnesses, medical records, sample collections and extensive analyses and studies of chemistry, ballistics, military elements, forensic expertise, computer modelling, satellite imagery, remnants of munitions, as well as the authentication of videos and photos, to name a few — which, taken together, have enabled the IIT to reach its conclusions.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“In addition to all of this, countless national statements have been delivered in past years at the OPCW, the United Nations and other international forums expressing the view that those responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable. There is one common principle underlying those reactions that has never been contested by any State party — the absolute prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and the unanimous and repeated condemnation of any use by anyone under any circumstances, in addition to the belief that the perpetrators must be identified and held accountable. I would like to point out that every report produced by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW, including those of the IIT, follows the highest standards and best practices used by international investigative bodies for reaching solid conclusions.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“General Assembly resolution 77/73, adopted this year, expresses the firm belief that individuals responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable. It also stresses the importance of the implementation of the decision on 27 June 2018 of the OPCW Conference of the States Parties, which mandated the Technical Secretariat to identify the perpetrators of chemical-weapon use in Syria, creating the IIT. The Conference and the Executive Council of the OPCW have also stated in a number of decisions that those responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“In August 2011, the Human Rights Council created the Independent International Commission of Inquiry with the purpose of investigating alleged abuses of international human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic. In December 2016, the General Assembly established the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. The General Assembly has addressed the issue of chemical weapons through its annually adopted resolution on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, submitted this year by Poland.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Accountability for the use of chemical weapons has been requested on many occasions at the highest level. The Security Council has repeatedly called for those responsible for the use of chemical weapons to be held accountable. Council resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015) and 2235 (2015) all contain that strong message. The Secretary-General has also supported that call in his statements by emphasizing that accountability is an essential part of deterrence in the use of chemical weapons. The General Assembly and the Human Rights Council have both echoed the call that those responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable. Several international entities have been created to address the alleged crimes committed in the Syrian Arab Republic as part of the accountability framework.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Among the war’s atrocities, the grim record of the conflict includes chemical weapons. Chemical weapons have been used in the Syrian Arab Republic, both before and after its accession in September 2013 to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Those well-documented and repeated uses took place despite the successful destruction of more than 1,300 metric tons of declared Syrian stockpiles under stringent OPCW verification measures. All 193 States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention solemnly and voluntarily agreed and committed to excluding completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. That has been upheld, as we have seen from the international reactions to the use of chemical weapons at various levels in various organizations, entities and forums.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“It conclusively demonstrates that craters found on top of the buildings could not be caused by dropping the cylinders from the adjacent buildings, because the highest one is highly is hardly 16 metres higher than those on which the cylinders fell. That difference in height is not sufficient for the cylinders to reach the needed speed to produce the damage that was found on top of the buildings. The IIT found that on the basis of all the information analysed, there are reasonable grounds to believe that at least one helicopter was used, and that it was operated by the Tiger Forces, an elite unit of the Syrian armed forces. The details of the IIT report will be presented by Mr. Santiago Oñate-Laborde, Coordinator of the IIT, following my statement. The Syrian people have now been suffering from war for about 12 years.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Some of the individuals who were in the building sought refuge in the basement, thinking that they would be better protected there during what they thought was a conventional air strike at the time. Others, who were aware that the chemical used would be heavier than air and sink to the lower part of the building, tried to reach the upper floors. Both the basement where the chlorine gas expanded, as it is 2.5 times heavier than air, and the upper floors of the building where the cylinder was releasing chlorine gas in high concentration were lethal places to shelter. The work of the IIT also provides proof that it would have been impossible to stage the attack by manually placing the cylinders, even less so in the middle of the air strikes that were taking place at the same time.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“local time, at least one helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force, departing from Dumayr airbase and operating under the control of the Tiger Forces, dropped two yellow cylinders that hit two residential buildings in a civilian- populated area, killing 43 named individuals and affecting dozens more. Several contradictory scenarios were examined by the IIT against the backdrop of evidence collected and analysed. The evidence not only validated and corroborated the conclusions reached, but also discarded all other scenarios. The work of the IIT confirmed that highly concentrated chlorine gas coming from one of the two cylinders killed 43 persons in one of the buildings.