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2022-10-27

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2023-12-22

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un-security-council

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1. “The United Nations will continue to support all efforts to uphold the norm against chemical weapons and to relegate these dreadful weapons to history. As we look forward to a new year, I urge the members of the Council to again unite on this issue and show leadership in demonstrating that impunity in the use of chemical weapons will not be tolerated. The Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can.”

   2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source

2. “With regard to the tripartite agreement concluded among the OPCW, the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Syrian Arab Republic, it is my understanding that all parties have agreed to an extension, which is currently being finalized, for a period of six months, covering the period from 1 January 2024 until, and including, 30 June 2024. On 30 November, we observed the annual Day of Remembrance for All Victims of Chemical Warfare. On that solemn occasion, the Secretary-General called for the day to also be one of resolve — resolve to end the use of chemical weapons once and for all. As he emphasized, that means living up to the Chemical Weapons Convention’s call to prevent any use of these repugnant weapons and ending impunity for all those who dare to use them, especially against civilians.”

   2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source

3. “I call upon the Syrian Arab Republic to continue its cooperation with the OPCW Technical Secretariat and respond with urgency to all of the Technical Secretariat’s requests. I have been advised that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission continues to study all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. I understand that the Fact-Finding Mission is currently preparing upcoming deployments and will report to the Executive Council on the results of its work in due course. The Investigation and Identification Team also continues its investigations into incidents in which the Fact-Finding Mission has determined that chemical weapons were used, or likely used, in the Syrian Arab Republic and will issue further reports in due course.”

   2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source

4. “The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains fully committed to implementing its mandate, aimed at verifying the fulfilment of the Syrian Arab Republic’s declaration obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, decisions by OPCW policy-making organs and Security Council resolutions. However, as has been previously emphasized, full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing all outstanding issues. Considering the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, at this time, the OPCW Technical Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.”

   2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source

5. “Furthermore, through its note verbale dated 12 October, the Syrian Arab Republic informed the Secretariat that additional inquiries would be discussed with the relevant SSRC staff during the inspections. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has also requested information regarding the unauthorized movement of the two cylinders related to the chemical weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018, which were allegedly destroyed in an attack on a chemical weapons production facility. I have been informed that, as of the date of this report, the Technical Secretariat has not received a response to that request.”

   2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source

6. “However, as of the date of this month’s report, the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in November 2018. The OPCW Technical Secretariat also continued its engagement with the Syrian National Authority on the matter related to the observation, during the ninth round of inspections, of a number of boxes containing a chemical of a dual-use nature, stored in large quantities at the Barzah facility’s chemical storage warehouse. Through a note verbale dated 21 August, the Syrian Arab Republic provided some information previously requested by the Technical Secretariat.”

   2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source

7. “That includes the complete declaration of activities at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and the declaration of quantities of nerve agents produced at one chemical weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce chemical weapons. With regard to the inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC, I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat conducted the next round of inspections in December — the tenth such round. The outcome of that round of inspections will be reported on by the Technical Secretariat in due course.”

   2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source

8. “Following the consultations, the Syrian Arab Republic provided, via note verbale, explanations of the results of analysis of samples collected by the DAT from two sites during the limited in-country activities, which took place in April. I understand that the OPCW Technical Secretariat is in the process of translating those explanations, which will be followed by their analysis by the DAT and the outcomes reported by the Technical Secretariat in due course. It is my sincere hope that that renewed spirit of cooperation can be maintained, so that all outstanding issues regarding the initial and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic can be resolved.”

   2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source

9. “Since the Council’s previous meeting on this matter, the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) has continued its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic. I am very pleased to report that, after a gap of more than two and a half years, the twenty-fifth round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority took place from 30 October to 5 November. I have been informed that all DAT experts, as deemed required by the OPCW Technical Secretariat, were able to deploy to Damascus for the consultations. I have been further informed that, during that period of consultations, the DAT conducted daily technical meetings, revisited the status of all outstanding issues and discussed their means of resolution.”

