YouSaid · the spoken record

Dejammet

lines on the record: 838
first: 1995-11-09
most recent: 2000-03-09
sittings or episodes: 128
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I think that we must bear very much in mind the lessons of Angola and avoid repetition of the same errors. If we underestimate and undersupply a United Nations mission - that is, if our estimates of the personnel necessary are insufficient - we could deprive that mission of the critical mass, of the adequate size, essential for it to be able to discharge its mandate. A failure in the Democratic Republic of the Congo means that we might run the risk of helplessly witnessing a resumption of hostilities, as was our sad experience in Angola. I think it is essential that the Security Council, under your authority, Mr. President, bear very clearly in mind this experience of Angola when it takes an important decision relating to the scope and the configuration of the operation that we wish to set up for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2000-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4090 (2000) · source
“We welcome the Secretary-General's decision to entrust Ambassador Gambari, his Special Adviser on Africa, with a special mission in Angola. However, we must reflect on lessons of the past. The United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) was criticized for not having seen that UNITA was not respecting its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol, particularly as regards disarmament and demobilization. I believe we must reflect upon this aspect of the Angolan tragedy. If MONUA was unable to fully discharge its mandate, we must ensure that the United Nations is not exposed to such criticism or the repetition of similar observations, when, in a few days' time, we will take important decisions on the deployment of observers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo who will monitor respect for the Lusaka Agreement.”
2000-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4090 (2000) · source
“We can see that the conflict is now spreading to other countries in the region; very recently our Namibian friends were affected, and there have been civilian losses in Namibia as well. This underlines the need for us, the Security Council, to deal with all the crises in the region comprehensively, because each of them affects security in neighbouring countries. Obviously, these comments lead us to understand the necessity of the role of the United Nations. The Ambassador of Mali rightly recalled the memory of Maitre Blondin Beye, who was from Mali. Out of respect for his memory, we must try to preserve the role of the United Nations in Angola, and we therefore hope that the Status- of-Mission Agreement will soon be concluded definitively and implemented.”
2000-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4090 (2000) · source
“Ogata for international assistance, and we should respond favourably to the United Nations Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for Angola, which amounts to $258 million. Lastly, we should take into account what was said by Mrs. Ogata regarding the continuing problems caused by anti-personnel landmines. Some of those problems have existed since the beginning of the fighting. That is not the only problem in Angola, but it strengthens our conviction of the need for a complete prohibition on anti-personnel landmines. Another comment that arises from the statements made is the obvious link among all the crises in Africa. Angola was led to intervene in the Democratic Republic of the Congo because UNITA sought to operate from that territory.”
2000-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4090 (2000) · source
“President, to impose a logical sequence on our debates this month, and you were inspired in inviting Mrs. Ogata here, because today, when we are talking about Angola, we must bear in mind what she said about the humanitarian situation. You were right, Sir, when a few days ago you questioned the limits of the mandate of Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The problem in Angola is certainly one of refugees, as there are hundreds of thousands of Angolan refugees in neighbouring countries. But above all, there is a considerable problem of several million displaced persons. Even more disturbing is the fact that almost 4 million people are affected by the war, and we should bear that in mind. We must, therefore, follow up the appeal made by Mrs.”
2000-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4090 (2000) · source
“That is the goal of the international community in supporting the Luanda Government. Therefore, we cannot help but be pleased by all that is being done in this area by the Angolan authorities. What other lessons can we draw from this debate? First, with regard to the sanctions, as I have already said - and as has been proved by Ambassador Fowler - the will of a Chairman of the sanctions Committee and the means made available to that Chairman to carry out his functions lead to results. It is evident that such results have been manifested on the ground with UNITA's loss of influence and its difficulties. I repeat: this is all due to the way in which the sanctions Committee has successfully carried out the rigorous implementation of Security Council decisions. You are also right, Mr.”
