YouSaid · the spoken record

Ebo

lines on the record: 83
first: 2022-10-27
most recent: 2023-12-22
sittings or episodes: 9
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“In that context, on 28 June 2023, the OPCW Technical Secretariat issued a report of the FFM regarding incidents of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Kharbit Masasnah on 7 July and 4 August 2017. The report concluded that the information obtained and analysed in line with the FFM’s mandate did not provide reasonable grounds for the FFM to determine that toxic chemicals were used as a weapon in the reported incidents. I understand that the FFM is currently preparing upcoming deployments and will report to the OPCW Executive Council on the results of its work in due course. The Investigation and Identification Team also continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic and will issue further reports in due course.”
2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source
“It is my understanding that the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) continues to provide support to the OPCW fact-finding mission in Syria in accordance with the tripartite agreement concluded among OPCW, UNOPS and the Syrian Arab Republic. The current extension of the agreement remained in force up to and including 30 June. As of the date of the most recent OPCW report (see S/2023/484), the finalization of the new extension of that agreement was in progress. I have been advised that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) continues to study all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.”
2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source
“Regarding the unauthorized movement of the two cylinders related to the chemical weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018, which were allegedly destroyed in an attack on a chemical weapons production facility, the OPCW Technical Secretariat is still awaiting information related to the unauthorized movement of those cylinders. I again call upon the Syrian Arab Republic to respond with urgency to all of the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s requests. With regard to the invitation extended by the OPCW Director-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic to an in-person meeting, I note that the OPCW Technical Secretariat stands ready to engage further on an agreed agenda for the meeting through the agreed channel.”
2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source
“Considering the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, at this time the OPCW Technical Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. With regard to the inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC, I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to plan the next round of inspections, to be held in 2023. I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in November 2018.”
2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source
“The first such deployment took place from 17 to 22 January, and the second took place from 12 to 19 April. The outcome of the first deployment was reported to the States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in March, and the outcomes of the second deployment will be reported to the OPCW Executive Council in due course. The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains fully committed to implementing its mandate aimed at verifying the fulfilment of the Syrian Arab Republic’s declaration obligations under the Convention, decisions by OPCW policymaking organs and resolution 2118 (2013). However, as has been previously emphasized, full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing all outstanding issues.”
2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source
“I have been advised that, although the Syrian Arab Republic agreed to that proposal, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has yet to receive from the Syrian Arab Republic any declarations or other documents requested. That includes the complete declaration of activities at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and the declaration of quantities of nerve agents produced at one chemical weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce chemical weapons. Owing to this situation, and in a further attempt to implement its mandate, the OPCW Technical Secretariat proposed to deploy a reduced team comprised of several members of the DAT to the Syrian Arab Republic to conduct limited in-country activities.”
2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source
“Since the Council last met on this matter, the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) has continued its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations of the Syrian Arab Republic. Unfortunately, efforts by the OPCW Technical Secretariat to organize the twenty-fifth round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority continue to be unsuccessful. As Council members were previously informed, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has provided the Syrian Arab Republic with the list of pending declarations and other documents requested by the DAT since 2019 that could assist in resolving the current 20 outstanding issues. The OPCW Technical Secretariat proposed, in May 2022, to address the declaration-related issues through exchange of correspondence.”
2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source
“Mr. Ebo: I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief them on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. I am providing this briefing on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, who is currently away from Headquarters. Since the last consideration of this matter by the Council (see S/PV.9317), and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts in the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on activities related to resolution 2118 (2013).”
2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source
“I take this opportunity to call on all Member States to support and effectively implement the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, which was adopted in November 2022. That Declaration is an important tool for better protecting civilians from the increasing urbanization of armed conflict. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which is a violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, is causing massive suffering and devastation for Ukraine and its people. The world cannot afford for the war to continue. I appeal to all Member States to make every effort for peace. The United Nations stands ready to support all genuine efforts to that end.”
2023-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9325 (2023) · source
“Hospitals and health facilities have been attacked, resulting in the deaths or injuries of health-care workers and disruptions to essential services. Explosive remnants of war have resulted in widespread land contamination, rendering land unusable for agriculture and impeding the movement of people. Under international humanitarian law, combatants must not direct attacks against civilians or civilian infrastructure and must take all feasible precautions in the conduct of military operations to avoid — or at least minimize — incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. The attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure must stop.”
2023-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9325 (2023) · source
“Most of the civilian deaths and injuries continue to be caused by the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects, including attacks by heavy artillery, tanks, multiple launch rocket systems and missiles and air strikes. After almost 15 months of the Russian Federation’s military offensive in Ukraine, the suffering, loss, displacement and destruction continue to form part of an unbearable routine. In addition to the thousands of civilians killed or injured, the destruction of essential critical infrastructure and services is particularly alarming. Homes, schools, roads and bridges have been destroyed and damaged. Attacks on energy infrastructure have interrupted power, heating, the drinking water supply and sewage facilities, as well as mobile and Internet communications.”
