YouSaid · the spoken record

Griffiths

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722
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2018-04-17
most recent
2023-10-18
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57
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un-security-council

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  1. We are very encouraged by Russia’s assurance — which is not merely a distinction, but an important fact — that it is not pulling out of the Initiative, as some have said, but is only temporarily suspending activities in the implementation of the Initiative. The Russian Federation has deployed a highly professional team at the Joint Coordination Centre for its implementation, and it is still there. We look forward to welcoming it back as a full and active participant as soon as possible in the fulfilment of reaching the goals that we have all agreed and signed up to. We have had many discussions, and the United Nations is ready to address concerns and listen to suggestions from all sides as we approach the 120-day extension point on 19 November, when the Initiative can be renewed, with no one objecting.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9176 (2022) · source

  2. For me, as the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the thought of even more global hunger next year is the nightmare that we face. I particularly welcome the pledges from both Russia and Ukraine to donate food to support humanitarian relief operations in the world’s hardest-hit and most hungry nations. It is a heartening sign that both sides recognize the special responsibilities they share. As I am sure Ms. Grynspan will explore and explain much better than I, when the Chicago Board of Trade opened today wheat prices jumped as a result of recent events. Each fraction of a percentage point pushes someone, somewhere over the line into extreme poverty. Insurers tell us that their premiums may leap by a quarter or a half for shipping crossing the Black Sea.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9176 (2022) · source

  3. Mark my words — when things go awry, as they are doing now, we can all see how much good it can do and has been doing. We insist, as we have all along, that the exports from both of these global breadbaskets — Ukraine and Russia — are vital. We need unimpeded exports from both. Of course, Ms. Grynspan will brief the Council in more detail, but let me also say very clearly that we hope and expect all Member States to work to support the implementation of the memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and the Russian Federation, also signed on 22 July, to ensure that their own food and fertilizer exports can expeditiously reach global markets. If we cannot get more fertilizer out, we face even worse shortages next year.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9176 (2022) · source

  4. However, in the days leading up to Russia’s suspension of its participation, it is true that the process had been getting bogged down, owing to insufficient inspection capacity. Food for millions was stuck in a maritime traffic jam in the Bosporus, visible from above. Ships’ captains were calling in, desperate to get moved up through the queue. That meant that we lost time, the shipping industry lost money and we were delaying food delivery. We need to get back to the status quo ante, when we were able to export those millions of tons. I want to point out that some have questioned the value of this quite extraordinary effort. They have said that it is not enough, that the food is going to the wrong places and that it is the wrong type of food.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9176 (2022) · source

  5. The searches have come up with plenty of minor inconsistencies — missing paperwork, some sacks of rice swept from a previous cargo shipment, a crew member’s passport wrongly recorded. More seriously, the Joint Coordination Centre’s teams have battled to maintain a balance between safety and rigour when inspecting cargo that has been fumigated with toxic insecticide. The Joint Coordination Centre has recorded some 60 navigational deviations from the agreed corridors in more than 820 voyages facilitated by the Initiative. On more than 100 occasions, when problems have been raised, the Joint Coordination Centre process has been comprehensive and exhaustive. Corrective measures have been agreed by consensus. It is not the easiest format for countries at war to work with, but until now it has worked, to their great credit.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9176 (2022) · source

  6. We stand ready to discuss any concerns about the Initiative and its implementation. We continue to rely on the key contribution of Türkiye as mediator, facilitator and host. The Joint Coordination Centre’s operations are an open book — or perhaps I should say an open database. The journeys of cargo vessels in the Initiative can be tracked in real time on public websites. All parties share the same information about ships, cargo, inspection and destinations. The data for the 9.5 million tons of shipments to date has been accessed more than 70,000 times on the United Nations website. The rigorous joint inspections, including by Russian inspectors and all parties to the Initiative, have combed through the storage holds, engine rooms and tanks of ships more than 800 times.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9176 (2022) · source

  7. Those elements come into play when a ship passes through those lines on the sea. Thirdly, turning to the alleged misuse of cargo vessels in the Initiative for military purposes, none were in the corridor on the night of 29 October, when the reported attacks took place. No vessel reported an incident over the weekend. We are therefore ready to consider an inquiry into any evidence that is reported to us in the Joint Coordination Centre. All sides decided, within the Joint Coordination Centre, that the Initiative would be entirely civilian in nature. Rather than escorts, as had been previously envisaged by some, or patrols, the safety of shipping is protected by the commitments of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Both commit not to attack ships and related port facilities, under paragraph C of the agreement signed in Istanbul on 22 July.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9176 (2022) · source

