YouSaid · the spoken record

Arias

lines on the record: 1,107
first: 1999-09-11
most recent: 2023-02-07
sittings or episodes: 176
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“On 21 April 2015, a hundred years later, we commemorated the centennial of the attack in Ypres for an entire day. I was invited because I was already involved in the field of chemical weapons, so I went. All the Member States — all of them, without exception — agreed with the declaration in which they reaffirmed their condemnation in the strongest possible terms of the use of chemical weapons. They also expressed their strong conviction that those responsible for the use of chemical weapons should be held accountable. At that time, everyone agreed on this declaration. But now some Member States are opposed to investigating and identifying the origin of those chemical weapons and therefore assigning responsibility for their use; those countries cannot be comfortable with the OPCW Technical Secretariat.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“It is a declaration that constitutes the prohibition and is based on universal uncontested doctrine of international law and undisputed customary international law, because the use of chemical weapons can be a war crime, even a crime against humanity. This principle was of course not established by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat is in charge of implementing States parties’ and Council members’ decisions, on the basis of international law. And resolution 2118 (2013) clearly states that those responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable. On 21 April 1915, the first large-scale chemical-weapons attack took place. It looked horrible. It happened in a little village in the south-west of Belgium called Ypres.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“That those responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable is a principle that is found in resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, and in many decisions of the Conference of the States Parties, and in countless national statements at the United Nations, at the OPCW and in other bodies. I want to properly state the following: if I requested hard copies of all the statements of the States Members of the United Nations or the member States of the OPCW declaring that those responsible must be held accountable, my office would be filled with documents.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Let me refer also to something that is in the background of the many commentaries, which have been on the whole very positive. I thank Council members very sincerely for that. But what I see is that there is general support for the implementation of the Convention and general support for the work of the Technical Secretariat. However, there are some critics, for example, of the mandate of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT). The IIT has a mandate that is not recognized by some — very few — Member States.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“I have already implicitly responded to this question: no visas, a lack of access to Syrian territory, but what I have to say is that the position of the Director-General is very often very difficult. When asked about cooperation with the Syrian Arab Republic, I will say that all States parties are obliged to implement rules and decisions and that they have to adopt measures in case of non-implementation. My task is to implement the Convention and to run the Technical Secretariat in the best way possible. The Director-General is not a judge. I cannot judge the Member States. I cannot judge the work of the Executive Council or the Conference. It is up to Member States to forge their perception of the situation and, if they consider it necessary, take action.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“It means a very strong basis to conclude that chemical weapons have been used. In connection with the comments related to the BBC podcast in November 2020, a person named “Leon” was being interviewed on the programme. The word “león” in Spanish means “lion” in English. The OPCW Technical Secretariat does not know this person, and, of course, it did not authorize any staff members to go to the BBC for this programme. If this person is identified, I will naturally open an investigation to find out if there is a breach of the rules of confidentiality. For the time being, what we did is open an internal investigation. Let me now address progress in Syria’s cooperation, which is a question that has been posed by more than one member of the Council.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“The combination and the consistency of all the information collected as well as corroboration among the various sources help us to reach conclusions. The challenge for the IIT has not been a lack of information; we got a lot of information. Its real challenge has been the inability to access the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic because its authorities did not allow the IIT in — despite the requests I made and the obligation of the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution 2118 (2013), which calls for immediate and unfettered access to the territory of Syria. I would also like to express my consistent position on the reasonable grounds to believe as the basis for the conclusions. This is standard; we did not invent it. It is customary; and it is a very well-known legal term.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“We also conducted many interviews, analysis of samples, analysis of remnants in the field, analysis of glass-dispersion models, forensic studies and topographic studies. All of these together —and perhaps I am forgetting some — make up 400 gigabytes of information, assessed holistically by a very competent team, with the support of the specialized team of the rest of the Technical Secretariat, of course. The methods reflect the best practices of international fact-find missions. The lines of inquiry suggested by the Syrian Arab Republic in connection with this case were also analysed, but no concrete information supporting them was found. I insisted that the IIT work off of leads with different kinds of information.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“The second report of the IIT, covering the period of April 2020 to April 2021, in connection with an attack on Saraqib, concluded that on 4 February 2018, at approximately 9.22 p.m., a military helicopter belonging to the Syrian air force and controlled by the Tiger Forces dropped at least one cylinder releasing chlorine — a toxic gas — and affected 12 individuals. The chlorine that was released is not the chemical one can find in a market for cleaning at home. It is a special chlorine. The information used by the investigation carried out by the IIT was based on the information provided in the second report —although the first report is very similar — by State parties that have given us a lot of important, needed information.