2023-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9325 (2023) · source
“I call on States to consider joining the relevant treaties and to implement their legal obligations and political commitments under the conventional arms control instruments to which they are party in order to minimize the risk of diversion of arms and ammunition. Beyond addressing arms transfers, all parties to the conflict have a duty to protect civilians in armed conflict and to ensure compliance with applicable international law, including and especially international humanitarian law. Since 24 February 2022, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has recorded 23,821 civilian casualties in Ukraine — 8,836 killed and 14,985 injured, with the actual figures likely to be considerably higher.”
2023-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9325 (2023) · source
“In UNROCA’s 30 years of operation, 178 Member States have submitted a report to it at least once. I call on Member States to participate in the mechanism, because among other things, it helps to track the influx of weapons into conflict zones. In order to prevent the diversion of conventional arms and regulate the international arms trade, States have also established a number of arms-control treaties and instruments, which include the Arms Trade Treaty, the Firearms Protocol and the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, with its International Tracing Instrument. Moreover, Member States are in the process of developing a new global framework for through-life conventional ammunition management.”
2023-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9325 (2023) · source
“Such measures include pre-transfer risk assessments, end-user certification, effective legal and enforcement measures and post-shipment verifications such as on-site inspections. Diversion prevention also requires cooperation and information-sharing between importing, transit and exporting States, as well as concrete measures such as marking and tracing, effective accounting practices and the physical safeguarding of arms and ammunition, along with customs and border- control measures. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) remains a key tool in that regard. Transparency in armaments can serve as a confidence-building measure, thereby contributing to the prevention and reduction of misperceptions and tensions among Member States.”
2023-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9325 (2023) · source
“There have been reports of States transferring, or planning to transfer, weapons such as uncrewed combat aerial vehicles and ammunition to the Russian armed forces for use in Ukraine. Media outlets have also reported on the transfer of major conventional arms, including artillery rocket systems, to non-State groups involved in the war in Ukraine. A large-scale influx of weapons and ammunition into any situation of armed conflict raises concerns about peace, security and stability, including as a result of diversion. Measures to address the risk of diversion to unauthorized end users and for unauthorized uses are essential if we are to prevent further instability and insecurity in Ukraine, the region and beyond.”
2023-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9325 (2023) · source
“Mr. Ebo: Since the previous briefing to the Security Council by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, held in February on the topic of transfers of military assets to Ukraine (see S/PV.9256), the provision of military assistance to the armed forces of Ukraine has continued. Information from Governments about their transfers of weapon systems and ammunition is available from open sources. The transfers have included heavy conventional weapons, including battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft helicopters, large-calibre artillery systems, missile systems and uncrewed combat aerial vehicles, as well as remotely operated munitions and small arms and light weapons.”
2023-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9325 (2023) · source
“Any use of chemical weapons is unacceptable and the absence of accountability for that use is a threat to international peace and security and a danger to us all. It is therefore imperative to hold accountable all who would dare to use chemical weapons. As we start the new year, I state my sincere hope that Council members will unite on the issue. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can.”
2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9235 (2023) · source
“The Investigation and Identification Team is also continuing its investigations into incidents in which the Fact-Finding Mission has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Investigation and Identification Team will issue further reports in due course. With regard to the decision entitled “Addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9), adopted on 21 April 2021, I have been informed that unfortunately the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet completed any of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/ DEC.2. The OPCW Technical Secretariat will continue to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic with regard to their completion and to report to the OPCW Executive Council, as mandated.”
2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9235 (2023) · source
“With regard to the tripartite agreement concluded between the OPCW, the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Syrian Arab Republic, it is my understanding that on 8 December 2022 all the parties finalized an extension for a period of six months from 1 January up to and including 30 June. I have been advised by the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission that it remains in the process of studying all the available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In the context, I understand that the Fact-Finding Mission was deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic from 6 to 12 November 2022 to conduct interviews with witnesses regarding several of the incidents under review.”
2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9235 (2023) · source
“With regard to the invitation to an in-person meeting extended by the OPCW Director-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic, I note that while the Technical Secretariat was still awaiting a response from Syria on the most recent version of the agenda, submitted in December 2021, the Syrian Arab Republic suggested holding a preliminary meeting in Beirut. Since then, as Council members were previously informed, communication between the focal points in charge of the preparations for the meeting between the Director- General and the Syrian Minister has been reinitiated by the Technical Secretariat, and the Syrian Arab Republic has responded.”
2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9235 (2023) · source
“I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet provided sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection in November 2018 of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities. Neither has it received the information requested from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the unauthorized movement of the two cylinders related to the chemical-weapon incident in Douma on 7 April 2018 that were destroyed in an attack on a chemical-weapon production facility. I call on the Syrian Arab Republic to respond with urgency to all of the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s requests.”
