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Arria

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361
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1992-01-21
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1993-08-27
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un-security-council

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  1. Allow me to express publicly to each and every one of my colleagues and to their dedicated and highly qualified delegations my appreciation, admiration, respect and solidarity. I have felt fully and in every way the privilege of belonging to this body and being a representative of the international community. I have dedicated all my efforts to this activity in circumstances which I understand to be particularly difficult and perilous for humanity. I have tried to serve the world and fulfil the responsibility of the Security Council which represents, without any doubt, the greatest pride of my public life and a privilege for which I am immensely grateful.

    1993-08-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3271 (1993) · source

  2. My delegation wishes, nevertheless, to note its concern over the serious violations and abuses relating to human rights that continue to take place in Haiti. The Haitian Armed Forces must understand clearly that the international community, represented by the Security Council, has no inclination to tolerate the continuation of such procedures. Venezuela realizes that it can never repay the enormous debt it owes the Haitian people, who, led by President Petion, gave very generous assistance in the saga of Latin American independence - or a great part of it - which was set into motion by Simon Bolivar. In conclusion, as you know, Madam President, this is the last occasion on which I shall have spoken as representative of Venezuela in this Council.

    1993-08-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3271 (1993) · source

  3. By the same token, the invariably decisive and very active contribution of the Governments of the United States, France and Canada has been fundamental. My own country has taken part in those efforts with equal passion, stubbornness and tenacity Since day one. My country is especially pleased by the decisive contribution of the international community: that of creating the conditions now making it possible for President Aristide to return and take up again the presidential mandate to which he was elected with 70 per cent of his people's vote. The ratification of Prime Minister Malval and his cabinet represents an extraordinary step for the return of democratic life in Haiti, and, indeed, it is this that has led to the suspension of embargo measures.

    1993-08-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3271 (1993) · source

  4. Starting from that precise moment, the international community will have the opportunity to bring those efforts to culmination - to crown them - stimulating the democratic regime so that it can be technically and financially supported in order to give it indispensable living conditions so that it can really build a stable democratic system. The American continent itself has, in this regard, a particular responsibility to show its solidarity through effective acts of cooperation in coming to the rescue of the quality of life of the mistreated Haitian people. Allow me to take this opportunity to highlight the fact that the support of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Sates played an indispensable role in the process that allowed the Security Council to act.

    1993-08-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3271 (1993) · source

  5. The coordination between the regional organization and the global one was extraordinary. In this regard, the role played by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Dante Caputo, has been equally extraordinary. The process that began with the 1991 elections, with the support of the United Nations, is being renewed after a tragic and deplorable interruption. The process has not reached its culmination and will not do so even with the return of President Aristide, expected to take place on 30 October this year.

    1993-08-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3271 (1993) · source

  6. Mr. ARRIA (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): Allow me, Madam President, to anticipate by five days the end of your term of office and congratulate you on your productive leadership and your innovative management, carried out with solidarity and respect, which have won for you the admiration and respect of all of us. It is almost exactly two years now since the overthrow of the constitutional President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. From the first day the international community began lending invaluable support for the return of the democratic system, and the Council's resolutions and those of the General Assembly clearly reflect their will to do so. The cooperation between the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations produced an effective and unprecedented synergy.

    1993-08-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3271 (1993) · source

  7. I trust that tomorrow, when contemplating the devastation of the remains of what used to be a beautiful and peaceful country, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Member country of our Organization, we will not be obliged to recall Shakespeare's lamentation in Henry V: "Shame, and eternal shame, nothing but shame" (IV: v)

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  8. Its famous perimeter, where churches, Orthodox basilicas, minarets and synagogues live together, is a symbol of the tolerant, cosmopolitan, pluralist Europe that the apostles of Maastricht wanted to build. Today Sarajevo faces two options. The first is that the capital city does not fall, which would be a triumph for that Europe. It would also prove that this Europe is possible and that, in any case, the cause of a civilization founded on the basis of mixture and of the 'impurity' of its origins is not absolutely desperate. The second is that Sarajevo falls; you would then see that, sooner or later, from one end of the European continent to the other, the fanatics of the soil, of blood, of the purity of origins and races will triumph - in short, fundamentalism".

