YouSaid · the spoken record

Haysom

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332
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2014-12-18
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2023-12-14
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24
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un-security-council

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  1. Mr. Haysom: I thank you, Sir, for the opportunity to brief the Council today on the situation in South Sudan. On 12 September, South Sudan marked the three-year anniversary of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. That agreement provides the only broadly agreed framework through which long-term stability and durable peace can be achieved in South Sudan. I am pleased to report some positive developments registered since my latest briefing in June (see S/PV.8801). On 30 August, we saw the inauguration of the reconstituted Parliament, members of which were sworn in on 2 August.

    2021-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8859 (2021) · source

  2. I take this opportunity to recognize the efforts of our uniformed and civilian personnel. As is the case for all peacekeeping missions, working in the midst of the coronavirus disease pandemic has been seriously challenging. I am proud of our personnel, who have risen to the challenge and continue to work away from their family and often in austere and uncertain conditions. On that note, I thank Council members for the support we have received and will continue to receive.

    2021-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8801 (2021) · source

  3. A strong and well-developed justice chain is integral to breaking the cycle of violence and holding peace spoilers accountable. Finally, UNMISS is keenly aware that all those endeavours cannot be accomplished alone. Therefore, the Mission intends to enhance collaboration and promote greater coherence among the international partners, including IGAD, AU, the European Union, the Troika, neighbouring States and the diplomatic community in general. Enhanced engagements with the transitional Government will also be key going forward. In that regard, the recent establishment of a high-level coordination forum with the Government to deal with movement restrictions and operational challenges is an important step. In conclusion, I would like to share that we are well placed to execute our mandate more effectively.

    2021-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8801 (2021) · source

  4. Through their assistance, the Mission intends to enhance general security, contributing to a safe and secure environment for political progress that would also allow for the urgent and necessary delivery of humanitarian assistance along with the conditions necessary for refugees and IDPs to return and earn a livelihood. Thirdly, as critical as is the contribution of uniformed personnel are civil and political engagements at the grassroots level. They enable conditions and arrangements under which neighbouring communities can live together. Our widespread engagement throughout the country has increased in scale and importance in that area. That also highlights the significance of the fourth component — existing rule-of-law institutions.

    2021-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8801 (2021) · source

  5. In the current mandate, the Security Council recognized the imperative of peacebuilding and directed UNMISS to advance a three-year strategic vision around that imperative. In that regard, please allow me to share some thoughts on five key tracks of that vision. First, South Sudan is fortunate in having concluded a multi-stakeholder peace agreement to guide its transitional path. Making irreversible progress towards peace requires tangible gains on implementing the agreed transitional benchmarks. Those benchmarks include significant markers regarding an enduring national accommodation and lasting peace in the form of elections, a new constitution and the establishment of democratic institutions. Secondly, we commit to making optimal use of one of our distinctive assets — our uniformed personnel.

    2021-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8801 (2021) · source

  6. Upon my arrival in Juba, I had the opportunity to meet with the President and senior Government officials. I also travelled to all 10 states to hear directly from the South Sudanese people. What has emerged from those engagements is that local authorities want assistance in tackling subnational conflicts and the widespread presence of firearms. They require support and infrastructure. The lack of infrastructure and extreme flooding make access to many parts of the country challenging. In other parts of South Sudan, long spells of drought have compounded existing vulnerabilities. In that regard, the Mission is committed, with the United Nations Development Programme, to addressing climate-related security concerns in South Sudan.

    2021-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8801 (2021) · source

  7. This year alone, four humanitarian workers have been killed and millions of dollars of humanitarian supplies looted or destroyed. The callous and indiscriminate killing of humanitarian workers is deplorable. UNMISS recognizes its own important contribution to creating a safe environment for humanitarian partners, and the Mission will continues to take the lead in promoting and advocating for safe conditions that for the delivery of life-saving services. At the international level, UNMISS continues to support the efforts of the Community of Sant’Egidio to facilitate dialogue and calls on the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity and the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance to build on the declaration of principles reached in Naivasha, Kenya, earlier this year.

