YouSaid · the spoken record

Haysom

lines on the record: 332
first: 2014-12-18
most recent: 2023-12-14
sittings or episodes: 24
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Turning my attention to the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, if fully implemented, the road map agreement brokered last year by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel can lay the ground for lasting peace in the Sudan, as it contemplates a comprehensive solution to the conflicts in Darfur and the two areas through peace negotiations and national political dialogue resulting in a new, inclusive social contract. Humanitarian aid delivery to the territories under the control of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement- North (SPLM-N) remains a major contentious issue and a road block between the Government of the Sudan and the SPLM-N.”
2017-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8078 (2017) · source
“In my view, the enabling role of UNISFA is crucial for any future progress on the implementation of the transitional agreements and the arrangements on the border, as well as the resumption of talks about the final status of Abyei. In my continuous engagement with the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan, I have urged them to build on the relative improvement in their relationship, including through bilateral meetings between President Al-Bashir and President Kiir, to take concrete measures to achieve progress on the joint administration of Abyei and to resume discussions about its final status.”
2017-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8078 (2017) · source
“Today, thanks notably to the sustained and fruitful efforts of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), for which Ethiopia should be commended, the risk of relapse into conflict between the Sudan and South Sudan is low. The stabilizing role of UNISFA, described in detail in the briefing by my colleague Assistant Secretary-General Alexander Zouev, should inform any decision the international community takes regarding Abyei and the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. The conflict prevention and mitigation strategy adopted by UNISFA and its engagement with both communities to foster dialogue and reconciliation have also been critical in averting an escalation of tensions.”
2017-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8078 (2017) · source
“Since the independence of South Sudan, the most prominent outstanding territorial issue between the Sudan and South Sudan has been the question of sovereignty over the Abyei Area. After an interval that followed the upsurge in violence in Abyei in 2011, resulting in the displacement of the population there, and following the independence of South Sudan later that year, the Security Council adopted resolution 2046 (2012), which urges the parties to cease all hostilities and withdraw their forces. The main concern of the members of the Security Council then was to avoid the risk of greater conflagration and, in the words of the United States representative, "returning to the horrors of the past and [taking] the entire region with them" (S/PV6764, p. 1).”
2017-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8078 (2017) · source
“The Sudan also continued to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to South Sudan by allowing the World Food Programme to deliver food assistance on 5 October to Aweil. With the lifting of United States sanctions on the Sudan, South Sudan has expressed interest in a joint approach to the international community, including a creditor outreach strategy arrangement as contemplated in the agreement on economic matters, which has not yet been implemented. In my future engagement with the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan, I will encourage them to build on their sustained cooperation on oil and their interest in enhancing their economic and commercial cooperation to implement the agreements on security arrangements and border issues in the same spirit.”
2017-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8078 (2017) · source
“The Sudan would provide technical assistance and electricity and accommodate oil workers at its base camp in Heglig. In line with the agreement on trade and trade-related Issues, the two Governments agreed in September to boost border trade and approved the export of 54 Sudanese products to South Sudan through five border crossing points yet to be identified. It is expected that a meeting of customs and immigration officials will be organized to operationalize the agreement, while the branch of the Sudan's central bank at Kosti has been identified to facilitate transactions. The contemplated Joint Political and Security Mechanism meeting at the end of this month is intended to expedite the establishment of the first crossing points.”
2017-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8078 (2017) · source
“If fully implemented, the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism can help them prevent violations and cross-border incursions by armed groups, contain the cross-border circulation of weapons and assist in building mutual trust, particularly in the light of the mutual accusations of harbouring rebels. It can also serve to protect the flanks of the Abyei Area. While there has been limited progress on security and border issues, the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan have continued to show more appetite for sustained bilateral cooperation in the oil sector. In September, the Ministers of Petroleum of the two countries agreed in Khartoum on the resumption of oil production in the Unity state oilfields, which had stopped with the outbreak ofthe war in 2013.”
2017-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8078 (2017) · source
“An extraordinary Joint Political and Security Mechanism meeting convened by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel is expected to take place on 1 November. In my engagement with the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan, I have reiterated that the agreements on security arrangements and border issues cannot be implemented without regular meetings of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, the main bilateral mechanism empowered to take decisions regarding security and the border. The monitoring of the border remains critical to peace efforts, as border violations have the potential to be a flashpoint of military confrontation between the countries. In line with the July 2011 agreement on the border monitoring support mission, both sides acknowledge the importance of border monitoring.”