   2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source

10. “Mr. Ebo: I thank Security Council members for the opportunity to brief the Council once again on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. I am conducting this briefing on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, who is currently away from the office. Since the most recent consideration of this matter by the Council (see S/PV.9411), and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat on activities related to resolution 2118 (2013).”

    2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source

11. “The Secretary-General has unequivocally urged all States to avoid the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, as such use is highly likely to result in indiscriminate harm to civilians, including in Ukraine. I take this opportunity to call on all Member States to endorse and implement the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, adopted in November 2022, in a broad and meaningful manner. The world cannot afford for this senseless war to continue. As the Secretary-General has repeatedly emphasized, the United Nations is committed to supporting all meaningful efforts to bring a just and sustainable peace to Ukraine, guided by the Charter, international law and relevant General Assembly resolutions.”

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source

12. “Most civilian casualties continue to be caused by shelling and multiple-launch rocket systems in areas near the front line. However, attacks have recently escalated on populated areas across Ukraine. As it does for any other conflicts in the world, the United Nations strongly condemns attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure and calls for their immediate cessation. Regrettably, the use of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles against civilians and civilian infrastructure continues. Just like any other weapon or weapon system, armed uncrewed aerial vehicles must not be used in a manner inconsistent with international humanitarian law.”

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source

13. “Under international humanitarian law, parties to an armed conflict are prohibited from targeting civilians and civilian objects, including civilian infrastructure, and have the responsibility to take all feasible precautions in the conduct of military operations to avoid, or at least minimize, the incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. In that regard, the continued and intensified attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure across Ukraine remain very alarming. From 24 February 2022 to 11 December 2023, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recorded 28,711 civilian casualties in Ukraine, with 10,058 killed and 18,653 injured. The actual figures are likely to be considerably higher.”

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source

14. “I call on States to join relevant treaties and agreements and to fully implement their legal obligations under conventional arms control instruments to which they are party, as well as their political commitments, to minimize the risk of the diversion of arms and ammunition. I would also like to raise the matter of transparency in arms transfers as a crucial confidence-building measure that can serve to reduce tensions, ambiguities and misperceptions among Member States. The United Nation Register of Conventional Arms remains a key tool in that regard. It has been consistently repeated, but is nevertheless worth emphasizing once again, that all parties to any armed conflict have a duty to protect civilians in armed conflict and ensure compliance with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.”

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source

15. “To prevent the diversion and illicit trafficking of conventional arms and to regulate the international arms trade, States have also developed a number of instruments, including legally binding ones such as the Arms Trade Treaty and the Firearms Protocol. In addition, the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and its International Tracing Instrument also remain essential tools for addressing the illicit trade in all its aspects. Most recently, I welcomed the adoption of the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management. This new regulatory instrument is a landmark achievement in our collective efforts to reduce the risks and human costs of illicit trafficking and diversion of conventional ammunition of all types and to prevent unplanned explosions at munitions sites.”

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source

16. “Measures to address the risk of diversion to unauthorized end-users and for unauthorized uses are essential for preventing further instability and insecurity in Ukraine, the region and beyond. Such efforts will also be key to post- conflict recovery. In laying out his vision for a New Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General calls on Member States to take measures to address challenges related to the diversion, proliferation and misuse of conventional weapons at the regional, subregional and national levels. A significant reduction of illicit arms flows, as stipulated by target 16.4 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, can be effectively achieved only through strong cooperation and coordination by the international community.”

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source

17. “Just recently, in his New Agenda for Peace policy brief, the Secretary-General encouraged Member States to commit to reducing the human cost of weapons, including by achieving the universality of treaties banning inhumane and indiscriminate weapons, such as the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects and its Protocols; and the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. The influx of weapons and ammunition into any armed conflict can contribute to escalation and presents significant risks of diversion and proliferation even after the conflict has ended.”

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source

18. “Reports related to the use of anti-personnel landmines and the use and transfer of cluster munitions in Ukraine are deeply concerning. I would like to strongly reiterate my call for an immediate end to the use of those horrendous weapons, which have lasting and devastating impact on innocent civilians long after conflicts have ended.”