    2021-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8801 (2021) · source

  8. I recently led a delegation of representatives from the AU, IGAD, the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the African diplomatic community based in Juba on a visit to Pibor. We all share a deep concern over the resumption of violence between communities in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area. While recognizing the importance for the Government to take concrete steps to address the root causes of the conflict, UNMISS is collaborating with local authorities and communities in Jonglei to promote reconciliation, secure the release of abducted women and children, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Worryingly, weakened rule-of-law institutions and economic deterioration have led to increased criminality and the targeting of humanitarian workers.

    2021-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8801 (2021) · source

  9. Deploying, often pre-emptively to in conflict hotspots, the UNMISS force has maintained a presence in strategic areas during the rainy season, enduring extreme weather conditions. Those initiatives, among others, have contributed to some reduction in violence as compared to the previous year. Nevertheless, weak or absent State governance institutions throughout South Sudan have enabled spoilers to exploit perennial communal and ethnic cleavages. Entrenched insecurity has hindered the cultivation of crops and has contributed to a vicious cycle of livestock raiding. Many communities are dangerously short of food supplies in places such as Warrap, Lakes and Jonglei, to name but a few. Meanwhile, in the Equatorias, the National Salvation Front and the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces remain engaged in intermittent armed conflict.

    2021-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8801 (2021) · source

  10. The recent announcement by the Presidency, that is, both the President and the Vice-President, in support of the rapid implementation of chapter II of the Agreement, including expedited graduation of the new unified forces, is encouraging. It is our hope that the commitments so publicly made will be duly delivered on. I would like to highlight the pervasive insecurity, in particular intercommunal violence, which continues to obstruct the realization of a durable and sustainable peace in South Sudan. This year, more than 80 per cent of civilian casualties were attributed to intercommunal violence and community-based militias. The UNMISS force continues to interrogate the impact of its own response to those threats and its commitment to being a highly mobile force in a highly mobile posture.

    2021-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8801 (2021) · source

  11. The constitution of the Council of States and the nomination of the Legislative Assembly Speaker is pending. UNMISS continues to encourage the Government to continue with those processes, while ensuring the adequate representation of women and young people at all levels. Similarly, the transitional security arrangements remain behind schedule. The formation and graduation of the unified forces is a critical element of South Sudan’s transition, intended to prevent the intractable relapse into conflict. Troops continue to suffer in cantonment and training sites without adequate shelter, health care and food. It is therefore important that the precondition of a coherent command and control structure be finalized, followed by the graduation of the forces.

    2021-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8801 (2021) · source

  12. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) will continue to dedicate provide physical protection, as required. I am also pleased to report that, as commissioned by the Security Council, a needs assessment mission for the conduct of free and fair elections was conducted from 6 to 26 May. A detailed report will shortly be submitted to the Council. UNMISS is firmly committed to supporting such elections. However, our work must be aligned with that of South Sudanese stakeholders and institutions and in partnership with the international community, especially the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Notwithstanding those markers of progress, the overall implementation of the Revitalized Agreement is progressing slowly. The formation of the legislature remains incomplete.

    2021-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8801 (2021) · source

  13. An inclusive national conversation will lay a foundation for a social contract among the citizens of the country and engagement in an inclusive process will increase the probability of a durable peace. In addition to those achievements, I would like to inform the Security Council that on 17 March, the Bentiu protection of civilians site was redesignated as an internally displaced persons (IDPs) camp. The freed-up peacekeepers are now deploying to more remote locations, such as Koch and Mayom, enhancing confidence and stability in areas of IDP returns. Concurrently, the efforts of United Nations Mission in South Sudan are ongoing to support the Government of South Sudan in protecting displaced populations. The last protection of civilians site in Malakal retains its protective status owing to protracted insecurity in and around the area.

