YouSaid · the spoken record

Griffiths

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722
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2018-04-17
most recent
2023-10-18
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57
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un-security-council

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  1. I am also deeply concerned about the humanitarian consequences of fuel shortages in Ansar Allah- controlled parts of northern Yemen. I want to emphasize the importance of ensuring that civilians can regularly and reliably access adequate supplies of fuel and other essential goods. I know that Mark Lowcock will describe this as a basic principle of humanitarian protection and assistance. The flow of essential commercial imports, including food, fuel and medical supplies, and their distribution throughout Yemen to civilians are of course of the highest priority. I am also deeply concerned that Ansar Allah recently announced the closure of Sana’a airport to humanitarian flights.

    2020-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8757 (2020) · source

  2. If Ma’rib falls, simply put, this would undermine the prospects of convening an inclusive political process that brings about a transition based on partnership and plurality. In Al-Hudaydah, meanwhile, reports of ceasefire violations continue daily. The United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), led by Lieutenant General Guha, continues to experience restrictions that hamper the Mission’s operations. You, Mr. President, will recall the tragic shooting in March of Government of Yemen liaison officer Colonel Al-Sulayhi, who later died of his wounds. UNMHA is engaging with both parties to ensure such incidents do not reoccur, and to pave the way for a return to a functioning joint set-up overseen by the Redeployment Coordination Committee. These steps should further the implementation of the Hodeidah Agreement.

    2020-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8757 (2020) · source

  3. Heavy fighting continues to take place — if anything it has increased — along its front lines, including along the governorates’ borders with Al-Jawf, Sana’a and Al-Bayda governorates. The situation in Ma’rib is of concern in a number of different ways — principally, the high degree of loss of lives and the real threat to hundreds of thousands of people and others in need. Ma’rib has played the role in this war of a safe haven for those people displaced from other parts of Yemen who came to Ma’rib for safety. And a battle there, which is threatened, would tragically displace them yet again, forcing them to move yet further from their homes. The political importance of Ma’rib must also not be underestimated. Military shifts and consequences and events in Ma’rib have ripple effects on the dynamics of the conflict across Yemen.

    2020-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8757 (2020) · source

  4. Last week, I sent the two parties an advanced draft text of the joint declaration that, as you know, Mr. President, we have been negotiating over the past six months. The draft document reflects and balances the comments from prior rounds of the talks during those months and, importantly, I believe, incorporates inputs from civil society, women’s groups and other components of Yemen’s voice for peace. Now is the time for the parties to swiftly conclude the negotiations and finalize the joint declaration. My appeal at this time is very simple: choose peace; end this conflict; work with us urgently on the joint declaration. Nowhere is the importance of this choice more evident than in Ma’rib, the governorate to the east of Sana’a.

    2020-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8757 (2020) · source

  5. Mr. Griffiths: I thank you, Mr. President, for giving me this opportunity to brief the Security Council. Earlier this year, I warned that Yemen was at a critical juncture. I said that either the guns would be silenced, and the political process would resume, or Yemen would slip back away from that road to peace. Unfortunately, this is exactly what seems to be happening. Increased fighting, greater humanitarian needs and the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic are still taking their toll. That does not mean that, together, we cannot turn the corner and move back towards finding a solution to this conflict, but it requires the parties to choose and to decide. We all know what needs to be done and what choices need to be made if Yemen is to emerge successfully from this conflict.

    2020-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8757 (2020) · source

  6. I have said it before, and I hope I will not have to say it too often again: the coming period will test the political will of the parties to bring forward a breakthrough. I hope I can bring you better news, Mr. President, when next we meet.

    2020-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8753 (2020) · source

  7. There is a real risk that these negotiations will slip away, and that Yemen will enter a new phase of prolonged escalation, of the uncontrolled spread of the coronavirus, and of severe and threatening economic decline. The United Nations and all its entities are committed to doing all they can to support the parties in reaching an agreement that puts Yemen on a path towards a peaceful and prosperous future. Through you, Mr. President, I call on all Member States, including members of the Security Council, and others who have an interest in the stability and future of the region to lend their full support to us to persuade all involved to move forward with speed to a successful conclusion. But ultimately the responsibility lies with the parties to bring peace negotiations to a successful close.

