YouSaid · the spoken record

Arria

lines on the record: 361
first: 1992-01-21
most recent: 1993-08-27
sittings or episodes: 40
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“That would definitely be the case - although humanitarian assistance by air, transported by the United States, has reached places where UNPROFOR troops have never been able to go. In that sense, it is important to emphasize that humanitarian assistance was conceived as a mean of helping a people to survive while steps were taken to put an end to the conflict - but not to take the place of a more purposeful and significant effort. The point is not just to halt the outflow of refugees or to attend to the needs of a devastated people. Humanitarian assistance, as the Coordinator of Red Cross Operations - in the former Yugoslavia - described it, "has been used by the humanitarian organizations to fill a political vacuum created by the international community. We have been asked to throw flour at political problems.”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“President Mitterrand said, "If we were talking about the security of our own States, it would take us two hours, not weeks, to take that decision." In conclusion he said, "If we cannot defend the safe areas, it will be impossible to tell the Bosnian Muslims that they will not be allowed to defend themselves." To these statements of such distinguished statesmen can be added that of the Head of Government of Germany, Mr. Helmut Kohl: "The international community cannot be allowed to abandon the Bosnian Muslims. Lifting the arms embargo is a necessity and a moral duty, because it means helping the weakest." And finally, the statement of Baroness Thatcher: "It is intolerable to prevent people from detending themselves, unless one is willing to defead them oneself." It is further objected that humanitarian assistance would be compromised.”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“There can only be one answer: do everything necessary so that this does not come about, because if it did, Europe would never be the same, neither for itself nor for the rest of the world. In this regard, President Gonzalez of Spain stated in Copenhagen, "If the international community is unable to resolve the problem by the means available to it and if it does not want to undertake a massive intervention in Yugoslavia, as seems obvious, the Bosnians' right to self-defence begins to emerge." President Mitterrand of France said, "It is intolerable that the Muslims cannot defend themselves." And he reminded his colleagues in the European Community that the United Nations had decided to defend their safe areas and that the Secretary-General was still begging the Governments of the third world to provide 7,500 soldiers.”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bilhac and Zepa constitute the rest of the chain of atrocities. Those zones are definitely free and safe for committing all kinds of crimes and attacks. Those of us who have been there know this very well. The Serbian offensive would be speeded up. This is very probably true, unless the international conmunity decides to carry out the necessary compensatory actions to neutralize the heavy armaments which have been allowing the Serbs to act with all impunity. If this is not done, there is no doubt that a disarmed Government will in the end be worn down and conquered. "What would the international community do then?" asked one of our Security Council colleagues in one of our meetinas.”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“The old colonial philosophy that says, (spoke in English) "There are times when considerations of abstract justice must give way to those of administrative expediency" (spoke in Spanish) must not be realized. It would be the end of the safe areas. The whole world knows what those areas consist of and what they mean. To continue calling them by that name threatens to destroy what little credibility the Council has left in this conflict. For the past three months, Srebrenica, the first safe area, has been forcibly deprived of its services of potable water, electricity and medical care. Epidemics are devouring thousands of children caught between the cruelty of their Serbian jailers and our own inability to defend them. In Gorazde, another safe area, no sooner do we manage to get a few trucks in and the area is once again under siege.”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“I cannot understand how Lord Owen can declare that, (spoke in English) "We have to stop this nonsense of decisions being taken by the Bosnian Government that are not discussed by the Government; we could do to Izetbegovic what Karadzic and Bovan do, which is to refer to him as the Muslim party." (spoke in Spanish) Even more difficult to understand is that the division of an already well-battered Government could be provoked in order to eliminate any obstacles in the way of the partition agreement being hatched in Geneva. The United Nations cannot, must not, lend its name - which is that of all our nations, small, medium-sized and large - to the legitimization of the final ravaging of that Republic.”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“The international community's inconsistent attitude in the adoption of measures to stop aggression has given free rein to the escalation of the conflict, which has meant a massacre of mainly the Bosnian Muslim people. That is a reality. The negotiating process in Geneva will be affected. Frankly, in Geneva what remained of the the Vance-Owen Plan has been replaced by the Karadzic-Milosevic-Tudjman-Bovan agreement. Why should the United Nations worry about affecting a process in which those who took a territory by force seek the legitimacy undoubtedly conferred on them by the presence - and not a passive presence - of Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg at the site of the talks: the Palais des Nations in Geneva.”