    2021-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8801 (2021) · source

  14. First, on 10 May, the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity established a taskforce to oversee and coordinate transitional justice and other judicial reforms Secondly, on 11 May, President Salva Kiir Mayardit reconstituted the national legislature and appointed 550 new members to that legislature. That, too, was a distinct step forward. Thirdly, on 25 May, President Kiir Mayardit, with the Sudan’s Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, in attendance, officially launched the permanent constitution-making process in Juba. Drafting a national constitution is the quintessential act of sovereignty. It expresses the highest aspirations of a nation and its most cherished values.

    2021-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8801 (2021) · source

  15. Mr. Haysom: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council today on the situation in South Sudan. On 9 July, the Republic of South Sudan will mark its tenth anniversary as an independent State. Council members will recollect the jubilation 10 years ago when we welcomed South Sudan to the family of independent nations. The international community pledged its support to South Sudan at that time. That commitment remains as important and as urgent today as the world’s youngest nation strives to deliver peace and security to its citizens. I am pleased to report some progress in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan since our last report in March (S/2021/172). Allow me to highlight three notable advancements.

    2021-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8801 (2021) · source

  16. The management of the upcoming regional elections in 2019 and the remaining political processes, particularly the review of the Constitution, will determine whether Somalia makes further progress or not. Achieving this will require all role players to pull in the same direction. Somalia has set that direction, and I hope that the Council will be updated on the progress in the year to come.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  17. Respect for human rights and international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians in the context of the conflict remain key for Somalia's transition and sustainable peace. UNSOM. has documented 1,384 civilian casualties in 2018, with Al-Shabaab accounting for 60 per cent of these. Progress has been made, including in taking steps to establish institutions that protect human rights, such as the federal independent national human rights commission. I encourage the Federal Government to finalize the commission's foundation. Somalia has laid the foundations to make significant progress in 2019. The plans are in place and the milestones are clear.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  18. Armed conflict and widespread violence, as well as recurrent climatic shocks, perpetuate high levels of humanitarian need and protection concerns. While the humanitarian situation has improved compared to last year, owing to above-average Gu rains, needs remain high, with 4.2 million people in need of assistance and protection. Of those who need assistance and protection services, almost two-thirds are children. Around 1.5 million are severely food insecure at crisis or emergency levels. Around 2.6 million people are internally displaced. The 2019 humanitarian response plan, to be announced this month, targets 3.4 million people, or 81 per cent of the 4.2 million people in need of assistance, requiring $1.1 billion for its implementation.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  19. We have continued to support conflict resolution and conflict prevention efforts in several parts of the country, in collaboration with other partners. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Puntland and Somaliland to help them de-escalate the tension in Tukaraq and find a sustainable solution. As a result of the joint mediation effort, a de facto ceasefire is holding. At the regional level, the tripartite agreement signed between the leaders of Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea on 6 September is an opportunity for Somalia to strengthen its regional ties and provide further support to Somalia's economic, political and security progress. The humanitarian crisis in Somalia remains among the most complex and long-standing in the world.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  20. An operational readiness assessment of the regional forces is under way, and these processes will, hopefully, assist in the mapping of regional capabilities ahead of the future integration of these forces into the national security architecture. The implementation of the transition plan made an encouraging start, but has recently slackened. There will need to be a more comprehensive and better-coordinated planning process to achieve the more ambitious transition locations in the timelines contained in the Somali transition plan. This must be guided by respect for human rights and appropriate measures towards stabilization, as agreed in the transition plan. Overall, the approach to transition should be conditions-based, with progress in building effective Somali security institutions as the main factor setting the pace.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  21. In Mogadishu and Puntland, elements that are pro-Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham have targeted business owners using extortion to extract revenue and carrying out assassinations. It appears that the cause of conflict between the two extremist groups is now primarily driven by financial interests. Their focus is now on extortion of so-called taxes. In addition to military operations, it is therefore important to tackle this aspect as well as the infrastructure used by Al-Shabaab to assemble IEDs. There has been some progress in building the institutional capacity of the security sector to tackle these threats. Biometric registration programmes for the Somali National Army and the Somali Police Force are forging ahead.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  22. Despite the ongoing operations to degrade that terrorist group, it still has the capacity to conduct indiscriminate attacks on Somali citizens and to target electoral delegates, the Somali security forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). As AMISOM. and the Somali security forces operations have succeeded in denying Al-Shabaab the possibility of launching conventional attacks, it now relies on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and targeted assassinations. It is of note that on 9 November, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a complex attack against the Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu initiated by three vehicle-borne IEDs. More than 50 people, including seven Al-Shabaab militants, were killed in the attack.