2000-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4090 (2000) · source
“But I would also like to draw attention to the statement made by Ambassador Greenstock, who referred to a statement made by the European Union. I believe that, quite rightly, Ambassador Greenstock recalled that the European Union, which welcomed the turn of events and the extension of the Angolan Government's administration, has appealed to the Luandan authorities in Angola and encouraged them to establish the political, social and economic conditions which would make it possible for the rule of law and democracy to develop in Angola. As the Luanda Government is reaffirming its authority throughout Angola, it is good that it is able to show that it is adhering to those values of good governance and democratic values, which confirm the consolidation of a free civil society.”
2000-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4090 (2000) · source
“Mr. Dejammet (France) (spoke in French): We have benefited today from several statements which have been in agreement and expressed convergent views. Mr. Prendergast's statement was detailed and rigorous; Ambassador Fowler made an enlightening statement - we can never congratulate the Chairman of the sanctions Committee enough for the persistence and willingness he has displayed in trying to give meaning to the action of the Security Council and weight to the sanctions; finally, we heard the statement by the Vice-Minister of External Relations of Angola. All of those statements were in agreement and expressed convergent views. We associate ourselves with the comments made on behalf of the troika by the Ambassador of the Russian Federation.”
2000-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4090 (2000) · source
“Ogata's statement, can really have - above and beyond the immediate consolidation of the ceasefire - a more general objective: a return to stability through an international conference on stability in the Great Lakes region.”
2000-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4089 (2000) · source
“We must certainly strengthen the ceasefire and strengthen relations of dialogue and trust among the African leaders who will be coming here to New York. But above and beyond that, we must lay the foundations of a genuine conference on the Great Lakes region that, by dealing with the issues brought up by Mrs. Ogata, would establish real stability in that region of Africa and would allow the re- establishment of satisfactory humanitarian conditions. This is the wish that I address to you, Mr. President: that the debates to be held soon here in New York, which began with the meeting this past Monday and now continue with Mrs.”
2000-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4089 (2000) · source
“Therefore, the States of a region must meet around a table so that they can look courageously and clearly at the problem of minorities, the problem of how to strengthen democratic rule within States and the problem of how to protect within States people who have been displaced because they feared action by minorities from the exterior. That is the basic objective of a stability pact, and it is something that African leaders should consider. I think it is one of the guiding ideas that will be discussed in the course of the meetings that you, Mr. President, have had the wisdom to schedule. I believe that we have to set an objective for the work that is soon to be undertaken under your presidency, Sir, here in New York.”
2000-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4089 (2000) · source
“This would lead naturally to a set of commitments between neighbouring States, States of the region, to establish truly friendly relations and, within their borders, to deal with the fate of displaced persons and of minorities. It is obvious that where minority populations are threatened, they want to defend themselves by force of arms; at that point there can be displacements of people across borders, and then all regimes are threatened by the existence of armed groups beyond their borders that want to return to the country, but that also want to protect themselves, and that thus might use violence and threats.”
2000-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4089 (2000) · source
“This can also unquestionably, have a bearing on the size and scope of an operation. The second substantive point made very forcefully by Mrs. Ogata related to Africa's establishment of the equivalent of a stability pact. Mrs. Ogata referred to what has been done in Europe, and its true that as of 1993, 1994, 1995, France had proposed the idea of a stability pact for European countries, affirming their independence so that relations could be established among all of them on a basis on mutual trust and with a view to avoiding crises and their humanitarian consequences. I think this same idea should be advocated for Africa.”
2000-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4089 (2000) · source
“This means that people involved in peacekeeping operations must, under their mandate, be able to accept the need to accompany and protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This is not a new idea; it is something that we ourselves proposed in 1996. Our proposals were accepted and noted in two resolutions of the Security Council, though they never took shape. I think that the unfortunate consequences of that shortcoming have led all of us to reflect on the frightening numbers of dead, those who died because of lack of assistance in the Congo area. So if we are thinking of deploying a peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we must very seriously bear in mind this observation made by Mrs. Ogata on the need to protect humanitarian assistance. This is one aspect of the mandate that we have to think about.”
