YouSaid · the spoken record

Blix

lines on the record: 106
first: 2003-01-27
most recent: 2003-06-05
sittings or episodes: 5
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The Iraqi side also informed us that the commission that had been appointed in the wake of our finding 12 empty chemical weapons warheads had had its mandate expanded to look for any still existing proscribed items. This was welcomed. A second commission, we learned, has now been appointed with the task of searching all over Iraq for more documents relevant to the elimination of proscribed items and programmes. It is headed by the former Minister of Oil, General Amer Rashid, and is to have very extensive powers of search in industry, administration and even private houses. The two commissions could be useful tools to come up with proscribed items to be destroyed and with new documentary evidence. They evidently need to work fast and effectively to convince us, and the world, that this is a serious effort.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“Documentary evidence and testimony by staff who dealt with the items still appear to be needed. Not least against this background, a letter of 12 February from Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate may be of relevance. It presents a list of names of 83 participants "in the unilateral destruction in the chemical field, which took place in the summer of 1991". As the absence of adequate evidence of that destruction has been and remains an important reason why quantities of chemicals have been deemed unaccounted for, the presentation of a list of persons who can be interviewed about the actions appears useful and pertains to cooperation on substance. I trust that the Iraqi side will put together a similar list of names of persons who participated in the unilateral destruction of other proscribed items, notably in the biological field.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“Experts who were present from our side studied the papers during the evening of 8 February and met with Iraqi experts in the morning of 9 February for further clarifications. Although no new evidence was provided in the papers and no open issues were closed through them or the expert discussions, the presentation of the papers could be indicative of a more active attitude focusing on important open issues. The Iraqi side suggested that the problem of verifying the quantities of anthrax and two VX precursors, which had been declared unilaterally destroyed, might be tackled through certain technical and analytical methods. Although our experts are still assessing the suggestions, they are not very hopeful that it could prove possible to assess the quantities of material poured into the ground years ago.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“On the matter of the 380 SA-2 missile engines imported outside of the export/import mechanism and in contravention of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), UNMOVIC inspectors were informed by Iraq during an official briefing that these engines were intended for use in the Al Samoud 2 missile system, which has now been assessed to be proscribed. Any such engines configured for use in this missile system would also be proscribed. I intend to communicate these findings to the Government of Iraq. At the meeting in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February, the Iraqi side addressed some of the important outstanding disarmament issues and gave us a number of papers, for instance regarding anthrax and growth material, the nerve agent VX and missile production.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“The experts have confirmed that the reconstituted casting chambers could still be used to produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometres. Accordingly, these chambers remain proscribed. The experts also studied the data on the missile- engine test stand that is nearing completion and have assessed it to be capable of testing missile engines with thrusts greater than that of the SA-2 engine. So far, the test stand has not been associated with a proscribed activity.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“The experts concluded unanimously that, based on the data provided by Iraq, the two declared variants of the Al Samoud 2 missile were capable of exceeding 150 kilometres in range. This missile system is therefore proscribed for Iraq pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) and the monitoring plan adopted under resolution 715 (1991). As for the Al Fatah, the experts found that clarification of the missile data supplied by Iraq was required before the capability of the missile system could be fully assessed. With respect to the casting chambers, I note the following: UNSCOM. ordered and supervised the destruction of the casting chambers that had been intended for use in the production of the proscribed Badr-2000 missile system. Iraq has declared that it has reconstituted these chambers.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“Iraq itself must squarely tackle this task and avoid belittling the questions. In my January update to the Council, I referred to the Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah missiles, reconstituted casting chambers, construction of a missile-engine test stand and the import of rocket engines, which were all declared to UNMOVIC by Iraq. I noted that the Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah could very well represent prima facie cases of proscribed missile systems, as they had been tested to ranges exceeding the 150-kilometre limit set by the Security Council. I also noted that Iraq had been requested to cease flight tests of these missiles until UNMOVIC completed a technical review. Earlier this week, UNMOVIC missile experts met for two days with experts from a number of Member States to discuss these items.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“Without evidence, confidence cannot arise. In my earlier briefings, I noted that significant outstanding issues of substance were listed in two Security Council documents from early 1999 and should be well known to Iraq. I referred, as examples, to the issues of anthrax, the nerve agent VX and long- range missiles, and said that such issues "deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq, rather than being brushed aside" (S/PV.4692, p. 5). The declaration submitted by Iraq on 7 December, despite its large volume, missed the opportunity to provide the fresh material and evidence needed to respond to the open questions. This is perhaps the most important problem we are facing. Although I can understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to provide the evidence needed, it is not the task of the inspectors to find it.