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  23. Completing the demanding legislative agenda requires continued cooperation between the executive and legislature. Discord between the two can seriously hinder Somalia's progress. I welcome the recent progress made, however, on the passage of the 2019 budget and the pension law before Parliament adjourned for recess. I strongly condemn the mortar attack on our premises that took place two days ago and the casualties caused by such use of force. In no country are attacks against the United Nations acceptable. As the Council is aware, three of our staff were injured, one seriously but not critically. It may also be aware that responsibility for this attack was claimed by Al-Shabaab. I welcome the Federal Government's condemnation of the attack. Al-Shabaab remains the biggest source of insecurity in Somalia.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  24. Allegations of interference by the Federal Government and the violence that erupted following the arrest of one of the candidates, a former Al-Shabaab deputy leader, marred the process and does not bode well for the upcoming electoral processes in other regions or for the 2020 national elections. This may also have implications for the likelihood of future Al-Shabaab defectors who may be considering taking a political path instead of that of violence. Regrettably, 15 people, including a regional assembly member, were killed during the violence. Strains between the executive and the legislature also came to the surface on 9 December, when members of the House of the People submitted a motion for the impeachment of President Farmajo.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  25. President Farmajo offered direct dialogue behind closed doors, and in October Prime Minister Khayre established a six-member ministerial committee to work with the Upper House to end the stalemate. However, the landscape is complicated by the electoral processes that are currently under way in several of the member states. Politics is complex in any nation, but in one that is still establishing its norms and institutional parameters, and still debating the roles and responsibilities of its respective governance structures, there is a risk that complexity might shift to conflict. We witnessed this during the electoral process in South-West state.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  26. Members ofthe women's caucuses from both houses of Federal Parliament recently held the second annual conference for women representatives of federal and state assemblies to consider the constitutional review process and preparations for the national elections. Despite these positive developments, the stalemate between the Federal Government and the federal member states continues to impede concrete progress in defining the federal model and in building institutions of State, as well as in the implementation ofthe national security architecture. The halt to cooperation between the Federal Government and the federal member states was announced by the Council of Interstate Cooperation on 8 September. After visits to all the regions by Ambassador Madeira and myself, there have been encouraging Somali-led initiatives to restore relations.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  27. This could have a possible impact on the timelines for the electoral process. However, the National Independent Electoral Commission is still making headway with pre-voter registration preparations, including the recruitment and training of new staff, the planning of the mapping of voter registration sites and the establishment and consolidation of its subnational structure. So far, 35 political parties have been registered. Technical cooperation has continued on the constitutional review process, laying the groundwork for real progress at the national level. The F ederalization Negotiation Technical Committee has been negotiating draft political agreements on justice, mineral-resource sharing, the allocation of powers and fiscal federalism. Women's meaningful participation in these decisions is essential.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  28. I want to commend the Office of the Prime Minister for leading Government efforts to tackle corruption, including the announcement on 9 December of the Federal Government's intention to ratify the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Turning to political progress, the road map on inclusive politics covers elections, the constitutional review, federalism and reconciliation. These are components essential to Somalia's State-building proj ect. The draft electoral law has been submitted to the Cabinet, and amendments from political parties, civil society and the international community have been provided. The delay in submitting the draft electoral law to Parliament will see a key milestone missed as per the Government's commitment to have the electoral law adopted by December 2018.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  29. In recognition of the country's significant progress, the World Bank's 2019-2022 country partnership framework unlocked International Development Association financing through pre-arrears clearance grants totalling $80 million to strengthen basic service delivery, improve financial management capabilities and restore economic resilience. Improvements in public financial management and an expansion of the domestic revenue base, with a recorded fiscal balance surplus of $8 million in September, means that 56 per cent of the Federal Government's $340 million budget for 2019 will be financed from domestic revenue, with the rest provided by donors.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  30. Mr. Haysom: I arrived in Somalia on 3 October and was well received by prominent officials of the Federal Government and of the regional states. I have been impressed with the Government's far-reaching reform agenda and its commitment to practical implementation through road maps for delivery in each relevant sector. Somalia has maintained a positive trajectory, but continuing political turbulence could throw it off course. In December, the International Monetary Fund completed its first review of the third staff-monitored programme, noting the satisfactory performance by the Federal Government.