2000-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4089 (2000) · source
“There is, of course, the ongoing appeal to donors to continue their efforts, in view of the gravity and scale of the crisis, which is unlike anything in other parts of the world. This was a quite legitimate appeal from the High Commissioner. But above and beyond that appeal to donor countries, to those that can give something and continue their efforts - an appeal that we hope will be heard - Mrs. Ogata made certain operational points, notably the idea that humanitarian assistance in some crisis areas needs to be protected. I think that is a very useful point that we should bear in mind. The point was made by Mrs. Ogata in connection with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Above and beyond the possible monitoring of the ceasefire, I think we have to remember that the delivery of humanitarian assistance must be protected.”
2000-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4089 (2000) · source
“Ogata can give that might help strengthen the resolve of the United Nations and the OAU to end the crisis would be welcome. I also think that further reflection on other subjects could be useful. Mrs. Ogata has mentioned the regroupment policy in Burundi. But we might ask, in view of the threats existing in the region, whether what is being done in Burundi could be assessed on the basis of the similar experience of regroupment in Rwanda. The two countries have had to face obvious and extremely serious security problems, so any comparison between them could be helpful. But what I would especially like to highlight from the High Commissioner's statement are the very strong and direct appeals addressed to us to respond in the exercise of our responsibilities.”
2000-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4089 (2000) · source
“Ogata could give us an idea of a possible time-frame for the return of the refugees, which might give some hope to the Guinean authorities, who, I should like to say once again, we must commend for having taken in the refugees from Sierra Leone in accordance with African tradition. I should also like to know if we could obtain more detailed information about the humanitarian impact of the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. We know that there has been some progress and that sustained efforts are being made under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and with our full support, to resolve the crisis. But from the outset we have been disturbed by descriptions of the humanitarian impact of the conflict. Since then, we have not really received any detailed information, so any information that Mrs.”
2000-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4089 (2000) · source
“I shall therefore content myself with asking her to elaborate a little further on the situation in West Africa, and to give us some idea as to the possible rate of return to Sierra Leone of people who had taken refuge in Guinea and Liberia. We know that the great number of people in Guinea - several hundred thousand - were a considerable economic, social and human burden on the resources of the State, which was courageously trying to handle the situation with support from certain other countries and from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It would be useful if Mrs.”
2000-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4089 (2000) · source
“Mr. Dejammet (France) (spoke in French): We would like to thank you, Mr. President, for inviting Mrs. Ogata to speak to us. Her introductory comments were the best and clearest, although perhaps, also the most distressing, that we have heard at the opening of a debate. Perhaps I should say refer to this as a continuation of the debate that began on Monday on problems in Africa. Mrs. Ogata set out, as thoroughly as usual, the human aspect of the situation in Africa and, in the coming days, we should seek solutions in the light of her thoughts and comments. I had thought of a number of questions to ask Mrs. Ogata, but when I heard her statement, I realized that she had, in fact, already anticipated the issues that would be of concern to us and answered all of the questions that I had in mind.”
2000-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4089 (2000) · source
“Thus, I believe that, thanks to the commitment that the Secretary-General has shown as a moral authority and, I stress, as a political authority - thanks to that commitment and to the efforts that we will be called upon to make today because of his initiative - in this way we might find it possible to drive back this disease and to provide prospects for the genuine sustainable development of the African countries.”
2000-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4087 (2000) · source
“Finally, all of the donors could commit themselves to considering each of the possible actions for cooperation regarding HIV/AIDS and could examine each of these actions to see how to reduce the impact of the epidemic and strengthen prevention and access to care. In conclusion, I believe that we should emphasize the key role that the Secretary-General can play in this area. Once again, we would like to express our thanks for his presence and participation in this debate, and for having set its tone. The Secretary-General has the political and moral authority to continue to keep our collective awareness on alert in order to maintain the vigilance of each country regarding this subject in order to plot our course and to see to it that we act in conformity with the very generous words that we are hearing today.”
