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Elaraby

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1992-01-06
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2015-10-22
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un-security-council

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  1. Mr. Elaraby (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): Mr. President, I take pleasure in conveying to you at the outset my congratulations on your accession to the presidency of the Security Council during the month of May. I am sure that, under your presidency, and with your long experience as a diplomat, the Council will be able to discharge its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. I should also like to thank most sincerely Ambassador Kovanda of the Czech Republic for discharging his responsibility as President of the Security Council last month with such great wisdom. Only a few years ago the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East was but a distant dream. Today, after the historic reconciliation between Palestine and Israel, that dream has come closer to realization.

    1995-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3536 (1995) · source

  2. In point of fact, the adoption of this draft will not in any way strengthen the NPT regime. As it stands today, the draft is, regrettably, insufficient in both form and substance.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  3. We noted with appreciation the statement of the Permanent Representative of France in the Conference on Disarmament on 6 April 1995 that the draft resolution "constitutes a first in many respects, and reflects our intention to meet the expectations of the international community globally, collectively and specifically." (S/1995/264, annex, p. 3) In our View, the only global, collective and specific assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. My delegation therefore does not subscribe to the view that the draft resolution provides the non-nuclear-weapon States with the required and long-awaited credible security assurances to which they are entitled as a result of their renunciation of the nuclear option.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  4. However, one cannot help but wonder whether the adoption of such a draft resolution by the Security Council would suffice to dispel the wide scepticism about its credibility, which will have detrimental repercussions on the future success of the Treaty as a whole. This is not to suggest that the Security Council is not the right forum to enunciate such assurances. On the contrary, it is perhaps the course dictated by the Charter. However, it is self-evident that the crux of the security assurances is, and will remain, not who issues the assurances but what their contents are. In conclusion, my delegation appreciates the efforts exerted by the sponsors to improve the text of the draft resolution. We must stress, however, that the draft resolution before us should not represent the end of the road, but rather the beginning.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  5. It is obvious that the timing of the submission of the draft resolution has a certain significance. The rush of the sponsors to secure its adoption one week before the start of the NPT Review and Extension Conference no doubt aims at tilting the balance towards their most preferred outcome for the Conference. Thus, the Security Council is scheduled to vote today on a most important draft resolution with a direct bearing on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all non-nuclear-weapon States, without allowing adequate time for broad consultations between all the concerned parties. In point of fact, due to the far-reaching consequences of the draft resolution, its adoption should have been preceded by wide-ranging consultations and even a reasonable period of sober reflection.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  6. In the light of what I have said, it is evident that the draft resolution now before the Council lacks the following essential principles: first, a prior determination that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security; secondly, a trigger mechanism to ensure Security Council response to threats or attacks by nuclear weapons; thirdly, a commitment by the Security Council, as stated in the Charter: "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". I have expressed Egypt's position on the substance of the draft resolution. Allow me now to touch very briefly on the time factor.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  7. Unfortunately, current efforts by the five members of the Security Council to update resolution 255 (1968) have completely bypassed any dialogue with the non-nuclear-weapon States, which are the prime beneficiaries and the constituency for security assurances, and have thereby resulted in a draft resolution which addresses only one of the foregoing elements, namely assistance - as if the Security Council's role in this matter is not to anticipate a nuclear threat but, rather, to expect a nuclear accident similar to the one in Chernobyl.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  8. In this context it is appropriate to point out that at the 1991 session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure the Non-Nuclear States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Egypt submitted a paper on security assurances which sought to update and enhance resolution 255 (1968) and called for the initiation of a process of collective or individual consultations on security assurances. That was five years ago.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  9. Operative paragraphs 5 and 6 invite Member States of the United Nations to provide assistance to any State that is victim of an act of aggression by nuclear weapons and recognize the right of any such victim to compensation from the aggressor. These are definitely positive elements and represent a welcome improvement on resolution 255 (1968). We are not, however, persuaded that the formula in the joint draft resolution before us offers the non-nuclear- weapon States all that can now be devised, or even all that is due, to deter the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In all candour, the draft falls short of the general expectations.