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“The International Court of Justice and the World Conference on Human Rights have indicated that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a victim of genocide and "ethnic cleansing", among other unspeakable crimes. For this Council, then, what does it mean to say that violence would increase and spread? Obviously, an armed people would have a greater ability to defend itself - which does not mean that violence would necessarily increase. To date, the Serbs have found it very easy to trample and vandalize the Bosnian Muslims. When the latter are able to defend themselves, circumstances may deter the Serbs and, above all, place limits on their impunity. More war?”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“Before I take up each of these objections, allow me to remind the Council that the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia, which was decreed before the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was internationally recognized, has affected only that Republic. It is generally accepted that the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats received and continue to receive all the military support and equipment of other countries in the region and that the Security Council has still not managed to stop that violation of the embargo. Now I shall comment on the objections. It would increase violnnce. About 200,000 people have already died. More than 2 million people have been displaced from their homes. Twenty thousand women have been raped.”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“The main objections to the draft resolution that we have heard are the following: first, it would increase the level of violence and the conflict would spread and intensify; secondly, there would be more war, not less - all the parties would acquire more sophisticated arms; thirdly, the negotiating process in Geneva would be put in jeopardy; fourthly, it would mean the end of the safe areas; fifthly, it would speed up the Serbian offensive against what remains of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would be totally conquered; sixthly, humanitarian aid would be jeopardized; seventh, the personnel of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) would be withdrawn; and, eighth, it would be an admission that the Security Council had suffered a defeat in the face of this conflict.”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“I shall now take the liberty of summing up the main considerations that, throughout our consultations and discussions, have been put forward by represenatives in the Council who oppose the adoption of this draft resolution. I shall also take the liberty of offering some thoughts on these objections and concerns.”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“Mr. ARRIA (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): Article 51 of the Charter must be accepted and interpreted by all members of the Security Council without any form of discrimination. Just as yesterday we recognized as a fact one of our members' right to self-defence, we must do everything possible to see that, at the very least, that same right is not denied the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today we are debating the possible consequences of adopting the draft resolution that we, the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement that are members of the Security Council - Cape Verde, Djibouti, Morocco, Pakistan and Venezuela - have brought before the Council, along with the reasons that form its basis and justification.”
1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source
“Finally, I should like to note that the delegations of Brazil and Venezuela have consulted their regional group and CARICOM, taking into particular account their observations, which have served to broaden our position and make the reso'iution we have adopted today more representative. It undoubtedly represents a historic attempt to restore democracy, to which Latin America and the Caribbean are committed.”
1993-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3238 (1993) · source
“But that requires action on the part of the Security Council. In this respect, I should like to emphasize that we are not pursuing the embargo as an end in itself, but as a means to cive the Special Envoy of the Secretaries-General of both organizations an additional deterrent so that negotiations will continue and will achieve the goal we all seek. On this occasion, my delegation would like to express especial appreciation for the efforts and dedication of the Secretary-General and in particular for those of the Special Envoy, Mr. Dante Caputo of Argentina, who has demonstrated conspicuous dedication in this process.”
1993-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3238 (1993) · source
“It is also the first time that the Security Council has adopted a resolution implementing Chapter VII in connection with a country in the American hemisphere. It might be appropriate here to recall that the OAS has attempted, since the beginning of the crisis in Haiti, to apply measures aimed at bringing about a negotiated settlement. There is no initiative, no mission, no meeting, no declaration that has not been undertaken within the framework of the OAS. Thus, all that remained was recourse to the Security Council, which we petition today to strengthen the OAS resolution, adopted on 6 June 1993 in Managua, which emphasizes the need for all States members of the OAS and the United Nations alike to strengthen the embargo. It is obvious that the only way to strengthen the embargo is to make it binding and universal.”
1993-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3238 (1993) · source
“The Special Rapporteur of the United Nations, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and other intergovernmental bodies have received innumerable complaints faithfully documenting these activities. This terrifying reality, existing in our hemisphere only three hours from New York and Washington, D.C., is being suffered by Haitians who only appeal for the right to live in freedom and democracy. The measures taken in accordance with the resolution of the OAS, imposing the oil and weapons embargo, are not enough. The provisions of the embargo have not been respected because they are not binding. The action on which the Security Council has decided today is unquestionably a sign of the cooperation between the United Nations and a regional organization, in this case the Organization of American States.”
