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Da Piedade Veríssimo

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2022-06-08
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2023-06-21
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  1. As much as the revised protocol I mentioned is anchored in the vision of asserting their sovereignty over their space at sea and in shared continental waters, ECCAS member States also express their desire to strengthen their cooperation with bilateral and multilateral partners interested in supporting them in achieving the goals related to the sovereignty and security of their maritime spaces and shared continental waters. I cannot conclude without reiterating our organization’s thanks to the President of the Council for once again inviting ECCAS to participate in today’s important discussions.

    2023-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9355 (2023) · source

  2. That is based on six pillars, namely, Community exchange and management of information; Community surveillance of the maritime space of ECCAS member States in the Gulf of Guinea and shared continental waters; the harmonization of action by the States parties at sea and in shared continental waters; the establishment of a sustainable funding mechanism; the acquisition and maintenance of major equipment to guarantee operational capacity; and the institutionalization of the annual maritime conference of the parties.

    2023-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9355 (2023) · source

  3. That process gave rise to the Interregional Coordination Centre for the implementation of the regional strategy for maritime safety and security in Central and West Africa, which is based in Yaoundé. Furthermore, as part of its institutional reform, the basic texts of which were adopted in December 2019, ECCAS organized its first maritime conference, which was held in Kinshasa between November 2022 and February 2023. The conference, which assessed the implementation of the 2009 Kinshasa protocol, led to the adoption of a revised protocol on the safety and security strategy for vital interests at sea and in the shared continental waters of ECCAS member States.

    2023-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9355 (2023) · source

  4. Since 2009, ECCAS member States have committed to coordinating their efforts to combat security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea maritime space, through the adoption in Kinshasa of a protocol establishing a security strategy for ECCAS member States with vital interests in the Gulf of Guinea. The protocol also established the Maritime Security Regional Coordination Centre for Central Africa, a specialized institution tasked with coordinating the ECCAS maritime strategy and headquartered in Pointe-Noire. In 2013, in view of the indivisible nature of the Gulf of Guinea maritime space, ECCAS decided to formalize its cooperation and coordination with the Economic Community of West African States and the Gulf of Guinea Commission through the Yaoundé Architecture process.

    2023-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9355 (2023) · source

  5. Overall, 55 maritime security-related incidents were reported in the first six months of 2023 in the Gulf of Guinea’s Economic Community of Central African States. However, compared to the period between 2018 and 2020, since 2021 there has been a reduction in instances of piracy and hostage-taking in the Central African region of the Gulf of Guinea. The downward trend can be explained, on the one hand, by the fact that States have ramped up their respective navies, with the presence of international vessels deployed as part of the Coordinated Maritime Presences to counter piracy in jurisdictional waters and on the high seas and, on the other, by greater information-sharing among States instituted as part of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Cooperation Forum, established in April 2021.

    2023-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9355 (2023) · source

  6. However, at the same time, the Gulf in Central Africa faces myriad challenges, in particular in relation to issues of delimitation and demarcation, security and monitoring, the protection of marine ecosystems and endangered species, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, climate change and natural and technological disasters and coastal erosion and environmental security. With respect to security, it is important to recall that above and beyond illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, the region — Owing to a teleconferencing connectivity failure, there is a 10-second gap in this statement. On 25 March there was an attack on the Monjasa Reformer oil tanker off the coast of the city of Pointe-Noire in the Congo.

    2023-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9355 (2023) · source

  7. Along the coast of Central Africa, the Gulf of Guinea extends from Angola in the south to Cameroon in the north. It also borders the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, for a total of seven of the member States of the Economic Community of Central African States. The Gulf of Guinea stretches over a distance of 3,307 kilometres, with a surface area of approximately 1.225 million square kilometres. It has considerable hydraulic, aviation, mining, trade and tourism potential. It is a source of hydrocarbons for other parts of the world.

    2023-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9355 (2023) · source

  8. Mr. Da Piedade Veríssimo (spoke in French): It is an honour for me to address the Council for the second time this June (see S/PV.9338). At the outset, I would like to sincerely thank Ambassador Nusseibeh and the United Arab Emirates, as President of the Security Council for the month of June, for again inviting the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to an important meeting. The fact that the Council decided to devote today’s meeting to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is a clear acknowledgement of the multidimensional significance of the geographic area and the security- related challenges it faces. As an African maritime space in the Atlantic Ocean, the area commonly known as the Gulf of Guinea covers both Central Africa and West Africa.