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  10. The fourth and last element is assistance. It is imperative to clarify and specify the scope and nature of assistance and compensation to be provided to any non- nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT that is a victim or object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. In this context, it should be recognized that assistance must be comprehensive and reparation mandatory. The draft resolution has expanded the technical assistance aspects. It remains silent, however, on the political remedial assistance needed to defend the victim. However, in our View, the draft resolution before us contains three positive elements: It is endorsed by all the permanent members of the Council. It addresses the element of technical assistance in a more comprehensive manner than resolution 255 (1968), albeit in voluntary language.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  11. The element of genuine protection must also be clearly enunciated in the form of a mechanism for enforcement of the security assurances which would indicate the mandatory action to be adopted by the Council to redress a situation where a non- nuclear-weapon State was the object of a nuclear attack or threat of an attack. It is axiomatic that the magnitude in the degree of devastation and destruction by nuclear weapons necessitates a proportionate elevation of the Security Council's response. It has to be abundantly clear that the territorial integrity and the political independence of any non-nuclear-weapon State, as well as the survival of its population, will be guaranteed as a matter of right and not as a recognition of an interest - whether or not we term it legitimate - to receive security assurances.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  12. If the resolution is to have any deterrent effect on a would-be aggressor, it must contain an explicit reference to the fact that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and shall automatically trigger an immediate response by the Security Council in conformity with Article 39 of the Charter and in a manner consistent with the substance and the spirit of the relevant Articles of Chapter VII. The effectiveness of the deterrent hinges on spelling out the precise dimensions of the response of the Council. The third element is protection.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  13. The rationale and philosophy of the draft resolution under consideration are based on the assumption that the potential nuclear threat is not expected to come from any of the permanent five, which have solemnly offered not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The draft resolution therefore is directed toward a threat emanating from a non-NPT party or perhaps an NPT party which violates its NPT obligations and develops nuclear weapons. This fact poses a legitimate question: why is this important draft resolution "vetoable"? It is our considered view that this particular draft resolution should undoubtedly be beyond the scope of application of the veto in order to ensure its credibility. The second element is deterrence.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  14. Moreover, attention must be drawn to a most grave factor, namely, the fact that the Council's response to a nuclear threat is subject to the regular voting procedure provided for under the Charter, specifically in the provisions of paragraph 3 of its Article 27, which pertains to the concurring votes of the five permanent members. The magnitude of the unprecedented and unparalleled devastation nuclear weapons can cause necessitates a degree of automaticity if credibility is to be conferred. Therefore, it should be clearly spelled out that a nuclear threat shall be deterred and that the victims shall be protected, assisted and defended in a clearly defined manner commensurate with gravity of the nuclear threat.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  15. Experience has shown that it is no easy matter to repress a conventional armed attack. A conventional attack, however, has a limited scope; it does not entail the total destruction and massive annihilation that a nuclear one does. When a conventional attack occurs, one can swallow a response confined to "bringing the matter to the attention of the Council" and to "seeking Council action to provide necessary assistance". But a threat or use of nuclear weapons to wage war should unleash the collective security system, set out in Chapter VII of the Charter, in order to repel the aggression.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  16. Under paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter, "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State ..." Accordingly, whenever a State threatens another with conventional weapons, the Security Council is duty-bound to take effective collective measures for the removal of the threat and the suppression of the aggression, as stipulated in paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Charter. This Charter injunction, as we all know, addresses conventional weapons, be they cannons, bullets or missiles, or even bows, arrows and spears. The Council's response must draw a clear distinction between the nuclear and the conventional threats. Failure to distinguish can only undermine the credibility of the whole edifice.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  17. Until the NPT becomes universal, the danger of proliferation will steadily increase with the passage of time. With this premise in mind, my delegation, in its consideration of the proposed resolution, is guided by four basic principles: credibility, deterrence, protection and assistance. I shall address each of these elements. Firstly, credibility. Any resolution must capture and accurately reflect the magnitude of the nuclear threat which, as I said earlier, was unforeseen and unimagined by the authors of the Charter. Any distinction between a nuclear threat and a conventional threat must be amplified in no uncertain terms.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  18. Today, as the Security Council ponders the adoption of a new resolution which aims to provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, and as we are about to embark, next week, on the process of reviewing the NPT and securing its preservation in the most suitable manner, we must also remind ourselves that any system of security assurances must be measured - and measured carefully - on the basis of its effectiveness and its credibility. This is the spirit in which my delegation approaches the question of security assurances. Security assurances, to be worthy of the name, must be designed and structured in such a manner as to cover the exigencies of our contemporary world and at the same time anticipate the developments of the future. They must meet the security needs of the world not only for today but also for tomorrow.