2017-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8078 (2017) · source
“The internal conflicts in the Sudan and South Sudan, coupled with the mistrust between the two countries, have continued to impede the proper implementation of the agreements and the normalization of their bilateral relations. At the extraordinary meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, held in Addis Ababa from 14 to 15 May, both Governments recommitted to the resumption of regular meetings and to the implementation of the decisions taken at their last meeting, held in Khartoum a year earlier. However, the ordinary meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism agreed to be held at the end of June did not take place, after both Governments once again exchanged accusations of harbouring each other's rebels.”
2017-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8078 (2017) · source
“Mr. Haysom: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on progress in the implementation of resolution 2046 (2012), which concerns outstanding bilateral issues between the Sudan and South Sudan and the conflict in the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. As relations between the two countries have continued to be tense, it was hoped that the meeting between Presidents Al-Bashir and Kiir that was planned to take place in Khartoum during the reporting period would provide guidance on the way forward, at least on the stalled implementation of the 2012 agreements. But that meeting did not materialize, at least during the reporting period.”
2017-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8078 (2017) · source
“The Revitalization Forum, the national dialogue and the other initiatives should neither adopt the agenda of the others, nor overload the agendas of competing initiatives with their own goals. Therefore, in the quest for a more coherent approach, my Office will continue to work closely with IGAD, the JMEC, the AU and UNMISS to support initiatives towards sustainable peace. I will also continue to engage South Sudanese stakeholders to open lines to all sides of the conflict.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“That will be crucial as we enter a period of more intensive public engagement by the Security Council, the AU Peace and Security Council and forums on the margins of the General Assembly, respectively. Given the motives and underlying logic that drive the national dialogue, the SPLM. reunification process, IGAD's peace Agreement Revitalization Forum and even the AU plan of action, it would, at first instance, appear to suggest that those initiatives might clash or undermine one another. On the other hand, they could harness potential complementarity, and such an outcome would require a clear commitment to an inclusive and credible peace process. We have underlined to the IGAD secretariat the importance of distinguishing the particular goals of each initiative and encouraged it to focus on how they can work to the greater good.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Meanwhile, with regard to the African Union's (AU) engagement, the AU Chairperson, President Alpha Oumar Konare, is awaiting the internal adoption of a broad AU engagement strategy on South Sudan before taking further measures. Previously, President Konare' emphasized speaking with one voice, the primacy of internal support for any solutions to the conflict and a full and robust presence of the Regional Protection Force. President Konare will visit Addis Ababa this week, thereby providing my Office an opportunity to engage and take stock of the current tracks of engagement and the respective steps to be taken by the AU, IGAD and the United Nations. We will be concerned about establishing mutual complementarity between IGAD and AU initiatives.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Although those engagements are delicate, the danger is that the more the initiative consults with IGAD capitals, including Juba, the more suspicious the opposition will become that its agenda is partisan. Crucially and irrespective of his declared commitment made to the IGAD Council of Ministers during their Juba visit to implement the IGAD summit decisions, President Kiir continues to prioritize the national dialogue and the reunification of the SPLM, which he recently stressed would bring about peace, with the revitalization process playing only a supplementary role. As IGAD grapples with those challenges, it has already warned that the indicative timeline for holding the Revitalization Forum at the end of September will necessarily slip.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Following that, IGAD, with help from the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and my Office, carried out a mapping exercise on the relevant opposition actors to be included in the Revitalization Forum. In mid-August, I attended an IGAD-hosted meeting in Ethiopia of independent South Sudanese experts. The discussions were frank and generated a number of recommendations for IGAD, including on which opposition parties to engage and on how the peace Agreement could be adjusted to reflect the new realities in South Sudan. While the IGAD initiative continues to have potential, a main concern, which I have conveyed to IGAD, is its cautious preparation for engagement with opposition actors.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“A meeting between opposition parties, possibly outside Kenya, could be reinstated as part of preparations for the Revitalization Forum of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The decision of the IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government of 12 June to convene a high- level Revitalization Forum in respect to the 2015 IGAD-sponsored peace Agreement has begun to gain some momentum. It aims to include Government and opposition groups in a dialogue to consider how to implement the peace Agreement, and IGAD has appointed Ambassador Ismail Wais as its Special Envoy to follow through on its decisions. Recognizing the importance of securing President Kiir's buy-in, IGAD's Council of Foreign Ministers met on 24 and 25 July in Juba.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“President Museveni has also begun to engage groups outside the SPLM. core, by, inter alia, encouraging preparations for elections. Another regional initiative - the meeting of opposition parties, which was to be hosted in Kenya by President Kenyatta - has not gained much traction. With the Kenyan Government focused on the outcome of recent elections and the former detainees, who were a driving force behind the initiative, preoccupied with their Kampala discussions, the initiative appears to be stalled. The apparent advantage to any peace process of dealing with a coherent opposition and the increaising competition and conflicts between opposition groupings have led stakeholders to explore alternatives.