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“It elaborates on the conclusions reached by the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s Fact-Finding Mission, which determined in its report published on the 1 March 2019 that highly concentrated chlorine gas had been used in the Douma incident of 7 April 2018. Beyond the work of the Fact-Finding Mission, the IIT led its own independent investigations. It reviewed a wide range of information, part of which it received and part of which it directly collected. On the basis of the analyses and studies carried out, the IIT concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that, on 7 April 2018, between 7.10 p.m. and 7.40 p.m.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“The Council will recall that, on 27 June 2018, the OPCW Conference of the States Parties decided to mandate the Technical Secretariat to put in place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In accordance with the decision, the Investigation and Identification Team was established. The Team began its work in June 2019 and subsequently issued two separate reports, on 8 April 2020 and 12 April 2021, about four different cases. The report before us today is therefore the third report issued by the IIT. It sets out the findings of the investigation that took place over a period of two years, from January 2021 to December 2022.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“We will brief the members of the Security Council today on the third report of the Investigation and the Identification Team on the chemical-weapons attack that took place in Douma, in the Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018. On Friday, 27 January, the report was shared in The Hague with the 193 member States of the OPCW and with the Secretary-General, as mandated by the OPCW Conference of the States Parties in its decision of 27 June 2018. Later, the report was also published on the OPCW official website. I believe that everyone here has already had an opportunity to read the findings of the report. Translations in all official languages are being processed, and we will make them available them in due course.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“I also thank members of the Council for inviting me to brief them to today, together with Ambassador Oñate-Laborde, Coordinator of the Investigation and Identification Team. This is the fifth time, in less than five years, that I have been provided with an opportunity to brief the Security Council, which demonstrates the interest of the Council on matters of common interest. Every month, the Council meets pursuant to resolution 2118 (2013) to address the Syrian chemical weapons dossier and is briefed by Under-Secretary-General Nakamitsu. At each meeting, the Council is supported in this task by the OPCW and the monthly report we address through the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council. In addition, Under-Secretary- General Nakamitsu and I have periodic conversations to update her with the latest information.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Mr. Arias: On behalf of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and on my own behalf, I would like to convey our deepest condolences to the representatives of Türkiye and Syria on the deadly earthquake that struck both countries yesterday. In this period of grief, our thoughts and prayers here in The Hague are with those who lost loved ones. We wish those who were injured in the disaster a speedy recovery in such difficult circumstances. I will start with the briefing to the members of the Security Council on the third report of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT).I very much appreciate the presence of the Under-Secretary-General in the Chamber today and her very good statement.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Again, I thank the members of the Security Council, and especially the President and the Russian Permanent Representative. We have to be open. We have to work together in the best spirit that we can for the benefit of the United Nations, the OPCW and, of course, the international community.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Out of the more than 100 samples, more than 70 good samples were analysed after the summer of 2018. The bulk of the investigation, the bulk of the information, the bulk of the analyses of all the information that had been gathered came after the two inspectors left. I do not understand why the Pinheiro Commission — the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic — is contested. The Commission has legitimacy because it was set up by the General Assembly, and it has this authority because it reports to the General Assembly. The Commission reported to the General Assembly in August 2018 what I have already said in connection with Douma referring to helicopters, cylinders, chlorine, apartment buildings and casualties. The Russian note verbale is published and that is what they have to say.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“The IIT was set up by a decision of the Conference of the States Parties. The Conference of the States Parties, according to the Chemical Weapons Convention, must deal with any matter or issue related to the implementation of the Convention. On the other hand, this decision is in line with what I have commented on extensively previously. All this international doctrine is related to the general will that those who used chemical weapons had to be held accountable. The Conference of the States Parties decided, on 27 June 2018, that the IIT had to be set up of its own authority and in line with Security Council resolutions, and not only resolution 2118 (2013). Of course, the bulk of the investigations related to Douma came after I arrived at the organization, after July 2018.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Mr. Arias: It has been said that I came to this meeting well-prepared. I came well-prepared because I respect the Security Council and when I come to brief Council members, I consider it to be an extremely important task and I make an effort to prepare my notes and my knowledge in the best possible way, which I think is a very normal thing. Nothing has been said that was not known. I do not know if Council members know everything. Perhaps it is not necessary for the Director-General to come back to the Security Council, but I would come back with my best will and highest interests to transmit to members what I know. If members know everything, that is all the better. The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is not recognized by the Syrian Arab Republic.