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  19. To this end, Egypt became the first to submit proposals, to the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT and the Conference on Disarmament in 1990, to update the substance of resolution 255 by expanding the nature and scope of application of security assurances, and by ensuring that they are enunciated in an international instrument, of a legally binding nature, that would ensure a response by the Security Council to any attack or threat of attack against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT. Egypt's record confirms that its position on security assurances has throughout been both consistent and persistent.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  20. Nor did it indicate the scope and nature of assistance to be provided to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT that fell victim to a nuclear attack or threat of such an attack. The unilateral declarations issued at that time by the three nuclear-weapons States were, in essence, statements of intent with no binding assurances to provide for their application or to prevent their withdrawal. They stated that nuclear aggression would create a qualitatively new situation but, in effect, did not provide any corresponding, qualitatively new procedures, over and above the provisions of the Charter itself, for dealing with such a grave threat. In light of these shortcomings, non-nuclear-weapon States continued to strive for more effective, more comprehensive and more binding assurances for their security.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  21. The NPT was finally adopted by the General Assembly in May 1968 without a clause on security assurances. One month later, Security Council resolution 255 (1968) was adopted in conjunction with unilateral declarations by three nuclear-weapon States. However, resolution 255 was from the very outset defective and disappointing. It was widely considered inadequate, since it did not extend genuine security to non-nuclear-weapon States, nor did it and the accompanying declarations add anything new to what had already been provided for in the Charter. In point of fact, resolution 255 failed to demonstrate any effective element of deterrence to a would-be aggressor or to provide protection to a Victim of aggression.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  22. When negotiations began on elaborating a treaty to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the mid-1960s, many States held the view that a clause on both negative and positive security assurances must form an integral part of any such treaty. Indeed, the Egyptian delegation has consistently strived, throughout the years, to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States would be adequately protected. As far back as October 1967, during the negotiations for the elaboration of the NPT, Egypt submitted, at the 18-nation Disarmament Committee, a draft article to be incorporated in the proposed text of the NPT. Notwithstanding the initiative by Egypt and many other non-nuclear-weapon States, the efforts to incorporate a security assurance in the text of the NPT were unsuccessful.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  23. Moreover, the NPT relies for its implementation on the strict application of comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, which are themselves inadequate and need to be strengthened, updated and improved. Consequently, the nuclear-weapon States have a definite obligation to demonstrate to non-nuclear- weapon States parties to the NPT that their security will not in any way be endangered by the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and to extend genuine protection and assistance in the event that this security is threatened. A brief survey of the genesis of the concept of security assurances is in order.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  24. In this context, it was imperative politically and even psychologically to assign the highest priority to attaining general and complete disarmament. It was also for the purpose of preserving peace and security in the world that efforts were directed at limiting the possibilities of nuclear confrontation. Only the five permanent members of the Security Council were exempted from the ban on obtaining nuclear weapons. In return, non-nuclear-weapon States were to be offered guarantees that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. It is indeed regrettable that, 25 years after the entry into force of the NPT, it has not yet acquired universality. General and complete disarmament remains a faraway and even an elusive objective.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  25. It is relevant to recall that the Charter was conceived and concluded before the advent of the nuclear era; hence, the perils of the nuclear age were unforeseen and perhaps unimagined by the authors of the Charter. This explains the absence of measures commensurate with the qualitatively higher threats posed by nuclear weapons to international peace and security. The advent of the atomic bomb fundamentally altered the nature of the world in which the United Nations would have to function, modified the attitude that had been expressed in the Charter towards disarmament, and firmly established the elimination of nuclear weapons as the primary concern of all endeavours pertaining to the survival of life on our planet.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  26. The Charter, in its Article 26, specifically confers upon the Security Council the crucially important task of formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. The elaboration and adoption of credible security assurances would fall squarely within the ambit of the mandate assigned to the Council. When the General Assembly was debating the adoption of the NPT in 1968, Egypt's Permanent Representative stated in unequivocal terms that the non- nuclear Powers that signed the Treaty without a firm guarantee from the major nuclear Powers would be undermining and even jeopardizing their very existence as sovereign States.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  27. Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of office. The delegation of Egypt is confident that your able leadership will benefit the Security Council in its deliberations on this important issue. I should also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing, the Permanent Representative of China, for his commendable contributions during the month of March. The Permanent Representative of Indonesia will be speaking shortly on behalf of the non-aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We have seen his text and my delegation shares his views. This meeting of the Security Council is of the utmost importance. What is really at stake is the ability of the Council to discharge its primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security.

