YouSaid · the spoken record

Dejammet

lines on the record: 838
first: 1995-11-09
most recent: 2000-03-09
sittings or episodes: 128
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“As a member of the Tripartite Commission, France intends in this regard to fulfil its responsibility to ensure that this matter is finally settled and to make it possible to establish new relations between Iraq and Kuwait. Moreover, the draft resolution would immediately make improvements to resolution 986 (1995). The elimination of the oil ceiling is a good example of this. We thank the United Kingdom for having in recent weeks incorporated a number of French suggestions, which most often drew on the conclusions of the Amorim panels.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“The establishment of expert panels, on the apt initiative of Canada, made it possible to begin a pragmatic and impartial approach. I wish here to pay tribute to the Chairman of the panels, Ambassador Celso Amorim, whose recommendations made a considerable contribution to the preparation of today's draft resolution. For our part, we would have wished that those recommendations could have been adopted in full and implemented by the Secretary-General in April 1999. The present text combines successive drafts of various origins; through the work resumed in September by a number of delegations, it has been considerably modified. The Council agreed unanimously to call on Iraq to cooperate on the matter of Kuwaiti missing persons and property.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Hence France's January 1999 observation that the restoration of security and stability was the top priority: the Security Council should look to the future in order to prevent the arming of Iraq, and should to that end ensure the long-term presence on the ground of professional inspectors to help guarantee the security of all the States of the region. In the shorter term, it was also necessary to ensure that the sanctions targeted only prohibited weapons and materiel, and that they stopped punishing the Iraqi population, the humanitarian situation of which, as everyone is aware, is deteriorating daily. The Council heard that message, and early in 1999 agreed that the relationship between Iraq and the United Nations needed to be set on a new footing.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“Mr. Dejammet (France) (spoke in French): Today's vote is taking place a year and a half after the crisis with Iraq began in summer 1998 with Baghdad's refusal to cooperate with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), and with the subsequent sudden departure of UNSCOM. and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) without consultation with the Council, and the ensuing events. The draft resolution before us acknowledges the difficulties encountered in the implementation of resolution 687 (1991): the disarmament demands could not be fully met; the prospects of the early lifting of sanctions were no longer credible; and UN SCOM. no longer offered all the necessary guarantees.”
1999-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4084 (1999) · source
“I believe that the issue of Africa, like other issues that are capable of giving rise to crises, must be considered by the Council on a permanent basis. It must be on the agenda of Council in February, March and April. These issues and questions will remain on the agenda of the Council. I very much hope that the objective of convening an international conference will begin to take shape under the upcoming presidency of the United States.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“We will have to ensure that during that upcoming presidency, building on the work done this month under the presidency of the United Kingdom, the Security Council will manage to make tangible progress on the ground and undertake a genuine diplomatic enterprise leading to an overall political and diplomatic settlement of the problem. I believe that it would be a positive development if, through the various open debates that are envisaged under the presidency of the United States, the idea of holding an international conference on the Great Lakes were given real impetus. That will mean work in the future for other Presidents, because the discussion of Africa will not be limited to one month. There will be no need for statements to the press.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“It is well known that at some stage we will have to bring the leaders of these countries around the table to speak about their problems - issues of border security and the protection of minorities, which are interrelated. Otherwise, the sources of conflict and discord will remain. We believe that such an international conference must also be an overarching objective in the work of our Council. In this regard, I would like ask the representative of the Secretariat to invite the next President of the Council, who will have a great deal of work to do next month and will have to evince his continued interest in the subject, to call for consideration of the subject of an international conference.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“A consensus has been emerging with respect to the desirability and the possibility of mounting a peacekeeping operation - I believe that now it is clear that there is a consensus - and on the urgent desire of all of us to move ahead swiftly. In addition to that consensus, it seems to me that another idea has received vigorous backing - the idea of an international conference on the Great Lakes to be jointly sponsored by the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations. In this regard, I listened carefully to the conclusions of the President of the Council and to the comments that were made by the representative of the Russian Federation. That is important, because, at the outset, support for this idea did not have so much conviction.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“Mr. Dejammet (France) (spoke in French): I, too, endorse the comments of the representative of the United States in asking the Secretariat, like so many others, to do what it envisaged. That is not a reminder for Mr. Miyet; it simply means that we are interested in his soon-to-be- issued conclusions on the concept of operations and his clarifications. I like that word, "clarifications". It fits with the objective of having the kind of operation that is capable of being implemented. In our view, as the Council knows, it should also be applied to other United Nations endeavours with regard to other delicate situations in other regions of the world.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“Let us remember some happier examples of situations in which the United Nations succeeded in Africa. Let us pin our resolve on the decision we adopted in resolution 1279 (1999) - which we have yet to implement - and on the information - which we hope will be accurate and rigorous - to be provided by the Secretariat in early January along with its concept for the operation. I conclude by welcoming the programme of work proposed by the future President of the Security Council. It is a good programme and a heavy one that will require great assiduity and presence here on the part of the President. I believe, however, that the stakes are high enough that your example, Sir, will be followed and prove itself convincing.