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“To take an example, a document which Iraq provided suggested to us that some 1,000 tons of chemical agent were unaccounted for. One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist. However, that possibility is also not excluded. If they exist, they should be presented for destruction. If they do not exist, credible evidence to that effect should be presented. We are fully aware that many governmental intelligence organizations are convinced and assert that proscribed weapons, items and programmes continue to exist. The United States Secretary of State presented material in support of this conclusion. Governments have many sources of information that are not available to inspectors. Inspectors, for their part, must base their reports only on evidence that they can themselves examine and present publicly.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“In the current situation, one would expect Iraq to be eager to comply. While we were in Baghdad, we met a delegation from the Government of South Africa. It was there to explain how South Africa gained the confidence of the world in its dismantling of the nuclear-weapons programme by a wholehearted cooperation over two years with IAEA inspectors. I have just learned that Iraq has accepted an offer by South Africa to send a group of experts for further talks. How much, if any, is left of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and related proscribed items and programmes? So far, UNMOVIC has found no such weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions which should have been declared and destroyed. Another matter - and one of great significance - is that many proscribed weapons and items are not accounted for.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“This impression remains and we note that access to sites has so far been without problems, including to those that had never been declared or inspected, as well as to presidential sites and private residences. In my last updating, I also said that a decision to cooperate on substance was indispensable in order to bring, through inspection, the disarmament task to completion and to set the monitoring system on a firm course. Such cooperation, as I have noted, requires more than the opening of doors. In the words of resolution 1441 (2002), it requires immediate, unconditional and active efforts by Iraq to resolve existing questions of disarmament, either by presenting remaining proscribed items and programmes for elimination or by presenting convincing evidence that they have been eliminated.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“We have now commenced the process of destroying approximately 50 litres of mustard gas declared by Iraq that was being kept under UNMOVIC seal at the Muthanna site. One third of the quantity has already been destroyed. The laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor, which we found at another site, has also been destroyed. The total number of staff in Iraq now exceeds 250 from 60 countries. This includes about 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 15 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, 50 aircrew and 65 support staff. In my 27 January update to the Council, I said that it seemed from our experience that Iraq had decided in principle to provide cooperation on process, most importantly prompt access to all sites and assistance to UNMOVIC in the establishment of the necessary infrastructure.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“At certain sites, ground-penetrating radar was used to look for underground structures or buried equipment. Through the inspections conducted so far, we have obtained a good knowledge of the industrial and scientific landscape of Iraq, as well as of its missile capability, but, as before, we do not know every cave and corner. Inspections are effectively helping to bridge the gap in knowledge that arose due to the absence of inspections between December 1998 and November 2002. More than 200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples have been collected at different sites. Three quarters of these have been screened using our own analytical laboratory capabilities at the Baghdad Centre. The results to date have been consistent with Iraq's declarations.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“All inspections were performed without notice and access was almost always provided promptly. In no case have we seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming. The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq at industrial sites, ammunition depots, research centres, universities, presidential sites, mobile laboratories, private houses, missile production facilities, military camps and agricultural sites. At all sites which had been inspected before 1998, rebaselining activities were performed. This included the identification of the function and contents of each building, new or old, at a site. It also included verification of previously tagged equipment, application of seals and tags, taking samples and discussions with the site personnel regarding past and present activities.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“The regional office in Mosul is now fully operational at its temporary headquarters. Plans for a regional office at Basra are being developed. Our Hercules L-lOO aircraft continues to operate routine flights between Baghdad and Larnaca. The eight helicopters are fully operational. With the resolution of the problems raised by Iraq for the transportation of minders into the no-fly zones, our mobility in those zones has improved. We expect to increase utilization of the helicopters. The number of Iraqi minders during inspections had often reached a ratio as high as five per inspector. During the talks in January in Baghdad, the Iraqi side agreed to keep the ratio to about one to one. The situation has improved. Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“Mr. Blix: Since I reported to the Security Council on 27 January, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) has had two further weeks of operational and analytical work in New York and active inspections in Iraq. That brings the total period of inspections so far to ll weeks. Since then, we have also listened, on 5 February, to the presentation to the Council by the United States Secretary of State and to the discussion that followed. Lastly, Mr. ElBaradei and I have held another round of talks in Baghdad with our counterparts and with Vice President Ramadan, on 8 and 9 February. Let me begin today's briefing with a short account of the work being performed by UNMOVIC in Iraq. We have continued to build up our capabilities.