2000-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4087 (2000) · source
“There really are specific initiatives to be taken. In this regard, we believe the United Nations could usefully organize joint action on this question that would bring together manufacturers, the donor countries and the recipient countries. This is one of the specific initiatives that we would like to see as a result of this debate. This also seems to us to be an opportune time to draw up a master listing, under the aegis of UNAIDS, of all the bilateral and multilateral actions currently being taken in order to ensure the cohesion and geographic and medical-social complementarity of such actions. As Dr. Piot said earlier, we have seen that some countries have avoided the spread of this pandemic. There must have been reasons for this, and we should perhaps look for further cooperation in our bilateral and multilateral actions.”
2000-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4087 (2000) · source
“This is, in brief, what the Namibian Minister recalled earlier with great conviction, I believe. We cannot focus solely on prevention. Twenty-three million Africans are already infected. We also need to concern ourselves with the issue of treatment, and this is expensive. Hence the interest in this fund for therapeutic solidarity. To make progress in this area, we need to mobilize funds and to have the courage to recognize that, yes, this will cost money if we do not wish to limit ourselves to prevention, but also to try to provide care and treatment. The pharmaceutical industry must also more systematically be able to propose to the developing countries, to the African countries, modified financial conditions facilitating the provision of guarantees regarding the lack of parallel or consecutive exports to the developed countries.”
2000-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4087 (2000) · source
“Aside from its direct benefits, such an initiative should contribute by giving new hope to populations of the countries of the South stricken by this disease. We cannot avoid the issue of access for developing countries to treatment and to a future vaccine when 23 million Africans are already infected. AIDS highlights the enormous gap between the rich and the most disadvantaged countries and creates almost unbearable inequalities because of its effects on the most essential right: the right to life. As was asked by the French Minister of Health, Dr. Kouchner, during the special session of the General Assembly devoted to the follow-up to the Cairo Conference in July 1999, how long will we be able to accept the fact that the treatment is in the North and the patients in the South?”
2000-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4087 (2000) · source
“However, we are aware that those efforts and the efforts of all donors cannot alone make it possible to cope with the challenge of the epidemic. This is why we support the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) initiative of the International Partnership against AIDS in Africa, which is designed to strengthen the mobilization of the entire international community and in which France intends to actively participate. It is also in this spirit that we have hoped to see the establishment of an international fund for therapeutic solidarity, a fund that would receive public and private contributions and that would be designed to promote better access for populations in the developing countries to treatment against AIDS, including anti-retroviruses.”
2000-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4087 (2000) · source
“Over the last decade, 600 million French francs, or approximately $100 million or more have been mobilized under the French fund alone for aid and cooperation, through 60 projects focused primarily on prevention, safety of transfusions, medical oversight, support for associations that are active in this area and support for applied research. Aside from these mostly public efforts, there are also the French contributions to multilateral agencies, the contributions made by our embassies and contributions linked to decentralized cooperation carried out by local, regional and municipal bodies in France. Altogether this amounts to approximately FF 100 million that France allocates annually to the struggle against HIV/AIDS in the developing countries.”
2000-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4087 (2000) · source
“I do not wish to dwell on that; I simply wish to recall that we are dealing with a general undertaking that should include appeals for all forms of aid, in particular to official development assistance and indeed for debt relief endeavours. However, I would like to focus on what we can do more specifically and directly to combat AIDS and to recall that in this regard France, which has the honour of being the leading donor of public and private funds to Africa, has been aware since the beginning of the 1980s of the need to render very concrete assistance to the struggle against HIV/AIDS.”
2000-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4087 (2000) · source
“We wish to recall, with regard to the picture sketched for us, that if we are not careful and if we do not indeed follow up the appeal we are addressing to the international community today, a lasting health, economic and political crisis in Africa will win out over the sustainable development strategies that we are trying to promote. Therefore, everything we do here at the United Nations, in other chambers besides that of the Security Council and in other international forums will be reduced to nothing if we do not try to clearly and courageously confront the problems raised by the AIDS epidemic. But let us devote ourselves to the positive actions that can be taken. We must mobilize our efforts at the economic level, as was mentioned earlier by the Minister of Namibia.”
