YouSaid · the spoken record

Gatete

lines on the record
127
first
2022-04-27
most recent
2023-09-28
sittings or episodes
16
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. Rwanda gains no benefit from an insecure Democratic Republic of the Congo and would like to reaffirm its steadfast support for regional mechanisms, especially the Nairobi and Luanda peace processes. Those who seek to exploit the conflict for personal political gain are misguided. In addition, actions by certain external Powers designed to please the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in pursuit of their own economic interests, at Rwanda’s expense, are unhelpful and risk aggravating the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That is the paramount issue demanding the Council’s attention. In conclusion, Rwanda remains deeply concerned about the plight of refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, most of whom have been sheltered in Rwanda for more than 20 years.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  2. The Council should therefore urge the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to fulfil its responsibility to dissociate itself from the FDLR and ensure its members’ immediate repatriation, as stipulated in the Luanda and Nairobi mechanisms. As has been said in the past, the proliferation of hate speech targeting Rwandophones, along with killings and the confiscation of property belonging to Kinyarwanda-speaking communities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, poses a grave threat not only to Rwanda but to the entire Great Lakes region. That has continued for several years now with impunity, and the Council cannot continue to be a mere observer.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  3. And now it is not just a matter of collaboration. They are fighting alongside the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s army and are also supported by the Government through its arming of them. I do not see that anyone can claim any legitimacy when what is at issue is a group that committed genocide in Rwanda and is being supported by another country. And then that country turns around and blames Rwanda. What is Rwanda supposed to do in that case? The disruptive behaviour of those negative forces, in alliance with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, threatens to reignite hostilities and undermine any positive regional initiatives.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  4. Rwanda remains deeply concerned about the Congolese Government’s ongoing collaboration with and arming of the genocidal militia known as the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and indigenous armed groups. Many Council members have repeatedly brought up the issue of Kinshasa’s collaboration with and arming of the FDLR, despite the denials last year by the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, when he said that there are no members of the FDLR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He said that last year to the Security Council (see S/PV.9215), which has actually imposed sanctions on that genocidal militia, a group that committed genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and has been living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and working with the Congolese Government for more than 20 years.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  5. The swift deployment of the East African Community regional force and the relatively quick establishment of a ceasefire have underscored the political determination to address the regional crisis. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that a ceasefire is only one step in the conflict- resolution process, contingent on the willingness of all of the warring parties to pursue a peaceful solution. It is imperative that the Democratic Republic of the Congo seize the opportunities provided by the ceasefire and the M-23’s withdrawal and address the root causes and drivers of the conflict, rather than resorting to using Rwanda as a scapegoat while the internal failures of the Democratic Republic of the Congo persist.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  6. I thank Ms. Bintou Keita, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for her briefing, and all members for their valuable contributions. In the wake of the Luanda and Nairobi mechanisms, which were reinforced by numerous communiqués from various summits of Heads of State, the concurrent withdrawal of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23) and the deployment of the East African Community regional force gave rise to optimism that it would be possible to finally put an end to the devastating conflict that has caused immense suffering to the people in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  7. Rwanda will never allow the FDLR and its backers to cause any harm, directly or indirectly, to Rwanda or its people. We call on the international community to support the ongoing Luanda and Nairobi peace processes, which constitute our region’s best chance for peace and stability. The meeting rose at noon.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  8. To conclude, the security challenges in our region are complex, but they are soluble. Amplifying the false allegations of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo while never holding it accountable for allying itself with armed groups that together with the FARDC commit serious human rights abuses against civilians cannot lead to solutions. Treating the Government as a perpetual victim despite the evidence to the contrary is symbolic of how the dysfunction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been encouraged and sustained for decades. As long as Kinshasa backs the genocidal FDLR and other anti-Rwanda elements, Rwanda’s defensive and preventive mechanisms will remain in place to guard against violations of our borders and airspace and to counter any spillover into Rwanda to ensure total security for our territory.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  9. It is common knowledge that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has stalled the implementation of those efforts, including by frustrating the East African Community regional force’s ability to execute its mandate. Nonetheless, the implementation of the Nairobi and Luanda peace processes has been progressing, the East African Community regional force has fully deployed, a ceasefire has been secured and the Mouvement du 23 mars has withdrawn from its previously occupied positions, as agreed. Ideally, those achievements should be followed by the Government’s political process aimed at bringing the region close to its peace objectives. However, and not surprisingly, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has not taken a single piece of action in line with the regional peace agreements.