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source

19. “Those transfers have reportedly included heavy conventional weapons — such as battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft, helicopters, large-calibre artillery systems, missile systems and uncrewed combat aerial vehicles, as well as remotely operated munitions, small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. We also take note of reports related to the transfer of depleted-uranium tank ammunition to Ukrainian forces. There have also been reports of States transferring, or planning to transfer, weapons such as uncrewed aerial vehicles and ammunition to Russian armed forces, including for possible use in Ukraine. As has been stressed by the High-Representative for Disarmament Affairs, any transfer of weapons must take place within the applicable international legal framework, including relevant Security Council resolutions.”

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source

20. “Mr. Ebo: I am providing this briefing on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu. Since the previous briefing to the Security Council on this topic, on 27 October (see S/PV.9457), the provision of military assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine has continued in the context of the full-scale invasion of that country, launched by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022 in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Over the past months, reported transfers of arms and ammunition to Ukrainian forces have continued. Information from Governments about their transfers of weapons systems and ammunition is available through open sources.”

    2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source

21. “The Secretary-General has unequivocally urged all States to avoid the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, as such use is highly likely to result in indiscriminate harm to civilians, including in Ukraine. Civilians and civilian infrastructure across Ukraine continue to face unrelenting and indiscriminate attacks. Let me say it once again: attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure are prohibited under international law, in Ukraine and in any other conflict setting. All such attacks must stop immediately. Before concluding, I would like to reiterate that the United Nations is committed to support all meaningful efforts to bring a just and sustainable peace to Ukraine, guided by the Charter, international law and relevant General Assembly resolutions.”

    2023-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9457 (2023) · source

22. “From 24 February 2022 to 8 October 2023, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights recorded 27,768 civilian casualties in Ukraine, with 9,806 killed and 17,962 injured. The actual figures are likely to be considerably higher. The vast majority of civilian casualties are a result of the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects, including by shelling from artillery, tanks and multiple-launch rocket systems, cruise and ballistic missiles and by air strikes. Regrettably, the use of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles against civilians and civilian infrastructure has not ceased. Just like any other weapons or weapon systems, armed uncrewed aerial vehicles must not be used in a manner inconsistent with international humanitarian law.”

    2023-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9457 (2023) · source

23. “I urge Member States to utilize various United Nations instruments to increase transparency, such as the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and to prevent diversion through instruments such as the Arms Trade Treaty, the Firearms Protocol and the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and its International Tracing Instrument. In addition, I look forward to the General Assembly’s endorsement of the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management and its operationalization to counter the diversion of conventional ammunition of all types, from small calibre to the largest calibres. All parties to any armed conflict have a duty to protect civilians in armed conflict and ensure compliance with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.”

    2023-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9457 (2023) · source

24. “In the New Agenda for Peace, the Secretary- General once again calls on Member States to take concrete measures to address challenges related to diversion — at the regional, subregional and national levels. The prevention of the illicit flow of arms and diversion, as stipulated by target 16.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals, can be effectively achieved only through strong cooperation and coordination by the international community. As I mentioned many times before, transparency in armaments is a crucial confidence-building measure that can serve to reduce tensions and ambiguities between Member States.”

    2023-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9457 (2023) · source

25. “I also reiterate my call to all relevant parties to abide by their obligations under the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and not to transfer or use any mines prohibited by its Amended Protocol II. The supply of weapons and ammunition into any armed conflict situation raises significant concerns about the potential escalation of violence and the risks of diversion. Measures to counter the potential diversion of weapons and ammunition will be key to post-conflict recovery and regional security and stability, as well as to conflict prevention in other regions.”