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  9. Obviously, no one advocates allowing the criminals to go unpunished, but there is a specific way in which that insidious result can be avoided: the election of an effective prosecutor who knows the area, the nature of the conflict, the specifics of the situation and the types of violations of major importance. Our caucus has made its views on this matter known in the informal paper it has circulated among the members of the Council. Transparency of purpose must be matched by transparency of action. To conclude, I would like to bring to this Council the powerful reflections of the very distinguished French philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy: "Sarajevo is a symbol.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  10. The inability or unwillingness of those with the power to prevent what we have witnessed must now yield to the only thing left for us to do - bring to justice those who have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity: systematic rape, torture, the large-scale killing of civilian populations, the massive destruction of civilian property and cultural property, attacks upon hospitals and medical personnel, the prevention of humanitarian relief and, last but not least, the abhorrent policy of "ethnic cleansing". To allow the perpetrators of these deeds to go unpunished would run counter to every basic principle of law and morality; this the United Nations must reject most vigorously.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  11. A recent editorial in The New York Times summarized its purpose: "The world can still deploy the non-lethal but devastating weapons of truth, law and shame". The credibility of the United Nations, and more particularly the Security Council, is at stake with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. If the Tribunal fails, this will have a historic impact on the standing of the United Nations and of the Council in the eyes of the nations and the peoples of the world.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  12. Should it fail to do one thing or the other, the credibility of the international-security system the Charter is meant to represent will have been seriously undermined. As the issue is also addressed by this resolution, I would like to take this opportunity to make some comments about what we believe is, although indirectly, another major part of a comprehensive settlement of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina which has not been under discussion in Geneva, and rightly so. I refer to the International Tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. If peace is to prevail in Bosnia and Herzegovina urgent action must be taken to make the International Tribunal operational as soon as possible.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  13. The future is fraught with uncertainties; the experience of this whole process does not seem to bode well for lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the stability of the region, or for the future of our Organization, whose leadership and resources will most certainly be critical in the near and foreseeable future if even this kind of settlement is to have any practical impact on the ravages of war. Should this exercise fail and war begin again, the Council will be well advised to make the choice it has avoided until now: provide the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the means to exercise its right of self-defence, or enforce the resolutions it has itself adopted on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  14. I have tried to sketch what my delegation, in the exercise of its duties as a member of the Council, feels to be flaws in the process that led to the Geneva draft agreement, but it is now undoubtedly up to the parties to state their positions. It may well be too late for those of us who abhor the logic of war and the injustice and misery it brings with it to pretend that this Organization is willing to reverse its consequences. Might is still right, and put to the test immediately after the end of the cold war, this Council has not been politically capable of unravelling the logic of that proposition. Our concerns do not stop at that point. No Member of this Organization should be led to believe that it will not be a party to the consequences of the process as it has come about.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  15. Moral evasions, when they eclipse our ability to see and respond to evil, will undermine our values and our fundamental beliefs at a time when the world is shrinking and so many are looking to the West for leadership". I might add that the aggressor's triumph will surely diminish all of us in the Security Council. The draft resolution before us takes into account many suggestions by all members of the Council. It is the product of long consultations, Madam President, under your very effective and intelligent guidance; my delegation certainly hopes that in its reiteration of principles it will serve for the future reference of the Council when it considers whether any agreement among the parties is or is not in conformity with its provisions, and whether or not the range of guarantees it may call for should be provided.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  16. It is unthinkable that the Council should act in any manner that could foster further hostilities and suffering, yet the draft agreement the parties have taken back to their authorities for decision can hardly be said to be the basis of a just, equitable and lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It can reasonably be doubted that it does not reward aggression. It will impose on the United Nations very serious political and financial commitments. Not only is the wisdom of such commitments difficult to judge in the light of the very peculiar characteristics of this round of negotiations, but the far~ranging implications most certainly do not seem to have been clearly spelled out to the Council. Mr. George Zarycky of Freedom House recently said: "Bosnia is a horrible lesson.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  17. Lord Owen finally said, "I leave it to him [President Alija Izetbegovic] to desribe his position and how he intends to handle it". To ask President Izetbegovic to describe his position is probably not very considerate. I remember my visit to Sarajevo with the Bosnian President and other members of the Government; I was reminded of what Winston Churchill said after Munich in 1938: "All is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken Czechoslovakia recedes into darkness". That could be the Bosnian President's description of the position today in Mostar. The Council is now faced with stark choices.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  18. The other option was eloquently expressed by the Conference's spokesman, Mr. John Mills, who said: "The deadline for replies is August 30th - if they do not sign, the war will continue". When Mr. Mills said "they" he was, of course, referring to the Bosnian Muslims, because the two victors in the conquest of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbs and the Croats, had already expressed their full satisfaction and readiness to sign. Obviously, neither Lord Owen nor former Minister Stoltenberg was in a position to offer any other option. That other option should be provided by the Security Council, especially with the support of its permanent members - that is, it should enforce its previous resolutions to halt the aggression until a just, equitable and permanent peace agreement can be reached, without deadlines for the victims.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  19. Could the Council, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, look at these issues in any other manner? We categorically believe the answer is a pure "no". Lord Owen added: "We went through the cptions facing Izetbegovic"" meaning Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; "I recalled to him that it is his country, his people, his choice". The first option was this: The President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina should accept the deal presented to him - that is, 30 per cent of the country to the 44 per cent of its population which is Muslim and the partition of the Republic along ethnic lines, with the territory acquired by force and "ethnic cleansing" remaining in the hands of those who now hold it.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  20. To our delegation, the agreed principle of fostering a settlement among the parties themselves ceased to have any standing once it became evident that it was designed to serve the purpose of legitimizing the spoils of war. I should now like to comment con some of Lord Owen's recent remarks in Geneva, which we consider of significant importance. He says that "if anyone sits down and looks at the Geneva package in a pure sense, there will be deficiencies". After all, "we were were dealing with the effect of 17 months of bloody war". In reaction to this statement my delegation believes that the questions the Security Council should ask itself are as follows: Are there any other ways to consider this process than in a pure sense?