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  10. Despite being fully aware of the collaboration of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the FDLR, neither MONUSCO nor the Security Council have taken any substantive action. Instead, Rwanda has been made a scapegoat for the insecurity in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. That unfortunately reflects an unwillingness on the part of the international community to face up to the root causes of the conflict there and to demand true accountability from the Congolese Government, which is responsible for that legacy of failure. Rwanda remains committed to working within regional mechanisms, particularly the Nairobi and Luanda processes.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  11. Given the imposition of a number of sanctions and the establishment of various regional agreements, it was expected that members of the FDLR would be disarmed and repatriated to Rwanda to face justice for their role in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Instead, both the FARDC and the FDLR have consistently violated Rwanda’s territorial integrity, including through a number of cross-border rocket- firing incidents, incursions into Rwanda by soldiers of the Congolese armed forces and several airspace violations by Congolese fighter jets. The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s choice to integrate the FDLR into Government forces rather than repatriating its members sends a strong and clear message to Rwanda, the region and the international community that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not interested in peace.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  12. The latest report of the Secretary-General highlights the key active armed groups perpetrating atrocities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but inexplicably omits the FDLR, despite the fact that it is the main orchestrator of the instability in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The FDLR militia stands out from the more than 120 armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo on three counts — its military expertise, an extensive economic network and the unwavering support it enjoys fighting alongside the Congolese army, the FARDC. The proliferation of hate speech and anti-Tutsi genocide ideology widely observed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo today reveals the extent of the FDLR’s reach.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  13. Anti-Rwandophone slogans and hate speech are openly propagated in schools and saturate Congolese social-media platforms on a daily basis. What is even more concerning is that high-level Congolese officials propagate anti-Rwanda sentiment as an expression of pat- riotism or civic duty to score political points. We call on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to investigate those crimes and take appropriate action. Additionally, efforts should be made to strengthen the legal frameworks that address hate speech and ensure accountability for those who engage in such behaviour.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  14. We are also concerned about the apparent silence of MONUSCO and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo about the genocidal nature of those atrocities. Last week, on 18 June, the United Nations commemo- rated the International Day for Countering Hate Speech. During her moving speech, Under-Secretary-General Alice Nderitu, the United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, reminded us that genocide does not start with bullets or machetes but with hate speech. The ways in which the authorities in the Demo- cratic Republic of the Congo have given licence to poi- sonous anti-Rwandophone and anti-Tutsi hate speech, public incitement, mob killings and targeted violence have been detailed in a number of reports of the United Nations and other regional and international organiza- tions.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  15. What is surprising is that the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo finds himself able to state categorically before the members of the Security Council that the FDLR has never attacked Rwanda in the past 10 years, when last year we all witnessed it carry out three attacks together with Democratic Republic of the Congo forces. In the province of Ituri alone, in the space of less than three months, 643 civilians were killed by armed groups such as the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo and the Allied Democratic Forces. That is a level of violence not seen since 2017. What is particularly concerning is that those grave human rights violations occurred quite close to the MONUSCO base and to Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) positions.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  16. However, we are deeply disappointed by the lack of an official statement from the Council or the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) condemning the ongoing acts of genocide targeting Congolese Tutsi and Rwandophones on a daily basis. We thank those Member States that have condemned hate speech. As we have heard and as has been reported, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has given financial support, weapons and political cover to a number of illegal armed groups, including the genocidal group of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), which is under United Nations sanctions. It is therefore not surprising that there has been a dramatic surge in violence against civilians.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  17. I thank you for giving me the floor, Madam President, and I would also like to thank the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Ms. Martha Pobee, for her briefing and the members of the Security Council for their statements. We would like to express our gratitude for the regional endeavours that have led to a cessation of hostilities in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. We particularly acknowledge the support of the Member States in the Great Lakes region that have contributed to the implementation of the regional mechanisms involved, as well as the daily efforts of the East African Community regional force on the ground. In view of the positive progress we have seen, we urge the international community to provide support and enhance regional initiatives in order to ensure the complete implementation of those mechanisms.