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“The rules to protect the information are based on the Policy on Confidentiality document adopted in February 2006 by the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as on the annex on confidentiality to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The annexes to the Convention have the same value as the Convention itself. As a result, those requirements are very serious, and I must respect them. I know that the majority is interested in my comments on the second report of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT). I will comment on that if I have the time, but I would prefer to start with the first report. The Fact-Finding Mission has been producing reports, and the IIT uses those reports, but it also investigates, with additional sources of information.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“The Director-General of the OPCW has the primary responsibility to protect the information in the organization and must adopt, on the basis of his judgment, a decision on whether to disclose information, but that must always be done on the basis of safeguarding the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In addition, part of the information is automatically protected and confidential, such as when it belongs to a State that provides it or when it affects a certain State. Without the authorization from that member State, we cannot publish that information. Those are the rules; I did not invent them.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“The Security Council, the Conference of the States Parties and the Executive Council of the OPCW have produced resolutions and decisions, many times on the basis of the work of the Technical Secretariat. I understand that my responses do not satisfy everyone, especially one Ambassador in particular. I am very sorry for that; I cannot please everybody. There is nothing that can alter the reality; I cannot change the truth. In connection with the insistence to release information related to teams of experts we have hired, I have to say that I have a really important responsibility.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Police and judges have to protect the witnesses. We too have to protect our sources. As such, the names of the designated labs are not published. The names of the witnesses are not published. The names of the consultants we use are not published. We cannot publish that information because we want to guarantee their protection and independence, that is, no interference in their work. Every report of the Fact-Finding Mission has detailed information — the facts collected, the analysis made and the methodologies applied. These respond to long-standing international standards that we have not invented. We do not leave anything out of our conclusions. The processes that lead the Technical Secretariat have been presented repeatedly, in detail, to the Security Council and to the OPCW Executive Council.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“In those cases, our approach is to analyse everything we can on the basis of the information provided by witnesses and medical personal and documents of all kinds — satellite imagery, forensic analysis, metallurgy, military engineering, photos and videos. In other words, we adopt a holistic approach and come to conclusions when the various missions and teams see that all the information leads to the same origin, that one piece of information after another corroborates the whole. That is the system we need. Sometimes people ask why we do not give them more information related to the consultants, medical personnel, hospitals and designated labs we use? I do not go into those details because I cannot. It would make no sense, because witnesses need to be protected. That is also true in other places.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“That means that the Fact-Finding Mission is in charge of establishing if a chemical has been used as a chemical weapon or not. It uses standard methodology. The Fact-Finding Mission is a young body, as it was set up only in 2014. There is a long tradition of commissions of inquiry, and these are standard methodologies. The methodology used by the Fact-Finding Mission in its investigation is reflected in the facts that the mission has reported. We very much stress that the reports must be detailed, so that Member States all know about the process that led to the conclusions reached. Sometimes it is difficult to go on-site, of course.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“During the third round of inspections, in November 2018, the DAT discovered a Schedule 2.B.04 chemical, which is a degradation of a product included in the list of Schedule 1 chemicals. The Schedule 1 chemical is listed in the annex of chemicals to the Convention, which has the same value as the treaty. It is a list of the most dangerous chemicals that exist and that are usable only for warfare purposes. The Syrian Arab Republic has not yet provided an explanation. I now turn to the working methods of the Fact- Finding Mission. The Fact-Finding Mission was set up in 2014, as the Council is aware, and, I would stress, is in charge of establishing the facts relating to allegations of chemical weapons use. It has nothing to do with finding the perpetrators, those responsible for the use of chemical weapons, only the facts.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Council members are well aware of the fact that in summer it gets very hot at the sites and that we cannot deploy because the inspectors and experts must wear very heavy protective suits and carry very heavy equipment, so it is really impossible for them to work in the summer. The postponement of the DAT dates, as I mentioned in my opening statement, may mean that the DAT will not be able to go to the Syrian Arab Republic until the end of the summer. In connection with the two sites that have been inspected in relation to the Scientific Studies and Research Centre — Barzah and Jamrayah — we are inspecting them; we are in charge of verifying that no research, development, production or stockpiling of chemical weapons is taking place there.