YouSaid · the spoken record

Blix

lines on the record: 106
first: 2003-01-27
most recent: 2003-06-05
sittings or episodes: 5
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We formed a good team of long-standing friendship in which his knowledge of Arabic proved more directly useful than my knowledge of Swedish. I want to end my statement by noting the strong commitment among nations, both within and outside the Security Council, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to terrorists as well as to States, and to eventually to achieve the elimination of those weapons. The case of Iraq has been a major factor in forging that commitment. The wide support that UNMOVIC has received from Governments and from the public is further testimony to the strong wish to reduce the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction and to the continued importance of inspection.”
2003-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4768 (2003) · source
“As this is likely to be my last briefing to the Security Council as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, I would like to take this opportunity to thank each and every member of the Council for the valuable guidance and support offered to UNMOVIC and myself. I would also warmly like to thank the Secretary-General personally and the Secretariat for the excellent cooperation they provided since the creation of UNMOVIC. I have had the opportunity to thank UNMOVIC's College of Commissioners for the advice that it has provided; it has been of great help throughout our existence. I trust that the Council has noted the excellent working relationship that prevailed between Mr. ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency and myself.”
2003-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4768 (2003) · source
“The Council will be aware that UNMOVIC remains ready to resume work in Iraq as an independent verifier or to conduct long-term monitoring, should the Council so decide. In paragraph 16 of the introduction to the report before the Council, and in chapter VIII of the report, there are some comments on UNMOVIC's readiness to resume work in the field. Some reduction in UNMOVIC's staff will take place. However, the core expertise and experience available within UNMOVIC remain a valuable asset that the Security Council could use where the services of an independent body would be required for verification and monitoring. That might be of particular value in the field of biological weapons and missiles, for which there exists no international verification organization.”
2003-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4768 (2003) · source
“Even before UNMOVIC began its inspections, in November 2002, the Commission had received information about such facilities, and our inspectors were looking for sites where such mobile units could be hooked up for support services. Upon our request, the Iraqi side presented some information about the mobile system they possessed. As the Council will see from our report, neither the information presented to us nor pictures given to us by the Iraqi side match the description that has recently been made available to us, as well as to the media, by the United States. At UNMOVIC, we cannot of course make a proper evaluation of the depicted vehicles on the basis of published material alone. In resolution 1483 (2003), the Security Council declared its intention to revisit the mandate of UNMOVIC.”
2003-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4768 (2003) · source
“While we are all aware of the large amounts of proscribed items that still remain unaccounted for, we should perhaps take note of the fact that for many years neither UNSCOM. nor UNMOVIC made significant finds of weapons. The lack of finds could be because the items were unilaterally destroyed by the Iraqi authorities or else because they were effectively concealed by them. I trust that in the new environment in Iraq, in which there is full access and cooperation, and in which knowledgeable witnesses should no longer be inhibited from revealing what they know, it should be possible to establish the truth we all want to know. Let me further make some brief comments on mobile facilities, as there is currently much media attention devoted to this issue.”
2003-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4768 (2003) · source
“As to items, only a few remnants of the biological weapons programme were subsequently found. A great deal - Iraq asserts all - was unilaterally destroyed in 1991. Thus, in the main, UNSCOM's supervised destruction of actual weapons and agents took place during the early years of the Commission, and had regard mainly to items declared by Iraq, or at least found at sites declared by Iraq. Subsequent UNSCOM disarmament activities dealt almost exclusively with the destruction of equipment and facilities for the production of weapons connected to past programmes. In addition, of course, UNSCOM. was able, with great skill, to map large parts of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes.”
2003-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4768 (2003) · source
“Fifty per cent of the declared warheads and 98 per cent of the missile engines remained intact. Also, there was no time to assess whether the A1 Fatah missile programme stayed within the range allowed by Security Council resolutions. In the context of the destruction of proscribed items, I should also like to draw the attention of the Council to the information provided in appendix I. It shows that the weapons that were destroyed before inspectors left in 1998 were, in almost all cases, declared by Iraq, and that the destruction occurred before 1993 in the case of missiles, and before 1994 in the case of chemical weapons. The existence and scope of the biological weapons programme was uncovered by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in 1995, despite Iraq's denials and concealment efforts.”