    2023-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9358 (2023) · source

  18. Rwanda therefore extends a call to action to the international community, international financial institutions and development partners and asks for their valuable support. Such partnerships will enhance development in education, health care, infrastructure and capacity-building, which will contribute to the Central African Republic’s resilience and economic development. As I conclude, let me emphasize once again that the circumstances that justified the imposition of the arms embargo are no longer relevant, considering the ongoing progress in the Central African Republic. While sanctions may be needed in specific situations, it is essential to continually assess their overall impact on peace processes and carefully examine whether their consequences outweigh their advantages.

    2023-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9352 (2023) · source

  19. As a significant contributor to multilateral and bilateral forces in the Central African Republic, Rwanda maintains that the conditions that warranted the arms embargo are no longer applicable. A lifting of the embargo on the Government of the Central African Republic would serve as a potent symbol of the international community’s trust, solidarity and support, which is what the Government of the Central African Republic hopes to receive from the Security Council. Investment in peace and security is not just about arms and sanctions but also about nurturing the nation’s socioeconomic fabric. If we consolidate resources for investment in Central African Republic, it will foster self-sufficiency and ensure sustainable peace and security.

    2023-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9352 (2023) · source

  20. The dynamic evolution of militia tactics, the growing intricacies of their activities and alliances, and the innovative use of digital technology for improvised explosive ordinance call for a strong and proactive response from our end. More alarmingly, intelligence is pointing towards an active market for lethal equipment within the region. Meanwhile, the Government of the Central African Republic is struggling against the constraints imposed by the ongoing arms embargo. The security challenges mentioned just now pose a significant threat to the hard-earned progress in implementing the road map to peace as well as peacebuilding initiatives. It is therefore essential to lift the arms embargo imposed on the Government of the Central African Republic to allow it to reassert State authority nationwide.

    2023-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9352 (2023) · source

  21. Rwanda sincerely thanks the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and all the stakeholders involved, including the Government of the Central African Republic, the national armed forces, bilateral forces, regional organizations and development partners, for their valuable contributions. The protection of civilians against hostile armed groups is the result of efficient coordination and collaboration between stakeholders. However, this achievement is not without its challenges. Recent reports indicate a growing concern about armed groups targeting isolated national defence posts and ambushing peacekeeping patrols.

    2023-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9352 (2023) · source

  22. I thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Valentine Rugwabiza and the other briefers for their comprehensive briefings. I also welcome and thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central African Republic for her detailed statement and the Angolan Secretary of State for External Relations and the members of the Security Council for their statements. The ongoing peace process and nation-building efforts in the Central African Republic paint a picture of optimism. Although challenges still lie ahead, we firmly believe they are not insurmountable, especially considering the hardships the country faced just a few years ago.