2000-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4087 (2000) · source
“What we have already heard clearly demonstrates that the AIDS epidemic, in terms of its social and economic effects, is indeed related to the instability that can afflict African countries and consequently has a direct bearing on security issues dealt with by this Council. Therefore, I shall not emphasize the statistics, and at the same time I regret that those that have been given or projected on the screen dealt with a limited number of countries. In this regard, I would like to thank Dr. Piot for having corrected or supplemented our information by also mentioning the positive aspects resulting from the efforts of certain countries. He cited Senegal as one such country, and I believe he was perfectly right to do so.”
2000-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4087 (2000) · source
“Mr. Dejammet (France) (spoke in French): Taking into consideration your repeated appeals for brevity, Mr. President, I shall shorten the usual compliments that it seems to me should be addressed to the Vice-President of the United States and to you for having organized this meeting, as well as to Mr. Wolfensohn, Mr. Malloch Brown and Dr. Piot for participating in our work. I also believe it is pointless to repeat all the statistics that have already been given this morning and that will probably be reiterated during our debate attesting to the seriousness of the effects of AIDS. We wish simply to thank the United States for having taken the initiative to organize this meeting.”
2000-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4087 (2000) · source
“It is producing positive results. Let us keep this in mind when we consider the situation in Kosovo, where the international community's financial involvement is, unfortunately, not so great.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“The only question that I would like to pose to Mr. Annabi in this regard is whether the high figure that has been projected - more than 8,000 men just for this operation, with all the costs entailed - is it possible that at some future date this figure could realistically be reduced, while ensuring, of course, that the security conditions are maintained. Here again, we have a situation that seems to be progressing satisfactorily on the ground. Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining the processes under way to promote human rights, which are linked to the strengthening of national reconciliation, is it not possible that the size of the military part of the operation could be reduced? It is up to the Secretariat to provide us information in this regard. I repeat, the total cost of the operation is large. It is perfectly justified.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“In this case Australia is deserving of the praise it has received for taking the principal responsibility for the burden of this operation and for assuming the costs that have already been rightly noted by Ambassador Fowler. Again, this is explained by the urgency of the situation and by the need to act quickly. This has not been our only experience with such a case. We have seen similar cases in Africa, as well as in Europe, with operation Alba. Nonetheless, the members of the Security Council who emphasize that our objective should be the deployment of a genuine United Nations operation with obligatory financing are right. This is why I, like Ambassador Fowler, can only be pleased that in the very near future the transformation of the mission in East Timor will take place and that we are going to undertake a peacekeeping operation.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“The second positive piece of information is clearly the rapid transformation of an operation that in the beginning was authorized by the Security Council, but of an intergovernmental nature, into a United Nations peacekeeping operation. In this regard, I must note my complete endorsement of the ideas so forcefully presented by the Canadian representative. He was without doubt correct in stressing that this operation must be a United Nations operation. As in this case, the reality is often that in order to act rapidly we are sometimes led to use the formula of giving Security Council authorization for a multinational force.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“Positive results are also being seen in the return of refugees, although we are aware that there are still several tens of thousands of refugees who have not been able to return. In this regard, I would like to ask Mr. Annabi if these statistics can be explained either by the fact that refugees are of their own will refusing to return or by other reasons. In spite of the security conditions in East Timor, in spite of the will to achieve national reconciliation that has been confirmed by UNTAET and by the Timorese leaders who have come together around Mr. Vieira de Mello - in spite of all this positive news, are there some refugees who are of their own will refusing to return to East Timor, or is it because of logistical problems, the conditions of roads, transportation problems, and so forth.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“I believe that what we should bear in mind is the generosity that has been shown as regards Timor, assistance that has come not only from the European Union but also in the form of bilateral aid from a number of countries of the region - I am thinking of Japan, of Australia, of Thailand; in fact, I am thinking about almost all the countries of Asia, which have responded to the appeal with most generous bilateral assistance. I would hope that such generosity could also be shown as regards another region, Kosovo, which certainly has need of financial support from the international community if we wish to give the United Nations Mission there the same chance of succeeding as that of the current mission in Timor.