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  21. My delegation considers that a peace process based on such extraordinary premises cannot but be flawed in essence. The third characteristic of this process which dismays my delegation is the stand taken by the Co-Chairmen. On their own authority - certainly without updated guidance from this Council - they undertook to revert to an "assistance to the parties" position, leaving the parties thereby to their own devices on how to reach an agreement. The implication is, obviously, that pre-eminence was given to the military situation on the ground, thereby reinforcing and giving authority to the imbalances and pressures derived from the hostilities.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  22. It remains to be studied how large an impact such hostilities may have had on the process. To our delegation, it is evident that such hostilities can only have been geared to serve the purposes of those with the upper hand on the ground, and this is to be deplored unreservedly. The Geneva negotiations have equally taken as a basis the joint Serbian-Croat proposal. We should remember that this proposal came about following the dismissal by the Bosnia-Serb party of the Vance-Owen Plan, and in the context of continued hostilities against the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which allowed that party to adopt a negotiating position based on the use of force and on the process of "ethnic cleansing" it has carried out systematically since the beginning of the war.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  23. After the Vance-Owen Plan supported by this Council was rejected in May by the Pale Serbs, we humbly dared to believe that had Lord Owen resigned, his prestige and dedication could have made of him a formidable critic of this process. He could, I believe. have influenced and generated a much-needed change in the international community's position. Lord Owen could have dramatized the fundamental difference between negotiation and capitulation. Hanging on to the process when the plan, his plan, the international community's plan, was essentially replaced by the aggressor's plan, added a certain misleading image of continuity to the now-defunct Vance-Owen plan. The Geneva negotiations, it should be remembered, have taken place against a background of continual hostilities.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  24. tragedy has accelerated downhill into ethnic partition - a kind of apartheid modality - no longer a peace plan, but simply a deal. We have the impression that there is an interest in terminating this matter at any price. The price might possibly be forced onto the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it will never be accepted by the world community, which watches in dismay political expediency and lack of resolve taking the place of moral principles and the values of civilized behaviour. Bosnia and Herzegovina will pay an extremely high price, but the international community will certainly pay an even higher one in moral and political terms.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  25. Had it considered the draft resolution in a timely fashion, the Council would thereby have exercised its duty to contribute to a just settlement, and would have avoided some of the flaws which, in our judgement, have characterized the negotiating process since the beginning of this, its latest stage. My delegation has carefully followed the news on the Geneva negotiations. We have on numerous occasions expressed our concern over the relative scarcity of information provided to the Council, and we have reiterated that a more active interaction would have been desirable if the Council were to be in a position to exercise fully its responsibilities. From Lord Carrington's negotiations to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, Bosnia and Herzegovina's.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  26. The original intention of the non-aligned members of this Council when they again brought up the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to convey to the parties and the Co-Chairmen of the peace talks that any agreement which might derive from such negotiations would need to be in conformity with a minimum set of principles, recognized by the United Nations Charter, by international law and by prior resolutions of this Council. I should like to state for the record that consideration of our original draft resolution was unfortunately delayed for various reasons, among them in particular the serious situation in and around Sarajevo during the month of July.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  27. A new nation rises from the ashes of a war in which everyone was unjust. They are watched by the fallen, from above, and by those who still hope."