1993-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3238 (1993) · source
“The United Nations opened a ney prospect and a new dimension in the life of the people with the elections in Haiti, but our efforts must not flag until the lawful authorities of that country - which has experienced so many violations of human rights and, I venture to say, such discrimination on the part of the international community - are restored to power and are accorded the same consideration and support which the United Nations has shown in other extreme cases elsewhere in the world. The human rights situation in Haiti has worsened considerably. People have disappeared and been killed. There has been preventive repression, persecution, arbitrary detention and torture.”
1993-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3238 (1993) · source
“There is no reason that Haiti - the first country of our continent, after the United States, to find independence and freedom, and the first in the world to abolish slavery - should today find its leaders in exile and its people forced to flee violations of human rights committed by. usurpers who do not recognize the most fundamental human rights. In Haiti, the United Nations believed that, in order to make democracy viable, it was enough to establish an electoral process. Of course, I do not wish to play down the importance of that process, but I would like to emphasize that the international community seemed to exhaust its concern for the people of Haiti after taking what was only the initial step in a long process of democratization and freedom.”
1993-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3238 (1993) · source
“The legitimate and constitutional Government of Haiti - the Government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide - has asked us to act today in the Security Council. When my country was fighting for its independence in the early nineteenth century, our liberator Simon Bolivar found support for his actions to win independence for Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia only in the small island of Haiti, where he was generously greeted by President Alexandre Petion, who felt and measured perfectly the need for solidarity if the South American nations were to win their freedom. We recognize this debt of ours to Haiti as unpayable, but it is also unforgettable and we will never abandon it.”
1993-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3238 (1993) · source
“This position has encouraged the Secretary-General's group of friendly countries - Canada, the United States and France - as well as my own country to continue to support the process to cestore democracy, stability and peace in Haiti. The Haitian tragedy is a potential threat to regional and international peace and security. One need only imagine what a substantial increase of hundreds of thousands of Haitians, in terrified flight to other countries, would mean. This tragedy is not confined within the borders of Haiti. It has already extended dangerously beyond them. The situation in Haiti is undoubtedly a threat to peace and security, particularly in the Caribbean basin, an area to which my country belongs. It is not a question of interference in Haiti's internal affairs.”
1993-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3238 (1993) · source
“"The Council knows the history of our country, and we are ready to keep that history going - a history that is replete with struggles for peace, for justice, for solidarity with the international community." President Aristide went on to say: "As I speak to the Council, I see peace-loving people I have known go before my mind's eye, and I know that they have died. I am wondering how many more will be massacred if once and for all an end is not put - within the norm - to this attempt to murder democracy." (S/PV.3011, pp. 7-8) Throughout the 20 difficult months that have passed since President Aristide made that speech, he has never abandoned his commitment to peace. He has constantly cooperated with all the efforts and initiatives of both the Organization of American States (OAS) and our Organization.”
1993-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3238 (1993) · source
“(...) "Were we isolated and alone in our country, it would have been very difficult for us, the Haitian people, to face this tragic situation, in which arms and milita:y boots are always ready to crush a people that wish to stake their lives and work peacefully for the reign of democracy." President Aristide then said: "I shall simply say that with the Council standing with us, we are firmly convinced that once again the Latin American continent, the Antilles, the Caribbean and the rest of the world will say 'yes' to democracy and 'no' to military dictatorship, 'yes' to solidarity and 'no' to isolation.”
1993-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3238 (1993) · source
“I would recall here some of the aspects of that speech: "It is that people which, using non-violent means to protest that dictatorship, is standing and awaiting the svpport of the international community - your support - so that together we can show our will to live in democracy and for democracy and against dictatorship. "It is the selfsame people that expects the Council's support in the protection of human rights.”
1993-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3238 (1993) · source
“Mr. ARRIA (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): On 3 October 1991, the Security Council, in this Chamber, received the President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, whose constitutional Government had just been overthrown by a military coup d'etat. President Aristide at that time was in danger of losing his life. In spite of the circumstances, no one will ever forget his statement in the Council. Venezuela's delegation was sitting at the side of the Security Council. It was a speech with a tone and a purpose which showed determination to restore peace by peaceful means.”