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“We now have an inspection apparatus that permits us to send multiple inspection teams every day all over Iraq, by road or by air. Let me end by simply noting that that capability, which has been built up in a short time and which is now operating, is at the disposal of the Security Council.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“In the past two months, during which we have built up our presence in Iraq, we have conducted about 300 inspections to more than 230 different sites. Of these, more than 20 were sites that had not been inspected before. By the end of December, UNMOVIC began using helicopters both for the transport of inspectors and for actual inspection work. We now have eight helicopters. They have already proved invaluable in helping to "freeze" large sites by observing the movement of traffic in and around the area. The setting up of a field office in Mosul has facilitated rapid inspections of sites in northern Iraq. We plan to establish soon a second field office in the Basra area, where we have already inspected a number of sites.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“At the end of that course, we shall have a roster of about 350 qualified experts from which to draw inspectors. A team supplied by the Swiss Government is refurbishing our office in Baghdad, which had been empty for four years. The Government of New Zealand has contributed both a medical team and a communications team. The German Government will contribute unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and a group of specialists to operate them for us within Iraq. The Government of Cyprus has kindly allowed us to set up a field office in Larnaka. All of these contributions have been of assistance in quickly starting up our inspections and enhancing our capabilities. So has help from the United Nations in New York and from sister organizations in Baghdad.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“However, we hope that, with further encouragement from the authorities, knowledgeable individuals will accept private interviews, in Baghdad or abroad. I must not conclude this update without some notes on the growing capability of UNMOVIC. In the past two months, UNMOVIC has built up its capabilities in Iraq from nothing to 260 staff members from 60 countries. This includes approximately 100 new UNMOVIC inspectors, 60 air operations staff, as well as security personnel, communications, translation and interpretation staff, medical support, and other services at our Baghdad office and Mosul field office. All serve the United Nations and report to no one else. Furthermore, our roster of inspectors will continue to grow as our training programme continues - even at this moment we have a training course in session in Vienna.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“This was the background of the provision of resolution 1441 (2002) for a right for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to hold private interviews "in the mode or location" of our choice, in Baghdad or even abroad. To date, we have asked 11 individuals for interviews in Baghdad. The replies have invariably been that the individual will speak only at Iraq's monitoring directorate or, at any rate, in the presence of an Iraqi official. This could be due to a wish on the part of the invited to have evidence that they have not said anything that the authorities did not wish them to say. At our recent talks in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to encouraging persons to accept interviews "in private" - that is to say, alone with us. Despite this, the pattern has not changed.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“Some 400 names for all biological and chemical weapons programmes, as well as for their missile programmes, were provided by the Iraqi side. This can be compared to over 3,500 names of people associated with those past weapons programmes that UNSCOM either interviewed in the 1990s or knew from documents and other sources. At my recent meeting in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to supplementing the list, and some 80 additional names have been provided. In the past, much valuable information came from interviews. There were also cases in which the interviewee was clearly intimidated by the presence of, and interruption by, Iraqi officials.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“There can be no sanctuaries for proscribed items, activities or documents. A denial of prompt access to any site would be a very serious matter. When Iraq claims that tangible evidence in the form of documents is not available, it ought at least to find individuals, engineers, scientists and managers to testify about their experience. Large weapons programmes are moved and managed by people. Interviews with individuals who may have worked in programmes in the past may fill blank spots in our knowledge and understanding. It could also be useful to learn that they are now employed in peaceful sectors. These are the reasons why UNMOVIC asked for a list of such persons, in accordance with resolution 1441 (2002).”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“The recent inspection find in the private home of a scientist of a box of some 3,000 pages of documents, much of them relating to the laser enrichment of uranium, supports a concern that has long existed that documents might be distributed to the homes of private individuals. This interpretation is refuted by the Iraqi side, which claims that research staff sometimes may bring home papers from their work places. On our side, we cannot help but think that the case might not be isolated and that such placements of documents is deliberate to make discovery difficult and to seek to shield documents by placing them in private homes. Any further sign of the concealment of documents would be serious. The Iraqi side committed itself at our recent talks to encourage persons to accept access also to private sites.