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Elaraby

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1992-01-06
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2015-10-22
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un-security-council

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  1. I have set out Egypt's View of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is shared by all the States members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina. We deem it extremely important that the role of the Security Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina not be confined to the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite its valiant efforts contributing to the stabilization of the situation, or to the efforts of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) to restructure the local police. All these efforts are clearly reflected in the report before the Council today. We feel that it is imperative that the Security Council set a number of guidelines to address the aforementioned problems in coordination with the Peace Implementation Council in Bosnia.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  2. What is currently impeding the reconstruction and development of Bosnia and Herzegovina are considerations of political control over the economy, as well as the lack of a minimum degree of transparency on economic questions. This is undoubtedly the result of the lack of trust among the various parties. The reconstruction efforts must therefore be linked to the responsiveness of the parties to the political efforts being made. This year's General Assembly resolution on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has sent the correct message by linking economic assistance to the responsiveness of the parties to efforts to achieve a political settlement. It is our hope that this will lead to improved responsiveness to those political efforts.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  3. In this framework, the efforts for reconstruction and economic development must be given high priority within the struggle to reunite Bosnia, in the context not only of implementing the Dayton Agrement, but also of the international community's unrelenting efforts to help Bosnia. The donors honoured their pledge of $1.8 billion in 1996; they have also pledged $1.24 billion for 1997. And yet, Republika Srpska's refusal to attend the annual donors' conference and to respond to the efforts for integration and unification raises serious questions about the intentions of this entity at this complex stage of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  4. As concerns the formation of the common institutions, Egypt has closely followed the results of the various meetings of the Peace Implementation Council, the most recent of which was in Bonn on 9 and 10 of this month. We would reiterate once again that the triumph of the forces of reunification will depend to a great extent on the creation of the common institutions. It is not logical, for instance, to speak of reunification at a time when there are no direct telephone contacts between the Federation and Republika Srpska; when there is no common currency; when laws of citizenship have yet to be enacted; when there is no economic capacity to create these institutions; and in an environment that does not provide the necessary freedom of movement.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  5. However, Republika Srpska continues to refuse to make the deep cuts necessary to comply with the provisions of that Agreement, casting doubt on its military intentions, especially in View of the fact that the Federation's military capabilities remain far below the maximum established by the Agreement. In this regard, the fears and concerns expressed by Republika Srpska vis-a-vis the equipment and training programme are unjustified if it has the political will to reconcile and avoid military confrontations. The Security Council therefore bears a special responsibility for the implementation of this part of the Dayton Agreement, not only to prevent the eruption of conflict in this region in the future, but also within the context of exercising its Charter responsibility for the regulation of armaments.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  6. Therefore, the need has become urgent to take decisive measures, the most important of which is the recision of the ethnically based property laws throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and the organization of a swift return of refugees and displaced persons to their original homes, and not - I emphasize "not" - to any other place that they might be compelled to go to. Human rights, freedom of movement and freedom of the press throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina - which have assumed increasing importance with the passage of time - must be fully respected and guaranteed. I turn now to the implementation of the military and regional stability provisions of the Dayton Agreement. The date set for the implementation of the second phase of arms reduction under the Agreement on Subregional Arms Control was 31 October 1997.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  7. Of a total of more than 2 million displaced persons at the end of the hostilities, only 381,000 - 171,000 refugees and 210,000 displaced persons - have returned to their homes. Until now, there has not been an opportunity for the rest of the refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes. Despite the relative success of the open cities plan launched by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, a plan that contributes to the delivery of economic aid to the refugees and the internally displaced persons at their current places of residence, and despite the comprehensive plan adopted by the international community for the return of large numbers of refugees, the political obstacles impeding the implementation of these plans remains great.