1993-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3238 (1993) · source
“It is a warning also to those in Cambodia and in the former Yugoslavia, who think that they will never have to answer for their crimes. Finally, my delegation would like to express its profound admiration to the Government of Pakistan for the determination expressed today through its representative, Ambassador Jamsheed Marker, that these criminal acts will in no way affect its determination to serve the cause of peace.”
1993-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3229 (1993) · source
“It is clear that the process of disarming the factions - as was so heavily emphasized in the Council, especially by the Secretary-General himself - must be concluded, because it is urgent to reactivate this indispensable stage in what promises to be a long process of peacemaking. We owe this first of all to the suffering people of Somalia, who want peace, and also to those Members of the United Nations that have generously contributed to UNOSOM II. One of the noblest and most magnanimous dimensions of the United Nations is represented by those who made up the peace-keeping operation. With the adoption of this resolution, it is clear that the international community will not allow these criminal acts to be committed with impunity.”
1993-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3229 (1993) · source
“With the confirmation of his responsibility for the attacks against UNOSOM II, however, his impunity will have come to an end, because the Secretary-General, apart from ordering his arrest and detention, will be able to proceed to trying him so that he may later be punished appropriately. This crime against the peace-keeping force of the United Nations, along with those committed against the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, in Cambodia, establishes dangerous precedents if the international community is unable to take the measures we have agreed upon today. The international community cannot permit the troops of countries that have so generously contributed to peace-keeping operations to become the targets of warring factions, as in the case before us today.”
1993-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3229 (1993) · source
“The resolution, in reaffirming the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), goes beyond condemnation and requests the Secretary-General, through the force commander, to arrest, detain and put on trial those responsible for the attacks as well as those who used radio transmissions - members of the Aidid faction - to incite publicly these cowardly attacks. Aidid is nationally and internationally recognized as primarily responsible for the destruction of Somalia and for thousands upon thousands of crimes against his people. The absence of any judicial machinery has permitted him so far to continue to act with total impunity, in spite of the erimes for which he is responsible and for which he will have to answer one day.”
1993-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3229 (1993) · source
“Mr. ARRIA (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): The resolution we have just adopted is not confined to condemning the crime against the international community, represented so worthily in Somalia by the valiant troops of Pakistan, victims of an ambush apparently perpetrated by factions of the so-called Somali National Assembly, undoubtedly instigated and encouraged publicly by Aidid himself. This is but one of the many actions designed to intimidate United Nations forces to prevent them from fulfilling their mandate O£ restoring peace in Somalia, initiated with "Operation Restore Hope".”
1993-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3229 (1993) · source
“Today, this State Member of our Organization is on the verge of disappearing under the weight of terror. Circumstances require that the Council take substantive action in order to stem this extermination. This is the time to really take action, not just to appear to be taking action. For all of these reasons, the Venezuelan delegation will abstain in the vote on the draft resolution that is now before the Council.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“Because that safe area - a misnomer - is in reality becoming a refugee camp controlled 'and supervised by the refugees' aggressors. If we were to draw a conclusion from this conflict, would it not be that we should all be armed, because if the United Nations were to impose on 'us an embargo, we would be at the mercy of our enemies? No one should, of course, fall for this erroneous solution. What we must do is respect and apply collective security, which ensures the right to self-defence, as guaranteed by the Charter. While we have been attempting to negotiate the Peace Plan, Bosnia and Herzegovina has lost two thirds of its territory, and its people have been the victims of mounting crimes and violations on an unprecedented and unacceptable scale.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“It has not been possible to resolve the substantive differences that separate us from other members of the Council with regard to what steps could have shown, according to some views, the unquestionable will no longer to tolerate the prevailing situation and to rechannel our initiatives in a common conception of the desirable solutions. Perhaps our own assessment was influenced by the experience of having visited, upon the initiative of the Council, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the safe area of Srebrenica, as part of the mission that was sent over a month ago to assess the situation and make recommendations to the Security Council. At that time, I described Srebrenica as an open prison, subject to slow genocide. We stated that Srebrenica was an emergency situation and that it must not become a model to be followed. Why?”