    2023-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9352 (2023) · source

  23. Each day that a fugitive remains free is another day that justice is delayed. And as we all know, justice delayed is justice denied.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  24. As I conclude, let us reflect on the plight of the survivors, whose peace is continually disturbed by the knowledge that perpetrators are still at large. They, and indeed all of us, yearn for the day when justice will no longer be delayed, the guilty will finally answer for their actions and the victims can find solace in knowing that their suffering has not been forgotten. Let me reiterate that the fight against impunity is not a task that Rwanda should shoulder alone. It is a collective responsibility that we, as the global community, must undertake. We plead with all Member States to consider the gravity of the crimes committed during the genocide against the Tutsi, the prolonged suffering of the survivors and the potential instability that the ongoing impunity poses.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  25. Their action reinforces the belief that the pursuit of justice is not insurmountable, but merely requires the political will to act. Each year in April, Member States stand with us as we commemorate the genocide against the Tutsi. They show us compassion and acknowledge our resilience. However, when we send indictments, our appeals are often met with silence. We need Member States to demonstrate solidarity in our pursuit of justice, as they do when we commemorate. Rwanda and Rwandans have come a long way from the dark events of 1994. However, having prominent figures and perpetrators of genocide remaining active and the spread of genocide ideology and incitement threatens the hope of a truly peaceful society. We ask that members join us in making “never again” a reality.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  26. Despite the provision in article 28, paragraph 3, of the Mechanism’s statute for assisting national authorities in the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law, we observe a reluctance by some States to cooperate. That inaction, in the face of available options for deportation, extradition or conducting trials within their territories, hinders the fight against impunity. We extend our gratitude to the countries that have demonstrated their commitment to justice by extraditing or prosecuting fugitives on their soil. They include Belgium, France, the United States of America, Uganda, the Netherlands, Canada, Norway, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Malawi, the Republic of the Congo, Finland and Switzerland.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  27. Every delay in the process equates to justice denied. It is unfortunate that the pace of justice is slowed by a lack of cooperation from some Member States, despite clear Security Council mandates and judiciary instruments urging such cooperation. Such delays not only hinder the pursuit of justice but also impede the opportunity for criminals to face trial and be held accountable for their crimes. A recent instance highlighting that issue is the Trial Chamber of the Residual Mechanism’s decision ruling that Félicien Kabuga is unfit to continue standing trial — a deeply disheartening outcome for the survivors, victims and the people of Rwanda as a whole.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  28. Nonetheless, considering the substantial volume of appeals, we continue to welcome the ongoing partnership and support provided by the Mechanism. We also hope that the staff of the Office of the Prosecutor will help the Rwandan authorities overcome the ongoing challenge of tracking down more than 1,000 genocide fugitives and achieve further justice for the victims and survivors in Rwanda. As of June, Rwanda has issued 1,148 indictments against genocide suspects in 33 countries and INTERPOL’s General Secretariat. In view of that, we call upon countries where indictments have been issued to redouble their efforts in arresting the remaining fugitives within their jurisdiction. Justice for the victims and survivors of the genocide against the Tutsi is not merely about prosecution; it is about timely justice.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  29. We welcome the cooperation that led to Kayishema’s arrest, provided by the law-enforcement agencies of South Africa, Mozambique and Eswatini, together with United Nations investigators. We are especially grateful to South Africa for the role that it played in the process. Rwanda continues to thank countries that have extended their cooperation to the Office of the Prosecutor and to Rwandan prosecutions. It is important to highlight that the Mechanism has officially confirmed Rwanda’s ability to conduct genocide trials in complete compliance with international due-process standards. In recent years, as Prosecutor Brammertz emphasizes in his report, Rwanda has effectively carried out trials and appeals for cases referred to it by the Mechanism.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  30. I would like to thank Judge Graciela Gatti Santana, President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, and its Chief Prosecutor, Serge Brammertz, for their extensive briefings. I also want to thank the members of the Security Council for their statements. We appreciate the cooperation between the Mechanism and the Government of Rwanda. We commend the Prosecutor for the recent arrest of the genocide fugitive Fulgence Kayishema, one of those on the most-wanted list of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, who had been on the run for 22 years. We would also like to express our condolences on the passing of Judge Elizabeth Ibanda-Nahamya of Uganda. We thank the Residual Mechanism for the consolidated progress report and its personnel’s continued efforts to seek justice for the crime of genocide.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  31. We must acknowledge progress in some areas, and I would like to commend the ongoing deployment of contingents of the East African Community regional force to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the M-23’s continued withdrawal. In conclusion, all the parties involved are implementing the regional agreements — except for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In that regard, Rwanda urges all parties to the conflict to strictly respect the ceasefire agreements and build on them to implement the regional agreements’ road maps in the hope of peaceful negotiations and ultimately a peaceful resolution.