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Among the regional efforts, the Ugandan initiative has focused on the reunification of certain factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). In late July, that initiative led to President Kiir, Ms. Rebecca Garang, of the former detainees group, and First Vice-President Taban Deng committing to expediting the implementation of the Agreement on the Reunification of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, known as the Arusha Agreement, of January 2015. The Agreement concerned a resolution of SPLM intra-party problems. With the continued absence of the SPLM. in Opposition, led by Riek Machar, and some among the former detainees group reluctant to reconcile with President Kiir in such a manner, the Ugandan initiative continues to falls short of achieving its goal. It may even be divisive both among and between opposition groups.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“For our part, we have made clear to all external and internal stakeholders our view that the prevailing insecurity, internal and external population displacement and lack of appropriate institutions, or a reasonably level political playing field, in an increasingly divided ethnic environment, militate against organizing credible elections within the year. Indeed, it may well contribute to deepening and extending the conflict. Assistant Secretary-General Wane dealt with some of the challenges facing the national dialogue and its potential contribution to long-term sustainable peace. I would simply draw attention, in the context of current regional initiatives, to the possibility of the national dialogue initiative being played off against other initiatives directly related to securing an immediate cessation of hostilities.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“As we just heard from Assistant Secretary-General Wane, there is sporadic fighting and widespread insecurity across the country. Our engagements with South Sudanese interlocutors, including the opposition, suggest that battlefield fortunes continue to inform the calculus of both the Government and its opponents. Alongside its military pacification efforts, the Government has created an appearance of reconciliation efforts, including through the limited release of political prisoners. The Government has further linked those efforts to the national dialogue initiative and to laying the groundwork for calls on political actors to prepare for elections in 2018.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Mr. Haysom: I thank you, Sir, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the situation in South Sudan. My remarks will build upon the briefing provided by Assistant Secretary-General Wane and will cover the developments relating to a resumption of the political process in South Sudan. Since my previous briefing (see S/PV.7982), two months ago, the five internal and regional initiatives to address the crisis in one form or another indicate continuing concern about the trajectory and depth of the conflict, without any of them thus far presenting a definite breakthrough in the political impasse. However, I remain hopeful that some, or a combination of them, may have the potential to positively impact the situation.”
2017-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8030 (2017) · source
“Finally, to reinforce the common message, credible national elections can be held only to conclude a transition period underpinned by political inclusion and stability - not in circumstances of insecurity and widespread displacement. My office will continue to engage all South Sudanese stakeholders and work closely with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and the members of the international community, particularly IGAD and the AU, in pursuit of those objectives.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“I believe the demands for a resumption of an inclusive political process are greater today than they were a month ago, or three months ago; but much work remains to be done for a credible political process to be established. The international community should, in support of those efforts, deliver a clear message that it supports an inclusive process that includes all significant armed groups and the political parties that are, to one degree of another, influential in bringing the ongoing fighting to a halt. Initiatives, including regional initiatives that promote dialogue within the opposition and between the opposition and the Government should be supported. Collaboration between IGAD, the AU and the United Nations should further be promoted.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“In addition, it would require the attendance of the new players that have come to the fore, at least for the purposes of negotiating a ceasefire and an adjustment to the peace agreement. The opposition groups began meeting in April and have started issuing joint statements regarding developments in the country. They are reported to have met with the Government officials of neighbouring States to seek their understanding and support. It remains to be seen whether the groups will overcome the differences between them, especially on the issue of the leadership of the Opposition. Still, the discussions that took place in the Oslo forum last week among the opposition groups, which I chaired, revealed more common ground among them, and even between the Opposition and the Government, than had been the impression before.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“To that effect, the summit mandated the IGAD Council of Ministers to urgently convene and facilitate such a forum in collaboration with relevant stakeholders, emphasizing the importance of IGAD- African Union (AU)-United Nations collaboration. Those proposals, as well as the appointment of an IGAD Special Envoy, were positive outcomes of the summit. One concern, however, remains, and that is the lack of clear timelines for the implementation of the proposals put forward in the IGAD communique. There seems to be a common understanding now that a credible political process in South Sudan is one in which, inter alia, both President Kiir's Government and the SPLM. in Opposition that is, the Rick Machar faction, are represented, although not necessarily by having the principal protagonists attend themselves.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“The most recent initiative emanates from the extraordinary summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) held on 12 June. Reiterating that the full implementation of the peace agreement remained the only viable way to bring about peace, IGAD had decided to convene a high-level revitalization forum ofthe parties to the 2015 agreement, including what it termed "estranged groups". The forum will address concrete measures to restore the permanent ceasefire, advance the full implementation of the peace agreement, and to develop a "revised and realistic timeline" for democratic elections at the end of the transition period.