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“In this connection, all the countries that were to finance that operation might examine their consciences to find that they may have been responsible for certain arrears in relation to that operation as well. And yet, the situation was not simple there. Let us take another example: Sierra Leone. That was not an easy situation. We all know that the Lome Agreement was not respected. The danger is there, and yet the United Nations agreed to deploy a large peacekeeping operation of some 6,000 men, which proves that, in the final analysis, when we wish to do something, we take the decision to do it. We hope that, with the actual deployment of that peacekeeping operation, we will be able to correct the situation in Sierra Leone. I say this to indicate that, despite the magnitude and gravity of the crisis, we must not lose hope.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“We can take heart in recalling similar situations. Certainly, three or four years ago the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was less disturbing, given that fewer people were involved, but fundamentally the situation was extremely serious. There was a crisis. France knows something about this, because we played a role in getting the United Nations to deal with the crisis in the Central African Republic. This was not easy. We came up against a lot of scepticism, a lot of the same reactions we are now hearing as regards the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We were told that we risked becoming involved in a "dubious enterprise". Over time, we can see that the operation in Central African Republic was concluded - perhaps not successfully, but at least to our relative satisfaction.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“I also wonder whether the JMC might not be able to provide reports to the Security Council on decisions that the Commission is taking. This relates to one of the requests made yesterday regarding better relations, better cooperation, between the OAU and the United Nations. I think that if the Security Council wants to become actively and genuinely involved in dealing with the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it must have all the available information, so it is entitled to expect the JMC to provide some information, some reports. This would, in fact, respond to the wishes expressed for greater coordination between the regional organizations and the United Nations. Once again, despite all the references that have been made to the complexity of the situation, I think we have to keep our heads and not lose all optimism.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“We can be pleased at the decision that was finally taken to appoint a very distinguished, highly respected and wise person - the former President of Botswana - as facilitator. I also think we have to welcome the arrival in Kinshasa of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Morjane, who has an excellent reputation. We hope that he will be able to do some very solid work. Simple actions might perhaps be taken to contribute to respect for the ceasefire. Given the current situation I would ask Mr. Miyet whether it might not already be possible for the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to provide some military assistance to the Joint Military Commission by providing it with staff officers to help the Commission do its work.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“An explicit request to the Secretariat from the Council should lead the Secretariat, in conjunction with the Joint Military Commission (JMC) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to produce a report on a concept of operations that could be implemented in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Mr. Miyet spoke about producing such a report in early January, and I think, given the current schedule, this is a very reasonable time-frame; in the meantime, we eagerly and impatiently await this report from the Secretariat on a concept of operations. I think that such a report will truly enable the Security Council to shoulder its responsibilities in full knowledge of the facts. I hope the Council will act vigorously, because even if the situation is bleak, there are some encouraging signs.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“Further, I think that these kinds of explanations, this rationale can also be applied to other situations and other resolutions. Certain countries might legitimately wish that further consideration be given to such other resolutions before they are voted on, given the doubts that one might have about whether they could actually be implemented. All such thinking seems normal to me. However, we could also ask ourselves what we can do immediately in order to try - I will not say to take up the challenge, but to deal with the immediate dangers in the region, dangers that, I repeat, are leading to losses of human life. First, we should urge the Secretariat to continue its efforts to produce a concept of operations. This was a point made by Mr. Miyet, and I believe that this is the simplest and most specific issue that we face.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“At the same time, we as members of the Security Council, wish to be serious. We know that the decisions we take will be accompanied by risks to observers and to members of a peacekeeping operation. Of course, given this situation, how can one not understand the reaction of those who ask the Council to reflect and recall what has happened in other parts of the world, in Africa as well as in Europe. These past events explain why they, their Governments and their legislatures are asking for more reflection, and why they are calling on us to delve even deeper into all the facts of the situation before taking a decision. I understand all this full well. I understand the explanations that have been offered in this connection by those representatives who are being accused of foot- dragging.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“Mr. Dejammet (France) (spoke in French): I think we have nothing to add to the picture of the situation painted by Mr. Miyet. We know the situation is bleak. There have been ceasefire violations recently. Some time ago a report from the International Committee of the Red Cross described in very distressing terms the situation prevailing in the north-eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where clashes between tribes over the occupation of land resulted in thousands of people being killed. So we are more or less silent witnesses to a situation that we all know to be catastrophic, and we all know that it requires a response from the Council - an ongoing response, not just a few resolutions or debates from time to time. It should be a real, concrete effort.”