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  8. However, this cannot come about without the full implementation of the results of the elections and in a manner that permits the reunification of that entity. In this regard, the international community must pursue an approach that links economic aid on the one hand and the achievement of the desired political objectives on the other, especially in Republika Srpska. The implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Agreement concerning the voluntary, free and safe return of refugees and displaced persons, particularly in minority areas, has become a disappointing and discouraging process. This process makes it clear that the excessive attention accorded to the political aspects of the Dayton Agreement at the expense of the humanitarian and ethnic aspects carries with it an inherent danger that threatens peace entirely in Bosnia.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  9. The constitutional crisis that took place in the Republika Srpska caused the international community grave concern. It has proved that the lack of supervision of the implementation of the Peace Agreement and leaving the war criminals at large could lead to more separation rather than unification. The de facto division of that Entity into two parts, one administered from Pale and the other from Banja Luka, is concrete evidence of the results of such a situation, particularly in View of the clear struggle for power to which some war criminals are parties. In spite all this, the parliamentary election held last November brought a glimmer of hope. It is our hope that it will lead to a rectification of the situation.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  10. A thorough analysis of the statistics I have just mentioned and of the fact that major suspects, including Karadzic and Mladic, continue to be at large and even continue to exert a great deal of political influence, leads us to state that the peace process in Bosnia will not continuously progress without the apprehension of those indictees, and that the reconciliation process will not succeed without their being tried. The Security Council bears a historic responsibility at this important juncture to mandate SFOR and the force to succeed it in the future to pursue the war criminals and bring them to trial. The Council also has the additional responsibility of providing the Tribunal with the necessary financial support in order to enable it to discharge its tasks with the requisite dispatch and efficiency.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  11. This is particularly so because out of a total of 78 indictees, only 20 have been apprehended: 14 Croats, three Bosnians and three Serbs. Only two of them have been tried and sentenced. Five more are currently being tried in two different cases. It is also noteworthy here that the Bosnians were the only party that extradited all the indictees under their jurisdiction - all three of them - and that Croatia has displayed a great deal of good faith. The Republika Srpska is the only party that, until now, refuses to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal. Out of 57 Serbian indictees, only three have been apprehended, which means that a good number continues to be at large.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  12. However, a thorough analysis of the balance of the implementation of the provisions of the Peace Agreement makes it clear that, despite the progress made, that implementation, in some fields, continues to be lagging to a degree which causes concern, indeed fear, that the entire Peace Agreement might collapse. It is noteworthy that the progress made recently in implementation of the Agreement is closely linked to the efforts made to deal with and settle the question of war crimes. Despite the difficulty of dealing with this problem, the fact that the Stabilization Force (SFOR) on 10 July 1997 did apprehend one of the indicted war criminals, and the fact that yesterday evening it also apprehended two Croatian war criminals, has proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that SFOR is indeed capable of dealing with this question.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  13. This responsibility extends to include following up on the implementation of all peace agreements in all conflict areas with a view to ensuring that no setbacks occur in such areas and also to monitor the effective and balanced implementation of the provisions of these agreements in order to ensure the interests of all concerned parties in achieving security, stability and peace. Our general debate today assumes a special importance in View of the fact that it is being held in positive circumstances of attaining many achievements in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Foremost among these are probably the presidential elections, followed by the municipal elections and other elections of legislative bodies. All these are indications that the implementation of the Dayton Agreement is proceeding in the right direction in some fields.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  14. Mr. Elaraby (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): It gives me great pleasure to preface my statement by welcoming your Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, as President of this Council. Costa Rica is a State that has constantly made constructive contributions in support of the edifice of world peace. The Security Council meets today to discuss and evaluate the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the framework of the Council's discharge of its primary responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  15. In view of the foregoing - and taking into account the importance of renewing the validity of this resolution, given its urgent humanitarian nature, as well as the additions to its provisions, which have become more balanced, and which affirm that the Council will consider the situation once again when it receives the supplementary report of the Secretary-General at the end of January - the delegation of Egypt will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