2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9235 (2023) · source
“The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains fully committed to ensuring the complete implementation by the Syrian Arab Republic of all its declaration requirements and to assisting Syria in fulfilling its obligations under the Convention, the OPCW policymaking organs’ decisions and resolution 2118 (2013). I want to take this opportunity to reiterate the High Representative’s support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the OPCW’s work. With regard to the inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre, I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat will continue to plan the next round of inspections, to be held in 2023.”
2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9235 (2023) · source
“It is my understanding that the Syrian Arab Republic has welcomed the intention by the OPCW Technical Secretariat to send a reduced team and has requested supplementary information in order to make the necessary arrangements. Full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing all outstanding issues. As has been stressed many times before, due to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.”
2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9235 (2023) · source
“As Council members were previously informed, the OPCW Technical Secretariat provided the Syrian Arab Republic with the list of pending declarations and other documents requested by the DAT since 2019, with the aim of assisting the Syrian Arab Republic in resolving the current 20 outstanding issues. However, I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received the requested information from the Syrian Arab Republic. Due to this situation, and in pursuit of its ongoing efforts to implement its mandate, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has informed the Syrian National Authority of its intention to send a reduced team to conduct limited in-country activities in the Syrian Arab Republic from 17 to 22 January.”
2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9235 (2023) · source
“Since the Council’s previous consideration of this matter (see S/PV.9207), and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to resolution 2118 (2013). Efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations of the Syrian Arab Republic have not progressed since the Council previously met on this matter. Unfortunately, all efforts by the OPCW Technical Secretariat to organize the next round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority continue to be unsuccessful.”
2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9235 (2023) · source
“Mr. Ebo: I thank Security Council members for the opportunity to brief them on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. I am conducting this briefing on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, who is currently away from the office. I would like to take this opportunity to welcome the new non-permanent members of the Council — Ecuador, Japan, Malta, Mozambique and Switzerland. The High Representative looks forward to working closely with all of them on this important issue.”
2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9235 (2023) · source
“The Convention’s upcoming ninth Review Conference in November and December this year presents the ideal opportunity for its States parties to comprehensively strengthen the Convention.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.” The Convention does not provide any guidance on the type of investigation that the Council may initiate. States parties have also not developed any specific guidance or procedures concerning the modalities to be employed the purposes of an article VI investigation. Should the Council initiate an investigation, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to support it. As High Representative Nakamitsu has mentioned previously, the operations and institutional structures of the BWC must be further bolstered to ensure it is properly equipped and resourced to face future challenges.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“The provisions of article VI have not been invoked since entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention. Article VI of the Biological Weapons Convention states the following: “(1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. “(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“Additionally, the meeting heard national statements from 42 States parties and one signatory State. There then followed an opportunity to respond for the Russian Federation, the United States and Ukraine. States parties welcomed the fact that the delegations of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States had sought to clarify their positions with respect to the issue at hand. States parties noted that the consultation was fully in conformity with the conclusions of the final document of the third Review Conference relevant to the application of article V of the Convention. The formal consultative meeting concluded with States parties adopting a report agreeing that “No consensus was reached regarding the outcome of the formal consultative meeting”, The adoption of the report marked the end of the formal consultation process.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“The formal consultative meeting opened on Friday, 26 August 2022 for a brief procedural meeting. It then resumed its business on Monday, 5 September, for a period of four days, and was chaired by Ambassador György Molnár of Hungary. The meeting heard the presentation by the Russian Federation of its article V consultation request regarding respective outstanding questions by the Russian Federation to the United States and Ukraine concerning the fulfilment of their respective obligations under the Convention in the context of the operation of biological laboratories in Ukraine. The meeting also heard the response by the delegations of Ukraine and the United States. Each delegation then made further statements amplifying points raised in their statements.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“As High Representative Nakamitsu has previously stated in the Council, the relevant instrument of international law is the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which effectively prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons. The Russian Federation and Ukraine are both States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention. On 29 June, Russia submitted a request for the convening of a formal consultative meeting under article V of the BWC and the Final Declarations of the Convention’s second and third Review Conferences. In accordance with the agreed timelines, an informal meeting to discuss the arrangements for the formal meeting took place in Geneva on 27 July, chaired by Ambassador Aidan Liddle of the United Kingdom.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“Mr. Ebo: We are aware that the Russian Federation has filed an official complaint, in line with the provisions of article VI of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), regarding allegations of biological weapons programmes in Ukraine. As High Representative Nakamitsu informed the Council in March and May, the United Nations is not aware of any such biological weapons programmes. That remains the case today. I would also like to note that the United Nations currently has neither the mandate nor the technical or operational capacity to investigate that information.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source