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“We have one of the top companies in the Netherlands for the construction. If everything goes as it has so far thanks to the Board that we have here in the organization, chaired by the Deputy Director- General and our experts under my supervision, member States will have a fantastic tool for different activities with the programmes that we are preparing. I think that I have responded to the questions posed. It remains only for me to again thank you, Mr. President, for your invitation and your kind words.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“The Centre for Chemistry and Technology shown here will be a fantastic tool for research, investigation, international cooperation, which is highly demanded by the vast majority of member States, training, expertise and skills. We have been making serious efforts all together in the Technical Secretariat to progress in this project. We have the trust and confidence of member States, and the proof is that, despite the fact that we have a budget with zero nominal growth, in approximately 18 months we received voluntary contributions to the tune of more than €34 million euros to build the Centre. We respond to that trust and to that rapport with concrete results. I can say that we are on schedule and are respecting the budget in the construction of the Centre. We are not delayed. The construction will start this month, in June.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“I can assure Council members that the Technical Secretariat has been examining and analysing in depth everything that we have received from the Syrian Arab Republic through the permanent representation of Syria here in The Hague. But it has not been possible to link that information to any real origin of use of chemical weapons or to any of the investigations that we are carrying out. Regarding the accusation of use by terrorists in Syria, I said that in my opening statement. One of my main concerns is that it could be in favour of terrorists, who can cause a great deal of harm with very small amounts of extremely dangerous substances. We are working to investigate, safeguard the knowledge and have the means to deal with that threat, assisting and protecting Member States.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“But, of course, I want to make it clear that, if someone breaks the rules, I will react and I will take action. I will also respond to the question with regard to the materials supplied by the Syrian authorities. We were receiving a lot of materials. We received a great deal of information from the Syrian authorities. But I want to tell the Council precisely how much. Regarding the information supplied by Syria, in the past five years we received, and I think that the High Representatives received the same or something very similar, 197 notes verbales from the Syrian permanent representation in The Hague related to alleged chemical weapons activities in terms of storage, movements, intent of use or staging, with no details or no supporting documentation that could be verified independently.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“In addition, last July, in the twenty-first preambular paragraph of decision C-25/DEC.9, entitled “Addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Republic”, the Executive Council said: “Expressing its full support and appreciation for the professional, impartial, and independent work of the Director-General and the Secretariat”. In recent years, we have seen the re-emergence of chemical weapons in several places. The Technical Secretariat has tackled those new challenges with determination, commitment, independence, expertise and with the will to serve Member States and the international community. Since I started work at the OPCW at the end of July 2018, I saw in the organization a group of dedicated, honest and professional people who support me in an incredible way with very high professional standards.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“I must not judge the decisions or the task of the Member States, but thinking about its limitations, I have to say that I have difficulties understanding the system. In conclusion, because the OPCW Technical Secretariat has been recently — and unfairly, I have to say — criticized, I want to underline that, at its twenty-fifth session, in April 2020, the Conference of the State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, in its decision entitled “Addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, expressed its full support and appreciation for the professional, impartial independent work of the Director-General and the OPCW Technical Secretariat.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“My legal obligation is to implement what the Member States decide, and all of us in the Technical Secretariat work in a modest, dedicated, professional way because we feel a moral, professional and above all legal responsibility to do so. Not long ago, in the Security Council, Mr. Geir Pedersen, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the start of the war, said, “The Syrian tragedy will go down as one of the darkest chapters in recent history, with the Syrian people as among the greatest victims of this century... [I]n the face of the unimaginable violence and indignities[,] ... [t]hey have endured the unspeakable horrors of chemical weapons” (S/2021/265, annex I). This was said in the Security Council on 15 March 2021. As I said, I cannot judge.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Some Council members are perhaps not comfortable with the Technical Secretariat, but we implement the decisions and resolutions of the Council, which have basically the same goals. The decisions of the Executive Council and the Conference are also in line with this uncontested universal international law doctrine I mentioned, and with resolution 2118 (2013). The OPCW Technical Secretariat is a target of criticism because it is implementing the decision of the Conference of the States Parties of the 27 June 2018, which set up the IIT to investigate the identity of the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We have no choice, and we do have to understand that.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source