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“Machar, who declined to participate due to his present circumstances and the short notice of the invitation. It is to be recalled that the Ugandan initiative was faulted earlier by the former detainees group for prioritizing party unification over bringing the war to an end. We understand that there have also been discussions between President Kenyatta and the opposition parties on the facilitation of a meeting of all the opposition groups in Kenya. Recalling the reported abduction of opposition figures in Kenya, some groups have expressed anxiety about the meeting venue. Yet they seem to see the value of establishing a joint platform as a necessary step for full political engagement with the Government.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“I can report that arrangements are now being made for both Presidents Konare and Mogae, and my office to work together on ajoint action plan, which will in turn be promotedjointly to regional leaders in the coming weeks. Faced with a deteriorating situation in South Sudan and increasing calls from the international community for engagement, South Sudan's neighbours have also been exploring ways and means to start a process that could bring the conflict to an end. One of those initiatives, led by President Museveni of Uganda, is focused on the reunification of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Noting that the earlier decision to exclude the SPLM. in Opposition, led by Riek Machar, from this exercise had drawn criticism from some participants, Uganda has now belatedly reached out to Mr.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“His engagements - which, apparently, are due, after a three-month hiatus, to recommence in earnest shortly - were followed at the time by a Visit of the Chair of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, to South Sudan soon after taking office. These efforts on their own have so far not led to concrete steps forward on a political process. The Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, President Festus Mogae, has spoken ofthe limits to the implementation of the peace agreement in the face of pervasive conflict and the non-participation ofactive combatants and has called for a unified effort to secure those conditions.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“It seems that other political alternatives have been offered, such as trusteeship, early elections and a return to the status quo ante, that are deemed politically unfeasible. This realization, coupled with the downward trajectory of South Sudan, has now led to an increasingly broad understanding among South Sudanese and regional and international players that there is no way around an inclusive political process. To that end, and following the 25 January meeting of the Secretary-General, the African Union Chairperson and the IGAD Chair, President Alpha Oumar Konare engaged the South Sudanese Government and regional players in order to revive the political process, obtain a cessation of hostilities and create an environment conducive to inclusive dialogue.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“A genuinely inclusive and credible national dialogue would, no doubt, be an important nation-building exercise in and ofitself. In South Sudan, it would need to be anchored in a peace process and not be offered as a substitute for such a process. It would have to be preceded by a political process that creates the security and political environment necessary for an inclusive and credible dialogue. The demand for the opposition to lay down its weapons in order to participate in the national dialogue is interpreted as a call to surrender, without any assurance that the underlying grievances will be addressed. Nonetheless, it is most encouraging that the steering committee of the national dialogue only yesterday announced its intention to consult opposition groups outside the country, including Mr. Riek Machar.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“In the meantime, the pacification strategy has allowed the opposition to claim that they are in favour of peace, while justifying their military posture as protecting themselves against a Government offensive. Since July the conflict has spread throughout the country, and new actors, armed and unarmed, have emerged. All only pay lip service to the proposition that there can be no military solution to this conflict. As noted by Under-Secretary-General Lacroix, the mere introduction of the Regional Protection Force cannot substitute for a political solution, although it would surely contribute to an enabling environment for a peace process. Questions have arisen as to whether the national dialogue could substitute for an inclusive political process.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“The expulsion of Rick Machar - a key signatory - from South Sudan and his procedurally contested replacement by General Taban Deng has added a particular difficulty to establishing such a process: the demand for an inclusive process contradicts the narrative that First Vice-President Deng represents and will incorporate all opposition groups into the Government construct. The Government has argued that Mr. Deng's participation in the Government meets the inclusivity requirement set out in the peace agreement, and, following this logic, the Government has been required to pacify the remaining opposition-held areas and has consistently proposed alternatives to an inclusive political process. However, we sense that this opposition may be softening.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“At the moment, no clear, inclusive political process is in sight. There is still the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-sponsored peace agreement signed in 2015, to which the United Nations is a witness. Even though its current status is contested, it remains the only valid document signed by the major stakeholders. Though originally agreed with reservations by the Government, there is now broad understanding that the text is mostly and widely supported and should be adjusted only to the extent necessary to reflect new realities, including in respect of the inclusivity requirement.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“Mr. Haysom: I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Council on South Sudan. My remarks build on the briefing provided by Under- Secretary-General Lacroix and cover developments specific to the resumption of a political process in South Sudan. My starting point is the concluding observation of Under-Secretary-General Lacroix: that only a truly inclusive political process and the political will to implement the peace agreement will bring peace to war-torn South Sudan. It is important to define what is meant by an inclusive political process in South Sudan. Simply put, a genuine and inclusive political process at the least must involve the combatants and those political leaders with whom combatants and communities are aligned, as well as the signatories to the 2015 peace agreement.”
