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Gatete

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127
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2022-04-27
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2023-09-28
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un-security-council

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  1. Rwanda is aware that the Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) are fighting the M-23 alongside the FDLR, which was sanctioned by the Security Council in 2012, pursuant to resolution 2078 (2012). The FARDC should avoid the tendency of forging alliances with hostile and sanctioned armed groups to fight other armed groups. It is counterproductive and undermines the commitment of the region and the United Nations to stabilize the eastern part of the Democratic Republic. This alliance also puts MONUSCO in a very difficult position, because supporting the FARDC while it fights alongside the FDLR is tantamount to supporting a genocidal armed group.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  2. In turn, this will lead to deterioration of the security situation, which means that the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) may not successfully fulfil its mandate anytime soon. In this regard, Rwanda once again welcomes the outcome of the third Heads of State Conclave on the Democratic Republic of the Congo during which the Heads of State of the East African Community emphasized that all offensive language, hate speech, threats of genocide and other inciting political language must cease and must be discouraged. The Heads of State also called for the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to work together towards a solution.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  3. In the last few weeks, we have all observed hate speech in mainstream media and on social media and witnessed calls for killing and extermination, intimidation and stigmatization, xenophobic and inflammatory rhetoric, genocide ideology and political manipulation targeting Tutsi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular, and Rwandans in general. Targeting and killing innocent civilians perceived to be Tutsi may have a negative effect, as the targeted civilians may seek protection by joining local armed groups, which will lead to further insecurity. If the hate speech and calls for violence continue, it will exacerbate the problems in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and further divide the country by deepening hatred and mistrust among communities in the Democratic Republic.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  4. Any allegations in this regard should be reported to the Joint Verification Mechanism for an independent investigation, which the Democratic Republic of the Congo has not done up to now. The grievances and concerns of Democratic Republic’s domestic armed groups must be resolved through the implementation of prior agreements and political negotiations, rather than accusing neighbouring countries. Rwanda also rejects the ongoing propaganda narrative promoted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo that countries of the region want to balkanize the eastern part of the country. These are absurd statements without basis and intended to divert attention from complex internal issues. It is yet another attempt by the Government of the Democratic Republic to externalize its internal weakness and problems onto its neighbours.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  5. I would like to draw the attention of the Security Council to the false allegations that the Democratic Republic of the Congo has lodged against Rwanda and the resulting consequences, including hate speech targeting a section of the population of the Democratic Republic. As Council members know, the political and military leaders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have falsely accused Rwanda of backing the M-23. We have also heard it just now. It is an unfounded accusation. The problem is that, notwithstanding such statements, the Council has mechanisms to verify any accusations made against any country. In this case, there is Joint Verification Mechanism, which is never used, and then we hear such statements.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  6. In this regard, we welcome the outcome of the third Heads of State Conclave on the Democratic Republic of the Congo held in Nairobi on 20 June 2022, where East African Heads of State agreed to a joint regional force that will work in cooperation with the military and administrative forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to stabilize the region by neutralizing all the negative forces. Rwanda’s commitment to the protection of civilians is informed by the tragic history of the failure of the United Nations to prevent and stop the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. We call for a swift and lasting solution to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to ensure that this tragic history never happens again in the Great Lakes region.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  7. I wish to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ms. Bintou Keita, and Ms. Julienne Lusenge for their briefings, and the members of the Security Council for their remarks. We take note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/503) and appreciate that it identified all the main armed groups operating in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, the resurgence of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23) has overshadowed the presence of more than 130 armed groups in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic, including the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), which was founded by Rwandan former government forces and militia that committed the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi.

    2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9081 (2022) · source

  8. In conclusion, given the significance of the work undertaken by the Mechanism and the Prosecutor’s Office, we highly recommend that the Security Council provide them with all the support and financial resources they need to fulfil their mandate. Moving forward, Rwanda hopes for improved and meaningful cooperation between the Mechanism and Member States. Justice can be rendered only where there is the political will to do so.

    2022-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9062 (2022) · source

  9. That deteriorating environment is an early warning sign of intentions to commit genocide. We should all remember that on 18 June 2019, the Secretary-General launched the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, in which he noted that hate speech is in itself an attack on tolerance, inclusion, diversity and the very essence of our human rights norms and principles. More broadly, it undermines social cohesion, erodes shared values and can lay foundations for violence, setting back the cause of peace, stability, sustainable development and the fulfilment of human rights. In response to the Plan of Action, the Security Council should take urgent action against the hate speech that we are currently observing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2022-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9062 (2022) · source

  10. In all previous engagements with the Residual Mechanism, Rwanda made it clear that we welcome all ex-convicts who have completed their sentences and persons who have been released to return to Rwanda and resettle. A case in point is that of Major Bernard Ntuyahaga, who served his 20-year prison term in Belgium and was sent back to Rwanda, where he now lives peacefully. What makes the eight individuals’ case so special that they cannot be similarly resettled in Rwanda, and what kind of precedent does that set? As we contend with the issue of genocide fugitives and rising genocide denial, Rwanda is also deeply concerned about the current resurgence in hate speech targeting the Tutsi and Rwandaphones in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that is fast developing within public and official circles, as well as mainstream and social media.