    2023-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9457 (2023) · source

26. “Reports related to the use of anti-personnel landmines and the use and transfer of cluster munitions in Ukraine are disturbing. Reports already indicate significant land contaminated with explosive remnants of war of different types. The process to map that contamination and clear the land safely will be long and will require resources and the support of the international community. I call for an immediate end to the use of those indiscriminate and horrendous weapons, which have lasting and devastating impact on innocent civilians long after conflicts have ended. I call upon all States that have not yet done so to urgently consider acceding to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction and to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”

    2023-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9457 (2023) · source

27. “Those transfers have reportedly included heavy conventional weapons such as battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft, helicopters, large-calibre artillery systems, missile systems and uncrewed combat aerial vehicles, as well as remotely operated munitions and small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. We also take note of reports related to the transfer of depleted- uranium tank ammunition to the Ukrainian forces. In addition, we are aware of reports of States transferring, or planning to transfer, weapons such as uncrewed aerial vehicles and ammunition to the Russian armed forces, including for possible use in Ukraine. In that context, I would like to strongly reiterate that any transfer of weapons must take place within the applicable international legal framework, including relevant Security Council resolutions.”

    2023-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9457 (2023) · source

28. “Mr. Ebo: I provide this briefing on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu. Since the previous briefing to the Security Council on this topic, only two weeks ago (see S/PV.9436), the provision of military assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine has continued in the context of the full- scale invasion of that country, launched by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022 in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Over the past months, reported transfers of arms and ammunition to the Ukrainian forces have expanded. Much of the information on transfers of weapons systems and ammunition from Governments is available through open sources.”

    2023-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9457 (2023) · source

29. “Furthermore, all feasible precautions must be taken in the conduct of military operations to avoid — or at least minimize — incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. Attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure must stop immediately. Those responsible for attacks targeting civilians must be held accountable. The United Nations will continue working towards a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, in line with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolutions. I reiterate the Secretary-General’s call to all States to do their part to prevent further escalation, to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and to end this senseless war.”

    2023-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9436 (2023) · source

30. “I therefore urge all Member States to support and effectively implement the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas. That Declaration is an important tool to strengthen the protection of civilians in populated areas in conflict zones. On behalf of the High Representative, I condemn the systematic and relentless attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure and services across Ukraine, including against health, educational and grain-storage facilities. International humanitarian law obligates parties to armed conflict to protect non-combatants and prohibits attacks targeting civilians and civilian objects.”

    2023-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9436 (2023) · source

31. “The vast majority of civilian casualties are a result of the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects, including by shelling from artillery, tanks and multiple-launch rocket systems, and cruise and ballistic missiles and by air strikes. The continued use of large numbers of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles against civilians and civilian infrastructure is concerning. Armed uncrewed aerial vehicles, just like any other weapons or weapons systems, must not be used in a manner inconsistent with international humanitarian law. I reiterate the Secretary-General’s call for parties to conflict to avoid the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and to take combat out of urban areas altogether. Such use results in harm to civilians, including in Ukraine.”

    2023-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9436 (2023) · source

32. “I look forward to the General Assembly’s endorsement of the global framework and next steps in its operationalization to counter the diversion of conventional ammunition. Accordingly, I call upon all States to join all relevant treaties and agreements, including multilateral instruments, to fully implement their legal obligations under these agreements and to respect their political commitments to minimize the risk of diversion of arms and ammunition. The impact on civilians of the intensifying war in Ukraine continues to be an area of serious concern. From 24 February 2022 to 8 October 2023, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has recorded 27,768 civilian casualties in Ukraine, with 9,806 killed and 17,962 injured. The actual figures are likely to be considerably higher.”

    2023-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9436 (2023) · source

33. “To prevent the diversion of conventional arms and ammunition and to effectively regulate the international arms trade, States have established a number of arms control instruments, such as the Arms Trade Treaty, the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and its International Instrument for the Timely and Reliable Identification and Tracing of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. In addition, discussions in the dedicated Open-ended Working Group recently culminated in the adoption of its final report (see A/78/111) containing a set of political commitments as a new global framework for through-life management of conventional ammunition.”

    2023-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9436 (2023) · source

34. “Preventing the diversion of weapons and ammunition requires supply chain transparency and cooperation and information exchange between importing, transit, and exporting States. Equally required are concrete measures such as marking and tracing, effective accounting and comprehensive record-keeping practices, physical safeguarding of arms and ammunition, customs and border control measures and diversion-monitoring and analysis. I further note that the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms remains a key tool in that regard. Transparency in arms transfers can serve as an important confidence-building measure, contributing to the prevention and reduction of misperceptions, tensions and ambiguities among Member States.”