  8. I wish to stress three points related to the alleged connection between the Black Sea Grain Initiative and the Sevastopol attacks and damage to Russian military vessels and infrastructure. First, to be clear: no military vessels, aircraft or assets belonging to any party are, or have been, involved in support of the Initiative. They are not required. In fact, they are prohibited from approaching closer than 10 nautical miles to the cargo ships, according to the procedures agreed by all parties. Secondly, the corridor itself is just lines on a chart. When Black Sea Grain Initiative vessels are not in the area, the corridor has no special status. It provides neither cover nor protection for offensive or defensive military action. It is not a shield or a hideout. It is not a no-go zone.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9176 (2022) · source

  9. When a ship’s captain recently reported seeing a possible floating mine, the Joint Coordination Centre agreed by consensus to pause shipping. It allowed a Ukrainian tugboat, accompanied by a search- and-rescue vessel at a distance, to search the area. Nothing was found, and the Joint Coordination Centre decided to resume shipping the next day. I cite that as an example of the Joint Coordination Centre’s functioning. That is why Russia’s intended suspension is concerning. There is a painstaking process in the Joint Coordination Centre to arrive at consensus on matters large and small, even when a hot war is raging. The Joint Coordination Centre has to be — and is — meticulously impartial. The corridor has been tranquil. The ships sailed, the food flowed, prices dropped and hope rose again.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9176 (2022) · source

  10. Over the weekend, the Secretary-General heard from our Russian colleagues of their intention to suspend their participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative, the reasons for which I am sure they will share with us today. It would indeed be a grave abuse of the Black Sea Grain Initiative if it were used in any way for military operational advantage. The United Nations has the solemn privilege of assisting the parties in implementing this unique arrangement. Acting as the secretariat, the United Nations is ready to investigate, along with the Member States party to the Initiative, any and all evidence presented, if requested. The Joint Coordination Centre, which comprises representatives of all four signatories to the Initiative, has established and agreed processes for such incidents and accidents.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9176 (2022) · source

  11. Mr. Griffiths: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity. A total of 38 countries have purchased some 9 million tons of grain from Ukraine under the Black Sea Grain Initiative. As has been noted, not all of it has gone to the neediest countries but all of it has a humanitarian impact — the reduction of prices and the calming of market volatility. Ukraine’s grain exports are not a food aid operation, but they operate as a huge lever on price, with positive ripple effects throughout the world. New security allegations are cause for grave concern to the Secretary-General, and many Member States are now worried that the deal is in trouble. It is therefore a privilege for me to brief the Security Council on this particular matter today.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9176 (2022) · source

  12. Yet if we want to invest in resilience; if we want to shelter the peoples of those countries from a repetition of the shocks of this year; and if we want Somalia to survive the famines that will come later this year and into next year, we need the attention of the climate community and the money pledged by Member States, most — if not all — of which has not yet reached its destination.

    2022-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9133 (2022) · source

  13. Fourthly, they must sustain humanitarian financing for those crises. In all those countries, we are well below half of the required funding. Without those resources, we will do little. Finally, I want to highlight an issue that, as I have already mentioned, is central to peace and security: climate change. I have just come back from Somalia and a 10-day visit to Pakistan with the Secretary- General, where the absolute clarity of purpose that we tried to express in those visits was that the impact of climate change is felt variously by those who did little to create it. Access to climate financing remains pitifully little — Somalia has received nothing.

    2022-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9133 (2022) · source

  14. We may hope to see that in Yemen and elsewhere; we may plead to see that in Ethiopia. Secondly, they must remind and encourage States and armed groups to abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. They must not take any actions that threaten the survival of civilians, and they must ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief. I say that knowing full well how absurd that may seem to some. Thirdly, they must support an integrated response to address the underlying drivers of acute food insecurity. That is a matter of supporting the economies of countries facing severe large-scale hunger. The issues of economic collapse and shocks also related to the climate are those increasingly becoming the agenda of humanitarian action.