    1993-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3263 (1993) · source

  28. Africa Watch has rightly emphasized that experience with the Commission on the Truth in El Salvador shows it to be a mechanism that can be adapted to Liberia. Although the experiences of one region, where circumstances are different, are not necessarily applicable to another, I would point out that the mechanisms adopted in El Salvador could provide a valuable precedent, especially bearing in mind their moral and ethical value. The documentation of violations must have a purpose, as the Chairman of the Commission on the Truth, former President Belisario Betancourt of Colombia, pointed out when he said: "Peace is always signed by those who made war, and all former combatants have set up forums for reconciliation in the new society. Each party is called upon to carry out the task dictated to it by its pain and by its love of country...

    1993-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3263 (1993) · source

  29. My delegation wishes once again to express its appreciation for the involvement of the Economic Community of West African States, which very boldly three years ago sent a military contingent, which made possible the establishment of an Interim Government in Monrovia, presided over by Professor Sawyer. There can be no doubt that the intensity and complexity of the conflict gave rise to a series of actions which went beyond the original ECOMOG mandate. The question, however, is what would have happened if ECOMOG had not agreed to this intervention, especially since the United Nations itself began to play a political role in the conflict only in November 1992, almost three years after it began.

    1993-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3263 (1993) · source

  30. In the context of national reconciliation, I believe it is worth recalling that violations of human rights should not be disregarded in the process of the normalization of that long- suffering country. Impunity has only encouraged, and will only encourage, the continued perpetration of crimes. The massacre of 600 refugee women and children in St. Peter's Church in Monrovia, the murder of five American nuns - so reminiscent of the murder of American Jesuit priests and nuns in El Salvador - the use of armed brigades of children by the NPFL: all this adds a monstrous dimension to the violence suffered by the people of Liberia during a period which has been described as one of anarchy and national suicide, and which I myself once defined as a fratricidal low-intensity war, but a war of very high mortality.

    1993-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3263 (1993) · source

  31. Accordingly, my delegation hopes that the Cotonou Agreement can be implemented even within the very strict timetable that has been set - most especially for the holding of elections, which should not represent the end of Liberia's national reconstruction process The report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Gordon-Somers, emphasizes the urgency of involving the various levels of Liberian society ~ adults, women, community leaders - as an essential step in the process of reunification and national reconciliation. This aspect is of crucial importance, as is shown by the present situation in Somalia. In Liberia the situation is even more promising: there are independent newspapers, human rights centres, groups for the protection of children, and so forth, in operation.

    1993-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3263 (1993) · source

  32. The Agreement also provides that the parties to the conflict will constitute an electoral council initially composed of five members and a legislative assembly of 37 members. It will fall to these organs to conduct the initial transition process, which of course will be a long and difficult one of reconciliation and national reunification that will require, as the Liberian Minister for Fore: gn Affairs has very well pointed out, the cooperation of the parties and the support and vigilant assistance of the international community.

    1993-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3263 (1993) · source

  33. Baccus Matthews, Cotonou represents a victory by his people, a victory of their perseverance in seeking peace, a victory by his people in shouldering the responsibility for the political restructuring of their country. It is no doubt an agreement that the parties have imposed upon themselves, and that, in large measure, is its great value. Cotonou provides for the holding of elections in the first half of 1994 and for almost immediate disarmament by the parties. The experience of Angola in this respect must be borne very much in mind. Mr. Savimbi saw the electoral process in Angola as a mere ritual to confirm his leadership. When it did not turn out that way, he disregarded the process - with the consequences of which we are all aware. The leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) has given similar indications.