    2019-01-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8440 (2019) · source

  31. Against that backdrop, on two related issues, I can confirm first that, in regard to the Secretary-General's proposal on UNISFA, I believe that the provision of political depth to the UNISFA mission will enable it to better manage the intercommunal relations in Abyei and the adjacent border areas, pending a final solution. Secondly, I can confirm that both the Sudan and South Sudan acknowledge that UNISFA has indisputably contributed to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Area, including through intercommunal dialogue, and that it has prevented a relapse into conflict in Abyei and consequently between the two countries.

    2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source

  32. They were positive while being clear not to overpromise on a successful outcome. We have just heard that both Governments have now declined the offer to discuss it on the margins of the Mechanism meeting scheduled for 23 and 24 September, but this is most likely because of the unavailability of the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, owing to their presence here in New York. I remain hopeful, however, that such an engagement will indeed take place. Even if it only serves to put the issue of Abyei's final status on the agenda, it would be a positive move.

    2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source

  33. It is the first time since 2012, when the Presidents took responsibility for handling the Abyei issue, that it has been possible for the Abyei lobbyists in both countries to undertake direct discussions on this sensitive matter. The more positive posture between the two countries has encouraged the African Union High- level Implementation Panel to invite the two Foreign Ministers, Deng Alor Kwol and Eldirdiri Mohamed Ahmed, for discussions on Abyei's final status next week. That meeting was intended to take place on the sidelines of an extraordinary session of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism. Ipersonally engaged the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs to assess their willingness to engage on this issue and to confirm that the timing for such a discussion was appropriate.

    2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source

  34. In my engagements with the Governments of the Sudan and of South Sudan, I have encouraged them to extend their cooperation in the oil sector to intensified engagements in other fields of mutual benefit. It also seems that the reduction in intensity of both countries' internal civil conflicts, particularly in South Sudan, may enable consideration of a solution to this question as well as the other matters covered in the mutually agreed cooperation agreements. The new mood has enabled eminent personalities concerned with Abyei, including former Foreign Minister Francis Deng, to generate an informal series of discussions in Khatroum. Their aim is to identify a road map that would rejuvenate cooperation between the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya and and open a window to discuss the final status of Abyei.

    2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source

  35. Sudan has insisted that it is acting in the interests of peace in the region and the building of good- neighbourly relations with South Sudan. Its endeavours have been publicly appreciated by Juba and the other signatory parties of the revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. There is no doubt that the successful mediation by the Sudan of the outstanding issues in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development peace process has contributed to reducing tensions between Juba and Khartoum. It is notable that part of the agreement is concerned with building a concrete modality of cooperation between the two countries specifically on the rehabilitation of oil fields in Unity state.

    2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source

  36. In the past few months, we have seen a remarkable shift in the willingness of the States of the Horn of Africa region to engage neighbours with which they had long-held hostile relations or even open conflict. The rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has triggered if not the resolution of disputes between the States of the region, then at least a willingness to engage each other to seek solutions. There is now pervasive peer pressure to deal with the conflicts that beset the region, hold back its development and economic integration, or exacerbate political instability in the Horn of Africa. This shift is nowhere better represented than by the efforts of Khatroum to mediate an agreement between the competing parties in the civil conflict in South Sudan.