    2022-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9133 (2022) · source

  15. Turning to north-east Nigeria, we project that 4.1 million people are facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the conflict-affected states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. They include 588,000 people who already faced emergency levels between June and August, almost half of whom were inaccessible to our colleagues due to insecurity. Therefore, food security assessments could not be conducted in those areas, but we can deduce and fear that some people may already be at the level of catastrophe and are dying. Our white note recommends specific steps for each country. Member States could take the following actions in all four of those places and well beyond. First, they must leave no stone unturned in the pursuit of peaceful and negotiated resolutions to conflicts and other situations of violence.

    2022-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9133 (2022) · source

  16. Beasley will speak on the World Food Programme’s assessment, but one in February also found very worrisome food insecurity in parts of Afar and Amhara. We saw some recent improvements in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in northern Ethiopia, but that is done now. The resumption of hostilities in recent weeks is undoing that progress. Elsewhere in Ethiopia, in parts of Benishangul-Gumuz and southern and western Oromia, food insecurity and malnutrition are also believed to be extremely high. The prediction of famine in the Horn of Africa will not be limited to Somalia, and the numbers of people at risk in Ethiopia dwarf even the level of stress that we see in Somalia.

    2022-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9133 (2022) · source

  17. Assessments project that 87,000 people, mostly in Jonglei state and the Greater Pibor Administrative Area, could face catastrophe in the form of Integrated Phase Classification 5. I should add that South Sudan was one of the most dangerous places to be an aid worker last year, with 319 violent incidents targeting humanitarian personnel and assets. Five aid workers — our colleagues — were killed in 2021, and five more have died since the beginning of this year, while doing their best to get people the help they need and deserve. In Ethiopia, more than 13 million people need life-saving food assistance across Afar, Amhara and Tigray. In June, 87 per cent of people surveyed in Tigray were food insecure, more than half of them severely so. I am sure that Mr.

    2022-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9133 (2022) · source

  18. Disruptions to commercial imports could also exacerbate food insecurity — a prospect that has become very real over recent weeks, as we will hear from the other briefers, as a lack of funding threatens the operations of the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen, which inspects all commercial imports, including food, to Yemen’s Red Sea ports. We hope that particular funding gap will quickly be addressed so that we can avoid a shutdown of the Mechanism due on 1 October. In South Sudan, 63 per cent of the population, or 7.7 million people, were projected to be in crisis — or worse, at catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity — during the peak season this year.

    2022-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9133 (2022) · source

  19. The Secretary-General has made it clear recently, in both public and private statements, that climate change is here. It stalks the land. If I may, I will offer a brief snapshot of the situation in each of those countries in crisis. In Yemen, I know all too well that more than seven years of armed conflict have wreaked havoc on people across the country. Some 19 million people — six out of 10 — are acutely food insecure. An estimated 160,000 people are facing catastrophe, as per the Integrated Phase Classification 5 that I mentioned, and 538,000 children are severely malnourished. The situation there may worsen due to funding gaps for the humanitarian response and continuing economic instability.

    2022-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9133 (2022) · source

  20. Humanitarians will stay and deliver, but the conditions in some contexts are simply too difficult and unacceptable. Other drivers of hunger, including drought — which I will come back to — the effects of the coronavirus disease pandemic and rising global commodity prices are also compounding food insecurity and misery. The secondary impacts of the war in Ukraine are also among the drivers of food insecurity in many armed conflicts, increasing food and fertilizer prices and contributing to spikes in energy prices. Finally, although we are here to discuss the link between conflict and hunger, I would be remiss if I did not point out that every single one of the countries I mentioned, people are quite literally on the front lines of climate change. People are feeling the impact of climate change first.

    2022-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9133 (2022) · source

  21. In the most extreme and egregious of cases, the fighting parties have deliberately cut off access to the commercial supplies and essential services that civilians rely on to survive. Hunger is sometimes used as a tactic of war. Humanitarian organizations have extended relief lifelines to people in all those crises, working with local aid groups — again, the front-line responders who are the first to deal with trouble and the first to understand the suffering of their people. Sometimes they are the only ones there on the ground. Too often, we all face interference, impediments, harassment and attacks on our staff and our reputations and the looting or diversion of assets. That prevents us from reaching people in need and it makes their suffering worse.