    1993-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3263 (1993) · source

  34. The untrammelled violence that had reigned for three years, since the invasion by Charles Taylor of the Nimba area from Cete d'Ivoire to overthrow Samuel Doe, has already cost the lives of over 150,000 people and driven almost another million people from their homes. There can be no doubt about the remarkable role that has been played in this mediation by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers, to whom my delegation expresses its appreciation. Only time will demonstrate the true willingness of the parties - especially the National Patriotic Front of Liberia - to comply with the Agreement. As has been indicated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia, Mr.

    1993-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3263 (1993) · source

  35. Mr. ARRIA (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): Madam President, my delegation is especially pleased to see you presiding over the Council this month. You come here after a long and outstanding career in scholarly research and in the training of the human resources of your own country in the field of international relations. You enjoy very-well-deserved prestige for all this. On two previous occasions I have been in the Council under the presidency of Ambassador Hannay of the United Kingdom. I join in the remarks of recognition expressed by my colleagues of the extraordinary competence and dedication of Ambassador Hannay, aided by his very highly qualified delegation. On 1 August a cease-fire entered into force, pursuant to the 25 July Cotonou Agreement.

    1993-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3263 (1993) · source

  36. My delegation calls the attention of the Republic of Armenia to the responsibilities that the international community places on it, in terms both of its participation in the conflict and of its ability to contribute effectively to an immediate end thereto. My delegation is deeply concerned about the circumstances and the events on the ground that surround this conflict: they bear an extraordinary and very dangerous resemblance to the beginning of what is now the tragedy in the Balkans. This is the consideration that obliges the Council to remain alert and resolute, and to continue its support for the efforts of the Minsk Group of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

    1993-07-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3259 (1993) · source

  37. Mr. ARRIA (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): The Security Council has hastened unanimously and unamibiguously to condemn the occupation by force of territory of the Azerbaijani Republic. The attacks on the Azerbaijani Republic, which have caused the forced displacement of large numbers of people and the loss of life and property, are also to be censured and condemned. There can be no doubt that the extension of the conflict - which now includes the Agdam district in the Republic of Azerbaijan - has, unfortunately, inflamed the tensions between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, with the attendant consequences; my Government finds it most deplorable that this should be the case.

    1993-07-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3259 (1993) · source

  38. The Security Council must be consistent and shoulder the responsibility it assumed in recommending the admission of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to membership of the United Nations end not keep that State from the means necessary to safeguard its own existence, as provided for in the resolution on which we skall vote shortly. To dc otherwise would be to admit an inconsistency of the most. extreme gravity.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  39. To conclude, I deem it appropriate to recall today that the European Community took the initiative of recognizing the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic cf Bosnia and Herzegovina and that subsequently this lofty body, the Security Council, after an exhaustive and painstaking consideration, recommended to the General Assembly its admission to membership of this Organization. Almost two years have passed since those events. That recognition was not given lightly. It seems incredible that barely two years after Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted as a Member State, the Security Council can remain passive before the imminent partition of that Republic through territorial conquest by use of force and "ethnic cleansing".

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  40. What has President Izetbegovic done, he who is recognized by the entire international community as the legitimate President of his country and until recently the valid interiocutor of the negotiators at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia? Quite simply, President Izetbegovic - like Benes, like Churchili, like De Gaulle, like the valient people of Leningrad - did not agree to surrender, not even under the worst possible conditions. Mr. Izetbegovic reminds me of the 1938 message of the great intransigent Sir Winston Churchill: "Those who seek to prevent war without honour will end up suffering dishonour and war".

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  41. In Geneva negotiations took place first with the Croatian side and then with the Serbian side, but, strangely, when it came to negotiating with the Muslim side of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was agreed to bring in seven members of the presidency of that Republic: three Croatians, three Serbs and one Muslim. But unfortunately for its promoters, this Muslim, who was entrusted with subscribing to the rules for the partition of his country, is now being sought by the Austrian police for the crime of fraud against the poor Muslim refugees. President Izetbegovic, incredibly, has been pushed aside for his "hotheadedness" in insisting that the "peace plan" promoted by the United Nations and the European Community - the Vance-Owen plan - be implemented. Why has this happened?