    2020-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8753 (2020) · source

  8. I am grateful for the advice and guidance that we have received from them. My Office is fully committed to an inclusive mediation process, as is required, as Council members very well know, by resolution 2216 (2015). I will continue to engage with civil society actors, including through digital means. Gender inclusion is a high priority. I know it also a high priority of yours, Mr. President. My Office is systematically integrating gender perspectives into the joint declaration text and the planning to follow it in what we hope is its implementation. Finally, I continue to hope that the joint declaration negotiations will turn the tide away from these maudlin views, but towards peace. But I do not want to sugar-coat things today.

    2020-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8753 (2020) · source

  9. Tensions over State institutions persist in Aden and other areas, which are particularly troubling given the humanitarian context that Mr. Lowcock will describe. As we know, the Government of Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council are engaged in daily efforts in Riyadh under the auspices of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in order to reach agreement on moving forward on the Riyadh agreement. We had hoped to have specific news on that before today’s Council meeting; we are given to understand that there is some good news. We hope so. It is of extremely vital importance for all of us, as well as for the joint declaration and its process. The elements under negotiation in the joint declaration are important both for the parties and for the Yemeni people. We have seen intense debate among civil society and others around these issues.

    2020-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8753 (2020) · source

  10. The United Nations has it made clear to Ansar Allah that the team’s mission is to assess the condition of the tanker, undertake any initial possible repairs and formulate urgently needed recommendations on what further action is required. I think we can all agree that an independent and expert-driven assessment is of critical importance to allowing us to fully understand the scope, size and threat of this issue and the possible solutions to it. With Mr. Lowcock, I will keep the Council informed of any developments in this regard in the coming days and weeks. In the southern governorates, I am encouraged that there has been a reduction in the level of military activity in recent weeks, owing to the efforts of the parties, despite some limited casualties at the front lines in Abyan.

    2020-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8753 (2020) · source

  11. It is a deserved entitlement of these people, but it is also of extraordinary importance in terms of the humanitarian requirements of Yemen. It has been two weeks since the Security Council’s meeting (see S/2020/721) under the German presidency on the FSO SAFER, the decaying oil tanker that is threatening to spill over 1 million barrels of oil into the Red Sea. At that meeting, Mr. Lowcock and others raised the alarm yet again about the immense environmental and humanitarian threat posed by the tanker. At the beginning of this month, Ansar Allah confirmed in writing to us that they would authorize a long-planned United Nations-supervised technical mission to the tanker. However, we are still awaiting the permissions necessary for the team to deploy.

    2020-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8753 (2020) · source

  12. Through the President of the Council and the Council itself, I urge the parties to engage constructively with the proposals that are in front of them so that the Yemeni people can get the fuel they desperately need. In addition, as the parties know well, they also urgently need to agree on a mechanism to disburse revenues from Al-Hudaydah port — as was agreed in Sweden 18 months ago, as a contribution towards civil servant salaries. My Office has consistently endeavoured to support the parties in reaching an agreement on paying civil servant salaries to all Yemenis, based on the 2014 payroll database. I repeat it here because there are some who publicly deny it. These civil servants have the right to receive their salaries in full and on time. We will continue to engage the parties on proposals to achieve this vitally important goal.

    2020-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8753 (2020) · source

  13. Those efforts are ongoing. The humanitarian consequences of the impasse grow greater by the day, and this situation cannot continue. It is essential that all obstacles to imports and the domestic distribution of fuel and other goods vital for the civilian population be removed. The Government of Yemen has taken the positive step of clearing a number of fuel ships in recent weeks, and we encourage them to continue to release more ships. I want to stress our position on this because it is frequently misunderstood. Of course, we need, want and would like to see those ships entering Al-Hudaydah port. Nevertheless, that can only provide temporary relief. We have shared ideas with the parties about how to move forward in the immediate term, prior to a joint declaration agreement, but a long-term solution is needed.

    2020-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8753 (2020) · source

  14. Lowcock will explain, food prices are rising, the currency is depreciating and most Yemenis do not have enough money in their pockets to meet their basic needs. There are no quick fixes to Yemen’s economic problems, but the parties need to agree on steps to keep the economy out of the conflict. It is the people of Yemen who suffer when the economy is weaponized and politicized. The joint declaration process seeks to reach agreement between the parties on key economic and humanitarian measures that can finally bring at least some tangible results to improve people’s lives. We look to the parties to agree quickly on mechanisms to make that happen. Last month, I informed the Council that we were engaging the parties to find a solution to allow for the continued and regular entrance of ships carrying oil derivatives into Al-Hudaydah port.