    2022-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9133 (2022) · source

  22. It simply does not get any worse than that, and it is rare for people to return from it. This widespread suffering comes down to the direct and indirect impact of conflict and violence, as well as the behaviour of the fighting parties. A similar pattern recurs in each context: civilians are killed and injured; families are forcibly displaced from the land they depend on for their livelihoods and their food; explosive remnants of war disrupt people’s access to markets, agricultural production and income generation; civilian infrastructure and equipment essential for people’s food security are stolen, damaged or destroyed; and food stocks are looted and livestock is killed. In those contexts, economic decline and rising prices have put sufficient food out of reach for the most vulnerable.

    2022-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9133 (2022) · source

  23. And the Secretary-General recently wrote to all Member States to convey his concern. More than 200,000 people are already at risk of famine. That number is expected to reach 300,000 very soon, as I imagine we will hear from our colleagues from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and from the World Food Programme. Famine will happen in Somalia, and we feel it will not be the only place either. In the four contexts I mentioned, recent assessments have identified hundreds of thousands of people facing catastrophic levels of hunger — or phase 5 of the Integrated Phase Classification system, which monitors food security and food insecurity worldwide. As we have all come to know, phase 5 is the system’s ultimate, most devastating phase.

    2022-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9133 (2022) · source

  24. Mr. Griffiths: Four years ago, the Security Council made a connection between its responsibility to maintain peace and security and its commitment to address food insecurity and conflict-induced hunger. At that time, the Council asked to be swiftly informed when the risk of conflict-induced famine and widespread food insecurity occurred. That risk, as we will hear and discuss today, is now upon us; and so, regretfully, here we are again today. Last month, we shared a white note to highlight four contexts where this risk is clear: Ethiopia, north- east Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen. Of course, food insecurity has reached alarming levels in other situations that also demand our attention, such as Afghanistan and Somalia — and you, Madam President, may perhaps permit me to make reference to Somalia before I conclude.

    2022-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9133 (2022) · source

  25. That, we need to remember, is the kind of light that the people of Syria pursue. The centre now needs additional support, and we will all see what we can do to make that happen. In that context, we asked her whether she remained optimistic — and let me now echo Ms. Rochdi’s point — and she said that nothing is impossible when there is will and action — which, I would add, she shows on a daily basis — the kind of will and action that, naturally, we also need to see from the members of the Council.

    2022-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9130 (2022) · source

  26. She lives in a displacement camp with 1,200 other families, many of whom have special needs, disabilities and war injuries. Rasha herself had her spine badly damaged in 2019 when she, her husband and her children were nearly buried alive under rubble during a bombing until local responders — the White Helmets and others — pulled them out. She is now permanently in a wheelchair. Despite that, however, and with financial support from donors and sponsors, Rasha was instrumental in setting up a kindergarten and a physical therapy centre in the camp where she lives. The centre provides services to about 20 surrounding camps. Imagine the will, energy and determination of that mother, crippled by the war, still providing a daily service to 20 camps near the one where she continues to live with her family. She sees about 50 patients every day.

    2022-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9130 (2022) · source

  27. We expect, want and need more to follow. I want to assure you, Mr. President, that the United Nations and its partners will make every effort to ensure that the cross-line operations in the north-west and the north-east are pursued with vigour. They are necessary and, if successful, will complement the cross-border operation, which is of course of a different order of scale. In the north-east, we and our partners continue to assist on average 900,000 people every month through cross-line operations. We will continue to pursue that elusive cross-line mission to Ras Al-Ayn as soon as security conditions allow. I want to conclude with an anecdote that has been brought to my attention. It also echoes a point made by Ms. Najat Rochdi. It is the story of Rasha, a mother of four and a community leader in Idlib.

    2022-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9130 (2022) · source

  28. Only life-saving assistance such as bread and water distributions were and are currently allowed. Ensuring continuity in the provision of aid and basic protection services during those kinds of operations is of critical importance — but it is not being done. We would like to see all humanitarian activities resumed as soon as possible. The United Nations continues to do its utmost to expand cross-line operations in all parts of Syria. In the north-west, we have finalized a revised cross-line plan to incrementally ensure further access to people in need of assistance. In order for that to happen, we need to carry out many unimpeded cross-line convoys, with an increased number of trucks in each convoy. That is common sense. The next cross-line convoy to the north-west is scheduled to take place in the coming days to deliver 16 truckloads.