2003-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4768 (2003) · source
“We did not have time to interview more than a handful of the large number of persons who were said by Iraq to have participated in the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons in 1991. Such interviews might have helped towards the resolution of some outstanding issues, although one must be aware that the totalitarian regime in Iraq continued to cast a shadow on the credibility of all interviews. The report before the Council gives details of the Commission's supervision of the destruction of 50 Al Samoud 2 missiles out of the 75 declared to have been deployed, and of other items in the missile sphere. As the Council will note from the table in paragraph 115 of the report, the programme of destruction was not completed at the time the inspectors where withdrawn.”
2003-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4768 (2003) · source
“It was the task of the Iraqi side to present items unaccounted for, if they existed, or to present evidence - records, documents or other - convincing the inspectors that the items do not exist. If, for whatever reason, this is not done, the international community cannot have confidence that past programmes or any remaining parts of them have been terminated. However, an effective presence of international inspectors will serve as a deterrent against efforts aimed at reactivating or developing new programmes of weapons of mass destruction. Although during the last month and a half of our inspections the Iraqi side made considerable efforts to provide explanations, to begin inquiries and to undertake exploration and excavations, those efforts did not bring the answers needed before we withdrew.”
2003-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4768 (2003) · source
“The first point, made in paragraph 8 of the report, is that the Commission has not at any time during the inspections in Iraq found evidence of the continuation or resumption of programmes of weapons of mass destruction or significant quantities of proscribed items - whether from pre-l99l or later. I leave aside the Al Samoud 2 missile system, which we concluded was proscribed. As I have noted before, this does not necessarily mean that such items could not exist. They might - there remain long lists of items unaccounted for - but it is not justified to jump to the conclusion that something exists just because it is unaccounted for. In paragraph 11, we note that the long list of proscribed items unaccounted for has not been shortened by inspections or Iraqi declarations, explanations or documentation.”
2003-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4768 (2003) · source
“Mr. Blix: The thirteenth quarterly report of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) is before the Council in document S/2003/580. It covers the period 1 March to 31 May. The Commission carried out inspections in Iraq up to and including Monday, 17 March. The day thereafter, Tuesday, 18 March, all international staff were withdrawn, and the armed action commenced on 19 March. We are gratified that the withdrawal took place in good order and with full cooperation from the Iraqi side. I think that the UNMOVIC report speaks for itself. It is a bit longer than usual, because we thought it might be useful for the Council to get a fuller perspective on some of the questions. Let me highlight some points.”
2003-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4768 (2003) · source
“With increasing attention being devoted to the proliferation of these weapons, this capability may be valuable to the Council.”
2003-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4721 (2003) · source
“In its further deliberations, I hope the Council will be aware that it has in UNMOVIC staff a unique body of international experts who owe their allegiance to the United Nations and who are trained as inspectors in the field of weapons of mass destruction. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a large department of skilled nuclear inspectors and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has a large staff of skilled chemical weapons inspectors, no other international organization has trained inspectors in the field of biological weapons and missiles. There is also in the secretariat of UNMOVIC staff familiar with and trained in the analysis of both discipline-specific issues and the broad questions of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”
2003-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4721 (2003) · source
“Our experts have found so far that, in substance, only limited new information has been provided that will help to resolve remaining questions. Under resolution 1284 (1999), UNMOVIC's work programme is to be submitted to the Council for approval. I note, however, that what was drafted and prepared for implementation by a large staff of UNMOVIC inspectors and other resources deployed to Iraq would seem to have only limited practical relevance in the current situation. UNMOVIC is a subsidiary organ of the Security Council. Until the Council takes a new decision regarding the role and functions of the Commission, the previous resolutions remain valid to the extent this is practicable. It is evidently for the Council to consider the next steps.”
2003-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4721 (2003) · source
“However, it is evidently possible for the Council to single out a few issues for resolution within a specific time, just as the draft programme before members select 12 key tasks, progress on which could have an impact on the Council's assessment of cooperation of Iraq under resolution 1284 (1999). Whatever approach is followed, results will depend on Iraq's active cooperation on substance. May I add that, in my last report, I commented on the information provided by Iraq on a number of unresolved issues. Since then, Iraq has sent several more letters on such issues. These efforts by Iraq should be acknowledged, but, as I noted in this Council on 7 March, the value of the information thus provided must be soberly judged.”