    2020-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8753 (2020) · source

  15. In Al-Hudaydah, the level of violence has not relented and there has been an increase in the number of ceasefire violations. The Redeployment Coordination Committee and the joint mechanisms to implement the Al-Hudaydah Agreement are still not functioning. I am sure we will hear later on this from my colleague General Guha. His Mission, the United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement, continues efforts to overcome the mistrust between the parties and to restore dialogue, at a minimum, between them. In a further sign of how life is becoming even more difficult for Yemenis — and I apologize that this briefing is gloomy in many ways — the economic indicators are all pointing in the wrong direction. As Mr.

    2020-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8753 (2020) · source

  16. The strategic importance of Ma’rib should not be underestimated, and that is why we have frequently made reference to it. I call for immediate and urgent steps for de-escalation now more than ever, on the eve of Eid Al-Adha. Of course, my Office stands ready to support all efforts to that end. I am concerned — and I am sure that Mr. Lowcock will be more so — about the missile attacks that have threatened and injured civilians in Ma’rib. I have been dismayed by civilian fatalities, including many children, caused by aerial attacks in Al-Jawf and Hajjah. Like Mr. Lowcock, I condemn all attacks against civilians and civilian objects. I call on all sides to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law to protect civilians, in general, and children, in particular.

    2020-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8753 (2020) · source

  17. I hope that they will make the necessary compromises to reach their agreement — not mine — one that meets the aspirations of the Yemeni people. Unfortunately, even as the negotiations continue — and as we will hear from all the briefers today much more cogently than from me — for Yemenis across the country, life has become even more unforgiving. I am sure that Mr. Mark Lowcock will tell us that Yemen is experiencing the worst of times. The military situation has not improved over the past month. The continued military campaign against Ma’rib has had profound humanitarian and economic consequences, and it could easily undermine the prospects of reaching agreement on a ceasefire for the whole country and the ending of the shooting war.

    2020-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8753 (2020) · source

  18. I warned then that we had a reached a delicate moment with much at stake. Those negotiations have now been ongoing for four months. Both parties have provided feedback on various drafts and proposals, but they have yet to reach agreement on a final text. The process, as we discussed the last time, has been long and challenging. It has experienced bursts of momentum as well as very significant hurdles. That is normal, I suppose, for any mediation process that addresses issues of great importance to the parties. But it is important that both parties continue to engage in the process. The negotiations must be concluded before the window of opportunity of these months of early summer closes. As a mediator — not as a negotiator — I continue to attempt to bridge the divides between the parties’ positions.

    2020-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8753 (2020) · source

  19. Mr. Griffiths: I welcome those joining us from Sana’a. I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council. I want to start by congratulating the Muslims in Yemen and around the world on the occasion of Eid Al-Adha, which comes towards the end of this week. May this Eid bring to the people of Yemen calm, health and safety. The last time I briefed the Council, a month or more ago, I outlined the substance of the United Nations- brokered negotiations between the Government of Yemen and Ansar Allah. To recall: those negotiations seek to reach agreement on a joint declaration that will include a nationwide ceasefire, economic and humanitarian measures and the resumption of the political process aimed at comprehensively resolving and ending the conflict.

    2020-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8753 (2020) · source

  20. President, so as to ensure that the people of Yemen know what is on offer and in prospect. During a transition, power will need to be shared among different political and social components, including women, of course, and civil society, in the spirit of partnership and consensus. Transitional security arrangements will need to be agreed in order to provide for the security of Yemen’s people and to lead towards the State’s monopoly over the use of force. Lastly, the Yemeni people will need guarantees of humanitarian relief, reconstruction and economic recovery across the country to ensure that the suffering caused by the war is relegated to the past. We all hope that that will soon become the reality for Yemen.

    2020-03-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8745 (2020) · source

  21. Sana’a’s airport must be opened for commercial flights to alleviate the suffering of the Yemeni people. These are crucial humanitarian measures — and none of them are particularly new — and they must not become the subject of politicization. However, there is a limit to how much we can achieve in the absence of that political process to which I referred. We must maintain the focus — and I pledge that we will — on reviving a process that ushers into Yemen an inclusive transition away from conflict. As Council members know, we have consulted widely among Yemenis — and will continue to do so — on the key elements of such a transition. Several common themes have emerged, and I have communicated them publicly to the Security Council before, but they bear repeating, if you would allow me, Mr.