    2023-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9436 (2023) · source

35. “The large-scale influx of weapons and ammunition into any situation of armed conflict raises significant concerns for peace, security and stability, including as a result of diversion and proliferation even after the conflict has ended. Measures to address the risk of the diversion of weapons and ammunition to unauthorized end-users and for unauthorized uses are essential for preventing further instability and insecurity in Ukraine, the region and beyond. Such measures include the enhancement of marking practices, comprehensive pre-transfer diversion risk assessments, end-user certificates, including non-transfer clauses, effective legal and enforcement measures and post- shipment verifications.”

    2023-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9436 (2023) · source

36. “The process of mapping that contamination and clearing the land safely will be long and will require resources and the support of the international community. States that are not yet parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction and to the Convention on Cluster Munitions should make every effort to accede to those Conventions. I also reiterate the High Representative’s call to all relevant parties to abide by their obligations under the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, as well as not to transfer or use any mines prohibited by its Amended Protocol II.”

    2023-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9436 (2023) · source

37. “As has been stressed by the High-Representative for Disarmament Affairs, any transfer of weapons must take place within the applicable international legal framework, including relevant Security Council resolutions. Reports related to the use of anti-personnel landmines and the use and transfer of cluster munitions in Ukraine are deeply concerning. On behalf of the High Representative, I call for an immediate end to the use of those inhumane and indiscriminate weapons, which has severe and lasting humanitarian impacts. Landmines and explosive remnants of war have resulted in widespread contamination in Ukraine, posing a threat to civilian lives, rendering land unsafe for agricultural use and disrupting transportation and access to humanitarian aid.”

    2023-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9436 (2023) · source

38. “Those transfers have reportedly included heavy conventional weapons such as battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft, helicopters, large-calibre artillery systems, missile systems and uncrewed combat aerial vehicles, as well as remotely operated munitions and small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. Reported transfers of arms and ammunition to the Ukrainian forces have expanded over the past months. We also take note of reports related to the transfer of depleted-uranium tank ammunition to the Ukrainian forces. In addition, there have been reports of States transferring, or planning to transfer, weapons such as uncrewed aerial vehicles and ammunition to the Russian armed forces, including for possible use in Ukraine.”

    2023-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9436 (2023) · source

39. “Mr. Ebo: Since the previous briefing to the Security Council by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs on this topic, one month ago (see S/PV.9415), the provision of military assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine has continued in the context of the full-scale invasion of that country, launched by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Information from Governments regarding their transfers of weapons systems and ammunition is largely accessible through open sources.”

    2023-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9436 (2023) · source

40. “The Investigation and Identification Team is also continuing its investigations into incidents in which the Fact-Finding Mission has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic and will issue further reports in due course. As the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs has emphasized on many occasions, any use of chemical weapons is unacceptable. The absence of accountability for that use is a threat to international peace and security and a danger to us all. In closing, I would like to urge the members of the Council to unite on the issue and show leadership in demonstrating that impunity in the use of chemical weapons will not be tolerated. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can.”

    2023-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9393 (2023) · source

41. “I have been advised that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission continues to study all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. As the Council was previously informed, on 28 June the OPCW Technical Secretariat issued a report of the Fact-Finding Mission regarding incidents of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Kharbit Massasneh on 7 July and 4 August 2017. The report concluded that the information obtained and analysed in line with the Fact-Finding Mission’s mandate did not provide reasonable grounds for the Mission to determine that toxic chemicals were used as a weapon in the reported incidents. I understand that the Mission is currently preparing upcoming deployments and will report to the Executive Council on the results of its work in due course.”

    2023-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9393 (2023) · source

42. “Following the inspection, the OPCW Technical Secretariat engaged the Syrian National Authority on the matter and requested information that would allow it to assess that all activities conducted in the facility are for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. I understand that the Technical Secretariat is still awaiting that information. Regarding the unauthorized movement of the two cylinders related to the chemical-weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018, which were allegedly destroyed in an attack on a chemical-weapon production facility, the OPCW Technical Secretariat is still awaiting information related to the unauthorized movement of those cylinders. I again call on the Syrian Arab Republic to respond with urgency to all of the Technical Secretariat’s requests.”