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“They went to analyse large storage containers that had previously been declared as a chemical-weapons site. We took samples; the samples were analysed, and, of course, the explanation so far has not been completed. That is why we put it as an outstanding issue. One of the chemicals detected in those containers is a neat chemical-warfare agent; it is undeclared, so we put it as a new outstanding issue. We have asked the Syrian Arab Republic to respond to what the Council mentioned. What can we do? We have requested the Syrian Arab Republic to provide documents and to organize more meetings with us to visit two sites. We have not been able to go again because the visas have not been issued. Indeed, I am afraid that we will not be able to go until the end of summer.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Thirdly, the declarable activities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre are inaccurate and incomplete. As everybody knows, the Centre is the place where all the research and development programmes on chemical weapons took place. Fourthly, the quantity of chemical-warfare agents is not clear. The production or weaponization of the chemical-weapons production facility that has been discovered is not clear. We have even discovered samples that reveal that production has taken place in a former chemical-weapons storage facility that was declared; what was not declared was its production. I can provide additional information on the last two outstanding issues; one of them arose after the twenty-third round of consultations in Syria by the DAT in September 2020.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“They include one chemical-weapons production facility, four research and development facilities, five chemical-weapons agents and thousands of large-calibre chemical-weapons munitions. We have been working with the Syrian Arab Republic through the DAT for several years, during 24 rounds of consultations. The original declaration has been amended 17 times, each time because of the proposals the DAT made on the basis of the information that it was getting. Today we still have 20 outstanding issues. Their number counts, but their nature also counts. Why? Because hundreds of tons of agents and munitions were reported to have been destroyed or consumed prior to accession, but we cannot verify that that happened. Secondly, three chemical agents have been found in samples by the DAT. That is another pending issue; it has not been clarified.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“That is why my predecessor, following the normal legal procedure, put in place the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) in April 2014. What was the goal of the DAT? The DAT is not an investigative body. It is in charge of verifying that the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic was accurate and complete through technical consultations, high-level reviews, visits to sites, samples, analyses and interviews — everything in close cooperation with the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic. After more than seven years of joint work, the DAT has not yet been able to put on my desk a document saying that the original declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic is accurate and complete. New elements initially not declared or stated by the Syrian Arab Republic have emerged. I shall mention several of them.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“After exactly 29 April 2007, any possessor State having acceded to the Convention has to destroy the chemical weapons that it possesses following an order of destruction and a procedure of verification established by the OPCW Executive Council. That means that it was the Executive Council of the organization that determined the order of destruction and the procedures for the verification of the declared chemical weapons in Syria. That decision of the Executive Council was taken on 27 September 2013 and was endorsed by resolution 2118 (2013), I think it was the same day or perhaps a few days later. What happened after Syria’s accession to the organization? Several States parties started to express concern about the accuracy and completeness of Syria’s initial declaration.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“I realize, also, that some in the Chamber are interested in the Declaration Assessment Team. Again, a very clear question has been raised, querying why no State party has been under such a stringent verification regime — of our 193 States parties, why has not a single one been put under such a stringent verification regime as Syria? The response is clear, and it is not mine; it is in Article IV, paragraph 8, of the Chemical Weapons Convention — specifically, the framework for the accession of a possessor State. We are talking here about the framework for a possessor State to join the Convention more than 10 years after its entry into force in 1997.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“The goal of the Scientific Advisory Board, as written in the terms of reference, is to enable the Director-General to render specialized advice in connection with very sophisticated or complicated matters and issues related to chemicals and chemical weapons, which means that the Scientific Advisory Board has no role in assessing the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission. The Fact-Finding Mission is entrusted with investigating and subsequently producing a report — a report that I merely sign; I do not touch it. It goes directly to the policymaking organs — in this case, the Executive Council. This means that the Scientific Advisory Board has no authority to reassess an investigation of the Fact-Finding Mission or to assess any opinion of the inspectors in their personal capacity.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“This means that reopening an investigation or organizing anything related to reassessing the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission related to the Douma attack would require a decision of the policymaking organs of the OPCW. In connection with the Scientific Advisory Board, lately I received a lot of queries, especially from one country, as to why the Scientific Advisory Board does not meet with the two inspectors referred to earlier. In 2004, the Conference of the States Parties directed the Director-General to establish a body called the Scientific Advisory Board.