    2020-03-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8745 (2020) · source

  22. My Office has continued to work with them, as has the International Committee of the Red Cross, to fulfil that promise. Meanwhile, the World Health Organization continues its efforts aimed at ensuring that the medical air-bridge flights, which have Cairo as their next destination, operate, thereby allowing Yemeni patients to travel abroad for medical assistance that they cannot receive in Sana’a. But much more must be done. All parties bear a responsibility to ease the impact of war on civilians. They must work assiduously on prisoner exchanges and on opening and securing access roads in Taiz, Al-Hudaydah, Ma’rib and elsewhere; we discussed that very issue in Ma’rib with the Governor to whom I have referred earlier in my briefing. The parties must also work on ensuring the payment of public-sector salaries across the country.

    2020-03-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8745 (2020) · source

  23. During my meetings with them, they emphasized the importance of including in political negotiations a diverse array of Yemenis, including women, youth, and tribal and social leaders. I completely agree with that call and that need and that requirement, and I will continue to work to get the parties to ensure the full representation of women in political consultations. Indeed, I raised the matter earlier today in Sana’a. Despite this bleak season, the parties have indeed exhibited some willingness to continue engaging in confidence-building measures with a humanitarian purpose. As Council members know, the parties are taking important steps towards finally implementing the agreement that they reached in mid-February, again in Amman, on a large-scale exchange of prisoners.

    2020-03-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8745 (2020) · source

  24. On 26 and 27 February, my Office convened a group of Yemeni public and political figures here in Amman — and I am grateful for the Government of Jordan for allowing that meeting to go ahead — and these figures expressed a shared view that a durable peace can only emerge from a negotiated political settlement. Many participants called for the prompt resumption of a comprehensive political process with no preconditions. Several expressed a frustration, which I share, that the political process has been stalled since the last round of official peace talks, which took place in Kuwait in 2016, three and a half years ago. Over a third of the participants at that meeting were Yemeni women leaders.

    2020-03-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8745 (2020) · source

  25. I would like to add that I join the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in its statement condemning the death sentences handed down by a court in Sana’a to 35 Yemeni parliamentarians earlier this month. To say the least, the fragmentation and politicization of the judiciary and other institutions is a serious cause for concern. Despite the alarm I am expressing today, I also want to share with the Security Council the messages I have heard from Yemenis that reassure me that, despite all the foregoing, the expeditious resumption of a peaceful political process remains within reach.

    2020-03-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8745 (2020) · source

  26. It is imperative that the parties agree to participate in a public, accountable, nationwide de-escalation mechanism that quiets the tempo of war and steers Yemen off this precarious path I have been describing. I repeated this call when I was in Ma’rib on 7 March, and I have received initial, positive responses from the parties. These reactions must now translate into tangible commitments on the ground. Any de-escalation discussion should also be reinforced by efforts to resume the political process, which is also a subject we have discussed in this Chamber. The de-escalation and the political tracks should be supported and enhanced by an expeditious move to seriously address certain issues that have tangible effects on people’s lives and, as confidence-building measures, build confidence between the parties.

    2020-03-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8745 (2020) · source

  27. Clashes have continued in the Nihm district of Sana’a governorate — and we have discussed that in the Security Council before (see S/PV.8725) — and in the governorates of Al-Dhale’e, Shabwah, Taiz and Saada. In short, as we have discussed before, there is a real risk of a protracted military escalation across much of Yemen. We must do all we can to support the parties in containing and reversing the current trajectory. As Council members know, since the start of the escalation in January, I have been calling publicly for the parties to agree to an immediate and unconditional military de-escalation and to work with my Office to achieve that goal.

    2020-03-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8745 (2020) · source

  28. Under the leadership of my colleague General Guha, the United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), approved, of course, by the Security Council, is working to mediate and restore trust between the parties after yesterday’s events. I call on both parties to work through the established mechanisms to recover that calm. I should add that UNMHA continues to face movement restrictions. For example, its patrols have not been granted access to the city of Al-Hudaydah since 20 October 2019, which, naturally enough, hampers the implementation of its mandate. I am also observing with much concern the violence elsewhere in the country.