2003-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4721 (2003) · source
“Some inspection staff will now remain for a short time in Larnaca to prepare inspection reports. Others who have come from our roster of trained staff, will go home to their previous positions and could be available again, if the need arises. I would like to make some specific comments that relate to the draft programme. I am aware of ideas that have been advanced that specific groups of disarmament issues could be tackled and solved within specific time lines. The programme does not propose such an approach, in which, say, we would aim at addressing and resolving the issues of anthrax and VX in March and unmanned aerial vehicles and remotely piloted vehicles in April. In the work we have pursued until now, we have worked broadly and did not neglect any identified disarmament issues.”
2003-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4721 (2003) · source
“I naturally feel sadness that three and a half months of work carried out in Iraq have not brought the assurances needed about the absence of weapons of mass destruction or other proscribed items in Iraq, that no more time is available for our inspections and that armed action now seems imminent. At the same time I feel a sense of relief that it was possible to withdraw yesterday all United Nations international staff, including that of UNMOVIC and the International Atomic Energy Agency. I note that the Iraqi authorities gave full cooperation to achieve this and that our withdrawal to Larnaca took place in a safe and orderly manner. Some sensitive equipment was also taken to Larnaca, while other equipment was left, and our offices in Baghdad have been scaled.”
2003-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4721 (2003) · source
“It would have been difficult to draft it without this knowledge and practical experience. The time lines established in resolution 1284 (1999) have been understood to mean that the work programme was to be presented for the approval of the Council at the latest on 27 March. In order to meet the wishes of members of the Council we made the draft work programme available already on Monday this week. I note that on the very same day we were constrained together with other United Nations units to order the withdrawal of all our inspectors and other international staff from Iraq.”
2003-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4721 (2003) · source
“Mr. Blix: The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was established by Security Council resolution 1284 ( 1999) and was enabled to enter Iraq and carry out its inspection work almost three years later. It might seem strange that we are presenting a draft work programme only after having already performed the inspections for three and a half months. However, there were good reasons why the Council wanted to give us some time after the start of inspections to prepare this programme. During the months of the build-up of our resources in Iraq, Larnaca and New York and of inspections in Iraq we have - as was indeed the purpose - learned a great deal that has been useful to know for the drafting of our work programme and for the selection of key remaining disarmament tasks.”
2003-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4721 (2003) · source
“Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither Governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that, in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament, to give confidence and to sound an alarm if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programmes.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“The working document does contain suggestions on how these concerns may be tackled. Let me conclude by telling members that UNMOVIC is currently drafting the work programme that resolution 1284 (1999) requires us to submit this month. It will obviously contain our proposed list of key remaining disarmament tasks; it will describe the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification that the Council has asked us to implement; it will also describe the various subsystems that constitute the programme- for instance, for aerial surveillance, for information from Governments and suppliers, for sampling and for the checking of road traffic. How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can, and is, to be immediate, disarmament and, at any rate, the verification of it, cannot be instant.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Each cluster in the working document ends with a number of points indicating what Iraq could do to solve the issue. Hence, Iraq's cooperation could be measured against the successful resolution of issues. I should note that the working document contains much information and discussion about the issues that existed at the end of 1998, including information that came to light after 1998. It contains much less information and discussion about the period after 1998, primarily because of a paucity of information. Nevertheless, intelligence agencies have expressed the view that proscribed programmes have continued or restarted in this period. It is further contended that proscribed programmes and items are located in underground facilities, as I mentioned, and that proscribed items are being moved around Iraq.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“It is the answers to these issues that we seek through our inspection activities. It is also from the list of these clustered issues that UNMOVIC will identify key remaining disarmament tasks. As noted in the report before members, this list of clustered issues is ready. UNMOVIC is required to submit only the work programme with the key remaining disarmament tasks to the Council. As I understand, several Council members are interested in the working document with the complete clusters of disarmament issues, and we have declassified it and are ready to make it available to members of the Council on request. In this working document - which may still be adjusted in the light of new information- members will get a more up-to- date review of the outstanding issues than in the documents of 1999, to which members usually refer.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Under the timelines set by that resolution, the results of some of this work is to be reported to the Council before the end of this month. Let me be more specific. Resolution 1284 (1999) instructs UNMOVIC to "address unresolved disarmament issues" and to identify "key remaining disarmament tasks", and the latter are to be submitted for approval by the Council in the context of a work programme. UNMOVIC will be ready to submit a draft work programme this month, as required. UNMOVIC, UNSCOM. and the Amorim panel did valuable work to identify the disarmament issues that were still open at the end of 1998. UNMOVIC has used this material as starting points but has analysed the data behind it and data and documents since 1998 to compile its own list of unresolved disarmament issues, or, rather, clustered issues.