    1997-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3840 (1997) · source

  16. But the negotiations yesterday and today, during which all delegations showed a high degree of flexibility, have made it clear that there is an agreement to deal with this question by increasing revenues from oil sales, as well as to adopt the necessary procedures to develop and improve the working methods of the sanctions Committee and the Secretariat in a manner that would ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief in order to meet the needs of the Iraqi people in parallel with oil sales. This must be implemented when the supplementary report of the Secretary-General, expected at the end of January, is available, in order to allow Iraq to make full use of this programme.

    1997-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3840 (1997) · source

  17. In the light of the recommendations of the Secretary- General, and taking into account the urgent humanitarian nature of this question, the delegation of Egypt had hoped that the draft resolution before us today would reflect a preliminary agreement by the members of the Security Council to increase the amount of oil that Iraq would be allowed to sell in order to deal with the urgent humanitarian needs, and that the extent of this increase would be considered in the light of the supplementary report of the Secretary-General on this question.

    1997-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3840 (1997) · source

  18. Benon Sevan, to formulate recommendations that would ensure provision of the necessary goods at the appropriate time without obstacles, to address concerns over processing and supply issues, and to devise a new system to clearly identify interrelated applications and then bring them to the attention of the Security Council Committee. We also welcome the Secretary-General's intention to provide as soon as possible a supplementary report containing the results of a study of the situation, as well as concrete recommendations, in order to achieve the ultimate objectives of resolution 986 (1995) and the subsequent resolution.

    1997-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3840 (1997) · source

  19. All of these obstacles prevent the achievement of the careful balance that must be struck between the Iraqi oil sales, which of course are not an end in themselves, and meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, which is the ultimate objective for which we are all striving. The delegation of Egypt welcomes the recommendations made by the Secretary-General in his recent report on these two problems. First, he recommends that the Security Council re-examine the adequacy of the revenues envisaged in resolutions 986 (1995) and 1111 (1997) and consider the possibility of increasing those revenues in order to meet Iraq's priority humanitarian requirements. Egypt strongly supports this recommendation. Secondly, the Secretary-General directs the United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, headed by its Executive Director, Mr.

    1997-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3840 (1997) · source

  20. First, the financial resources resulting from sales of $2 billion worth of Iraqi oil every six months are insufficient to deal with the severe humanitarian crisis the people of Iraq are suffering. Secondly, the implementation of phases I and II of the oil-for-food programme has led to financial accumulations from oil sales in the escrow account, which, according to the latest estimate, have reached more than $300 million, while contracts for the purchase of humanitarian supplies for the people of Iraq are being scuttled by the slow pace of proceedings in the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 661 (1990) or as a result of routine financial procedures.

    1997-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3840 (1997) · source

  21. Mr. Elaraby (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): The delegation of Egypt would like at the outset to express its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his comprehensive and lucid report on the implementation of phase II of resolution 986 (1995), known as the oil-for- food resolution. The report clearly and sincerely records the Iraqi people's continued suffering as a result of the sanctions. It also reflects, even more starkly, the insufficiency of the financial resources being devoted to alleviating the suffering of the Iraqi people and the shortcomings of the procedure being followed in the implementation of this ambitious programme. A close examination of the implementation of the provisions of resolutions 986 (1995) and 1111 (1997) leads to several conclusions that can be summed up as follows.

    1997-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3840 (1997) · source

  22. Finally, we recognize that the reference made in the draft resolution to special arrangements accorded to the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) will not constitute a precedent for other operations of the same nature which the United Nations may deal with in the future. In accordance with our understanding, such arrangements arise from the particular nature of the current situation in Haiti at this time, and the requirements of dealing with it. Accordingly, Egypt will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

    1997-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3837 (1997) · source

  23. Therefore, the efforts of the United Nations Development Programme, as well as those of other United Nations agencies and programmes, will be crucial in achieving real economic growth rates which would eventually lead to political stability in Haiti. All of this will hinge upon the financial and technical assistance rendered by the international community to the process of development. Therefore, the delegation of Egypt appeals to the international community to respond to the call made by the Secretary-General to expedite the provision of voluntary contributions for the economic reconstruction of Haiti.

    1997-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3837 (1997) · source

  24. In view of Egypt's perception of the important and vital role of the United Nations and the significance of its operational activities in bringing stability and providing support for national institutions that operate in the developing countries in the sphere of national reconciliation, we stress here the relevance of supporting the efforts of President Preval to overcome the political crisis facing Haiti, and that attainment of final resolutions of the main areas of dispute among the political actors, namely, elections, economic reform and the appointment of a new Prime Minister. However, Haiti's political problems, as emphasized in the report of the Secretary-General and the provisions of the draft resolution on which we are about to vote today, underscore once again the need to address the economic problems facing Haiti.

    1997-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3837 (1997) · source

  25. All that prompted the Secretary-General to send a Special Representative to assess the prevailing situation in Haiti, which led to the recommendation by the Secretary-General to set up a Civilian Police Mission in Haiti in order to help supplement the support and training of the Haitian National Police.