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“All documents relating to the biological weapons programme were destroyed together with the weapons. However, Iraq has all the archives of the Government and its various departments, institutions and mechanisms. It should have budgetary documents, requests for funds and reports on how they have been used. It should also have letters of credits, bills of lading and reports on production and losses of material. In response to a recent UNMOVIC request for a number of specific documents, the only new documents Iraq provided was a ledger of 193 pages, which Iraq stated included all imports from 1983 to 1990 by the Technical and Scientific Importation Division, the importing authority for the biological weapons programme. Potentially, it might help to clear some open issues.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“Information provided by Member States tells us about the movement and concealment of missiles and chemical weapons and mobile units for biological weapons production. We shall certainly follow up any credible leads given to us and report what we might find, as well as any denial of access. So far, we have reported on the recent find of a small number of empty 122-millimetre warheads for chemical weapons. Iraq declared that it appointed a commission of inquiry to look for more. Fine. Why not extend the search to other items, declare what may be found and destroy it under our supervision? When we have urged our Iraqi counterparts to present more evidence, we have all too often met the response that there are no more documents. All existing relevant documents have been presented, we are told.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“Which are the means at the disposal of Iraq to answer these questions? I have pointed to some during my presentation of the issues. Let me be a little more systematic. Our Iraqi counterparts are fond of saying that there are no proscribed items, and if no evidence is presented to the contrary, they should have the benefit of the doubt, be presumed innocent. UNMOVIC, for its part, is not presuming that there are proscribed items and activities in Iraq, but nor does it or anyone else, after the inspections between 1991 and 1998, presume the opposite - that no such items and activities exist in Iraq. Presumptions do not solve the problem. Evidence and full transparency may help. Let me be specific.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“Also associated with these missiles and related developments is the import, which has been taking place during the last few years, of a number of items, despite the sanctions, including as late as December 2002. Foremost among these is the import of 300 rocket engines that may be used for the Al Samoud 2. Iraq has also declared the recent import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation and guidance and control systems. These items may well be for proscribed purposes; that is yet to be determined. What is clear is that they were illegally brought into Iraq; that is, Iraq or some company in Iraq circumvented the restrictions imposed by various resolutions. I have touched upon some of the disarmament issues that remain open and that need to be answered if dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“The test ranges in excess of 150 kilometres are significant, but some further technical considerations need to be made before we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the meantime, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both missiles. In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile production infrastructure. In particular, Iraq reconstituted a number of casting chambers, which had previously been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. They had been used in the production of solid-fuel missiles. Whatever missile system these chambers are intended for, they could produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometres.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“The Al Samoud's diameter was increased from an earlier version to the present 760 millimetres. This modification was made despite a 1994 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM. directing Iraq to limit its missile diameters to less than 600 millimetres. Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM. to Iraq prohibited the use of engines from certain surface-to-air missiles for use in ballistic missiles. During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on these two programmes. We were told that the final range for both systems would be less than the permitted maximum of 150 kilometres. These missiles might very well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“There has been a range of developments in the missile field during the past four years, presented by Iraq in the declaration, as non-proscribed activities. We are trying to gather a clear understanding of them through inspections and on-site discussions. Two projects in particular stand out. They are the development of a liquid-fuelled missile, named Al Samoud 2, and a solid propellant missile, called Al Fatah. Both missiles have been tested to a range in excess of the permitted range of 150 kilometres, with the Al Samoud 2 being tested to a maximum of 183 kilometres and the Al Fatah to 161 kilometres. Some of both types of missiles have already been provided to the Iraqi Armed Forces, even though it is stated that they are still undergoing development.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“The absence of this table would appear to be deliberate, as the pages of the resubmitted document were renumbered. In the letter of 24 January of this year to the President of the Security Council, Iraq's Foreign Minister stated that "all imported quantities of growth media were declared". This is not evidence. I note that the quantity of media involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax. I turn now to the missile sector. There remain significant questions as to whether Iraq retained SCUD-type missiles after the Gulf War. Iraq declared the consumption of a number of SCUD missiles as targets in the development of an anti-ballistic missile defence system during the 1980s. Yet no technical information has been produced about that programme or data on the consumption of the missiles.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared and that at least some of this was retained after the declared destruction date. It might still exist. Either it should be found and be destroyed under UNMOVIC's supervision, or convincing evidence should be produced to show that it was indeed destroyed in 1991. As I reported to the Council on 19 December last year, Iraq did not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kilograms, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged, as reported in Iraq's submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999. As part of its 7 December 2002 declaration, Iraq resubmitted the Amorim panel document, but the table showing this particular import of media was not included.