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  32. Alice Nderitu, has twice issued statements clearly indicating that the FDLR is very active and spreading genocidal ideology. As a result, she has called for the international community to attend to the warning signs of a possible genocide in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is complex. But while it would not be difficult to resolve, the statements from the country’s leaders regarding the situation and the FDLR in particular are counterproductive where the regional efforts and peace processes, as envisioned in the Framework Agreement, are concerned. Instead, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to make no effort to implement any of the signed agreements, which, to say the least, contradicts the Agreement in word and in spirit.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  33. Since fleeing to the Democratic Republic of the Congo 29 years ago, the group has persistently spread its genocidal ideology there, resulting in the killings of hundreds of thousands of Congolese Tutsi. That is in addition to multiple cross-border attacks on Rwanda. President Tshisekedi’s attitude to the FDLR and his recent statement are therefore problematic. In the press briefing with the President of Switzerland, he went so far as to sanitize the FDLR terrorist group, claiming that it poses no threat to Rwanda and saying, “The pretext that the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo support the FDLR is a fallacy. The FDLR is a residual force; it no longer attacks Rwanda and has no political vindictiveness towards Rwanda.” Members may also recall that the United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Ms.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  34. If negotiations are off the table, once the M-23 completes its withdrawal the peace mechanisms may hit a dead end yet again and the consequence would be a recurrence of the atrocities. At a time when Rwandans and the world are commemorating the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, I would like to remind the Council that the United Nations-sanctioned terrorist group that carried out the genocide — the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) — is still at large in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Furthermore, the FDLR enjoys the support and political shield that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo provides while it is actively violating United Nations sanctions.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  35. Despite the facilitator’s satisfaction with the M-23’s compliance, President Tshisekedi Tshilombo of the Democratic Republic of the Congo stated at a joint press conference in Kinshasa on 13 April with the President of Switzerland that he would not negotiate, saying “There is no way that there will be political dialogue with the M-23.” The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s stance is disturbing, as it clearly hinders all regional and continental efforts aimed at achieving peace in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The region and the international community are expecting Kinshasa’s cooperation in order to achieve lasting peace in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo following the M-23’s withdrawal.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  36. As the preparations continue for a fourth round of the Nairobi peace talks aimed at containing Congolese armed groups, the facilitator has recommended including the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23), in the light of its compliance with the Luanda recommendations. Its withdrawal from previously captured areas, which are now occupied by the East African Community regional force, is evidence of a productive regional effort, as well as the M-23’s resolve to respect the regional leaders’ road map reached through the Luanda and Nairobi processes.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  37. Any meaningful contribution to lasting peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region had to abandon the self-defeating practice of selectivity in both memory and responsibility regarding the known, long-standing causes of recurring conflict. Rwanda expected that the Framework would lead to peace, security, stability and development in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region as a whole. Ten years later, the scorecard indicates that the situation is no better. An evaluation of the Framework is long overdue to assess its effectiveness and the challenges emanating from its lack of implementation. There is a need to genuinely address the real problems of rights, justice and development and to commit to finding sustainable solutions for the peoples who look to us for leadership.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  38. Today’s briefing presents an opportunity to look back 10 years, to the moment when the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region was signed on 24 February 2013. The Agreement presented a valuable opportunity for all parties to build on the work started by the region and the wider continent and to focus seriously on addressing the real problems, as clearly identified. It was crucial that the signing of the Agreement not be seen as the end result of a peace process but as a big step in the right direction. The Framework Agreement signed 10 years ago recognized a holistic approach that addressed the multifaceted root causes as the only way to end instability.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  39. Thank you for allowing me to contribute to today’s Security Council briefing on the Great Lakes region. I thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission for their briefings. Rwanda commends the Special Envoy for his dedication to the peace and development of our subregion. We also welcome the convening of the eleventh high-level meeting of the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region to be held in Bujumbura, which Rwanda looks forward to attending.