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“That is why we organized an internal investigation, which produced a report that all members of the Council have. Regarding the question of reopening the case and suggestions of organizing a briefing with all the inspectors and the Scientific Advisory Board, I have to say that the report of the Fact-Finding Mission related to Douma is in the hands of the Executive Council and the Conference. The Director-General has no authority whatsoever to reopen this investigation, which concluded and reported to the Executive Council, and through it to the Conference. The matter is in the hands of the policymaking organs and not of the Director- General. The Executive Council was already seized of the matter in March 2019. In connection with the Scientific Advisory Board and the possibility of a meeting, I will expound on the information now.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“It was said earlier in this meeting by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation that there were some doubts about what I have said. I have here in front of me note verbal No. 759, form the Russian Embassy in The Hague dated 26 April 2019, which includes an attachment: a Russian Federation paper containing commentary on the conclusions of the report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Douma. This note verbal required me to disseminate the attached paper. It stated, as a conclusion, that the Russian Federation did not challenge the findings contained in the Fact- Finding Mission report regarding the possible presence of molecular chlorine in the cylinders, et cetera. This text is available on the webpage of the organization. The two inspectors who have been accused or pressured openly violated their obligations to the organization.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“The Commission received information on the death of at least 49 individuals, and the wounding of up to 650 others.” (A/HRC/39/65, para. 92) This report refers to helicopters, cylinders, chlorine, many people’s deaths and apartment buildings — much more than the report we produced almost seven months later as the result of the investigation of the Fact-Finding Mission. Our report is deeper but concentrates more on the mandate of the Fact-Finding Mission, which refers only to the establishment of the kind of chemical used in an attack. The Douma report is based on what were the standard reasonable grounds to establish which toxic chemical weapon was used, and this toxic chemical contained reactive chlorine. The Executive Council discussed the report in session, and no one rejected the report.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Because a lot of misguided information has been shared about the Douma case, when I have the opportunity I quote the report of the International Independent Commission of Inquiry — the so-called Pinheiro report — to the General Assembly in August 2018 — that is, around seven months before the Douma report was released to me on 1 March 2019. That report of the Pinheiro Commission contains a paragraph that refers to the Douma attack as follows: “Throughout 7 April, numerous aerial attacks were carried out in Douma, striking various residential areas. A vast body of evidence collected by the Commission suggests that, at approximately 7.30 p.m., a gas cylinder containing a chlorine payload delivered by helicopter struck a multi-storey residential apartment building located approximately 100 metres south-west of Shohada square.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“He confirmed in writing— and I have the document — to senior management in the organization, at that time, because I was not yet here, that he agreed with the interim report’s conclusions. Inspector B departed the organization in August 2018 — and, to be accurate, he left at the beginning of August because he had holidays and did not work on anything related to the Fact-Finding Mission during the rest of August. The Fact-Finding Mission, after Inspector B departed, worked for more than six months, during which the bulk of the results of the investigation were obtained by the team. For instance, out of the more than 100 samples, more than 70 results were obtained in those final six months of investigation. The conclusions of the reports produced personally by Inspector B are, of course, erroneous and uninformed.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“It was unauthorized and used incomplete information, and it was written after having illegally provided highly protected information to persons outside the organization who had nothing to do with the Fact-Finding Mission. Inspector A stopped providing support — support only — to the Fact- Finding Mission more than six months before the final report was released by me on 1 March 2019. Inspector B, mentioned here today, was, after many years working in the organization, appointed for the first time as a member of the Fact-Finding Mission in April 2018. He could not be deployed on-site in Douma because he had not completed his special training. He was involved in the drafting of the interim report of the Fact-Finding Mission related to Douma.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Inspector A, who claims to know a lot about the attack in Douma, was, as usual, requested to support the tasks of the Fact- Finding Mission, as he happened to be in the Command Post at the time of the deployment. He had no access to all the information. He stopped working in the summer of July 2018, when he came back from his assignment at the Command Post in Damascus and was assigned to prepare an inventory of the two cylinders that were analysed in Douma. He contacted companies and engaged professors at a university without authorization, and he produced the report that some media have called the “engineering report”. That report is only a personal, private report of Inspector A.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Two former inspectors have been mentioned at this meeting, and they are both making claims with regard to the origin of the chemicals that could be related to those who are responsible for the attacks. The OPCW does a completely independent investigation, and those inspectors were part of the inspection carried out by the team of the Fact-Finding Mission. Inspector A was never a part of the Fact-Finding Mission team that went to Douma. We have a permanent office in Damascus — called the Command Post — and we always have one inspector there on a rotating basis. That inspector, who is there for a couple of months at a time, is in charge of providing general support to the different missions that we have in Syria.