1999-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4083 (1999) · source
“All of these recommendations will serve no purpose, obviously, if we do not apply them in concrete cases. Many crises in Africa are at a critical stage. Many of them have been on the agenda of the Council for several months, if not several years: the Great Lakes, Sierra Leone, Angola, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea and, obviously, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Decisions in the weeks to come on all of these topics - and I would like to emphasize the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo - will show the extent of any real resonance of the words uttered today.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“It is up to all of us, Member States, organizations and donors, to send the same message about the appropriateness of having power sharing accepted. In the economic sphere we must maintain a meaningful level of assistance for development, along with what is being done in the area of trade. Three quarters of the least developed countries are located in Africa, and there are no miracles - they have to be helped. The requirements for official development assistance remain substantial. I would agree with what was said by the representative of the United States regarding the campaign against AIDS. But this campaign against AIDS, in terms both of prevention and of treatment, also requires assistance. It requires solidarity, meaning funds for giving treatment.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“The financial dimension must not become a constraint that determines everything else. When we are dealing with the maintenance of peace and security, the cost should be an outcome and not a determining factor, and the most enthusiastic declaration of intentions is worth nothing in the face of stinginess on the part of States. T hirdly, the best way to resolve conflicts is obviously to try to prevent them. We had a debate two weeks ago on this subject. Preventing conflicts requires many actions that very often are not within the purview of this Council. In the political sphere, we should promote the idea of genuine power sharing, which protects the rights of minorities and thereby avoids a vicious circle of seizure of power or political or ethnic revenge.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“The Security Council attempted this for the first time with the adoption of resolution 1279 (1999), on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which requests the Secretary-General "to take the administrative steps necessary for the equipping of up to 500 United Nations military observers with a View to facilitating future rapid United Nations deployments". (resolution 1279 (1999), para. 9) For the first time, we agreed, finally, to prepare in advance. We should continue on this track. One cannot on the one hand, deplore the slowness of the United Nations response and on the other reject all innovation. Secondly, it is obvious that we should ensure that the resources of an operation are in line with its mandate. To whittle down the format, the components or the budget of United Nations operation is the best way to ensure failure.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“I fully agree with Ambassador Fowler's comment that assessed financing for peacekeeping operations is preferable to voluntary financing. But the best way to help Africans solve their problems is, first of all, to train them for peacekeeping. That is the purpose of programmes undertaken by a number of countries, including France. And we must help them to prepare and implement those operations. The second approach is direct United Nations action, which would answer the criticism that the Organization does too little too late. First of all, the United Nations must prepare itself to act rapidly. The United Nations should be able to consider the means to launch an operation in good time.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“The chairmen or secretaries-general of organizations or ad hoc committees that are engaged in negotiations ought to meet more often with the Council, and the Council ought to invite them at key stages of a peace process in which they are engaged. This, of course, would apply first and foremost to the Chairman and the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). On the other hand, States that have the resources should provide financial and logistical support to regional or subregional organizations and to ad hoc coalitions when these are engaged in a peacekeeping operation. What was done for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone and in Guinea-Bissau was inadequate.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“Mr. Dejammet (France) (spoke in French): I thank the United Kingdom delegation for organizing this discussion during its presidency of the Council. There is no single prescription for all the crises and conflicts in Africa. But we can draw some conclusions and learn some lessons from our experiences. First of all, as most other speakers have already said, there should be improved relations between the Security Council and regional and subregional organizations or indeed ad hoc regional initiatives. In the past, the Security Council has not always been kept adequately informed about certain regional initiatives; there is recourse to the Council only in the latter stages of dealing with a matter, leaving it insufficiently prepared to give its endorsement or to make recommendations.”