    2020-03-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8745 (2020) · source

  29. I met with Ma’rib tribal representatives and communal figures living in Sana’a to listen to their views and concerns about the conflict in Ma’rib. To be very clear — I wish to be very clear — there is no justification for military escalation in Ma’rib. Ma’rib must not become the next epicentre of Yemen’s tragic conflict. The governorate of Al-Hudaydah continues to experience clashes, particularly in the city and in the southern part of the governorate, and civilian casualties are, regrettably, increasing. Developments since yesterday’s distressing and indeed tragic incident at the joint observation post in the city of Al-Hudaydah threaten to undermine the de-escalation mechanism put in place and the achievements of the Redeployment Coordination Committee.

    2020-03-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8745 (2020) · source

  30. In Ma’rib, I met with local Government officials, political parties, tribal chiefs, civil society leaders, including women and youth, and persons displaced by the conflict. Let me, through the Council, thank the Governor of that governorate, Governor Al-Arada, for all his support and hospitality shown to me on that day. I listened to the concerns of all those I met about the military escalation and the humanitarian challenges, and I assured them of the commitment of my Office to supporting peace in Yemen. I heard from the people in Ma’rib a strong demand for peace, but not a peace that would be dictated from a position of military dominance. In Sana’a, from which I have just come, I also discussed the need to stop the fighting in Ma’rib governorate.

    2020-03-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8745 (2020) · source

  31. Rajasingham, and are in critical need of shelter and assistance. This escalation could trigger conflicts in other governorates and drag Yemen downwards into a new and irresponsible cycle of violence. This would have devastating humanitarian and political consequences. It would gravely endanger civilians and delay the long- awaited and much-needed political process aimed at bringing this war to a comprehensive close. The parties must therefore exercise maximum restraint to prevent such a terrible outcome. It is imperative that they uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law. Indiscriminate attacks affecting civilians or civilian objects are unlawful and reprehensible. Over the last week, I travelled to Yemen to stress the need to stop the fighting.

    2020-03-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8745 (2020) · source

  32. Mr. Griffiths: I thank you very much indeed, Sir, for giving me the opportunity to brief the Security Council. The last time I did so (see S/PV.8725), I warned that the military situation in Yemen was growing increasingly dire. Today, I see the country at a critical juncture. The parties to the conflict will either move Yemen towards de-escalation and the resumption of the political process, or, I fear, towards greater violence and suffering that will make the path to the negotiating table more arduous. The most alarming military escalation has taken place in Al-Jawf, the governorate to the east of Sana’a. I am deeply concerned about the rationale driving these escalations and the impact of the violence on Al-Jawf’s people. Thousands of families have been displaced by the recent fighting, as I think we will hear from Mr.

    2020-03-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8745 (2020) · source

  33. I insist that it is time for us to recall them here and to hope that we will soon see their realization when the political will is truly there. I am sometimes accused of impatience, but now we see why. Hesitance on the political track allows the war drums to beat louder and allows provocations to spiral and multiply. The hard work of the parties is at grave risk of being undone. The parties must display the courage that I know they have to set aside short- term military goals and make a sustained, tangible and irreversible commitment to the political process.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8725 (2020) · source

  34. With the encouragement of the Council, we are actively working towards that goal and the re-establishment of truly inclusive de-escalation arrangements, but we realize that a reduction in violence is not enough. That has been the lesson of the past two months. We need the parties to unite around a vision for a post-conflict Yemen that is in line with the relevant Security Council resolutions. It is perhaps timely to recall those elements — a genuinely inclusive Government and a political transition process; a military and security arrangement and sector that safeguards all Yemenis; the chance for reconstruction and the revitalization of the country’s institutions and economy; and, finally, an acceptance that enmities must end even while differences remain. Those are reasonable, achievable goals, and they are no secret.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8725 (2020) · source

  35. Everything I have heard from Yemeni leaders in the almost two years that I have had the privilege of serving the Secretary-General and the Council in this assignment points to a core principle that I wish to emphasize today — peace in Yemen can emerge only from a political compromise between both parties through a process mediated by the United Nations, our process, which we discuss each time we meet. It will not be dictated or successfully resolved from a position of military dominance. Engagement in the United Nations process must be unconditional. It cannot be secondary to territorial gain, particularly when — as we have so vividly seen in Yemen — there is no military solution to the conflict. How do we move from here to the launch, at last, of that process?