2017-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7982 (2017) · source
“As this is my last briefing to the Security Council in my capacity as Special Representative for Afghanistan, I would like to thank my colleagues for their dedication to the work and values of the United Nations. A mission functions on the enthusiasm, professionalism and commitment of its staff, and in UNAMA I was extremely well served.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source
“That applies to the cohabitation between the legislature and the executive, among the elements within the National Unity Government, and with the political opposition outside of it. Looking forward with the insights I have gained over the past four years, I remain optimistic that Afghans can meet the challenges that they face. For that I rely on an appreciation of two qualities. The first is the resilience of the Afghan people in facing down their difficult challenges. The second is the existence of a real pan-Afghan patriotism, which survives in the face of sectarian loyalties. That is a quality that, from my experience in other war-afflicted countries, should not be undervalued. Because it is endowed with those two qualities, it is possible for Afghanistan not only to prevail to survive in 2016 but also to grow stronger as a result.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source
“An increasingly vocal opposition, drawing on the dissatisfaction prompted by the economic and security downturn but otherwise divided in its aspirations, appears to be coalescing around a common demand for a new Government arrangement. A political confrontation is the last thing Afghanistan needs as it endeavours to cope with its current challenges, particularly in the period immediately preceding the Brussels conference, when Government effectiveness will surely fall under the spotlight. I, together with my international colleagues, have urged all political leaders to adopt a broader, more collaborative approach, rather than allowing the current fragmentation and division to stand.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source
“Finally, on the political front, slow progress in advancing electoral reforms and setting an election calendar is one indicator of the need for greater political cohesion and a need for the members of a fragmented political class to acknowledge their shared destiny. On 13 June, the Wolesi Jirga voted against the draft structure law, thereby necessitating further review and discussions. The date of 17 June - the last date for announcing, pursuant to Constitutional requirements, the electoral calendar for the promised elections on 15 October - has come and gone, and there still appears to be no agreement on the way forward. Continued uncertainty about the electoral calendar will contribute to challenges to the legitimacy of both the National Unity Government and the Parliament, which has long overstayed its term of office.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source
“Most recently, we teamed up with the Organization ofIslamic Cooperation to insistjointly to the Taliban on the need for a viable peace process and to emphasize that a peaceful resolution of the long and bitter conflict was not a second prize, but a preferable outcome. A continued refusal to accept that will earn them only outcast status. We maintain our view that peace is not a luxury, but a necessity without which Afghanistan as we know it is not sustainable. Afghans must eventually agree the arrangements by which they can live together in peace and harmony. I am disappointed that there has not yet been any traction on peace efforts, but I remain optimistic that such a process will eventually emerge.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source
“With regard to the establishment of a viable peace process, with the failure, so far, of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group to midwife such a process, and the recent death of Taliban leader Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, such a process seems unlikely in the short term. We believe, however, that there are elements within the Taliban movement who are questioning whether they can win militarily - at least in the short term - and wondering whether a purely military goal is desirable. During my tenure, UNAMA has engaged intensively in the pursuit of peace, both by supporting others' initiatives and by proposing and pursuing our own.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source
“The appointment of a new Attorney General was another positive step. The challenge ahead will be to demonstrate results, not only on paper and in the machinery of governance but also in the everyday lives of Afghans. While we remain hopeful that the Warsaw meeting will be successful, preparations for the Brussels conference are still a work in progress. Afghanistan needs increasingly to appreciate the range ofcompelling demands from other countryies competing for donor dollars. The donor community, for its part, needs to recognize that its expectations of reform should be realistic when measured against the full range of challenges facing the Afghan State.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source
“We would strongly support the Afghan appeal that development assistance is a more effective way of dealing with migration than bearing the expense of integrating migrants in host countries. However, what is expected of Afghanistan is not proof of its considerable needs, but of its demonstrable capacity to utilize resources effectively so that aid has a real impact. There have been real attempts to meet donor expectations, as we have seen through progress in refreshing mutual accountability indicators and in providing an Afghanistan development framework. Efforts to counter corruption are moving beyond statements of intent. The establishment by President Ghani of the high council on governance, justice and anti-corruption is a first step in that regard, as is the setting up of the anti-corruption justice centre.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source