1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081 (1999) · source
“I should like to point out that, in certain very rare cases, texts that we know will not be implemented and therefore do not enhance the Council's authority should not be put to the vote. We must know how not to take a stand so as not to participate in an exercise that, I might say, is materially unworkable.”
1999-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4077 (1999) · source
“Mr. Dejammet (France) (spoke in French): One representative has explained that he did not understand how one could fail to take a position on such a resolution. I feel that it is easy to understand in hearing the dilemma described by that representative in expressing his delegation's interest in humanitarian considerations and in obtaining a six-month extension. At the same time, however, his delegation supports pressure being exerted by other members of the Council. Hence, his delegation faced a dilemma. It is precisely in order to avoid such dilemmas, which give rise to unreasonable solutions, that I believe such a resolution should not have been put to the vote.”
1999-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4077 (1999) · source
“That is why, given this exceptional and extremely unusual process, we see only one reasonable position to take: not to participate in the voting.”
1999-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4077 (1999) · source
“The draft resolution therefore seems to be drafted in such a way as to deliberately render incapable of realization the measure that it proposes. It is true that we have been told that the issue is not about adopting a humanitarian text, but about using this vote for another purpose: to bring pressure to bear on the members of the Security Council with regard to another exercise and another resolution. The expected vote therefore has nothing to do with its theoretical purpose. Is it conceivable that in the Security Council we should take a decision on a text that we know cannot be implemented in practice? Is it conceivable that we should take a decision on a text which owes its existence to considerations that are alien to its purpose? We do not believe so.”
1999-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4077 (1999) · source
“Mr. Dejammet (France) (spoke in French): The draft resolution before the Council relates to the renewal of resolution 986 (1995), commonly known as the oil-for-food resolution. After 1997 that resolution was regularly renewed by the Council for six-month periods, until a recent decision to extend its provisions for 15 days, which proved impracticable. The text before us would extend the provisions of the resolution for seven days. Such a short seven-day extension would make it technically impossible to sell oil and, therefore, fully to implement resolution 986 (1995). The minimum time required for processing contracts under the mechanism set up by the United Nations means that oil sales will not be able to take place.”
1999-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4077 (1999) · source
“President, are to make on behalf of the Council at the end of this open debate reviews the Council's means and capacities for carrying out its conflict-prevention mandate. It will be useful to review them, but it is even more important to keep them in mind when we examine specific situations, as we do on a daily basis.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“Regional organizations also have an essential role to play. Their coordination and dialogue with the United Nations - the Security Council in particular - must be strengthened. More frequent contacts between the Security Council and the leaders of the regional and subregional organizations would provide useful opportunities to exchange information and examine situations in which preventive action might be necessary and the involvement of the Security Council desirable. As can be seen, conflict prevention is an area in which we could do more and be more effective. France hopes that today's debate will both increase the level of resolve and stimulate imaginations. In this connection, the presidential statement that you, Mr.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“It is also worth commending again, as we have done in other circumstances, the initiative of Mali, now a project of the Economic Community of West African States for a moratorium on importing, exporting and manufacturing light weapons in West Africa. In the same spirit, programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants have both curative and preventive sides. The Council must continue to encourage such measures. But these will only have a limited scope if they are not completed by actions in other spheres related to the careful reintegration of ex- combatants. Reduction of the number of armed men presupposes that the economy offers real prospects of reinsertion. This underlines the necessity of continuing to support official development assistance for the least developed countries.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“Growing attention is rightly being given to the problem of excessive and destabilizing accumulation of and illegal trafficking in light weapons and small arms. These weapons, of which 500 million are in circulation throughout the world, have been the principal instrument of killing occasioned by conflicts of the post-cold war period. They are responsible for 90 per cent of the deaths caused by these conflicts. The struggle against their accumulation and trafficking constitutes the prime example of a preventable situation. It is appropriate here to recall the conference scheduled in 2001 on the illegal trafficking in small arms at which France has the intention to propose negotiation of an instrument making obligatory the marking of these arms.