    2023-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9355 (2023) · source

  9. We believe that the support provided by all those mechanisms, together with ECCAS, towards the realization of the agenda for democracy, peace and security in Central Africa could be even more effective if their mandates were reviewed with a view to adapting them to the ever-changing subregional context. On behalf of ECCAS, I want to conclude by once again commending the Security Council for organizing today’s important debate. I would also like to reiterate my organization’s thanks to you, Madam President, for involving ECCAS in today’s discussion.

    2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source

  10. To achieve that objective, ECCAS will pursue and strengthen its cooperation with the various relevant United Nations mechanisms on issues of democracy, peace and security in Central Africa, including the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the United Nations Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa. I would add to those four mechanisms the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

    2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source

  11. Finally, ECCAS, six of whose member States are also members of the ICGLR, has expressed its willingness to incorporate into its work the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region, also known as the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement. Looking ahead, we believe that the increasing strength of ECCAS’s new governance, peace and security architectures, which have been in place for the past two years, as well as the implementation of new mechanisms such as the recently approved revised protocol on the strategy for securing vital interests at sea and in the continental waters of ECCAS member States, will gradually enable the Community to give effective support to the States of our subregion in their quest for peace, security, stability and democracy.

    2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source

  12. While ECCAS remains Central Africa’s principal regional economic community, it is also true that many of its member States are also members of other intergovernmental organizations whose areas of activity cover Central Africa. Based on the principle of complementarity, ECCAS supports the efforts to mediate between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda led by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) under the leadership of President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço of Angola, within the framework of the Luanda process. We also support the work led by Mr. Uhuru Kenyatta, former President of Kenya, in facilitating the dialogue between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and armed groups as part of the Nairobi process.

    2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source

  13. With regard to Chad, for example, ECCAS is continuing its support for the transition process under way in that country, including through the opening of a liaison office in N’Djamena headed by a Special Envoy, the deployment of a mission to establish the facts surrounding the events of 20 October 2022 and the establishment of a platform to facilitate exchanges between the transition authorities and the entities currently opposed to the transition process under way. In accordance with the relevant decisions of the Community’s highest decision-making bodies, ECCAS will continue to support Chad until the holding of the elections that are scheduled for the end of next year and are intended to end the transition and mark the return to a democratic constitutional order.

    2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source

  14. The more ECCAS continues to provide support to member States in organizing electoral processes, the more it becomes aware of the challenges they are facing. Those challenges essentially concern disagreements over the composition of the bodies responsible for elections, the drafting of electoral legislation, the credibility of voter rolls, the authenticity of election results and so forth. Whether the challenges are strictly linked to security challenges or to political governance, ECCAS now has, as part of its revised Treaty in force since 2020, appropriate instruments to facilitate its work in the areas of politics, peace and security. Those instruments were recently activated in Chad and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe.

    2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source

  15. It also has been negatively affected for more than a decade by the instability in Libya, the expansion of Boko Haram to all the States bordering Lake Chad and the entrenchment of terrorist movements in the Sahelo-Saharan area. At the political level, the ECCAS member States are continuing, despite various contingencies, their determined march to establish the system of democratic governance. To that end, the year 2022 and the first quarter of this year were marked by the holding of several more or less peaceful elections in a number of countries. Elections at several levels are expected to be held in 2023 in the Central African Republic, Gabon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In addition to those elections, constitutional referendums are also expected in the Central African Republic and Chad.

    2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source

  16. Such challenges include the persistent activity of armed groups, secessionist factions and terrorist movements; the presence of cross-border combatants; the illicit circulation of weapons; crime at sea in all its forms; the illicit exploitation of natural resources; intercommunal conflicts; the humanitarian crises caused by armed conflict and natural disasters; and the political and diplomatic tensions between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda since the re-emergence of the Mouvement du 23 mars group at the end of 2021. In addition to those internal challenges, the security situation in Central Africa is being adversely affected by the ongoing armed conflict between rival factions of the Sudanese defence and security forces.