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina has communicated officially to the Council its rejection of the particular modality of "safe areas" as contained in this draft resolution. This position has not even been considered by the Council, though it is traditionally attentive to the opinions of parties in conflict, especially when they are Member States. My delegation took a very active part in working on the resolutions that provide for the creation of "safe areas" for Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac, and we could, thus, never be opposed to the concept. What we oppose is the shape this humanitarian modality has taken in practice. Along with the other members of the Non-Aligned Caucus, we have tried to contribute solutions to the dilemmas and we have profited from frank exchanges of views on the subject.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“To be frank, I must recall that when the Council adopted the resolution that left it up to the coalition toe deal with the trampling, vandalization and appropriation of a Member country, Kuwait, the international community deployed 500,000 military personnel, dividing the monumental cost among a group of countries, Vital interests were more closely linked to that crisis than to the vandalization of this other Member country, which gets no such generous response from the international community. Nevertheless, without my attempting to compare the two situations, this tragedy has far more worrisome dimensions, as manifested in unspeakable crimes against humanity. There are essential values that should indeed be of strategic importance for the international community.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“The central argument that has been put forward in the Council for not dealing with this tragedy with greater determination is that there are not enough military or financial resources available for us to put several thousand troops on the ground. Again and again we hear that nothing more can be done and that this is the only way to prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina from losing all of its territory.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“The arms embargo has substantially helped the well-armed aggressor and tragically weakened the victim. This is now obvious to everyone. "The consequences are clear and tragic: two thirds of our country is occupied; over 200,000 civilians have been killed; more than 2 million civilians have been uprooted from their homes; hundreds of towns and villages have been destroyed. This is the price this country and its people have paid for one unfortunate decision and for your unyielding opposition to it being corrected, ...". ($/25873. annex) This is an issue that the Council should duly re-evaluate under the provisions of article 51 of the Charter.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“In this context I should like to quote from the letter dated 1 June from the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, addressed to the President of our Council. It says, "Serb paramilitary units, directly supported by the Yugoslav Army from Serbia, continue their aggression throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina ... "The aggressor is able to do this because you, the Security Council, have tied our hands while our people are being killed and our country is being destroyed. "You say that you do not wish to take sides in this conflict. But, Excellencies, you implicitly and explicitly took sides in this conflict when the Council imposed an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia and when the Council decided to enforce the same resolution in respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“The conditions I have described are almost the exact opposite of those existing today in the so-called safe areas, and the draft resolution before us does not address their main points. We should call them what they are: ghettoes, refugee camps, open jails, areas under threat; but we should never be so brazen as to call them "safe areas". Perhaps the best description of a "safe area" was given by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) spokesman, Commander Barry Frewer, upon the Serbian refusal to admit UNPROFOR into the "safe area" of Gorazde after it had been trying for a month to gain entry: "We are going to put up a sign on the outskirts of Gorazde that says: 'SAFE AREA -- VERY DANGEROUS - KEEP OUT'.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“They should guarantee freedom of movement into and out of the area; international military presence; unrestricted presence of the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies, inclvding non-governmental groups; the right to humanitarian assistance; respect for human rights and the rights of minorities; uninterrupted access to basic services, such as water, electricity and communications; and access to economic activities, In addition to being provided security against military attack, which would only be possible by seizing or neutralizing the heavy armaments of the Serbs, and humanitarian assistance, these areas should be able to restore their civil government, local police, schools, productive activities and social services.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“They should not be a substitute for peace or a solution to the problems faced by threatened peoples. They should provide a minimum of safety for the "normal" life of their inhabitants, and they should be open areas where respect for human rights can be verified and humanitarian assistance can be received unimpeded. They should not confine people as if they were in prison.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“However, we vigorously disagree with the proposed way in which this is to be achieved, and our conviction is based on the way in which such "safe areas" have, in practice, functioned. They appear to be - and in fact, are -- nothing more than ethnic reservations under the wing of the United Nations. We fear that this Organization will be indefinitely committed to answering for and prolonging these aberrations. In the view of my delegation, safe areas ~ as has been stated by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Secretariat of the United Nations, and as I concluded personally during my recent visit to the so-called safe area of Srebrenica - should be temporary, intermediate steps in the peace process.