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“Thus, the Secretary-General, in his report on Africa, has very justly said that the best prevention is through treating the underlying causes of conflicts, notably internal conflicts. That supposes that States, assisted by donors and international organizations, ensure sustainable development, being attentive to social redistribution, watching over good governance, power sharing, democratization, respect for human rights and protection of minorities. This highlights our sense of the need for directions currently taken by the United Nations Development Programme, based on this concept of good governance, that we would like to see involve respect for human rights, proper justice and protection of minorities. These areas are various and related.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“The Secretary-General, I have already said, has an extremely important role to play in alerting the Council to situations which seem to him susceptible of degenerating and in taking, in consultation with the Council, preventive diplomatic actions directly or indirectly through special envoys. Evidently, to accomplish such missions, the Secretary-General must be able to rely on expertise within the Secretariat, as well as on other means of information and early warning. Reinforcing the Secretariat's ability in this area is not, we believe, optional and must not rely essentially on voluntary contributions. This should not prevent countries from placing personnel at the disposal of the Secretariat for its benefit, without creating suspicion and excessive vigilance on the part of various members of the General Assembly.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“We must not forget that, for example, with respect to the former Yugoslav Republic or Macedonia, the United Nations prevention force has been there from 1992 to 1999, the first example of the deployment of a force aimed at preventing conflicts and tensions in a region from overflowing into a neighbouring country. This must be credited to the United Nations, which has had successes as well in the Balkans. We cannot, with respect to preventive action, isolate the role of the Security Council from the responsibilities and functions of other organs of the United Nations and, beyond that, from regional organizations and from Member States.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“Practically, that means two things: on the one hand, having the courage and the political will to act while it is still not too late; on the other hand - and this is not limited to preventive actions - watching to ensure an appropriate balance of means to ends and provide the necessary human, financial and material resources. On this subject, when it involves preventing an armed conflict - which I believe is the subject of today's debate - the financial aspect, as important as it is, should become neither a constraint nor a pre-condition for action by the Security Council. Fortunately, some examples show how the Council acted effectively in the past.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“Because of the Council's hesitation in intervening in time and adequately, not only did tens of thousands of people die, but the causes of future problems remained; one year later these brought about a much greater conflict which we now find difficult to resolve. This highlights the importance of making an effort to solve problems tied to implementation of the Lusaka Agreement with all the determination and the all the honesty necessary, and that should one not play around with words. One should realize that it is necessary to provide the resources, financial and undoubtedly the human resources, and that, indeed, right now the means should be provided to make these decisions without any more slipping between words and reality.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“This leads me to the third difficulty, which consists of taking adequate measures, in time, to confront a situation and give oneself the means to desired ends. Is not the Council reproached too often for doing too little too late? Retrospectively, it would have been necessary in Kosovo to intervene earlier and more forcefully. In what was formerly Zaire, in the autumn of 1996, the Security Council, after having authorised deployment of a multinational defense force to allow the sending of humanitarian aide to hundreds of thousands of refugees, estimated too quickly that the situation was returning to normal and no longer justified such intervention. We now know well that such was not the case.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“The Council debated, preoccupied by a degradation during several months of the situation on the ground marked both by an intensification of repression by Yugoslav forces and by activities of the guerrillas of the UCK, and the Council adopted resolution 1160 (1998). This resolution included several demands addressed to the parties to put an end to Violence and terrorism and to engage in a real dialogue, and coercive measures, in particular an arms embargo aimed at putting pressure on the parties and depriving them of the means of intensifying the fighting. The events which followed, unfortunately, showed that only even stronger action on the part of the international community could prevent the conflict from getting worse.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“We should note in this respect that the text of the Charter, in legal terms, does not exclude the Council from debating an internal situation if, according to Article 34, "the continuance of the situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" or, again, as in Article 39, if "the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace". It is perfectly possible in the Council to debate, under these Articles of the Charter, a situation within a State. However, one must not confuse debate with having recourse to force, which comes under other provisions that are precise and limiting. The Council can take up an issue and take preventive measures without necessarily envisaging the use of force. This was done in the spring of 1998 in the case of Kosovo.