    2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source

  17. At the time of this meeting, the security situation in the majority of ECCAS member States is showing signs of hope and therefore encouragement. Those States are not spared from myriad security threats, but they are nevertheless managing to keep them under control and thus prevent them from contributing to the development of hotbeds of insecurity at the national level, which is likely to have a negative impact on the stability of the entire subregion. We believe that such efforts deserve to be supported, especially given the particularly restrictive economic context in which they are being undertaken. However, despite those rather positive signs, we must recognize that Central Africa is also facing major security challenges, the nature and scale of which vary from country to country.

    2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source

  18. Mr. Da Piedade Veríssimo (spoke in French): It is a great honour for me to take the floor at this important meeting devoted to examining the current situation in Central Africa. Allow me, at the outset, to express my heartfelt thanks to Ambassador Lana Zaki Nusseibeh, President of the Security Council for the month of June 2023, for having kindly included the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in today’s discussions. In the same vein, I would like to congratulate the Security Council on its decision to devote today’s meeting to the situation in Central Africa. We at ECCAS believe that this meeting comes at the right time, given the particularly complex security and political situation prevailing in our subregion.

    2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source

  19. The challenges created by the situations in the Central African Republic, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad and Sao Tome and Principe — and not forgetting Cameroon — provide us with an opportunity to rethink, reimagine, and continually reinvent our cooperative relationships in the work of promoting sustainable peace and security in Central Africa. I hope that 2023 will give us an opportunity to commit to that path and to advance the peace and security agenda in those countries and situations. I would be remiss if I concluded without reiterating the gratitude of the ECCAS to the Security Council for its continued efforts to promote peace on the African continent in general and in Central Africa in particular.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  20. It should also be noted that besides its collaboration with UNOCA — but always with its support — ECCAS works with other United Nations agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme, UNICEF, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in various areas related to human security that if neglected could lead to or exacerbate conflicts.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  21. Those actions have led, for example, to the establishment of the Network of Women Mediators of Central Africa and the Coalition of Civil Society Organizations for Peace, Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Central Africa, and will lead to support for developing legal instruments to establish new community institutions. Regular consultations on subjects of common interest between the leaders of both organizations will continue to be an important part of the cooperation between ECCAS and UNOCA. The recent experience in Sao Tome and Principe, which undoubtedly helped save lives, demonstrates their effectiveness and relevance.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  22. Prior to the establishment of the ECCAS Commission, the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (UNSAC) was one of the main frameworks for that cooperation, and it will remain so. But it can also be said that beyond UNSAC, such cooperation has mainly taken the form of joint actions in conflict prevention through good offices, awareness-raising, training to combat hate speech, capacity-building for the benefit of women and young people, based on resolutions 1325 (2000) and 2250 (2015), civil society and support for the implementation of reform.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  23. That also applies to the situation in the neighbouring country of the Central African Republic, where the forces of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) are facing similar challenges. ECCAS, like other African subregional organizations, I hope, is ready to contribute to those thoughts. But as we wait for them to produce results, it is vital for MONUSCO work quickly on the modalities of its coordination with the regional forces of the East African Community to ensure that their combined efforts lead to a restoration of lasting peace in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As I conclude, I would like to take this opportunity to commend the quality of our cooperation with UNOCA, which has continued to improve since its establishment in 2011.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  24. However, it is also true that the persistence and even the exacerbation of insecurity in certain areas of North Kivu and Ituri provinces in recent years have contributed to the deterioration of relations between the Mission, on the one hand, and the Congolese authorities and people on the other. As subregional organizations are now working on deploying a regional force in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, it is perhaps time that the United Nations gave careful thought to the effectiveness of its peacekeeping missions in present-day hotspots like those in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  25. To that end, ECCAS is on the one hand exploring ways to support the regional force currently deployed in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and on the other serving as an observer and a focal point for the two processes, which are currently running in parallel. The issue of insecurity in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot be adequately analysed without discussing the role of the United Nations force that has been deployed there for two decades and is commonly referred to by its acronym, MONUSCO — the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There is no doubt that the United Nations peacekeeping efforts over the past 22 years have greatly contributed to restoring peace and stability in several parts of the country.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  26. The persistent activity of armed groups and terrorist movements, particularly the Mouvement du 23 mars, is at the heart of the diplomatic tensions between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, with each country accusing the other of supporting the groups and movements. In its application of the principle of complementarity, ECCAS fully supports the Luanda and Nairobi processes set up by the African Union and the East African Community with a view to resolving the regional and national dimensions of the security crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  27. The report of the fact-finding mission will be submitted, on the one hand, to the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister of Sao Tome and Principe and, on the other hand, to the Chair of the ECCAS Conference of Heads of State and Government. It is expected to include recommendations that ECCAS will ultimately help Sao Tome and Principe to implement with the support of the United Nations and other actors of the international community. Still on the security front, the situation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo remains worrisome. The activity of terrorist movements and armed groups in South Kivu, North Kivu and Ituri continues to undermine the initiatives undertaken by the Congolese authorities, including the declaration of a state of siege in the latter two provinces more than a year ago.