    2022-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9062 (2022) · source

  11. We commend the countries that have heeded the call for justice and transferred genocide fugitives to Rwanda or prosecuted them in their national courts. Rwanda welcomes the 13 June decision by the Trial Chamber of the Mechanism that Félicien Kabuga is now fit to stand trial. We would like to remind the Council that Kabuga was one of the masterminds of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. The Government and the people of Rwanda have always made justice a priority, and given that it has been more than two years since Kabuga was arrested, we call on the Mechanism to commence his trial without delay. Rwanda takes note of the situation of the individuals who were transferred to the Niger.

    2022-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9062 (2022) · source

  12. Rwanda has sent out more than 1,000 indictments to 34 countries around the world, requesting their cooperation in arresting and prosecuting fugitives or transferring them to Rwanda to face justice. Regrettably, only a few have complied. Rwanda would like to remind Member States that all resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and all decisions of the African Union oblige Member States, particularly those where genocide fugitives are suspected to be living, to intensify their cooperation and render the necessary assistance to the Mechanism and Rwanda so as to quickly obtain the arrest of all remaining genocide suspects. The Council has repeated that call in all its resolutions, most recently resolution 2529 (2020).

    2022-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9062 (2022) · source

  13. The first is locating and arresting the remaining fugitives indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; the second is the Félicien Kabuga case; the third is the transfer of eight Rwandans to the Niger; and the fourth is the proliferation of hate speech in the Great Lakes region. In locating and arresting the remaining fugitives indicted by the Mechanism, Rwanda commends the Prosecutor’s Office for its relentless and fruitful efforts. However, while the Office has viable leads on the whereabouts of some of the remaining fugitives, the major remaining challenge is the lack of timely and effective cooperation on the part of some Member States.

    2022-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9062 (2022) · source

  14. Let me start by congratulating you, Mr. President, on your presidency of the Security Council for the month of June. I would also like to thank President Agius and Prosecutor Brammertz for their detailed briefings and the members of the Security Council for their statements. Rwanda welcomes the good work done by the court and the Prosecutor’s Office in the execution of the mandate of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. We also value the good cooperation that exists between the Mechanism and the Government of Rwanda. As Judge Agius concludes his mandate as President of the Mechanism, Rwanda recognizes and congratulates him on his tremendous contribution to international justice. We would like to focus on four points.