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“The link between this initiative and the Peace Plan will be merely theoretical as long as there is no genuine will to carry owt the Plan. In these circumstances, its implementation still depends on the party that has resorted to force, that holds sway over the territory and that continues to defy with impunity the international community and the values it strives to represent. The draft resolution also proposes the extension of protective measures for a certain number of urban centres having a predominantly Muslim population, where refugees and displaced persons are also concentrated. These centres today amount to enclaves under economic and military siege, surviving only by the whim of the aggressor. As already stated, Venezuela has no quarrel with the good intention of remedying this situation.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“For Venezuela, the draft resolution before the Council today has serious difficulties that we have not been able to resolve in the course of our extensive consultations. It proposes an initiative that we find, on the one hand, incomplete in scope and, on the other, contrary to its own objectives. In this draft the Council concentrates on those areas still under siege and attack, in an attempt to save them. This is well and good. However, it also makes it clear that it does so in the face of political reluctance to shoulder the same degree of responsibility for the broader and more meaningful goal of the fair and equitable distribution of territory between the various communities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“It invites, in particular, the European Parliament and the European members of the Security Council not to endorse as a basis for a peace agreement the results of Serbian aggression, with its territorial conquests achieved by force and terror, and invites the Council to promote a plan including the necessary military presence to disarm the Serbian aggressors. This resolution of the European Parliament should not go unnoticed. Its content and its political legitimacy, coming from so great and important a geographical area where genocide is arising once again, give it extraordinary significance. I felt it necessary to state the foregoing because the Council is at a historic crossroads in the discharge of its responsibilities. Hence, the import of the decisions we take from now on goes beyond the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“The only inevitable and inescapable deduction that we can draw is that in this conflict there has not been the firm determination to face reality, which we are now hastening to recognize de facto, legitimizing the situation as a basis for a solution which sooner or later will inevitably be imposed. At its recent session in May, the European Parliament, under the presidency of the Foreign Minister of Denmark, debated the plan of action. The Parliament adopted a resolution which clearly expresses its disagreement with the plan, a plan which "gives the impression of conceding the palm of victory to the aggressors", and reiterates the need to follow strictly the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“None the less, and in spite of all evidence of manipulation, delaying tactics, acts of aggression by some against others, it is felt now that all that are needed are containment and prevention measures: safe areas, border monitors, strengthening sanctions, the prohibition of overflights, a tribunal for crimes against humanitarian law. The obvious questions are: How? When? On what bases? Can we believe that this attitude will convince the aggressors that it is best graciously to renounce what they have conquered by terror and by force? Are we really capable of believing that this will be the inevitable consequence of this type of decision? In our view, this is not the case.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“This was an approach based on the unacceptability of the solution of conflicts by force, the unacceptability of putting at risk the territorial integrity of a Member State, the non-recognition of political or territorial gains achieved by aggression and the terror of "ethnic cleansing", the urgent need to find the just and equitable solutions the conflict requires and, above all, the need to put an end to the crisis and to do justice, given the unprecedented series of abuses and crimes that have characterized it.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“With all due respect for our colleagues on the Council, Venezuela does not subscribe to such assessments and recommendations because it believes that they run counter to reality. We note with profound concern that this conflict is seen by the major countries as being unrelated to their strategic interests, which is certainly in contradiction with the approach that just a short time ago quided them.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“It has been argued that that is not the case, that the Peace Plan remains valid and that it is only a question of seeking the best way of seeing to it that it eventually be implemented, maintaining that agreement among the parties is an essential prerequisite, and that in order to achieve this it is appropriate to embark on an exercise of growing pressures, sanctions and isolation. It has been pointed out that the situation is such that it is only possible to try to save what can be saved, while awaiting better times. On 22 May, the Vance-Owen Plan was in effect replaced by the Washington plan of action. Curiously, the only party that did not support the Vance-Owen Plan ~ the Serbian party - is the only one that today is enthusiastically supporting the plan of action.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source
“For reasons which it is not for my country to judge, the whole of the Council's proposals have not been followed through to their ultimate goals. The Peace Plan, in which so much effort has been invested and in which so much confidence and hope have been placed - especially by the victims of the conflict - is today still just a process, a frame of reference, and as such lacks the endorsement that would give it authority and make it what it was meant to be: a means of restoring justice in order to guarantee the rights of all and serve as a reliable basis for the restoration of peace. The result of this abdication is that the Council today lacks a credible instrument to achieve its objectives.”
1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source