    2022-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9130 (2022) · source

  29. I also hope that funding for early-recovery and resilience and livelihood programming will be increased. If we do not get funding, rations will be drastically reduced, as we are seeing in Yemen and elsewhere. As I just said, there are straightforward consequences. Regarding humanitarian access, since I last briefed the Council air strikes have disrupted the operations of the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) at Aleppo airport. UNHAS is a critical service for the humanitarian operation. It is the basis through which staff are deployed and move and it also occasionally moves supplies. Our ability to provide humanitarian assistance in Al-Hol camp was limited during the reporting period, particularly by the search operation carried out from 25 August.

    2022-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9130 (2022) · source

  30. Engagement with donors in the region indicates that we may not even reach half of the funding requirements for the humanitarian response plan by the end of this year, which obviously has a direct impact on the plight of many Syrians. Some 14.6 million people in Syria, more than half of them children, need humanitarian assistance. That is the highest level of need since the crisis began. And as I have said on previous occasions, we seem to fail the people of Syrian more each year. As each year passes, the needs grow and the gap increases, further worsening the Syrian people’s stress and suffering from the crisis. I want to thank the donors that have come through quickly on their pledges and urge those that are perhaps slightly slower to please put the money in the bank.

    2022-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9130 (2022) · source

  31. That is a lot of money. In addition, the regional refugee and resilience plan, which caters to refugee needs in the region outside Syria, amounts to $6.1 billion for this year, bringing the total needed up to $10.5 billion, an eye-watering amount of money. However, the amount reflects the severity of humanitarian needs in Syria and in the region following a decade of crisis. At the sixth Brussels conference, in May, which many of us — including the Permanent Representative of the United States — attended, donors pledged $4.3 billion for Syria and the region. To date, only approximately a quarter of the humanitarian response plan is funded. That is very low even in a difficult year globally, compared to other major crises, and the regional plan to which I referred, which requires $6.1 billion, is only 20 per cent funded.

    2022-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9130 (2022) · source

  32. With the support of donors and in line with the global humanitarian approach to early recovery, more than 4 million Syrians have benefited from projects that contribute to early recovery and resilience already this year. We also continue to contribute to the provision of electricity, which as I said is essential for running basic services. The bimonthly report (S/2022/635) of the Secretary-General provides many examples in that regard. For our programme to succeed in improving people’s access to livelihood opportunities and basic services, we need the continued commitment, support and generosity of donors, as well as their focus on early-recovery opportunities. That brings me to my second point, which is on funding. The annual humanitarian response plan for Syria is among the largest appeals in the world. For 2022, $4.4 billion is needed.

    2022-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9130 (2022) · source

  33. Of course, I call on all the relevant parties to facilitate reliable access to safe water, or we will see more cholera cases, more damage to the health system and more problems arising from the absence of reliable electricity. Today I will cover three important issues — early- recovery efforts, funding and humanitarian access. As members know, I regularly brief the Council on our work strengthening the resilience of affected communities. The focus on that issue responds to the realities of a changing context and allows us to concentrate our collective efforts on driving down the need for humanitarian assistance in Syria. Ms. Rochdi also referred to the economic basis, which is the cause of many of our humanitarian problems. Resilience and early recovery are a major priority, as I believe I have often pointed out.

    2022-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9130 (2022) · source

  34. The outbreak is a stark reminder of how critical our continued support remains to the people of Syria, given that the health system has been devastated by those 10 years of conflict. The outbreak is also an indicator of severe water shortages throughout Syria, which are the result of low water levels in the Euphrates, which we have frequently discussed in the Council, as well as drought-like conditions and the destruction of water infrastructure. In the north-east, amid the cholera outbreak, critical water shortages have been reported in Al-Hasakah governorate, as water remains inaccessible for the population through the Allouk water station, which, as we have also discussed, has been shut down since 11 August. In that context, access to safe water is more important than ever.

    2022-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9130 (2022) · source

  35. Mr. Griffiths: Since Ms. Joyce Msuya, the Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefed the Council two weeks ago (see S/PV.9117), the hostilities in Syria have continued. During this period, air strikes and shelling along front lines have caused civilian death and injury and interrupted livelihoods. One particularly devastating incident that I want to draw the Council’s attention to took place on 12 September, when three children were reportedly killed and four people injured by an improvised explosive device attached to a motorcycle that detonated close to a medical facility in a camp near Al-Hasakah city. It is one more tragic story in a 10-year war. I am also particularly concerned about the news of a cholera outbreak in northern Syria. The United Nations and partners are supporting the relevant authorities in responding to cases.