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“There were not only two or three samples; more than 100 samples were collected and analysed. Most of the samples were analysed after the summer of 2018, when the two inspectors who have already been mentioned were completely uninvolved in the tasks of the Fact-Finding Mission. Some argue that the report of the Fact-Finding Mission has something to do with attribution. The Fact-Finding Mission has a clear mandate. It is to establish the facts related to the origin of the attack in connection with the chemical weapon used, and not to the origin of the perpetrators, or the persons who could be involved. Its mandate is only related to the chemical weapon used in the attack. That is the subject of the report of the Fact-Finding Mission.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“On 15 April, exactly eight days after the deployment, the Fact-Finding Mission arrived in Damascus. On 6 July 2018, the Fact-Finding Mission was able to produce an interim report. The interim report was based on some samples that had been sent to designated labs. The interim report was completed, with a final report produced by the time I had become Director-General of the organization in March 2019. The designated labs, as Council members know, are completely independent labs. They cooperate with the organization, they work in a completely independent way and they have the highest professional standards. All the designated labs agreed that a chlorinated organic chemical — the report says “molecular chlorine”, a reactive chlorine — was found in the samples.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“A general comment: what I was pleased to realize is that there is general support for the implementation of the Convention by the members of the Security Council. I appreciate that very much, and I also appreciate the comments supporting the work of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Let us start with Douma, since that has been mentioned frequently in this meeting. In a few sentences, let us refresh our memories. On 7 April 2018, there were reports that alleged the use of chemical weapons in Douma. On 12 April 2018, the OPCW Fact- Finding Mission in Syria deployed. The Fact-Finding Mission deployed to Beirut just five days later, because it was not allowed to go to Damascus for three days for reasons that were justified.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“I will start with the questions posed by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, who said that perhaps his were inconvenient questions. I must say that I do not consider them to be inconvenient at all. I am used to responding to the questions of my colleague at The Hague Ambassador Shulgin. We have a very good, close and friendly relationship. I respond to all the questions he poses. Sometimes the questions are difficult to respond to, but I am used to it and I do not mind at all. The Russian Ambassador should not worry — we are good guardians of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the non-proliferation regime. We do our best. I am going to try to give him as much information as I can in my responses.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Mr. Arias: I thank you, Mr. President, for your kind words of support and for your invitation to brief the Security Council. At this meeting, the Security Council has accepted to be briefed and to respond to my questions in an open format. I communicated that to you, Sir, in the first contact we had on the telephone, underlining that the Russian delegation insisted in December that it wanted to have an open meeting with a briefing, statements, questions and responses in an open format. I am very pleased that the Security Council accepted this format upon the suggestion of the Russian Federation in December. Some of the responses will be valid for several questions because some of the questions are very similar.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“I take it as an integral part of my duties to reach out to representatives of all those stakeholders, including United Nations partners and the members of the Security Council. We will not succeed without all of them.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“The construction of this Centre for Chemistry and Technology will start this month and, according to current plans, will be completed at the end of 2022. In the coming two years, the organization is preparing to reach two other important milestones: first, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the organization, in 2022, and, secondly, the end of the destruction of all declared chemical-weapons stockpiles, which is expected to be completed in 2023. Keeping the world secure from a re-emergence of chemical weapons requires commitment and efforts by a full range of stakeholders: Governments, of course, parliaments, the chemical industry, international organizations and bodies, academia, the scientific community, and, obviously, civil society.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“The ChemTech Centre will empower us to better address the emerging chemical-weapons threats and to contribute to the use of chemistry solely for the benefit of humankind. The Centre will function as a repository of knowledge and skills pertaining to chemical disarmament, non-proliferation, chemical security and safety, and the peaceful uses of chemistry. It will also contribute to exchange and acquisition of the expertise and skills necessary to stay at the forefront of science and technology and technological developments. It will be a global forum for chemical research and analysis, enabling Member States to establish networks of experts, researchers and laboratories through a wide range of activities.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“The unique knowledge on chemical weapons that we presently possess must be preserved and retained. Our staff must be able to further develop skills and expertise so as to be able to assist the States parties in facing all kinds of chemical threats. The Technical Secretariat will continue to actively promote chemical-security culture in all States parties to counter the threat of chemical terrorism. To this end, and despite the fact that our budget is subject to zero nominal growth, we continue to make progress on all those essential aspects of our work. An example is the new OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology — the ChemTech Centre — which we are building in the Netherlands, and which will be a key tool at our disposal. The building can be seen in this image of the structure’s final design.