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  28. A joint communiqué on the visit was issued on 27 November, and on 29 November, an international fact-finding mission from ECCAS, comprising five members and led by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, with the support of the United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Sao Tome and Principe, began its work. The mission has so far enjoyed the cooperation of the civilian and military authorities of Sao Tome and Principe and the significant support of the United Nations. It has already met with a number of actors and will deliver its report at the end of its mission before the end of this month.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  29. The day after 25 November, that is, from 26 to 27 November, I went with my colleague Ambassador Abdou Abarry, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOCA, to Sao Tome and Principe. We met with the highest authorities, in particular the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, accompanied by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Interior, who asked us to send a mission to shed light on the two events, namely, the attack on the military camp and the human rights violations. We also met with the Chief of the General Staff, accompanied by his deputy and the Inspector General of the Armed Forces, as well as with the BASTA political party of former Speaker of Parliament Delfim Neves.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  30. However, it should be pointed out that, after initially announcing the arrest and detention of the assailants and their accomplices, the Sao Tome and Principe national and international communities were surprised and deeply shocked by the broadcasting of video images and photographs showing acts of torture and unacceptable cruelty towards the unarmed detainees, whose hands were tied from behind and bloodied, resulting in the death of men in the military barracks. We now know that the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Sao Tome and Principe has since resigned from his position after apologizing to the people of Sao Tome and Principe.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  31. There had been an easing of tensions and a calming of the political situation in Sao Tome and Principe to the extent that no one could have imagined any violent action less than a month after the inauguration of the new Government. However, that is what happened in the early hours of 25 November with the attack on a military barracks for purposes that have not yet been clearly established. In addition to the military response, which quickly brought the situation under control, it is worth noting that a number of civilians were arrested, including the former Speaker of Parliament, a Central Bank official and a former soldier from the ex-Buffalo Battalion of the former South African Defence Forces, who were identified as the masterminds of the attack, and an investigation by the judiciary was launched.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  32. After the deterioration of the security situation in Chad, particularly in terms of human security following the events of 20 October, the Central African region was once again caught by surprise with the emergence of a political and security crisis in Sao Tome and Principe, a member State of our Community, where it was far from expected, since the transfer of power regularly took place after elections, whose results were ultimately accepted by all the political actors. It will be recalled that, after the presidential and legislative elections of 2021 and 2022, all of which were monitored by ECCAS, political tensions arose, but they were rapidly overcome.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  33. With regard to the unfortunate events of 20 October, which resulted in serious violence, with the death of men in four towns in the country, including the capital, N’Djamena, the same meeting of 25 October condemned in the strongest terms any recourse to violence for political ends. ECCAS is currently working on setting up an international fact-finding mission, to which it has invited the United Nations, the African Union, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States and the Lake Chad Basin Commission. The mission has received the positive approval of the Chadian authorities and will shortly visit the four towns in the country where the violence took place in order to establish the facts, determine responsibilities and propose ways and means of ensuring justice for the victims.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  34. ECCAS therefore maintained its commitment to supporting the ongoing transition process as the only way to prevent the risk of instability in the country, which would have the immediate effect of destabilizing the Sahel and Central African regions. However, ECCAS is continuing consultations with the Chadian authorities and all the sociopolitical actors in the country, particularly those who did not take part in the dialogue, with a view to achieving greater inclusion of all the stakeholders in the transition process. In that context, the extraordinary meeting of the ECCAS Conference of Heads of State and Government, held in Kinshasa on 25 October, appointed His Excellency Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo, President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, as facilitator for reconciliation among the stakeholders in the Chadian process.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  35. With regard to the political situation in the region, it is worth recalling the recent holding of elections at several levels in the Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Angola, the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe and the Republic of Equatorial Guinea. The Commission of the Economic Community of Central African States deployed international electoral observation missions in each of these countries to monitor their electoral processes and ensure that they complied with international, continental and subregional electoral standards. In the Republic of Chad, ECCAS closely followed the proceedings of the Sovereign Inclusive National Dialogue held in N’Djamena between August and October. It took note of the extension of the transition period, as decided by the participants in the dialogue.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  36. Although he has already largely presented the contours and challenges of the current situation in the region, I would like to focus my briefing on the cases of the Republic of Chad and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe and on the collaboration between our regional organization, ECCAS, and UNOCA, in the area of promoting peace and security in Central Africa. Before going any further, allow me to take this opportunity to express my warm congratulations to the President of the Security Council for her country’s presidency of the Council in the month of December 2022, and for the way in which she is conducting the Council’s work, which, I cannot help but say here, is commensurate with the role that India plays on the international scene.