    2022-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9130 (2022) · source

  36. The people of Afghanistan are still there. They have shown incredible resilience over the decades and in this past year. Our task is to help them to prosper, flourish and be safe.

    2022-08-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9118 (2022) · source

  37. In addition, $154 million is needed to pre-position supplies, including food and livelihood assistance, before the winter weather cuts off access to certain areas. The humanitarian community has stayed and delivered for the people of Afghanistan and continues to do so. It is imperative that the international community, as reflected in the Security Council, continue to do the same. Afghanistan’s de facto authorities must also do their part. Bureaucratic interferences and procedures slow down humanitarian assistance when it is needed most. Female humanitarian aid workers — both national and international — must be allowed to work unhindered and in safety. And girls must be allowed to continue their education. There are many musts, but there are many opportunities. The path is clear and the dangers equally so.

    2022-08-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9118 (2022) · source

  38. Outreach to financial institutions to mitigate against bank de-risking must be stepped up, and we must continue to work to ensure that girls and women are educated and employed and free to do so. The consequences of inaction on both the humanitarian and development fronts will be catastrophic and difficult to reverse. Currently, the humanitarian response plan for Afghanistan has a gap of $3.14 billion, with more than $600 million urgently required to support priority winter-preparation activities, such as upgrades and repairs to shelter, the provision of warm clothes and blankets and so forth. We are up against time. Those particular contributions are needed within the next three months.

    2022-08-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9118 (2022) · source

  39. I am sure it is clear to all of us that some development support has to be restarted. Humanitarian programming must and will continue, but the United Nations country team in Afghanistan, under the exceptional leadership of Ramiz Alakbarov, the resident and humanitarian coordinator, is developing its strategic framework for 2023 to address those broader basic human needs. More than 70 per cent of Afghans live in rural areas. If agriculture and livestock production are not protected, millions of lives will be at risk and the country’s capacity to produce food for its population imperilled. Hospitals and clinics at the district and national levels must be kept running and their staff employed and paid. Nutrition centres and preventive care must be maintained. Those are all the basic services to which we refer.

    2022-08-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9118 (2022) · source

  40. We all expanded our humanitarian operations to reach affected communities in all 401 districts of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. That was possible because of a reduction in conflict, the introduction of cash shipments — the $1 billion that I referred to — and the adoption of resolution 2615 (2021). But of course humanitarian aid will never be able to replace the provision of system-wide services to 40 million people across the country and the need to support those services on a sustainable basis. Preserving basic service delivery alongside humanitarian assistance remains the only way to prevent a catastrophe even greater than what we have seen over the past many months. Poverty is deepening, the population is still growing and the de facto authorities have no budget to invest in their own future.

    2022-08-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9118 (2022) · source

  41. We should not need to explain in the twenty-first century why girls’ education and women’s empowerment are important — to girls and women, their communities, their countries and indeed all of us. Afghanistan is not just a humanitarian crisis. It is an economic crisis. It is a climate crisis. It is a hunger crisis. It is a financial crisis. But it is not a hopeless crisis. Humanitarian organizations have done their utmost to provide the population in Afghanistan with a lifeline. Despite the many challenges that we have just been reviewing, United Nations agencies and non-governmental-organization partners have mounted an unprecedented response over the past year, reaching almost 23 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.

    2022-08-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9118 (2022) · source

  42. Humanitarians have brought in more than $1 billion in cash to sustain programme delivery, but the liquidity and banking crisis continues to affect the delivery of assistance and the daily lives of Afghans. The humanitarian-exchange facility that we have discussed before, intended to temporarily and partially alleviate the liquidity issue, is still under negotiation and review by the de facto authorities. Women and girls have been pushed to the sidelines, as we have also observed here in this Chamber. The meagre gains that the country had made to protect women’s rights have been quickly reversed. It has been more than a year since adolescent girls in Afghanistan last set foot inside a classroom.

    2022-08-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9118 (2022) · source

  43. Before the Taliban’s takeover, Afghanistan was already facing severe levels of food insecurity and malnutrition — levels that have, of course, further deteriorated since development aid was halted — affecting families everywhere, from rural communities to urban centres. Secondly, the operating environment is extremely challenging. Engaging with the de facto authorities at national and subnational levels is labour intensive. There is no confidence in the domestic banking sector, which means that Afghanistan is heading into a severe liquidity crisis. International financial transactions are extremely hard owing to de-risking and the overcompliance of global banks.