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“It is the responsibility of the international community at large, as well as the OPCW and beyond — the wider United Nations — to take further measures. We must also take into account that despite the OPCW’s almost universal reach, there are still four States Members of the United Nations that have not ratified or acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Should any of those States join the Convention as a possessor State, another operation of elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles under OPCW verification would be set in motion. All of these matters, together with the evolution of the global security environment and the progress of science and technology, required the Technical Secretariat’s full preparedness in terms of knowledge, skills and capacity. We need to stay abreast of science and technological developments.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“I am constantly heartened by the determination and courage of my staff in meeting such challenging circumstances, which have been displayed in particular during the deployments that we managed to undertake notwithstanding all the obstacles and the risks. Along with the Syrian chemical-weapons dossier, there are a few important matters related to chemical weapons that also require our attention. As I reported to Council members previously, chemical weapons have also been used in the last seven years in several countries. Many of these cases of use involved highly sophisticated chemical agents and have to be tackled with expertise and competence. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has delivered assistance upon the request of concerned States parties.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“The Technical Secretariat also continues to prepare for inspections of the Syrian airbases identified in the JIM and IIT reports as having been involved in the use of chemical weapons. These inspections will take place as soon as both the security conditions and the evolution of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) will allow them to do so. I wish to stress at this point that the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to deliver on all the various Syrian-related mandates under extraordinarily difficult conditions, namely, the numerous and sophisticated cyberattacks it suffers, the massive spread of disinformation about our work and sometimes even the denigration of some staff members of the organization, and, thirdly, over the past year, the challenges imposed by the restrictions stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“On 30 April, I sent a letter to the Syrian National Authority announcing that the next round of consultations would take place between 18 May and 1 June. On 5 May, the Technical Secretariat requested the necessary and usual issuance of visas for the members of the Team. In the absence of a response, the Technical Secretariat informed the Syrian authorities, on 14 May, of the postponement of the DAT mission to 28 May. On 26 May, still not having received any response from the Syrian authorities on the issuance of the visas, I decided to postpone the mission until further notice. The Technical Secretariat will continue to seek the next opportunity to deploy the DAT in order to support the Syrian Arab Republic in complying with all its obligations. The biannual inspections of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre continue.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“It must be recalled that the mandate of the Fact-Finding Mission is to establish facts pertaining to the use of toxic chemicals as weapons — not to identify the perpetrators. Since 1 March 2019, the report of the Fact- Finding Mission about Douma is under the authority of the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties, and it will be further examined by the Investigation and Identification Team. Additionally, the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) continues its efforts to clarify the shortcomings found in the initial Syrian declaration. One new issue was recently opened and will be taken up during the twenty-fifth round of consultations we are preparing. It pertains to the presence of a neat chemical-weapons agent found in samples collected in large storage containers in September 2020.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“He could not be deployed in the field, as he had not completed some of the inspector training. Moreover, after their deployment to Douma in the summer of 2018, both of them ceased to be involved in the work of the Fact-Finding Mission and, consequently, neither had access to the critical information and analysis performed by the Mission since the end of August 2018 and for a period of more than six months preceding the conclusions of the Mission’s investigation and the publication of its report on 3 March 2019. So far, none of the 193 member States of the OPCW have challenged the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission that chlorine was found on the scene of the attack in Douma.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Following the issuance of the report, two former inspectors of the Technical Secretariat could not accept that the conclusions of the Fact-Finding Mission were different from their own personal views that were not backed by evidence. When their positions could not gain traction within the Technical Secretariat, they tried to publicly portray the work of the OPCW as biased and partial, and the report, somehow, doctored. By doing so, they violated all their fundamental obligations towards the OPCW and its member States. I would like to highlight that one of the two former inspectors was never a member of the Fact-Finding Mission and had only played a supporting role for the Mission for a limited period of time. The other inspector participated in the Fact-Finding Mission investigation for the first time, but only in a limited capacity.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Our work therefore continues on multiple fronts, including through engagement with Syria. The Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic continues to establish facts surrounding allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. To date, the Fact-Finding Mission has already investigated 77 allegations of chemical-weapons use and has determined 17 cases of likely or confirmed use of chemical weapons in Syria. The report of the Fact-Finding Mission related to the incident in Douma on 7 April 2018 is still a matter of interest for some Member States, including here in the Security Council. Let me recall the facts. The Fact-Finding Mission released its report on 1 March 2019. In it, the Mission concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the use of chlorine as a weapon likely took place.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source