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“supervision and had installed it at Fallujah for the production of chlorine and phenols. We have inspected this equipment and are conducting a detailed technical evaluation of it. On completion, we will decide whether this and other equipment that has been recovered by Iraq should be destroyed. I turn to biological weapons. I mentioned the issue of anthrax to the Council on previous occasions and I come back to it, as it is an important one. Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 litres of this biological warfare agent, which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little evidence of that production and no convincing evidence of its destruction.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“The finding of the rockets shows that Iraq needs to make more effort to ensure that its declaration is currently accurate. During my recent discussions in Baghdad, Iraq declared that it would make new efforts in this regard and had set up a committee of investigation. Since then it has reported that it has found four more chemical rockets at a storage depot in Al-Taji. I might further mention that inspectors have found at another site a laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor. While I am addressing chemical issues, I should mention a matter, which I reported on 19 December 2002, concerning equipment at a civilian chemical plant at Al Fallujah. Iraq has declared that it had repaired chemical processing equipment previously destroyed under UNSCOM.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for. The discovery of a number of 122 millimetre chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot 170 kilometre southwest of Baghdad was much publicized. This was a relatively new bunker, and therefore the rockets must have been moved there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions. The investigation of these rockets is still proceeding. Iraq states that they were overlooked from 1991 from a batch of some 2,000 that were stored there during the Gulf War. That could be the case. They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve, but rather points to, the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“I would now like to turn to the so-called Air Force document that I have discussed with the Council before. This document was originally found by an UNSCOM. inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by Iraqi minders. It gives an account of the expenditure of bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the Iraq- Iran war. I am encouraged by the fact that Iraq has now provided this document to UNMOVIC. The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tonnes.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“Consequently, it was said that the agent was never weaponized. Iraq said that the small quantity of agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilization and that more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed, one of the documents provided by Iraq even indicates that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared. There are also indications that the agent was weaponized. In addition, there are questions to be answered concerning the fate of the VX precursor chemicals, which Iraq states were lost during bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“Those issues deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq, rather than being brushed aside as evil machinations of UNSCOM. Regrettably, the 12,000 page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number. Even Iraq's letter sent, in response to our recent discussions in Baghdad, to the President of the Security Council on 24 January does not lead us to the resolution of those issues. I shall only give some examples of issues and questions that need to be answered, and I turn first to the sector of chemical weapons. The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed. Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes, and that the quality was poor and the product unstable.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“document S/1999/94 and the so-called Amorim report of March 1999 (S/1999/356). These are questions that UNMOVIC, Governments and independent commentators have often cited. While UNMOVIC has been preparing its own list of current unresolved disarmament issues and key remaining disarmament tasks in response to requirements in resolution 1284 (1999), we find the issues listed as unresolved in the two reports that I mentioned professionally justified. These reports do not contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, nor do they exclude that possibility. They point to a lack of evidence and to inconsistencies, which raise question marks and which must be straightened out if weapons dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“Rather, it is designed to lead to trust, if there is both openness to the inspectors and action to present them with items to destroy, or credible evidence about the absence of any such items. On 7 December 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration of some 12,000 pages in response to paragraph 3 of resolution 1441 (2002), and within the time stipulated by the Security Council. In the fields of missiles and biotechnology, the declaration contains a good deal of new material and information covering the period from 1998 and onward. This is welcome. One might have expected that in preparing the declaration, Iraq would have tried to respond to, clarify and submit supporting evidence regarding the many open disarmament issues, with which the Iraqi side should be familiar from the UNSCOM.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“When our Iraqi counterparts have some complaint, they can take it up in a calmer and less unpleasant manner. The substantive cooperation required relates above all to the obligation of Iraq to declare all programmes of weapons of mass destruction and either to present items and activities for elimination or else to provide evidence supporting the conclusion that nothing proscribed remains. Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002) states that this cooperation shall be "active". It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of catch as catch can. Rather, as I noted, it is a process of verification for the purpose of creating confidence. It is not built upon the premise of trust.