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  42. The draft resolution that we are discussing today is above all a declaration of moral and political principles. We trust that the Security Council will vote in favour of the draft resolution, because defending the rights of States can never be conceived of as a minority position. At the recent World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, a group of delegations - including my own - upheld the concept of the universality of human rights. Therefore, I cannot imagine that the very same countries would not today agree with the universality of the inalienable rights of States to self-defence.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  43. Not to come to the defence of and protect a State victim of genocide and ethnic cleansing is, as the International Court of Justice has pointed out, without any doubt a most alarming development. To do all that one can possibly do to prevent a people from exercising its right to defend itself in order to survive means to shoulder moral and political responsibilities of extraordinary significance. It is one thing to decide not to help a State that bases its preservation on the principle of collective security; it is another thing entirely to deny it its natural right to self-defence, in the face of the obvious decision not to implement that principle. Those who today would make that decision, through their vote, shoulder the corresponding responsibility before the world.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  44. Nor will it be enough for the conquerors of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, after exterminating the Muslims of that Republic, and having understood that crime pays, are now extending their actions to the rest of the area. For two years the illusion of a diplomacy of principles took us from the London Conference with Lord Carrington, to the peace plan of Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, and now to Geneva with Stoltenberg. All these illustrious diplomats have been effectively replaced as peace negotiators by Messrs. Milosevic, Tudjman, Karadzic and Boban. No country or group of countries has the right to instruct a State, no matter how small or defenceless, on what it must or must not do.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  45. On the one hand, President Aliza Izetbegovic is described - just as Benes was - as intransigent, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is being compelled to cede to its Croat and Serb neighbours 90 per cent of its territory. What will be left will be perfectly homogeneous areas, within the spirit of the apartheid so often condemened by this Organization, which counts among its main achievements its struggle against apartheid. Obviously, President Izetbegovic feels the same national passion as President Benes felt. His country is being dismembered, and he is on the way to losing it entirely. He cannot be less than intransigent. It was not enough for Hitler to do away with Benes and with Czechoslovakia. The offer of "land for peace" was not enough for him.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  46. In fact, what is its business - and indeed its obligation - is to see to it that the Charter of the United Nations is enforced. In 1938, the Czechoslovak leader, Edvard Benes, was also described as intransigent. The prestigious Times of London went so far as to publish an editorial in which it pointed out that "The Czechoslovak Government should consider making its country more homogeneous, ceding the Sudetans to Germany - the neighbouring country with which they are united by race". This historical backdrop - actually very recent - has now sowed many dangerous seeds in the degenerating conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  47. It must be recognized, however, that we have managed to save thousands of lives through humanitarian assistance, but it is no less true that many more thousands of lives have been lost at a time when the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has all but disappeared. Now the new plan has as its protagonists the chief aggressors against that Republic, and the international community continues striving assiduously, at any price, to bring about an agreement that would have to be imposed upon the victims. The Security Council is not a debating society or a future-oriented think tank. For that reason, to speculate about and anticipate the consequences of the implementation of this resolution is not the proper business of the Council.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  48. Almost two years ago, at the beginning of the conflict, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Mr. Jacques Poos, stated: "This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans". At that time, the effort was being made - in fact, an unsuccessful effort - to deal with the conflict regionally. Almost 40 resolutions later - and after the Security Council has supported the London Conference, the peace plans of Lord Carrington and of Vance and Owen, and the Washington plan of action - no one here today can deny that the aggressors have been progressively defeating this illustrious body that represents the international community.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  49. This information indicates that the humanitarian assistance is already extremely compromised. The noble contingents of UNPROFOR have rendered extraordinary service, but, notwithstanding the fact that their mandate would permit it, they are not equipped or prepared to defend themselves appropriately. As my colleague the Ambassador of Djibouti has rightly pointed out, the option to be considered - calmly and in keeping with the gravity of the question - would be either to give a really effective mandate to these troops or to withdraw them. What cannot be envisaged is for them to protect only the humanitarian convoys and not the people. The last of the objections is that this would recognize the defeat of the United Nations. The fact is that the Security Council inherited a situation that had very seriously deteriorated.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  50. Convoys protected by the United Nations are subjected to all kinds of humiliation, creating the illusion of helping ~ and in fact they are helping, but they are far from resolving the problem." He added: "The humanitarian organizations cannot take the place of political decisions. Governments should stop using humanitarian organizations for their own purposes." In that respect, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Stoltenberg, recently informed the Security Council that the climate of insecurity in which the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCK), UNPROFOR and other humanitarian agencies operate has grown so acute that these operations cannot continue very much longer, given the intensification of the conflict.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source