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8725 (2020) · source

  36. The United Nations is committed, ready and prepared to send objective technical experts to undertake an assessment and initial repair, to be immediately followed by permanent arrangements to address the threat and make that vessel safe. In my briefing last August (see S/PV.8598), I informed the Council, to my slight shame, that a date had been agreed for the assessment to occur later that month, but it never happened. The assessment mission must take place immediately and unconditionally, without further delay.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8725 (2020) · source

  37. We must hope that the confidence they have built has not completely gone to waste. However, my fear is that, as this briefing suggests, such confidence, trust and relationships are becoming increasingly fragile. I am also acutely alarmed by the lack of progress in addressing the threat posed by the FSO SAFER oil tanker, which we have discussed on previous occasions in the Chamber. The tanker’s condition is deteriorating by the day. Any rupture could spill more than 1 million barrels of oil into the Red Sea, causing an environmental and economic catastrophe for Yemen and its neighbours. We are all on notice of that potential catastrophe. That threat — which we discuss every time we visit Sana’a — must be dealt with on a purely technical basis, without politicization.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8725 (2020) · source

  38. Despite that small but significant sign of hope, many thousands of patients in need of medical care abroad remain in Sana’a, where such care is not available. For their sake, the medical air bridge must operate regularly and not just as a temporary solution. I know that my good friend and colleague, Ms. Lise Grande, United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, and Mr. Altaf Musani, the World Health Organization’s representative in Yemen, are working very hard to make that happen. I am sure Council members will join me in hoping that those efforts bear fruit. Overall, the progress on those humanitarian measures shows us that, even in this bleak situation, the parties can work together and situation across the table from one another to relieve the suffering of the Yemeni people.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8725 (2020) · source

  39. That positive step follows the release from prison by Ansar Allah, supported by our colleagues in UNICEF, of 68 boys encountered during military operations. The boys are now in interim care and — I am glad to say — being united with their families. I encourage Ansar Allah to continue to engage with the United Nations and UNICEF in order to make progress in addressing violations of children’s rights. Furthermore, during the first half of February, the first two medical air bridge flights transported 28 patients from Sana’a for medical assistance abroad. I once again commend the commitment of the parties and the support of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for that humanitarian measure. I am also grateful to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Egyptian Government, which will host additional patients.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8725 (2020) · source

  40. And it is a sign that the parties are prepared to progress towards their commitment to eventually release — “all for all” — all those deprived of their liberty in relation to the conflict. I heartily commend the Government of Yemen and Ansar Allah for their positive engagement and for making the concessions required to make progress. I was present during those discussions; the atmosphere to enable those concessions was unmistakable. I also thank the coalition, of course, but also the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for hosting the meeting. We all look forward to the implementation of the agreed releases as soon as possible. I should add that, as usual, that process benefits from the unique value of the International Committee of the Red Cross, with which we are very proud to be partners.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8725 (2020) · source

  41. However, I fear — and I know this would be true of my colleague Lieutenant General Guha as well — that the escalations elsewhere could pose a challenge to his efforts to maintain calm in Al-Hudaydah and distract the parties from the implementation of the Agreement. Despite the unremittingly dire military situation, the parties have made significant progress in their efforts to build confidence and provide relief for those who are suffering. Between 10 and 16 February, the parties met in Amman and agreed to exchange prisoners and detainees, in line with the executive mechanism agreed in Stockholm 14 months ago. That is a firm commitment from the parties to the families that they will be reunited with their loved ones.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8725 (2020) · source

  42. In December 2018, the parties reached the Al-Hudaydah Agreement in Stockholm based on the shared goals of avoiding military operations in the city and ensuring the passage of humanitarian and commercial goods through the three ports. We must not lose sight of those goals. The escalations on other fronts have raised tensions and led to greater volatility in Al-Hudaydah but have not yet had a major impact on the overall military situation — a small blessing, but one we must be happy for. The United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), led by Lieutenant General Guha, is striving to maintain cooperation between the parties, despite continued operational challenges and restrictions on the freedom of movement.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8725 (2020) · source

  43. The leaderships of both parties have the ability and responsibility to rein in the violence, scale down the rhetoric and commit to a more sustainable de-escalation. Prior to the recent increase in violence, the parties — as we observed in the Council — had considerably reduced the number of airstrikes and cross-border aerial attacks. That de-escalation had a strong, positive impact on the prospect of peace, and indeed can do so again if the parties are committed. I am concerned that the escalations may also threaten the progress made in Al-Hudaydah, where the situation is vulnerable to an increase in violence.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8725 (2020) · source