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“The inspectors went without United Nations insignia and were welcomed in the kind manner that is characteristic of the normal Iraqi attitude to foreigners. They took off their shoes and were taken around. They asked perfectly innocent questions and parted with the invitation to come again. Shortly thereafter, we received protests from the Iraqi authorities about an unannounced inspection and about questions not relevant to weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, they were not. Demonstrations and outbursts of this kind are unlikely to occur in Iraq without initiative or encouragement from the authorities. We must ask ourselves what the motives may be for these events. They do not facilitate an already difficult job, in which we try to be effective, professional and, at the same time, correct.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“The matter was solved by an offer on our part to take the accompanying Iraqi minders in our helicopters to the sites, an arrangement that had been practiced by UNSCOM. in the past. I am obliged to note some recent disturbing incidents and harassment. For instance, for some time, far-fetched allegations have been made publicly that questions posed by inspectors were of an intelligence character. While I might not defend every question that inspectors might have asked, Iraq knows that they do not serve intelligence purposes, and Iraq should not say so. On a number of occasions, demonstrations have taken place in front of our offices and at inspection sites. The other day, a sightseeing excursion by five inspectors to a mosque was followed by an unwarranted public outburst.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“While we now have the technical capability to send a U-2 plane placed at our disposal for aerial imagery and for surveillance during inspections and have informed Iraq that we planned to do so, Iraq has refused to guarantee its safety unless a number of conditions are fulfilled. As these conditions went beyond what is stipulated in resolution 1441 (2002) and what was practiced by UNSCOM. and Iraq in the past, we note that so far Iraq is not complying with our request. I hope this attitude will change. Another air operation problem, which was solved during our recent talks in Baghdad, concerned the use of helicopters flying into the no-fly zones. Iraq had insisted on sending helicopters of its own to accompany ours. This would have raised a safety problem.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“The most important point to make is that access has been provided to all sites we have wanted to inspect, and, with one exception, it has been prompt. We have further had great help in building up the infrastructure of our office in Baghdad and the field office in Mosul. Arrangements and services for our plane and our helicopters have been good. The environment has been workable. Our inspections have included universities, military bases, presidential sites and private residences. Inspections have also taken place on Fridays, the Muslim day of rest; on Christmas Day; and on New Year's Day. These inspections have been conducted in the same manner as all other inspections. We seek to be both effective and correct. In this updating, I am bound, however, to register some problems, the first relating to two kinds of air operations.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“A similar decision is indispensable to provide cooperation on substance in order to bring the disarmament task to completion through the peaceful process of inspection and to set the monitoring task on a firm course. An initial minor step would be to adopt the long-overdue legislation required by the resolutions. I shall deal first with cooperation on process. This relates to the procedures, mechanisms, infrastructure and practical arrangements to pursue inspections and seek verifiable disarmament. While inspection is not built on the premise of confidence but may lead to confidence if it is successful, there must nevertheless be a measure of mutual confidence from the very beginning in running the operation of inspection. Iraq has, on the whole, cooperated rather well so far with UNMOVIC in this field.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“As a subsidiary body of the Council, UNMOVIC is fully aware of and appreciates the close attention that the Council devotes to the inspections in Iraq. While today's "updating" is foreseen in resolution 1441 (2002), the Council can and does call for additional briefings whenever it wishes. One was held on 19 January, and a further such briefing is tentatively set for 14 February. I turn now to the key requirement of cooperation and Iraq's response to it. Cooperation might be said to relate to both substance and process. It would appear from our experience so far that Iraq has decided in principle to provide cooperation on process, notably access.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“It required this cooperation to be immediate, unconditional and active. The resolution contained many provisions that we welcome as enhancing and strengthening the inspection regime. The unanimity by which it was adopted sent a powerful signal that the Council was of one mind in creating a last opportunity for peaceful disarmament in Iraq through inspection. UNMOVIC shares the sense of urgency felt by the Council to use inspection as a path to attain, within a reasonable time, verifiable disarmament of Iraq. Under the resolutions I have cited, it would be followed by monitoring for such time as the Council feels would be required. The resolutions also point to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction as the ultimate goal.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“Supplementing the basic resolutions of 1991 and of the following years, it provided Iraq with a somewhat less ambitious approach: in return for "cooperation in all respects" for a specified period of time, including progress in the resolution of "key remaining disarmament tasks", it opened the possibility, not for the lifting, but for the suspension of sanctions. For nearly three years, Iraq refused to accept any inspections by UNMOVIC. It was only after appeals by the Secretary-General and Arab States, and pressure by the United States and other Member States, that Iraq declared, on 16 September last year, that it would again accept inspections without conditions. Resolution 1441 (2002) was adopted on 8 November last year and emphatically reaffirmed the demand on Iraq to cooperate.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source