    1997-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3837 (1997) · source

  26. My delegation has reviewed the report of the Secretary-General [S/1997/832 and Add.1], which clearly reflects the great achievements of the Mission and the technical assistance it has provided to the Haitian National Police, especially in the areas of rapid intervention, investigation and the professionalization of the work of the Haitian National Police in the operational sphere. The draft resolution before the Council today comes in response to the appeal addressed by President Preval of Haiti to the Secretary-General for continued United Nations assistance to the Haitian National Police after the end of the mandate of the Transition Mission. That appeal also coincided with the sensitive situation perceived by the United Nations in Haiti.

    1997-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3837 (1997) · source

  27. Mr. Elaraby (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): The Security Council is meeting today to examine a draft resolution submitted regarding the establishment of the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) which will replace the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) after it has successfully fulfilled its Security Council mandate. In this regard, the delegation of Egypt would like to pay tribute to the Secretary-General and to his Special Representative, Mr. Enrique ter Horst.

    1997-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3837 (1997) · source

  28. I should like, in this context, to express our appreciation for the agreement reached by the two parties regarding the creation of a joint security unit to carry out the task of providing security, including armed escorts, for the personnel of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT). In this regard, Egypt hopes that the unit will begin functioning at the end of this month, as mentioned in the Secretary-General's report. In conclusion, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution on expanding UNMOT, on the basis of the proposals of the Secretary-General in his report, and on the extension of its mandate until 15 May 1998.

    1997-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3833 (1997) · source

  29. My delegation also welcomes the progress made in the activities undertaken by the Commission on National Reconciliation, and I would mention in particular the exchange of prisoners of war and detainees as well as the registration of members of the United T ajik Opposition who are present in Tajikistan and the repatriation of refugees from Afghanistan to their country. In this regard, I should also like to express our concern at the explosive security situation in Tajikistan, especially in the central part of the State. In addition, there is a need to call upon both Tajik parties to cooperate further in ensuring the safety and freedom of movement of the personnel of the United Nations, the collective peacekeeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and other international personnel.

    1997-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3833 (1997) · source

  30. Mr. Elaraby (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): Allow me at the outset to express my delegation's appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report on the evolution of the situation in Tajikistan. I should also like to express my thanks to his assistants, and in particular to his Special Representative, Mr. Gerd Merrem, We welcome the serious efforts being made by the Government of Tajikistan, as well as those of the United Tajik Opposition, to fulfil the commitments entered into under the General Agreement.

    1997-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3833 (1997) · source

  31. This involves facilitating the participation of the States members of the League in its meetings held in Cairo. This is a responsibility which Egypt has the honour to undertake in its capacity as the host country, under the Charter of the League of Arab States. We should like also to place on record, and very clearly, our conviction that the draft resolution contains nothing that could open the way to an escalation of the situation, to the use of force or to resort to a military option. We hope that dialogue and the use of diplomatic means will continue, that normal relations will be resumed between Iraq and the Special Commission and that the constructive and fruitful cooperation between them will be resumed in manner that will enable the Council to consider lifting the sanctions imposed on the Iraqi people.

    1997-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3831 (1997) · source

  32. Despite our very difficult position, Iraq's lack of responsiveness to the many and intensive efforts we and many other States made up to the very last minute leaves us with no choice but to vote in favour of the draft resolution in the hope that Iraq will alter its position and resume its cooperation with the Special Commission in a manner that will ensure the lifting of the sanctions and an end to the suffering of the brotherly Iraqi people. While we intend to vote in favour of the draft resolution, we would like to place on record here our understanding that the travel restrictions contained in the draft resolution must not obstruct Egypt's discharge of its responsibilities as the host country of the headquarters of the League of Arab States.

    1997-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3831 (1997) · source

  33. It proposed some amendments, including the addition of a paragraph on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Kuwait and Iraq. Fortunately, the sponsors responded positively to that amendment. The consultations also resulted in the deletion of some formulations in the preliminary draft that implicitly threatened dire consequences and the use of various methods in dealing with Iraq.