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“The international community is witnessing an undertaking that is succeeding, and it is responding generously to the appeals that are being made. The donors conference that was held recently in Tokyo produced results that exceeded expectations. This is clearly for the good, and I also believe that here for once we can make a comparison between the situation in this Asian region and what is happening in Europe. People often talk about a double standard, a disproportionality between what is done for Europe and what is done for the rest of the world.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“Thus, we are seeing meetings between militia chiefs who were considered opposed to independence and the current leaders of the Timorese pro-independence movement. We are seeing such meetings being organized, we are seeing institutions of all sorts established, including both administrative and judicial institutions. We are seeing the achievement of national pacification and reconciliation, a goal of United Nations missions, both here and in other situations throughout the world. I believe that given these developments a most sincere tribute should be paid to Mr. Vieira de Mello and to the team he has put together. Positive results can already be seen. I believe one such positive result was already seen at the donors meeting.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“The credit goes to one of the members of the Council, Brazil, and obviously to the effective action taken by Portugal, and then, through the crisis of doubt in September, to the efforts of successive Presidents of the Security Council - all of this, I think, should be recalled. Today the indications regarding the functioning of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), I repeat, lead us to be rather optimistic. All of this no doubt is attributable to the clear-cut objectives of the Special Representative, in particular his emphasis on the idea of national reconciliation. I believe that when a senior official of the United Nations shows such a commitment, when he engages the efforts of the entire fine staff he has been able to put together, positive results are guaranteed.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“Mr. Dejammet (France) (spoke in French): I would like to join those who have expressed their gratitude to you, Mr. President, for having organized this discussion. I would also like to thank Mr. Annabi for the information he has given us, which enables us to make an up to date appraisal of the situation in East Timor. The information is generally positive, and this is obviously a source of satisfaction for the members of the Security Council. Ambassador Fonseca has rightly recalled that it was Brazil that, in April, began alerting Council members to the evolution of the situation. I think, in hindsight, we can see that the past months have for once given us an example of effective and positive action by the Security Council.”
1999-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4085 (1999) · source
“We will have to consider the roles that the Member States, individually and collectively, as well as the Secretary-General of the United Nations, will be able to play in this regard. France, for its part, will spare no effort. We hope that the much-desired resumption of dialogue between the United Nations and Iraq will also make it possible to dispel the uncertainties of the resolution. We shall be vigilant in the interpretation and implementation of this text. If, as we hope, within the Council there emerges the willingness to work towards consensus so as to clearly and realistically apply the guidelines set forth in this draft resolution, France will fully and unreservedly participate in that undertaking.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“That is why France will abstain. The text, however, is also the only way open to us today, in the light of the views expressed by the majority of the members of the Council. That is why, our abstention notwithstanding, we will plead for wisdom to prevail in the interpretation of paragraphs 33 and 34 so that a reasonable financial mechanism can be adopted, and so that everyone will act realistically and in good faith in order to get the best out of the resolution. Therefore, we must even now start thinking about the future, about what is to come after the resolution. The Council is going to decide. We will have to convince Iraq to abide by that decision and to muster its goodwill towards that end.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Indeed, the Council will have to approve without a veto the appointment of the new Chairman, approve without a veto the organization of the Commission and approve without a veto the list of the key tasks. If the interpretations of the text diverge, how will the Chairman of the new Commission be able to carry out his mandate, and how will the Council, for its part, be able to reach a decision as to when sanctions should be suspended? One last, justified, attempt to secure agreement therefore made sense. It would have sufficed to make some modifications, to clarify the meaning of paragraph 7 and to specify that progress is the criterion for cooperation. Notwithstanding that last and, I repeat, justified effort, a consensus was not achieved. The draft resolution therefore remains imperfect. It falls short of the hopes we had in January.