    1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source

  28. Pious rhetoric alone will not provide a solution; the path forwards must be paved with actual deeds, not high- flown words. We hope that the Security Council will succeed in sounding a warning against these dangers and will find a way to avert them.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  29. Israel's responsibilities do not end with the respect for the principles of international law and international conventions; it goes beyond that: Israel has responsibility for preventing the collapse of the peace process and saving it from certain doom. The widespread optimism that followed the world- famous handshake on the White House lawn has begun to dissipate in light of the deadlock in the negotiations. We are in a vicious circle of frustration, and this is leading to extremism and Violence. We must end this tragic cycle: no peace effort can be successful so long as the practices of the past are recrudescing the present. The Security Council must take a decisive step to reaffirm the need to respect international commitments and for all parties to implement their commitments to the last letter.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  30. The widespread support for the peace process has been associated in the public mind with increasing hopes for the restoration of land and rights and for an end to the shedding of innocent blood, not to mention the initiation of regional cooperation and arms control and the development of the economies of the countries of the region with a View to raising their peoples' standards of living. There can be no doubt that, with each day that passes without tangible progress towards fulfilling these aspirations, support for the anti-peace camps on both sides will only increase. Israel is being called upon today, more than at any time in the past, to respect its obligations as the occupying Power.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  31. The Israeli Government should respect its international commitments and immediately put an end to all construction and establishment of settlements under whatever guise and under whatever name. Egypt has exerted great efforts to prevent the current crisis from leading to a collapse of the ongoing negotiations, and so convoked the quadripartite Cairo summit on 2 February and joined the four-Power meeting of Foreign Ministers in Washington on 12 February last. Towards the same end and in the same earnest desire to safeguard the peace process, Egypt supported the appeal to the Security Council to consider decreeing a halt to Israeli settlement activity.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  32. Under these comprehensive and binding rules, no party can argue that any bilateral agreement, of whatever kind, allows it to deny the right of the international community to discharge its fundamental responsibility for guaranteeing the implementation of these basic rules that have become firmly established within the international community. The Security Council is called upon to shoulder its responsibilities and to take the necessary steps to impose respect for international Conventions and follow up the implementation of the relevant resolutions. This means that the Council must send a clear and unambiguous message to Israel that Israeli settlement activity is a grave legal violation that will also abort the peace negotiations.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  33. The question of settlements in the occupied territories is very important politically and legally: on the one hand, the policy of establishing settlements is that contradiction to the concept and philosophy of peace because it constitutes a rejection in practice of the "land for peace formula" which is the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). On the legal side, there is a consensus in the international community that there exist preemptory norms of international law better known as jus cogens. These norms cannot be violated, and one of them is the Fourth Geneva Convention.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  34. This is a collective international responsibility: all States parties to the Conventions bear responsibility for verifying their implementation, as is stated explicitly in article 1 of the Fourth Convention: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances." Hence, the members of the Security Council, permanent as well as non-permanent members, as parties to the Geneva Conventions, bear a joint responsibility, that is clear and specific, to secure respect for the provisions of the Conventions.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  35. Therefore, Israeli settlement activity has become one of the main instruments for demolishing the peace process and constitutes yet another argument for those who misdoubt its outcome. Indeed, on the Israeli side, the enemies of peace are exploiting the question of settlements in order to ensure that they can foil any chance of success in the peace negotiations. In confronting the crisis currently facing the peace efforts, and in View of the lack of a decisive and comprehensive Israeli commitment to ending settlement activities, recourse to the Security Council has become necessary in order to secure respect for the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  36. Israel is committed to making no alterations that would affect these negotiations. This commitment, which is in keeping with Israel's status as the occupying Power, will continue so long as the occupation continues. It cannot be shirked unilaterally by the occupying Power. The Israeli Government has declared its policy vis-a- vis settlement activity. We have all been waiting to hear about this new policy and have heard that there are many restrictions. Regrettably, these turned out to be essentially illusory ones, with wide loopholes. The exclusion of Jerusalem, from the restrictions, and now that its boundaries have been extended to cover approximately a quarter of the West Bank, allows the expansion of existing settlements and has in practice led to the construction of thousands of new units.