    1997-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3831 (1997) · source

  34. I believe it is reasonable for any country being at the receiving end of United Nations sanctions to ask for such a hearing provided it strictly complies with the resolutions of the Council." (spoke in Arabic) The delegation of Egypt today finds itself in the very sensitive position of voting on a draft resolution that imposes any kind of sanctions on an Arab State. Indeed, we abstained in the voting on the draft resolution adopted by the Council last month as resolution 1134 (1997), which hinted at the imposition of some additional sanctions but did not go beyond that to their enforcement. But today we view the question from various angles. The delegation of Egypt participated in the consultations on the draft resolution.

    1997-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3831 (1997) · source

  35. In this context, I call upon the Council to take into very serious account the comments made by the Secretary-General in his talking points for his briefing of the members of the Council on 10 November with regard to the outcome of the mission of his envoys to Iraq: (spoke in English) "Had Iraq agreed to return to full compliance, 1 would have had no hesitation to recommend to the Council that Iraq be granted a hearing by the Council in whatever format the Council might deem appropriate.

    1997-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3831 (1997) · source

  36. At any rate, we share the conviction of many delegations, both members and non-members of the Council, regarding the necessity always to comply fully with constitutional provisions and legal standards by not depriving any State Member of the United Nations of the right to express its view before the Council, in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter. This is the right of all States Members of the United Nations, especially if the question relates to sanctions imposed on that State under Chapter VII of the Charter. Such sanctions cause human suffering, as is well known.

    1997-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3831 (1997) · source

  37. Such positions do not serve the interests of any party, including Iraq itself. At yet another level, the Council should review the Special Commission's methods of work in order to ensure increased efficiency in carrying out its tasks as a subsidiary organ of the Council, within the context of the current dialogue taking place in the corridors of the United Nations on the need to reform all United Nations bodies in general. We are currently discussing reform and development in the General Assembly and in all other bodies, and we must do so here, too, so that we do not push Iraq, with its back to the wall, into believing that it has nothing to gain from its continued cooperation with the Commission and nothing to lose from a cessation of that cooperation.

    1997-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3831 (1997) · source

  38. We do not see any wisdom in this position because the completion of the process of cooperation between Iraq and the Special Commission and of Iraq's compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Council is the means of lifting the sanctions imposed on Iraq and, therefore, the means of alleviating the suffering of our brothers, the Iraqi people. On the other hand, the current crisis must be seen as a good opportunity to extract lessons. The Council must recognize this in its dealings with Iraq in the future. This should be in a manner that takes into account the concerns and suffering of the Iraqi people and the causes and ramifications of the feelings of frustration that lead to the taking of positions that, we hasten to reaffirm once again, are unacceptable to us.

    1997-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3831 (1997) · source

  39. While we recognize that its cooperation has not been ideal, it could be said that Iraq has gone a long way in that direction. Nonetheless, we do not see wisdom in Iraq's insistence on its recent position with regard to the Special Commission. Nor do we see wisdom in its lack of responsiveness to the efforts we and other parties made to dissuade it from insisting on this position. We do not see wisdom in that position because it means squandering the achievements made on Iraq's long road of cooperation with the Special Commission over the past years.

    1997-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3831 (1997) · source

  40. In addition, Egypt spared no effort in conducting contacts at all levels - at the highest levels - in Baghdad, in Cairo and here in New York. Up to the very last moment, we had hoped that all these efforts would be successful in defusing the crisis and in persuading Iraq to reverse its position, which would have negated the need to put the draft resolution before the Council today to the vote. Egypt understands the feelings of despair and frustration of the ordinary people of Iraq because of their continued suffering, which results from the sanctions imposed on Iraq. There is not even a glimmer of hope that they will be lifted after the six and a half years during which Iraq has been dealing with the United Nations Special Commission.

    1997-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3831 (1997) · source

  41. Mr. Elaraby (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): The draft resolution to be voted on today reflects the rapid succession of events during the last two weeks, since the beginning of the current crisis. Since the beginning of this crisis, Egypt has called for all possible efforts to be made to contain it through dialogue and diplomatic means. Egypt has also called for averting confrontation and escalation and any action that would affect the stability of that sensitive part of the world. In this regard, I would like to pay tribute to the efforts and the important contacts made recently by the Secretary-General. I would like to express Egypt's appreciation for the valuable effort made by the high-level mission sent to Baghdad under the chairmanship of Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi.