    2023-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9393 (2023) · source

43. “With regard to the inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC, I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to plan the next round of inspections, to be held in 2023. I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in November 2018. In addition, I have been informed that during the ninth round of inspections at the Barzah facility of the SSRC in September 2022, the inspection team observed a number of boxes containing a chemical of a dual-use nature stored in large quantities at the facility’s chemical storage warehouse.”

    2023-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9393 (2023) · source

44. “The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains fully committed to implementing its mandate aimed at verifying the fulfilment of the Syrian Arab Republic’s declaration obligations under the Convention, decisions by the OPCW policymaking organs and resolution 2118 (2013). However, as has been previously emphasized, the full cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential in closing all outstanding issues. Considering the gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that have been identified and remain unresolved, at this time the OPCW Technical Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete as required under the Chemical Weapons Convention.”

    2023-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9393 (2023) · source

45. “Secondly, the Syrian Arab Republic committed to presenting proposals for better implementing its obligations. Thirdly, the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the Syrian Arab Republic discussed the conduct of the twenty-fifth round of consultations as the optimal means of achieving outcomes related to the Syrian chemical-weapon dossier. Fourthly, the OPCW Technical Secretariat emphasized that its priority was a resumption of rounds of consultations that would include all experts designated by the Technical Secretariat. Regarding the resumption of consultations, I understand that the matter was to be referred to the head of the Syrian National Authority and that the OPCW Technical Secretariat is awaiting that decision in order to proceed with planning for the next round.”

    2023-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9393 (2023) · source

46. “I have been informed that in March, following a prior attempt by the OPCW Technical Secretariat in November 2022, the Syrian Arab Republic proposed meeting with the Technical Secretariat in Damascus or Beirut to develop a new work plan to resolve all issues related to the Syrian chemical-weapon dossier. As a result, a delegation from the Technical Secretariat met with representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic in Beirut on 22 and 23 June. I understand that the meeting had a fully open agenda, and the following points were addressed. First, a six-month extension to the tripartite agreement between the OPCW, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Nations Office for Project Services was agreed, extending its duration up to and including 31 December.”

    2023-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9393 (2023) · source

47. “That includes a complete declaration of activities at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and a declaration of quantities of nerve agents produced at one chemical-weapon production facility that the Syrian Arab Republic had declared as never having been used to produce chemical weapons. Due to that situation, and in a further attempt to implement its mandate, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has deployed a reduced team, consisting of several members of the DAT, to the Syrian Arab Republic to conduct limited in-country activities. The first such deployment took place from 17 to 22 January, and the second from 12 to 19 April. The outcomes of the deployments were reported to the States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in March and July 2023, respectively.”

    2023-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9393 (2023) · source

48. “Since the Council’s previous meeting on this matter (see S/PV.9372), the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) has continued its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic. As previously reported, the last round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority took place in February 2021. Since then, all efforts to organize the next — that is, the twenty-fifth — round of consultations have been unsuccessful. I have been advised that although the Syrian Arab Republic agreed to the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s May 2022 proposal to address the declaration-related issues through exchange of correspondence, the Technical Secretariat has yet to receive from the Syrian Arab Republic any declarations or other documents requested.”

    2023-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9393 (2023) · source

49. “Mr. Ebo: I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief them once again on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. I am providing this briefing on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, who is currently away from Headquarters. Since the most recent consideration of this matter by the Council, and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat on activities related to resolution 2118 (2013).”

    2023-08-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9393 (2023) · source

50. “In conclusion, I would like to reiterate a call made on numerous occasions by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs — the use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances, is a grave violation of international law. There can be no justification for their use. We must make every effort to ensure the continued resilience of the taboo against these horrific weapons. Those responsible for such attacks must be identified and held accountable, for the sake of the victims and as a deterrent to future chemical warfare. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can.”

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source