  44. Reports of airstrikes and cross-border aerial attacks have increased considerably. I am distressed — as we all must be — by reports of dozens, and perhaps hundreds, of civilian casualties, displacement of families and damage to schools and hospitals. Women and children continue to suffer the most from several attacks. Yemeni journalists and civil- society activists have also continued to face severe pressure and restrictions. The parties have reassured me many times of their belief in a peaceful, political solution to the conflict. But peace cannot be taken for granted. It requires continuous commitment and the nurturing of a political process to make it happen. The escalation I just described directly contradicts the parties’ desire to move in that direction.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8725 (2020) · source

  45. Mr. Griffiths: We are witnessing in Yemen what we have long feared. Since October, I have briefed the Security Council several times on the signs of hope and momentum towards peace. But, at the same time, we have all been acutely aware that renewed violence could reverse the gains made, render peace more difficult and inflict even more severe humanitarian consequences on the population. Since we last met (see S/PV.8704), the military situation over the past month has grown increasingly dire. Both sides have announced expansive military goals and exchanged fierce rhetoric. Most of the heavy fighting has taken place in the Nihm district of Sana’a governorate and in Al-Jawf, Ma’rib and Sa’dah governorates. Front lines that had been quiet for several months have been drawn into the escalation.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8725 (2020) · source

  46. Yemen has recently been brushed by potential tragedy from regional tensions and, so far, appears to have emerged unscathed. That is evidence of the leaders’ desire to keep Yemen safe from such tensions, but it is a fragile safety and one that needs our diligent and continuing attention if we are to deliver on our promise to the people of Yemen so that, this year, they may see the peace they so evidently deserve.

    2020-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8704 (2020) · source

  47. All of these initiatives and the measures associated with them support the urgent search for a political solution and the end of the conflict in Yemen. That pursuit is not dependent on the success of any one of them but reinforced by the success of all of them. With each positive step, we are brought closer to formally launching political consultations between the Government of Yemen and Ansar Allah. I have spoken about that in the Council on a number of occasions, with the hope that we see that happen soon. Indeed, the significance and meaning of the initiatives to which I have alluded will become real only in the context of such a political solution to end the conflict. We have discussed in this Chamber and at consultations the need for impatience in that respect.

    2020-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8704 (2020) · source

  48. I truly hope that, by the time we meet next month, we will have seen the first flight completed. Certainly, the release of six Saudi detainees by Ansar Allah on 1 January is further evidence of good will between the parties. I thank Ansar Allah for that important humanitarian gesture and the International Committee of the Red Cross for its support in moving the detainees from Yemen to Saudi Arabia. However, it falls short of the aspirations of the parties under the Stockholm Agreement and discussions on the release of many thousands of prisoners and detainees. We continue to hope that the parties can make that happen soon, and, for our part, I intend to convene the prisoner- exchange committee created under the Stockholm Agreement in the coming days with the intention of achieving substantive numbers of prisoner releases.

    2020-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8704 (2020) · source

  49. Turning briefly to further confidence-building measures, the proposal for so-called mercy flights refers to a World Health Organization (WHO) project negotiated by WHO with the Government of Yemen and Ansar Allah over many months. Those flights will transport patients who need medical attention unavailable in Yemen to agreed locations abroad. In recent weeks, WHO has benefited from an extraordinary array of diplomatic support to make those flights happen. Indeed, the coalition has provided its own support for the project in a statement of 26 November 2019 and a number of Member States have intervened at the highest levels to clear away any obstacles to that project. We thank them for their diligence. We are very close to seeing the first flight move 30 patients, who are waiting in Sana’a, for their treatment.

    2020-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8704 (2020) · source

  50. I mentioned before to the Council (see S/PV.8672) that we have seen considerable progress related to the entry of fuel ships into Al-Hudaydah and the collection of revenues, as agreed in the Stockholm Agreement. From the establishment of that mechanism in November 2019 until the end of the year, more fuel has been delivered to Al-Hudaydah than in any other equivalent period in 2019 and the taxes have been collected and deposited in an account in the Central Bank in Al-Hudaydah. We are working with the parties to reach an agreement on how those revenues can be used urgently to contribute to paying the salaries of civil servants, as set out in the Stockholm Agreement.

    2020-01-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8704 (2020) · source