    1997-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3831 (1997) · source

  42. All these reasons have prompted the Government of Egypt to reconsider its position. For that reason, we shall abstain in the voting on the draft resolution.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  43. In view of all that, this morning in informal consultations the Egyptian delegation made a point of asking that the calm and constructive dialogue in good faith that has been pursued in recent days with regard to the provisions of the draft resolution before us today be continued so as to take into account all proposals designed to achieve consensus in the Council on this important draft. However, the sponsors of the draft resolution insisted on its being put to the vote today without taking into consideration the majority of the proposals put forward in recent days, particularly the proposals made today so that the draft resolution would respect logic, legality and the provisions of resolution 1115 (1997), and so that it might, once adopted, inspire the Iraqi Government to cooperate more fully with the Special Commission.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  44. What we need to do today is to reaffirm the objectives of the Security Council's prior resolutions and to encourage Iraq to implement them precisely. That is why we call upon Iraq and the Special Commission to undertake further cooperation in a climate of calm and mutual respect. I take this opportunity to recall once again the importance of settling pending questions concerning prisoners of war and Kuwaiti property, including Kuwaiti national archives. These are humanitarian questions that should be settled without delay.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  45. The Council should have mandated the sanctions committee to determine clear criteria for the modalities for the implementation of the resolution, as well as the respective roles of the Special Commission and the Iraqi Government in this connection, so that the Council could avoid contributing to aggravating the tensions between Iraq and the Special Commission, which would complicate the task of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Butler's functions as Executive Chairman would also be made more difficult, and he deserves all our support. As a matter of principle, Egypt is also opposed to any measures that might increase tensions in the region, for that would not be in the short- or long-term interests of any State in the region.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  46. Should the Council today adopt a resolution based on the report of the Executive Chairman dated 6 October 1997, the date of implementation of any measures should be that of the report submitted to the Council by the Special Commission, not the date of resolution 1115 (1997). Seventh, the preparation of lists of individuals who have impeded the work of the Special Commission without specifying the person entrusted with preparing the lists or the modality of their preparation is ambiguous.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  47. Although the draft resolution now before us does serve notice on the Government of Iraq by threatening the imposition of special sanctions, we do not believe that any measure that the Council might take to prompt the Government of Iraq to cooperate further with the Special Commission should apply retroactively, since the proper legal interpretation of Security Council resolution 1115 (1997) is that the Council is prepared to impose additional measures if the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission advises it that Iraq is not in compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of that resolution.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  48. During the period covered by the present report, the Executive Chairman notes that the Special Commission has made more than 860 inspections. In considering these isolated instances of differences between Iraq and the Commission over the manner of implementing the agreed modalities, we must study them objectively and precisely in order to decide whether they can be described as having been respected by Iraq or whether Iraq has not lived up to its commitments. Sixth, Egypt is opposed in principle to the imposition of any additional sanctions against Iraq, since Iraq has, in our opinion, made further efforts in the past six months to cooperate with the Special Commission and the IAEA.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  49. Iraq must cooperate even further and implement what has been agreed, and the Special Commission, for its part, must make an effort to cooperate in establishing clear-cut modalities so that it can fully discharge its responsibilities and submit a good assessment to the Council. Fifth, assessing the manner in which Iraq is discharging its responsibilities means taking into consideration what the reports say: that only sporadically has Iraq not acted in conformity with Security Council resolutions. We must therefore ask the following questions: are we here faced with recurring, systematic non-cooperation with the Special Commission? Do the number of instances indicate a real pattern of unwillingness to comply with the Council's resolutions?

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  50. There is no doubt about this, but it still depends on the arrangements, measures and modalities determined by the Special Commission in consultation with the Government of Iraq, which has sovereignty over its own territory. Though the Security Council has not formally adopted such arrangements and modalities, they are set forth in the reports of the Special Commission, of which the Council has taken note, and they have therefore become an integral part of the machinery in place for evaluating the extent to which Iraq implements the Council's resolutions. This is why the difference of opinion between the Special Commission and Iraq with regard to the interpretation of these modalities and the manner of implementing them demands that we take the time to study the question objectively.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source