“Perpetrators of human rights and humanitarian law violations must be held to account, both to ensure justice for victims and to effectively reduce harm to the civilian population through deterrence. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has especially had cause recently to draw attention to the inviolate status of schools and medical clinics during conflict. Progress in the areas of the economy and security is imperative so that the Afghan people have confidence in their Government, and it is especially important at this time, as the Government seeks to secure, in Warsaw and in Brussels, a firm and longer-term of international support - the third hurdle. Serious engagement on the part of the Government with donors to address the issues that would promote success at those meetings is acknowledged.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source
“However, I remain deeply concerned about the impact that the high level of violence is having on the civilian population. There has been no let-up during Ramadan, during which period there have been some reports of disturbing brutality, including attacks on worshippers. Only yesterday, an incident in Badakhshan caused the deaths of 10 civilians, among them several children. Civilian casualty levels remain high and conflict-related displacement continues. I am especially concerned about the trend of targeted attacks on civilians working in the judicial sector and on journalists. In my View, there is a risk that the conflict could enter a new phase, which could see retaliatory acts of vengeance and an escalating spiral ofviolence. I remind all parties to the conflict of their obligations to protect civilians from the impact of hostilities.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source
“The security forces continue to face serious challenges, including in addressing questions of morale, leadership, attrition and logistics. For now, though, they are holding their ground. I am pleased to note that the nominees for the positions ofMinister ofDefence and head ofthe National Directorate of Security were confirmed by the Wolesi Jirga only yesterday. That is a positive development that ends a protracted period of uncertainty, and which will hopefully have both a positive operational impact and boost morale. Quite correctly, Afghanistan has been canvassing support for a regional counter-terrorism strategy, while recognizing that peace in Afghanistan and stability in the region demand and deserve a regional effort. I believe that the region accepts that logic and that responsibility.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source
“The agreement on the development of the Chabahar Port will open up a major new corridor for regional trade. Those developments come on the back of the earlier launch of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline project. Projects of such scale take time to deliver, but have real potential to transform Afghanistan into the regional hub it aspires to be. They Show what can be achieved through regional partnerships. On the security front, there has been a deliberate response by the security forces to the lessons learned from the dynamics and developments of last year. The battlefield in many areas is in a state of flux, with gains and reversals but with neither side effecting clear dominance.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source
“On the economic front, we have noted progress in revenue collection, in meeting International Monetary Fund benchmarks and in developing thoughtful medium-term plans for reform and for economic development under difficult conditions. There has also been distinct progress in the management of public finances. And, as we did only two years ago, we do not fear an imminent default in civil-service salary payments. We should acknowledge some of the milestones that have been reached on some of the most ambitious projects, developed in collaboration with other countries in the region. The past month has seen the inauguration of the Salma hydroelectric dam, the CASA 1000 electricity project and a trilateral economic agreement among Afghanistan, India and Iran.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source
“This is not to downplay the real progress that Afghanistan has made over the past decade, especially, for example, in education, human right, and especially women's rights, and in the emergence of a vibrant, democratic culture. That progress is widely acknowledged, and rightly so. Rather, the objective was to draw attention to the formidable obstacles that Afghanistan faces and to underline the need for a concerted response to the challenges from all stakeholders, including the international community. I am pleased to note that there have been positive steps in meeting some of those five challenges since I last addressed the Council.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source
“Mr. Haysom: In my previous statement to the Security Council in March (see S/PV.7645) I said that in 2016 the survival of the National Unity Government would be an achievement. I stressed that the Government had to overcome five distinct hurdles to prevail. The Government would need to tackle a potent conflation of political, economic and security challenges. To do so, it would also need to face two additional challenges, namely, that of securing medium-term financial and military assistance from the international communityand that of making headway in laying the foundation for an effective peace process. A failure to overcome any of those distinct hurdles could have significant consequences for the country.”
2016-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7722 (2016) · source