    2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source

  37. South Sudan, in particular, was not in a position to drive negotiations on this difficult topic, given the imbalance of power between the two countries. The prevailing tensions between the two countries impacted down the chain of authority. The regularity and tone of meetings of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee intended to deal with the interim administration of the Abyei box reflected this combative approach. The Juba delegation insisted that the Oversight Committee was not empowered to deal with matters relating to the joint administration of the territory. We now believe that there is good reason to hope that the parties' reluctance to deal with the final-status issue and even the interim administration issues will change.

    2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source

  38. The Sudan opposed the proposal and no further action has been taken to this day. Indeed, in 2014 the Abyei file in each country was transferred to the offices of President Omar Al-Bashir and President Salva Kiir. Since then, notwithstanding occasional meetings between the Presidents over the past five years, the invitation to include Abyei on the agenda of such meetings has been consistently declined by the two principals. The eruption of civil conflict in South Sudan in 2013 and again in 2016 has seen the issue of Abyei relegated to the sidelines. The two countries' internal predicaments have precluded a discussion on this matter, not least because of the mutual recriminations between them regarding allegations of their support for the respective internal insurgencies in their countries.

    2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source

  39. Mr. Haysom: I thank you, Sir, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council during its deliberations on the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). I shall confine my remarks to the question of progress in regard to negotiations between the Sudan and South Sudan on the final status of Abyei. It is the resolution of this issue above all else that would allow for a timely exit by UNISFA from Abyei. As Council members will recall, the African Union High-level Panel, under the chairmanship of President Mbeki, has considered this question and, in 2013, formulated a proposal to resolve the question of the status of Abyei by means of a referendum. Its proposal, including modalities for such a referendum, was considered and then adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council in 2013.

    2018-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8357 (2018) · source

  40. Such engagement would allow the Council to engage on the security architecture, including the provision of specialist, very important person protection personnel, as well as the geography of disengagement and separation, which would provide a more conducive environment for a peacekeeping intervention. Those issues do not prevent the revitalized Agreement from being welcomed as a real step forward. They can be resolved ifthe parties share and show a real commitment to bring peace to South Sudan. On that, the jury is still out. What is clear is that the international community, and the United Nations in particular, will need to keep South Sudan and the implementation of its latest peace Agreement under close watch.

    2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source

  41. In addition, there is no treatment, as of yet, of the security gap or who will fill it when the men under arms are cantoned. Until the very last moment there was little or no mention of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the fate of its mandate or changes to it in the documents produced during the negotiations. Over the past few days, a proposal to have the Sudan and Uganda fill that gap transformed into a proposal for Uganda, the Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia to be incorporated into the UNMISS Regional Protection Force. What arises from that is the need, referred to in the latest IGAD summit communique and underscored by Under- Secretary-General Lacroix, for IGAD to engage with the Council. Only the Council can determine the size and composition of United Nation peacekeeping forces.

    2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source

  42. The Council should urge the parties to undertake confidence-building measures to build faith in the peace process and ameliorate the bitterness and hostility, which is the legacy of the past four years of horrible intercommunal violence. Such measures do not require financial resources. Finally, detailed security arrangements and a mutual meeting of the minds on such arrangements are critical. In that regard, the parties may have a different understanding on how the unification of forces will take place. With regard to cantonment sites, there is no agreement on where such sites will be, how many will be established, who will be eligible or who will be responsible for sustaining them. That is despite the fact that today marks D-day plus six; cantonment is contemplated to be completed by D-day plus 30.

    2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source

  43. From my engagement with significant potential donors, they have shown no or little appetite to fund the process unless there is a clear provision to ensure transparency and propriety in financial transactions, including accountability for past misappropriation of public funds. The very low levels of trust among the parties constitute one of the hurdles facing the implementation of the Agreement. The prevalent spirit of rivalry will be imported into the Government by virtue of the fact that the parties and their leaders will likely be competing candidates at the elections, which will be the culmination of the transition.