    2022-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9062 (2022) · source

  15. The Government of Rwanda retains the capacity and justification to defend Rwandans and Rwanda’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, in accordance with international law. We call on the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to stop the proliferation of hate speech and messages inciting genocidal violence. Rwanda remains committed to existing bilateral, regional and international efforts to stabilize the region through established regional initiatives, including efforts made through the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Nairobi process, under the East African Community, as well as through multilateral collaboration, to establish the long-term security, stability and development of the Great Lakes region.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  16. We urge the United Nations, through the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, not to stand by and watch the perpetuation of the alliance between the FARDC and the FDLR. In conclusion, I would like to say that Rwanda categorically rejects the allegations by the Democratic Republic of the Congo that Rwanda supports the M-23. That is unfounded and unacceptable. Rwanda has absolutely no interest in destabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government of Rwanda notes that such allegations are a pretext by some spoilers within the Democratic Republic of the Congo to externalize the conflict for domestic political gains, which is dangerous and should be denounced.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  17. Even more disturbing is a factor that should be of global concern beyond the Great Lakes region, which is, the blatant resurgence of anti-Rwanda hate speech and calls for genocide that are being encouraged by some officials and politicians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and spreading through the population. It can be seen on social media and everywhere. There should never be silence on that issue by the Council and the international community, in view of what happened in Rwanda in 1994. Rwanda is extremely concerned about the military cooperation between the FARDC and the FDLR. The Council should be reminded that the presence of FDLR has caused untold suffering for the people of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and perpetuated insecurity in our region for close to three decades now.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  18. That agreement generated considerable hope for disbanding all the armed groups — and there are more than 100 of them — that regularly carry out massacres all over the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which are routinely met with silence and indifference. The more recent Nairobi process, led by President Uhuru Kenyatta and President Tshisekedi, also renewed hope for stability in our region through the framework of the expanded East African Community. What we see today, however, is the sliding back into an undesirable state of affairs. The consequences are being borne by innocent civilians.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  19. Rwanda has also made efforts to facilitate various engagements between those Congolese former M-23 combatants and their Government, which culminated in an agreement and a repatriation road map in 2019. As part of the process, the arms and equipment that the Government of Rwanda seized from the group were handed over to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, there has been a lack of commitment, or interest, on the part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in implementing the repatriation road map. Looking further back, it has been more than nine years since the signing in Addis Ababa of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  20. We call for the de-escalation of those hostilities and urge the parties to abide by the resolutions of the second Heads of State Conclave on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, held on 21 April. Rwanda rejects the labelling of members of M-23 as Rwandans. They are Congolese nationals, and therefore their grievances should be resolved internally in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. For the purposes of clarification, allow me to recall that in 2013, following the defeat of the M-23 by the Force Intervention Brigade, a number of combatants fled to Rwanda and Uganda. Those who entered Rwanda were disarmed and transferred far away from the border of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is where they remain, as agreed by the regional mechanism at the time.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  21. Those incidents have since been confirmed by the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. In addition, two soldiers of the Rwanda Defence Force, who were on patrol along the border, were kidnapped by elements of the FDLR and are now being detained by authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We have requested their protection and immediate release. Despite those provocations, there has been no acknowledgment or explanation by the FARDC or the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The question now is: What is Rwanda expected to do about the next provocation? Allow me to speak on the issue of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23). Rwanda is concerned about the resumption of hostilities between M-23 and FARDC.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  22. Rwanda is deeply concerned about the evolving security situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which poses a serious threat to peace and security in the region but also directly affects Rwanda. More specifically, on 23 May the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC), alongside the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), fired shells across the border into Rwanda’s territory in the districts of Musanze and Burera. The attack resulted in several serious injuries and damaged property. That was the second shelling this year, following a similar attack on 19 March. Let me make it clear: the shelling was not on both sides. The shelling came from the Democratic Republic of the Congo towards Rwanda. It happened twice, and Rwanda never responded.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  23. I thank you, Madam President, for giving me the opportunity to speak on behalf of Rwanda and on this matter of concern to our subregion. I thank the briefers and the members of the Security Council for their interventions. Rwanda values building a strong relationship with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Following the election of President Tshisekedi Tshilombo in January 2019, Rwanda undertook various initiatives to revive bilateral relations, which had deteriorated during the previous Administration. In that context, a number of bilateral agreements and memorandums of understanding were signed, which led to booming cross-border trade between the two countries and an intercommunal relationship between the peoples of the two countries. It is regrettable that all those efforts are being undermined.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  24. We welcome the Special Envoy’s efforts to implement peacebuilding priorities, as specified in the action plan of the regional strategy, based on the principles of ownership, complementarity and partnership. Those actions complement the efforts led by the East African Community. However, addressing the security situation is not enough. It is imperative that we also strengthen cooperation on economic development in the Great Lakes region. That is already being done through regional investment and the cross-border trade that exists in both the central and the northern corridors of East Africa, which facilitates the smooth movement of goods and people. Let me conclude by reaffirming Rwanda’s unwavering commitment to peace, security and development in our region and beyond.

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  25. Rwanda welcomes the outcome of that meeting, which includes a political process that involves domestic armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the disarmament and repatriation of all foreign armed groups. That initiative, which has been supported by the African Union, is expected to restore peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups are key to creating and maintaining sustainable peace and development in the Great Lakes region. We therefore call upon the Security Council to support such regional efforts, which complement the existing peace and security framework to build sustainable peace in the Great Lakes region.

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  26. On another note, the Great Lakes region is experiencing positive political developments and the normalization of relations among member countries, which is driving the momentum for regional cooperation and greater integration. This meeting also comes at an opportune moment when the Democratic Republic of the Congo recently joined the East African Community, which is another milestone towards achieving security in the region. Rwanda is encouraged by the measures taken during the second regional Heads of State conclave on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, hosted by the Chairperson of the East African Community, His Excellency Mr. Uhuru Kenyatta, President of the Republic of Kenya, on 21 April 2021, three weeks after the Democratic Republic of the Congo officially joined the Community.

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  27. First and foremost, the Republic of Rwanda congratulates the United Kingdom on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April, and we express our appreciation for it having organized this important briefing. I thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary- General, Mr. Huang Xia, the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Ambassador Samuel Caholo, and the independent expert on the Great Lakes region, Mr. Dinesh Mahtani, for their insightful briefings. I also thank Security Council members for their statements. Today’s briefing is important on many counts. First, it comes at a time when the Great Lakes region economies and socioeconomic systems are overcoming the consequences of the coronavirus disease pandemic, which exacerbated pre-existing challenges in the region.

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source