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  37. 6) In the same paragraph the Security Council strongly condemns "the continuation and persistence of Israel in pursuing those policies and practices and calls upon the Government of Israel to rescind those measures [and] to dismantle the existing settlements." Thirdly - and this was mentioned a few minutes ago by the Ambassador of Israel - Israel, in the Declaration of Principles, agreed to engage in the final-status negotiations on the questions of settlements, Jerusalem, boundaries and refugees. This text applies to the existing settlements. The objective is very clear - to decide the future of these settlements. But the scope of the text cannot in any way be expanded under the pretext that the wording is flexible and permits the establishment of new settlements in the occupied territories.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  38. Here I refer merely to resolution 465 (1980), which reaffirms "that Israel's policy and practice of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East". (resolution 465 (1980), para. 5) The resolution "calls upon Israel to cease the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem". (ibid., para.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  39. Suffice it to mention briefly the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, resolution 465 (1980) and the Declaration of Principles, all of which categorically forbid Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories as one of the means of altering the natural political and demographic situation in those territories. First, the Fourth Geneva Convention, in article 49, categorically prohibits the occupying Power from deporting or transferring any of its civilian population to the territories under its occupation. Secondly, the Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  40. Egypt has assisted and continues to assist the two parties to arrive at an agreement in this regard. Regrettably, however, Israel has so far failed to honour its pledges. Indeed, the problems that confront the peace process have become more grave. Israel has responsibilities as the occupying Power. This status places upon it duties and limitations based on international humanitarian law - something that is reaffirmed by previous categorical and decisive resolutions of the Security Council and, indeed, by the very pledges of Israel itself.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  41. We all expected the practices of expanding Israeli settlements to be abandoned. These practices certainly run counter to the new atmosphere obtaining in the region. The two parties - the Palestinians and the Israelis - have agreed on specific steps that represent a transitional period leading to negotiations for a final settlement. The first step - which has indeed been taken - is the withdrawal of Israel from Gaza and Jericho. Both parties also agreed upon the redeployment of Israeli forces outside the Arab cities in the occupied Palestinian territories as a prelude to Palestinian elections in an atmosphere of freedom, including freedom from the repression of the military occupation authorities, so that Palestinian authority might be extended to all occupied territories.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  42. There is no doubt that these positive developments are merely limited steps, which do not yet lead to a comprehensive and just peace in the area. Any observer of the history of the Middle East conflict will no doubt realize the magnitude of the historic accomplishment that has been realized since the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference. The Middle East has undoubtedly entered a new phase following the signing of the Declaration of Principles and the historic meeting in Washington in September 1993, after which the Middle East and the world at large had a feeling of optimism that the language of negotiation and respect for international law and commitments would replace aggression, Violence and occupation as a basis for relationships in this area, whose peoples have languished under the burden of wars and conflict.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  43. The importance of the issue is greater now because the new atmosphere in the Middle East, which heralded the dawn of a new era in the history of the region, compels the cessation of anything that could lead to a return to the practices of the past. The peace process, which began at the Madrid Conference three years ago, has seen its fruits effectively ripen. We were able, in the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel, to arrive at mutual recognition. This was followed by many agreements and steps by both parties to implement the Declaration. The peace process also led to the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel, which put an end to the state of war between the two States. Regrettably, similar progress has not so far been made on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks of the negotiations.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  44. Mr. Elaraby (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): Mr. President, I have pleasure at the outset in commending your wise leadership, which reflects your judgement and your lengthy diplomatic experience. I am also happy to extend my thanks to Ambassador Emilio Ca'rdenas for his excellent leadership last month. This is not the first time the Security Council has been seized of the question of Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories. On previous occasions the Council has taken a decisive stand on this issue, which is of vital importance to, and has a direct impact on, the peace process in the Middle East.