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives that are now being taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some longstanding open disarmament issues can be seen as active or even proactive, these initiatives, three to four months into the new resolution, cannot be said to constitute immediate cooperation, nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome, and UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues. Members of the Council may relate most of what I have said to resolution 1441 (2002), but UNMOVIC is performing work under several resolutions of the Security Council. The quarterly report before members is submitted in accordance with resolution 1284 (1999), which not only created UNMOVIC, but also continues to guide much of our work.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Against this background, the question is now asked Whether Iraq has cooperated "immediately, unconditionally, and actively" with UNMOVIC, as required under operative paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002). The answers can be seen from the factual descriptions that I have provided. However, if more direct answers are desired, I would say the following. The Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding helicopters and U-2 planes. Iraq has not, however, so far persisted in attaching these or other conditions for the exercise of any of our inspection rights. If it did, we would report 1t.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Iraq has also recently informed us that, following the adoption of the presidential decree prohibiting private individuals and mixed companies from engaging in work related to weapons of mass destruction, further legislation on the subject is to be enacted. That appears to be in response to a letter from UNMOVIC requesting clarification of the issue. What are we to make of these activities? One can hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January. This is welcome, but the value of these measures must be soberly judged in the light of how many question marks they actually succeed in straightening out. This is not yet clear.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“It should be followed by a serious and credible effort to determine the separate issue of how many R-400-type bombs were produced. In this, as in other matters, inspection work is moving forward and may yield results. Iraq proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the amount of unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at a site. However, even if the use of advanced technology could quantify the amount of anthrax said to be dumped at the site, the results would still be open to interpretation. Defining the quantity of anthrax destroyed must, of course, be followed by efforts to establish what quantity was actually produced. With respect to VX, Iraq has recently suggested a similar method to quantify a VX precursor stated to have been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Many have been found to restate what Iraq has already declared, and some will require further study and discussion. There is a significant Iraqi effort under way to clarify a major source of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons that were unilaterally destroyed in 1991. A part of this effort concerns a disposal site that was deemed too dangerous for full investigation in the past. It is now being re-excavated. To date, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs, comprising two liquid-filled intact R- 400 bombs and six other complete bombs. Bomb fragments have also been found. Samples have been taken. The investigation of the destruction site could, in the best case, allow a determination of the number of bombs destroyed at that site.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Lethal weapons are being destroyed. However, I must add that the report I have today tells me that no destruction work has continued today. I hope that this is a temporary break. Until today, 34 Al Samoud 2 missiles - including four training missiles, two combat warheads, one launcher and five engines - have been destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Work is continuing to identify and inventory the parts and equipment associated with the Al Samoud 2 programme. Two "reconstituted" casting chambers used in the production of solid propellant missiles have been destroyed and the remnants melted or encased in concrete. The legality of the Al Fatah missile is still under review, pending further investigation and measurement of various parameters of that missile. More papers on anthrax, VX and missiles have recently been provided.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Even a week ago, when the current quarterly report was finalized, there was still relatively little tangible progress to note; hence the cautious formulations in the report before the Council. As of today, there is more. While the Iraqi side tried to persuade us during our meetings in Baghdad that the Al Samoud 2 missiles that they have declared fall within the permissible range set by the Security Council, the calculations of an international panel of experts led us to the opposite conclusion. Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and associated items must be destroyed and has started the process of destruction under our supervision. The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament- indeed, the first since the middle of the 19905. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“In addition, ground-penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage have been found so far. I should add that, both for the monitoring of ground transportation and for the inspection of underground facilities, we would need to increase our staff in Iraq. I am not talking about a doubling of staff. I would rather have twice the amount of high-quality information about sites to inspect than twice as many expert inspectors to send. On 14 February I reported to the Council that the Iraqi side had become more active in taking and proposing steps which potentially might shed new light on unresolved disarmament issues.