    2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source

  44. It is what happens to those reports that constitutes 80 per cent of the system of accountability. If nothing happens to the reports, the system simply does not work. In that regard, we believe that the region must demonstrate a commitment to make the Agreement effective, including by confronting spoilers, even if those spoilers include the Government of South Sudan. With regard to the parties' responsibilities, we have pointed out that the first step is to demonstrate their political intent by making the guns fall silent - immediately and everywhere. Without such a sign, the international community will be reluctant to provide financial support. That brings me to the third requirement for sustainability, namely, financial resources, not least to provide for the immediate cantonment of the various forces.

    2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source

  45. That goes beyond a number count of parties signing the Agreement, with a real effort needed to ensure that no group or significant community is left behind. We have also alerted the parties of the need to address the enforceability of the Agreement. We have already noted the numerous cessation-of-hostility agreements that have been violated within hours of the parties recommitting to peace. No agreement can last in the face of continuing violations for which there is no penalty or consequence. That risks a response by the South Sudanese as to what is different in this Agreement from the previous failed agreements. In our view, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism for investigating, monitoring and reporting violations is not the problem.

    2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source

  46. First, notwithstanding the efforts of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) facilitation team, we note that there are still a few, but potentially significant, parties that continue to express reservations about the text. In addition, there are some substantive governance issues that the text contemplates will be resolved in due course. One such issue relates to the number of sub-national states. That issue concerns the very geography of the tribal authority and control. The other issue concerns the way in which the South Sudanese will make their national constitution - their new, embracing social contract. Those issues are indeed central, but not insurmountable if approached in a spirit of inclusivity.

    2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source

  47. Before dealing with those, let me emphasize that in our approach we recognize that we should not make the perfect the enemy of the good. We recognize that, even where the Agreement can be considered flawed, it could still be an effective platform for peace if the parties demonstrate the political will to implement it, deal collaboratively with the need to face down its challenges and avoid the impulse to seek political, tribal or regional advantage. In that regard, I have advised the parties that the support of the international community for the Agreement will follow an assessment of its sustainability, and not simply the signatures to the text. That now raises the question as to what sustainability might mean with regard to the newly finalized text. Fundamentally, our concerns relate to the following six issues.

    2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source

  48. At the outset, we need to acknowledge the achievement of the Republic of Sudan, supported by Uganda, in mediating the Agreement. Through the Agreement the gap has narrowed among the parties on a number of governance and security issues that had previously seemed unbridgeable. Their combined leverage, the presence of a hitherto absent protagonist - Mr. Riek Machar - and energetic diplomacy resulted in a signed agreement that contemplates a pre-transition period of eight months and a comprehensive transitional road map of three years. There are nonetheless a number of gaps, issues whose finalization remains unfinished and other reasons to assert that the process will need the continuing attention of the region and the international community.

    2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source

  49. Mr. Haysom: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, which was signed by a broad spectrum of political parties on 12 September in Addis Ababa. When I took up my present assignment, two years ago, South Sudan was attempting to implement the Agreement. As I prepare to leave, in two weeks' time, South Sudan is preparing to implement a revitalized version of that same Agreement, but only after an intervening two years of civil war and devastating conflict. The important question that faces us is how the international community and, notably, the United Nations should assess, support or otherwise respond to this important development.

    2018-09-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8356 (2018) · source

  50. The Government of the Sudan has reiterated readiness to implement the so-called United States proposal on humanitarian access, which consists of the United States delivering medicine from within the Sudan to South Kordofan Blue Nile states by air. The new SPLM-N leadership stated that the position of the Movement on the matter has not changed and that it sticks to the delivery of a certain percentage of the humanitarian assistance directly from a neighbouring country to the areas under its control. In my future engagement with the parties, I intend to urge them to build on the current unilateral cessation of hostilities declared by both sides in the two areas and to resume talks on the basis of the United States proposal on humanitarian assistance, under the auspices of the High-level Implementation Panel.

    2017-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8078 (2017) · source