    1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505 (1995) · source

  45. The Council should have prior consultations with countries that may be affected by the sanctions and must be able to review and assess the desired political impact of the sanctions and to minimize their collateral damage. We believe that the General Assembly should address this issue and consider adopting appropriate measures to alleviate the negative effects that have afflicted many countries. In conclusion, we share the Secretary-General's call for fresh thinking, for striving together and creating new ways to overcome crises. The world that emerged after the end the cold war may still be in transition. The new age, however, holds great promise for both peace and development and we should exert every effort to fulfil that promise.

    1995-01-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption2 (1995) · source

  46. He has rightly emphasized the need to examine this important issue, which directly affects other countries neighbouring the targeted country - if one can call a country a targeted country - and, in particular, the vulnerable sectors of the population of these countries. He has suggested that a mechanism be established for assessing, monitoring and measuring the effects of sanctions, that ways be explored of assisting Member States that are suffering collateral damage, and that the sanctions be lifted as soon as they have achieved their intended purposes. We welcome the Secretary-General's suggestions in this regard. Egypt has long called for the full implementation of Article 50 of the Charter. We strongly believe that the responsibility of the Security Council does not stop at imposing sanctions.

    1995-01-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption2 (1995) · source

  47. Regrettably, some States continue to decline to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is due for review and extension this year. Egypt has repeatedly advocated the universality of the NPT - the only way to guarantee its viability and its credibility in the future. We therefore call on all parties, especially the five permanent members of the Security Council, to spare no effort to attain this goal, thereby strengthening international as well as regional security and facilitating the possibilities of extending the NPT. The Secretary-General has referred in his report to the possible ramifications of sanctions.

    1995-01-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption2 (1995) · source

  48. The debate that preceded the adoption of the Security Council presidential statement on strengthening the arrangements for consultations is a good indication of how strongly Member States feel about this issue. At the Security Council summit meeting in 1992, the Council underscored the interest in and concern for disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, with special reference to weapons of mass destruction, the most devastating of which are the nuclear weapons. The Secretary-General, however, was not able to report any tangible achievements in the field of nuclear non- proliferation and nuclear disarmament, an issue which has enjoyed unanimous international support and the highest priority since the adoption of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978.

    1995-01-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption2 (1995) · source

  49. What the Secretary-General calls a rapid reaction force may be a far-reaching proposal inspired by the idea of a United Nations army. In our View, any such arrangements should, however, be set up according to the Charter's provisions and following wide consultations. While we support the principle of the unity of command and the necessity for a peace-keeping operation to function as an integrated whole, it is equally important to consult with the troop-contributing countries. Such consultations should be undertaken in accordance with the spirit of the provisions of Article 44 of the Charter by institutionalizing the consultations with troop-contributing countries as an integral part of the decision-making process on any peace-keeping operation.

    1995-01-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption2 (1995) · source

  50. The report has accurately cited the difficulties facing enforcement by the United Nations or by a group of Member States entrusted by the Security Council to implement such actions. When adopting enforcement measures the Council should strictly follow the Charter's provisions under Chapter VII. Expanding the definition of what may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and consequently justify enforcement measures, could have a negative impact on the Organization's stature and on its credibility. The same is true when the political will to enforce peace is missing while an abusive aggression is being witnessed by the whole world. The Secretary-General' s report contains very ambitious plans to make troops and equipment available to mandated peace-keeping operations.

    1995-01-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3492Resumption2 (1995) · source