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Iraq is expected to assist in the development of credible ways to conduct random checks of ground transportation. Inspectors are also engaged in examining Iraq's programme for remotely piloted vehicles. A number of sites have been inspected, with data being collected to assess the range and other capabilities of the various models found. Inspections are continuing in that area. There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed activities are conducted underground. Iraq should provide information on any underground structure suitable for the production or storage of weapons of mass destruction. During inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building structures for any possible underground facilities.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Since we started requesting interviews, 38 individuals have been asked for private interviews, of which 10 have accepted under our terms - seven of them during the past week. As I noted on 14 February, intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks and, in particular, that there are mobile production units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist. Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food-testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large containers with seed-processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities has so far been found.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“The second reflection is that, with relevant witnesses available, it becomes even more important to be able to conduct interviews in modes and locations which allow us to be confident that the testimony provided is given without outside influence. While the Iraqi side seems to have encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of Iraqi officials - so-called minders - or the taping of the interviews, conditions ensuring the absence of undue influences are difficult to attain inside Iraq. Interviews outside the country might provide such assurance. It is our intention to request such interviews shortly. Nevertheless, despite remaining shortcomings, interviews are useful.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“UNMOVIC has names of such persons in its records, and they are among the people whom we seek to interview. In the past month, Iraq has provided us with the names of many persons who may be relevant sources of information, in particular persons who took part in various phases of the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons and proscribed missiles in 1991. This provision of names prompts two reflections. The first is that, with such detailed information existing regarding those who took part in the unilateral destruction, surely there must also remain records regarding the quantities and other data concerning the various items destroyed.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programmes. Only a few new documents of this type have come to light so far and been handed over since we began inspections. It was a disappointment that Iraq's declaration of 7 December 2002 did not bring new documentary evidence. I hope that efforts in this respect, including the appointment of a governmental commission, will give significant results. When proscribed items are deemed unaccounted for, it is, above all, credible accounts that are needed - or the proscribed items, if they exist. Where authentic documents do not become available, interviews with persons who may have relevant knowledge and experience may be another way of obtaining evidence.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“That is not to say that the operation of inspections is free from friction but at this juncture we are able to perform professional no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance. American U-2 and French Mirage surveillance aircraft already give us valuable imagery, supplementing satellite pictures, and we expect soon to be able to add night vision capability through an aircraft offered to us by the Russian Federation. We also expect to add low-level, close-area surveillance through drones provided by Germany. We are grateful not only to the countries which place these valuable tools at our disposal, but also to the States, most recently Cyprus, which have agreed to the stationing of aircraft on their territory.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“In matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few difficulties - and certainly far fewer than those that were faced by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in the period 1991 to 1998. This may well be due to the strong outside pressure. Some practical matters which were not settled by the talks that Mr. ElBaradei and I had with the Iraqi side in Vienna prior to inspections or in resolution 1441 (2002) have been resolved at meetings which we have had in Baghdad. Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi side about helicopters and aerial surveillance planes operating in the no-fly zones have been overcome.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Mr. Blix: For nearly three years, I have been coming to the Security Council to present the quarterly reports of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). They have described our many preparations for the resumption of inspections in Iraq. The twelfth quarterly report (S/2003/232, annex) is the first that describes three months of inspections. They come after four years without inspections. The report was finalized 10 days ago, and a number of relevant events have taken place since then. Today's statement will supplement the circulated report on these points in order to bring the Council up to date. Inspections in Iraq resumed on 27 November 2002.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Regrettably, the high degree of cooperation required of Iraq for disarmament through inspection was not forthcoming in 1991. Despite the elimination, under UNSCOM. and IAEA supervision, of large amounts of weapons, weapons-related items and installations over the years, the task remained incomplete when inspectors were withdrawn almost eight years later, at the end of 1998. If Iraq had provided the necessary cooperation in 1991, the phase of disarmament under resolution 687 (1991) could have been short, and a decade of sanctions could have been avoided. Today, three months after the adoption of resolution 1441 (2002), the period of disarmament through inspection could still be short if immediate, active and unconditional cooperation with UNMOVIC and IAEA were to be forthcoming.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“The answer depends upon which task one has in mind: the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and related items and programmes which were prohibited in 1991 - the disarmament task - or the monitoring that no new proscribed activities occur. The latter task, though not often focused upon, is highly significant, and not controversial. It will require monitoring, which is ongoing - that is, open-ended, until the Council decides otherwise. By contrast, the task of disarmament foreseen in resolution 687 (1991) and the progress on key remaining disarmament tasks foreseen in resolution 1284 (1999), as well as the disarmament obligations which Iraq was given a final opportunity to comply with under resolution 1441 (2002), were always required to be fulfilled in a shorter time span.