    2023-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9307 (2023) · source

  40. The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s undermining of peace efforts, its refusal to repatriate Congolese refugees, its acquisition of mercenaries, its recruitment of armed groups and its alliance with FDLR demonstrate that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is using this crisis for short- sighted political gains, at the expense of the civilian populations and diplomatic relations. Rwanda once again appeals to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to acknowledge its obligation and implement the signed regional agreements for peace and stability. As always, Rwanda remains committed to the bilateral, regional and international efforts to stabilize the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, and we look forward to their materialization.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  41. As the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide noted, the presence of the FDLR and the genocide ideology are at the heart of the atrocity crimes perpetrated against Congolese Tutsi communities. Given all the reports expressing concerns over the escalating hate speech, what is the way forward for the Security Council? Is there going to be an investigation? The reports should not be the end, but should be a call for appropriate actions to be taken. In conclusion, we object to the ongoing Democratic Republic of the Congo campaign to characterize Rwanda as the cause of its instability.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  42. Rwanda’s concerns have been echoed in a number of reports and statements, including two statements by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide in November 2022 and January 2023, the report of the 2022 Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and those of the Human Rights Commission and the European Union and many other statements delivered by Security Council members present at this meeting today. Unfortunately, while the hate speech and the subsequent human rights violations have intensified, MONUSCO has chosen to be a silent observer, which gives the impression that the targeted killings of specific communities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are becoming normal and acceptable.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  43. As you heard, my good friend says that FDLR members are too old, and I wonder how the ideology they possess can also become old. Thirdly, but not least, we would like to reiterate our concern over the ongoing targeting of Congolese Tutsi communities, which is on every form of social media concerning the activities that they conduct. They continue to endure hate speech and targeted killings incited by the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s leaders, based solely on their ethnicity. We all know that the sustained persecution of, and discrimination against, a people is an early-warning sign for future atrocity crimes and genocide.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  44. One evident answer is that it is not peace or security for the people and the region. Secondly, our concern pertains to the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), the genocidal militia sanctioned by the United Nations and given free rein in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Even though MONUSCO and the Security Council have full knowledge of the fact that the Democratic Republic of the Congo Government provides the FDLR with weapons and allows it to fight alongside the FARDC, no action has been taken. As a result of the FARDC and FDLR alliance, Rwanda’s territorial integrity has been violated multiple times over the years. Like all States, Rwanda reserves the right to defend its borders and citizens against cross-border attacks.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  45. For example, in the places in which the unilateral withdrawal of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23) has been conducted in the absence of the East African Community regional force, the FARDC and allied militias have repeatedly violated the terms of the Luanda road map. They have moved to reoccupy the positions vacated by the M-23, triggering a predictable resumption of hostilities at the expense of the local populations. On top of all that, the Democratic Republic of the Congo Government has also encouraged hostility towards the East African Community regional force and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) itself. In the light of that, one wonders: What does the Democratic Republic of the Congo actually want?

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  46. Instead of implementing those agreements, the Democratic Republic of the Congo Government is instead stoking the conflict by encouraging hate speech and recruiting local armed groups and mercenaries to fight alongside the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC). Those mercenaries and armed groups show little regard for civilian welfare, and therefore pose a major human rights challenge for the region and the international community. By fighting alongside the very armed groups it should be disarming, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is refuelling the conflict and ensuring that any progress made is quickly undone.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  47. Until the Democratic Republic of the Congo acknowledges its own governance failure, we will continue to have continuous political dialogues and deliberations that yield no substantial results and are ultimately inconsequential. Allow me to paint a clear picture of our primary concerns regarding the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. First, the Congolese Government has refused to adhere to all the peace plans from the regional processes, a fact that is evident to everyone. The Nairobi and Luanda agreements, in particular, have 4 and 11 items, respectively. In both agreements, the first item is the ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  48. Rwanda has repeatedly noted that the crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo was started by, and is the primary responsibility of, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Unfortunately, the situation continues to deteriorate owing to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s leaders’ lack of political will, urgency and inaction. It has become evident that, even though the conflict continues to inflict terrible suffering on the civilian populations, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is using the conflict as a political stunt to obtain domestic support and silence opposition ahead of the upcoming elections. However, scapegoating Rwanda does not change the fact that the conflict stems from immense governance failures in the sociopolitical, economic and military arenas.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  49. I thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ms. Bintou Keita, for her briefing, and the members of the Security Council for their remarks. Let me start by commending the recent and ongoing deployment of additional East African Community regional force contingents to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from Burundi and Uganda. In the areas in which those contingents have assumed their interposition and monitoring roles, the implementation of the regional mechanisms is starting to bear fruit thanks to those two countries. To that effect, Rwanda encourages the parties to the conflict to strictly respect the ceasefire agreements for a peaceful resolution.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  50. It is about building trust and harmony and strengthening the social contract between the State and its people. Yet sustainable peace can be achieved not only at the national level, but also through regional and international efforts.

    2023-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9250 (2023) · source