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“However, if action is not taken soon enough, an internal crisis can rapidly degenerate into an armed conflict which, in many cases, has international repercussions and can destabilize a whole region, provoking a flood of refugees, stimulating arms trafficking and drawing in outside players. We have to find, therefore, a balance between these apparently contradictory preoccupations in such a way that the Security Council can be called upon early enough to prevent a spiral of violence.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“I shall mention only one example of this, and indeed one in which the Council was not directly involved: the decisive action by the former Secretary-General in the settlement of the dispute between Eritrea and Yemen over the Hanish islands. From the initial steps by the former Secretary-General to the decision by a court of arbitration, this required long months of delicate negotiations carried out with absolute discretion. Indeed, my country played a role in that peaceful settlement, but sought no public advantage from this. That is an example of how discretion is sometimes necessary and how we should value it, however much we may regret the absence of the media's cameras and flashbulbs. Furthermore, most current conflicts are internal. Their prevention can therefore be seen as an infringement of the principle of State sovereignty.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“That was certainly the effect of the Security Council mission to Jakarta and Dili, sent on the initiative of Ambassador van Walsum and led by Ambassador Anjaba in the outstanding manner that has already been noted. That mission made international intervention possible in East Timor before the situation was beyond repair. That was an example of the value of preventive Security Council action carried out publicly. But in other cases it can be preferable to act with discretion. While we understand the mounting wish for increased transparency in the Council's activities, we must also be able to make use of discrete ways and means to settle a matter satisfactorily, and of the advantages offered by informal consultations among Council members or other procedures that can make possible direct, private dialogue with the parties concerned.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“First of all, at a time that is powerfully influenced by the media, events leading to an armed conflict draw less attention than a conflict that is already under way. Unfortunately, news reports too often tend to define priorities. Moreover, preventive action often requires discretion and tenacity, virtues that are not well adapted to the constraints of an ultra-media-oriented world - about whose values a great deal has been said. In this area as in many others, good judgement is required. Sometimes it can be useful for the Security Council to deal openly and publicly with an issue so as to mobilize attention and to put pressure on the parties.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“Chapter VI, which relates to the pacific settlement of disputes, sets out the role the Council can play in assisting the parties, in determining whether the persistence of a dispute seems to threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, and in recommending procedures or methods of adjustment, or even what it deems as the appropriate terms of a settlement. Chapter VII deals with actions in the event of a threat to the peace. There, we are still in the preventive stage, and we can see that the Council has a range of resources that can go as far as the use of enforcement measures. Yet the Security Council has encountered difficulties in playing its proper role in conflict prevention, and we should be fully aware of those difficulties.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“I find it perfectly splendid that the Secretary-General is here today to demonstrate his interest in the President's initiative. During September's general debate in the General Assembly and during the Assembly's debate on the report of the Security Council, many Member States emphasized the importance of conflict prevention and the need to make better use of existing resources and procedures. That appeal is justified by the simple observation that it is always more costly both financially and in human terms to put an end to an armed conflict than to prevent it from breaking out. Hence the interest in this debate, which was clearly highlighted by the previous speaker. The Charter gives the Security Council a role in the prevention of armed conflict.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“Mr. Dejammet (France) (spoke in French): Mr. President, your initiative to organize today's open debate on the role of the Security Council in the prevention of armed conflict is a most welcome and timely one. I wish also to thank the Secretary-General for having opened our discussion. His statement reflected his wise conception of his role and of the implementation of the Charter of the United Nations. It is the Charter that, in Article 99, gives the Secretary-General the power and the right to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. That role has sometimes been debated; the Secretary-General's use of Article 99 and of his powers in that sphere have at times been criticized - with respect, for example, to the Middle East or to Africa.”
1999-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4072 (1999) · source
“Mr. Dejammet (France) (spoke in French): The Council is about to adopt a draft resolution extending the sixth phase of the humanitarian arrangements in Iraq, established by resolution 986 (1995), for a period of 15 days. We hope that the members of the Council will make good use of this period of time in order to make progress in the discussions aimed at preparing a comprehensive draft resolution to make it possible to re-establish international monitoring in Iraq and to restore cooperation between that country and the United Nations. France will spare no effort to ensure that such a comprehensive draft resolution is adopted as soon as possible, and by consensus. Only its unanimous adoption by the members of the Council will offer any real prospect of an end to the crisis.”
1999-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4070 (1999) · source