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“These developments are in line with suggestions made in a non-paper recently circulated by France, suggesting a further strengthening of the inspection capabilities. It is our intention to examine the possibilities for surveying ground movements, notably by trucks. In the face of persistent intelligence reports, for instance about mobile biological weapons production units, such measures could well increase the effectiveness of inspections. UNMOVIC is still expanding its capabilities, both in terms of numbers of staff and technical resources. On my way to the recent Baghdad meeting, I stopped in Vienna to meet 60 experts who had just completed our general training course for inspectors. They came from 22 countries, including Arab countries. UNMOVIC is not infrequently asked how much more time it needs to complete its task in Iraq.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“The reported movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been a routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of an imminent inspection. Our reservation on this point does not detract from our appreciation for the briefing. Yesterday, UNMOVIC informed the Iraqi authorities of its intention to start using the U-2 surveillance aircraft early next week under arrangements similar to those UNSCOM. had followed. We are also in the process of working out modalities for the use of the French Mirage aircraft starting late next week and for the drones supplied by the German Government. The offer from Russia of an Antonov aircraft with night vision capabilities is a welcome one and is next on our agenda for further improving UNMOVIC's and IAEA's technical capabilities.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“It showed that conventional arms are being moved around the country and that movements are not necessarily related to weapons of mass destruction. The presentation of intelligence information by the United States Secretary of State suggested that Iraq had prepared for inspections by cleaning up sites and removing evidence of proscribed weapons programmes. I would like to comment only on one case, with which we are familiar, namely, the trucks identified by analysts as being for chemical decontamination at a munitions depot. This was a declared site, and it was certainly one of the sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have noted that the two satellite images of the site were taken several weeks apart.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“Those who provide such information must know that it will be kept in strict confidence and be known to very few people. UNMOVIC has achieved good working relations with intelligence agencies, and the amount of information provided has been gradually increasing. However, we must recognize that there are limitations and that misinterpretations can occur. Intelligence information has been useful for UNMOVIC. In one case, it led us to a private home where documents mainly relating to laser enrichment of uranium were found. In other cases, intelligence has led to sites where no proscribed items were found. Even in such cases, however, inspection of these sites was useful in proving the absence of such items and in some cases the presence of other items - conventional munitions.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“It was realized that an international organization authorized to perform inspections anywhere on the ground could make good use of information obtained from Gwith eyes in the sky, ears in the ether, access to defectors, and both eyes and ears on the market for weapons-related material. It was understood that the information residing in the intelligence services of Governments could come to very active use in the international effort to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This remains true, and by now we have a good deal of experience in the matter. International organizations need to analyse such information critically and especially benefit when it comes from more than one source. The intelligence agencies, for their part, must protect their sources and methods.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“A credible inspection regime requires that Iraq provide full cooperation on process, granting immediate access everywhere to inspectors, and on substance, providing full declarations supported by relevant information and material and evidence. However, with the closed society in Iraq of today and the history of inspections there, other sources of information, such as defectors and government intelligence agencies are required to aid the inspection process. I remember how, in 1991, several inspections in Iraq that were based on information received from a Government helped to disclose important parts of the nuclear weapons programme.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“We feel that interviews conducted without any third party present and without tape recording would provide the greatest credibility. At the recent meeting in Baghdad, as on several earlier occasions, my colleague Mr. ElBaradei and I urged the Iraqi side to enact legislation implementing the United Nations prohibitions regarding weapons of mass destruction. This morning we had a message that a presidential decree containing prohibitions with regard to importation and production of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons has now been issued. We have not yet had time to study the details of the text of the decree. I should like to make some comments on the role of intelligence in connection with inspections in Iraq.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“The matter of private interviews was discussed at length during our meeting in Baghdad. The Iraqi side confirmed the commitment, which it made to us on 20 January, to encourage persons asked to accept such interviews, whether in or out of Iraq. So far, we have only had interviews in Baghdad. A number of persons have declined to be interviewed unless they were allowed to have an official present or were allowed to tape the interview. Three persons who had previously refused interviews on UNMOVIC's terms subsequently accepted such interviews, just prior to our talks in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February. These interviews proved informative. No further interviews have since been accepted on our terms. I hope this will change.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source