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“It is self-evident that one can not make the suspension - a partial and interim measure - contingent on conditions imposed for the lifting of sanctions. The very essence of the Council's proposal is here at issue. It seems to us, then, that this text should have been clarified, especially with respect to the criterion for suspension; in this way it would have better reflected the views of all the members of the Council. We praise the efforts undertaken to this end over recent weeks, especially by you, Mr. President, and by the United Kingdom. We have done our part in this common endeavour, proposing a number of formulations in the hope of garnering a consensus. Why this insistence on consensus? Because unanimity will be indispensable for the effective implementation of this draft resolution.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“The analyses of members of the Council diverge. Paragraph 7 of the draft resolution means to us that once the work programme is completed, then it will be possible not to suspend the sanctions, but to lift them outright. Suspension, a partial and interim measure, is in accordance with the spirit of paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991) and must, as we see it, come into play once progress is reported in the implementation of the programme and not be held up until the work programme is completed. Such progress, in keeping with paragraph 34 of the draft resolution, must be the criterion for cooperation; and cooperation, in keeping with paragraph 33, is itself the criterion for suspension. A different interpretation of the text makes any suspension of the sanctions very uncertain.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“The unknown factor stems from the fact that the details for the financial mechanism have not yet been specified. Iraq has been called upon to accept the return of the inspectors without knowing what arrangement will exist in the period after suspension. In future work on the issue, therefore, we will insist that monitoring be based on the reasonable proposals that our country formulated in writing at the end of July of this year. Resolution 986 (1995) must be suspended, and different modalities must be worked out to allow for freedom of trade and of civilian activity in conjunction with the retention of prohibitions on arms and dual-use goods. But above all, and herein lies the ambiguity, the criteria for the suspension and then the lifting of sanctions gives rise to difficulties of interpretation.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Hence the fact that members of the Council have finally agreed on the simple and realistic idea that if cooperation with Iraq were to resume in a manner that we all hope would be satisfactory, the sanctions would be suspended. That means relief for the Iraqi people and an incentive for the Iraqi authorities to cooperate. This mechanism for suspension is linked, as France had proposed, to solid guarantees. The suspension can be extended only through another positive decision of the Council, while arms continue to be prohibited, naturally, and dual-use goods continue to be subject to advance monitoring. If Iraq does not cooperate, the sanctions will automatically be restored. This draft resolution entails, however, one unknown factor and, above all, one ambiguous element that should have been resolved.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“The use of force to bring about the return of the inspectors is neither desirable nor practicable, as shown by the experience of December 1998. The draft resolution therefore had to include a mechanism for realistic incentives for the Iraqi authorities; this lies in the suspension, then the lifting, of sanctions. The impact of those sanctions, which have been of dubious effectiveness, falls first on the people of Iraq. It is they who daily pay the price for them. The Security Council, which has a choice of means to impose its policies, cannot completely shirk its responsibility in the face of what has been called a genuine humanitarian disaster.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“The new United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) will be very different from UN SCOM, and that is a good thing. The new Commission will follow the principles of professionalism, collegiality and universality. Those principles should guarantee its independence from all Member States and ensure that, like the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, it enjoys the respect of all, including Iraq. The Commission will have the same powers and duties as its predecessor, including the duty to abide by the Memorandum of Understanding of February 1998. But its behaviour, its methods, its organization and its composition will have been reformed in depth.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“These include notification to the Secretariat of contracts involving items related to food, health, agriculture and education; approval of contracts for petroleum-related spare parts by independent experts; an increased quota for such spare parts; and suspension of resolution 986 (1995) when the sanctions themselves are suspended. But two matters are regrettable: the refusal to break the isolation of the Iraqi population and in that connection to permit the resumption of civil aviation; and the lack of a real exception to the sanctions for religious activities such as the haj and the omra pilgrimages, because everything remains in the hands of the sanctions Committee, which itself is subject to a veto by any country.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source