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  37. Mr. Da Piedade Veríssimo (spoke in French): It is an honour for the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), on whose behalf I am addressing the Security Council and the entire diplomatic community in New York at today’s open debate, to be invited to give an overview of the political and security situation in the Central African region, following my colleague and brother, Ambassador Abdou Abarry, Special Representative of the Secretary- General and Head of the United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA).

    2022-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9213 (2022) · source

  38. By affecting the Central African States and the region, in one way or another such challenges affect the collective security for which the Security Council is responsible under the Charter of the United Nations, adopted in San Francisco in 1945. In conclusion, allow me to take this opportunity to express the readiness of the ECCAS Commission to collaborate in good faith, responsibly, productively and effectively with the Security Council, in the spirit of Chapter VIII of the Charter, to ensure security and peace, which are prerequisites for the protection of human dignity and the development of peoples.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  39. Another concern is the start of discussions in the political class on amending the Constitution, particularly article 35, on the number of presidential terms in the Central African Republic. That move by part of the Central African political class may exacerbate political tensions in the country. The polarization caused by this debate in a country like the Central African Republic, where peace is fragile, should be very closely watched. This is the message that the ECCAS Commission, through me, felt it had to highlight to the Security Council concerning the current security and political situation in the Central African region. Those challenges are clearly the primary responsibility of the region and of its own AU Peace and Security Council, but, at the same time, they transcend them.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  40. In addition to those political events and activities, which may help to ease tensions on the political front, one cannot help but focus on other actions that have the potential to lead to mistrust among political actors, thereby triggering crises and conflicts. In that regard, I would like to mention the postponement of the Chadian inclusive national dialogue to a later date, which will effectively prolong the political transition period. The planned electoral processes, namely, the constitutional referendum and the presidential, legislative and local elections, will most likely also be delayed. Although we should not succumb to the temptation to adopt dates or trivialize their importance, the concern must be to create the conditions for the participation of all political groups in rebuilding the State in the Republic of Chad.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  41. However, in terms of political governance, it is also worth noting the holding of the national dialogue in the Central African Republic last March and the establishment of a contact and coordination group, comprising senior officials from Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, supported by the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the three guarantor institutions, the Southern African Development Community, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the African Union (AU), tasked with drawing up an action plan that includes measures to support the military operations that an operational unit will be responsible for implementing.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  42. In relation to those electoral processes, we should already welcome some initiatives, in particular the updating of the electoral register in Angola ahead of the general elections scheduled for August. A major new development is the opening up of voting to Angolans living abroad by registering them on the electoral roll. The holding of a political consultation in Owando, Congo, in March, with a view to building consensus on strengthening electoral governance for the July elections, is also encouraging. The publication of the road map for holding elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2023 by its Independent National Electoral Commission is welcome, too.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  43. Despite the economic and social constraints and consequences caused by the coronavirus disease pandemic, the States of the region have respected the election dates set in 2021 and our Community is ready to observe the elections. That is a clear sign of the collective ownership of our shared values and the entrenchment of democracy in the region. That trend continues, and will be strengthened with the electoral processes planned for this year, 2022, and 2023. Elections are scheduled in Angola, Congo and Sao Tome and Principe in 2022, and in Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2023. The latter are already preparing. The Commission has started conducting missions to the countries holding elections in 2022 to ensure that the processes are well under way.