    2022-08-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9118 (2022) · source

  44. Some 5.8 million people remain in protracted internal displacement, requiring long-term solutions. Those are the figures. They are devastating and frankly difficult to comprehend. We worry that they will soon become worse. Once the cold weather sets in, food and fuel prices, which are already high, will skyrocket. Families will have to choose between feeding their children, sending them to school, taking them to a doctor when they fall sick or keeping them warm. Afghanistan’s problems are unfortunately neither new nor unique. Conflict, poverty, climate shocks and food insecurity have long been a sad reality for both Afghanistan and many other countries around the world. But let me outline what makes Afghanistan’s current situation so critical. First, large-scale development assistance has been halted for a year.

    2022-08-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9118 (2022) · source

  45. Some 25 million people are now living in poverty and three quarters of people’s income is spent on food. There has been a 50 per cent decline in households receiving remittances, unemployment could reach 40 per cent and inflation is rising owing to increased global prices, import constraints and currency depreciation. Those relentless layers of crisis persist at a time when communities are already struggling. In June, a 5.9 magnitude earthquake affected more than 360,000 people living in high-intensity impact areas. Since July, heavy rains have led to massive flash floods across the country and indeed the region, killing and injuring hundreds of people and destroying thousands of homes and thousands of acres of crops. Afghanistan has also witnessed unprecedented levels of internal displacement and population movement.

    2022-08-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9118 (2022) · source

  46. Mr. Griffiths: People in Afghanistan continue to face extreme hardship and uncertainty. Let me share some numbers with the Security Council. Close to 19 million people are facing acute levels of food insecurity, including 6 million at risk of famine. More than half of the population, some 24 million people, need humanitarian assistance. An estimated 3 million children are acutely malnourished, including more than 1 million estimated to be suffering from the most severe, life-threatening level of malnutrition. Without specialized treatment, those children could die. The malnutrition crisis has been fuelled by recurrent droughts, including in 2021 the worst drought seen in three decades, whose effects are still lingering. Eight out of ten Afghans drink contaminated water, making them susceptible to repeated bouts of acute watery diarrhoea.

    2022-08-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9118 (2022) · source

  47. We must expand and improve the footprint around the country. We must continue advocacy for rights but, more important, this is also where we, including Mr. Alakbarov, need to engage. Now is not the time to disengage and leave Afghanistan to a bleak future. Now is the time to redouble our engagement.

    2022-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9075 (2022) · source

  48. We face a $3 billion funding gap for the last six months of this year. Afghanistan is perhaps in as difficult a situation in terms of the gap between funding and needs as any other place in the world. I would like to associate myself again with the points made by Mr. Alakbarov. Now is not the time for hesitancy. Without intervention, funding, humanitarian assistance and basic services, it will be another winter of discontent, trouble and pain for the people of Afghanistan. Drought will persist — we almost forget it — wreaking havoc on crop yields and putting those 6.6 million people in Afghanistan on the edge of a catastrophe. I think that the aid community in Afghanistan has managed extraordinary achievements over the past year, but much more needs to be done, and much more can be done. We must address economic and banking paralysis.

    2022-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9075 (2022) · source

  49. That is once again contrary to the letter and spirit of the promises made to the United Nations last year. Other announcements, including the requirement that women travel beyond certain distances with a mahram, or chaperone, further constrain women’s ability to access life-saving assistance and services. The third impediment is that we simply do not have enough funding. Mr. Alakbarov was absolutely right about the generosity of Member States; it has been considerable. However, only one third of the resources needed for this year’s humanitarian response plan has been received. We have a response plan of just over $4 billion. We have received just one third of that amount, despite pledges made of approximately $2.4 billion at our launch in March. Many of those pledges have not yet turned into receipts.

    2022-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9075 (2022) · source

  50. However, for every issue that is resolved another one emerges, sometimes in the same location with the same departments. There is now a much more palpable frustration felt by aid organizations, local communities and local authorities. Interference cause delays in programming and, of course, compromises access to services. The situation of women and girls remains as concerning now as it has ever been — in fact, it is worse than ever before. The de facto authorities’ announcement in March that secondary schools for girls above sixth grade would not reopen affects more than 1 million secondary schoolgirls. That announcement was a major mistake at the time, and it has not been rescinded. In no other country in the world has a Government banned girls from secondary school.

    2022-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9075 (2022) · source