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  44. The issue of combating piracy on the high seas and in other maritime areas of the region, as well as that of the governance of the region’s maritime areas and the development of the blue economy, will be addressed at the conference and broadly discussed. With regard to the issue of human security and its links to peace and the security and stability of States, there have been some encouraging developments. I would like to mention a few salient points in relation to internal political governance. All the members of our region except one have signed the protocol of the African Peer Review Mechanism. The region is preparing to establish a programme focused on deepening democratic governance through greater commitment from member States.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  45. Piracy, which was the subject of a Security Council meeting (see S/PV.9050) held on 31 May at the initiative of Ghana and Norway, remains a threat in our region, in particular in the Gulf of Guinea, as no significant decrease in the number of incidents has been recorded. Although piracy may be a cause of insecurity at sea, it must be acknowledged that it is above all a symptom — behind piracy several issues are concealed. For the Council’s information, on the sidelines of the upcoming Summit of Heads of State and Government to be held in Kinshasa in July, ECCAS will organize a maritime conference on the theme “Sea, security and development”.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  46. The Constitutions of all States of the region have ensured that democratic governance and institutions that promote and protect human rights are now part of the institutional landscape of the countries in the region. However, that development has not put a stop to human rights violations. The most severe human rights violations are those committed by armed groups, which are often guilty of summary violations. Intercommunal violence has also re-emerged in our region. Humanitarian crises and transhumance for criminal purposes persist, thereby demonstrating the ever-increasing collusion between transhumance communities and criminal networks in at least three countries of the region — Chad, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  47. The rebels are also in Cameroon, operating under the cover of secessionist demands in the North- West and South-West regions. In our region, Central Africa, terrorism is no longer confined to the Sahel-Saharan area. The actions of two rival factions of Boko Haram and the expansion of terrorist groups, such as the Allied Democratic Forces and Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, show that our region is seriously affected by terrorism. We must do our utmost to prevent such groups from becoming entrenched in countries of the region. Concerning respect for human rights, it must be acknowledged that we have strengthened awareness of the need to build the rule of law in the region.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  48. The destabilizing consequences of the actions of those armed groups have led the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to declare a state of siege in the region and to set up joint actions with Ugandan armed forces in an attempt to suppress the disruptive capacity of those armed groups. It should be underscored that they remain active in other areas of our region, in particular in one part of the territory of the Central African Republic, where they carry out abuses against civilians despite the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, the announcement of a unilateral ceasefire by His Excellency Mr. Faustin Archange Touadera on 16 October 2021 and the holding of the Central African dialogue from 21 to 27 March this year.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  49. That followed the meeting I held in Kinshasa last week with His Excellency Mr. Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo, President of Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition to the security threat I just mentioned, one of the many other threats is the ongoing mobilization of other rebel armed groups and negative forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Their actions have led to mass population displacements, damage to infrastructure that was already weak and the development of a war economy, which prevents genuine development from taking place.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  50. The ECCAS Commission welcomes the fact that the Security Council was seized of the situation on 3 June and that it condemned all the armed groups operating in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and implored them to participate in the dialogue led by His Excellency President Uhuru Kenyatta in the framework of the Nairobi process. I would like to stress that a number of initiatives are under way in Central Africa aimed at reducing tensions and encouraging both States to engage in talks to find a permanent solution to the scourge of armed groups on their respective shared borders. I have just returned from Rwanda, where I discussed the situation with His Excellency Mr. João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, President of the Republic of Angola and current head of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source