YouSaid · the spoken record

Izumi Nakamitsu

lines on the record: 82
first: 2020-09-10
most recent: 2021-06-29
sittings or episodes: 9
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“While the digital space has come to underpin almost every aspect of our daily lives, the scale and pervasiveness of ICT “insecurity” is also now recognized as a major concern. The political and technical difficulty of attributing and assigning responsibility for ICT attacks could result in significant consequences, including in unintended armed responses and escalation. These dynamics can encourage States to adopt offensive postures for the hostile use of these technologies. It can also enable non-State armed and criminal groups and individuals seeking to develop or access potentially destabilizing capabilities with a high degree of impunity. Given these implications for the maintenance of international peace and security resulting from ICT threats, engagement by the Security Council on this issue is paramount.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/621 (2021) · source
“21 of the report of the Group of Governmental Experts. An advance copy is available at https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/final-report-2019-2021-gge-1-advance-copy.pdf. generation technologies that pose possible challenges to existing legal, humanitarian and ethical norms; non-proliferation; and peace and security. In his agenda, the Secretary-General makes the commitment to engage and work with scientists, engineers and industry to encourage responsible innovation of science and technology and to ensure its application for peaceful purposes. He also makes a second commitment to engage with Member States to help foster a culture of accountability and adherence to emerging norms, rules and principles on responsible behaviour in cyberspace.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/621 (2021) · source
“Perspectives from the private sector, civil society and academia contribute a unique and important part of the collective solution to cybersecurity that the international community is seeking. The United Nations, for its part, stands ready to support States together with other stakeholders in promoting a peaceful ICT environment. The Secretary-General convened a high-level panel on digital cooperation, which issued its report in 2019. Through a subsequent series of roundtable discussions with States and other key stakeholders, a road map was developed, which recommended further actions to take forward cooperation in key areas in the digital space. In the context of peace and security, the Secretary-General also launched an agenda for disarmament which places emphasis on understanding and addressing new ___ _ _ _ _ _ 2 See para.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/621 (2021) · source
“Many excellent private-sector-led cyberinitiatives have been established, such as the Cybersecurity Tech Accord led by Microsoft, the Charter of Trust led by Siemens and the Munich Security Conference, and the Global Transparency Initiative of Kaspersky Lab. The Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace of 2018 brought together industry, States, civil society and academia in a commitment to nine principles for cybersecurity. These principles cover a range of issues from developing ways to prevent the proliferation of malicious ICT tools and practices, to the promotion of widespread acceptance and operationalization of international norms for responsible behaviour, as well as confidence-building measures for cyberspace.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/621 (2021) · source
“Some regions have placed greater emphasis on implementing voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour through capacity- building efforts, while others have pioneered their own regional confidence-building measures to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from ICT activities or adopted other regional tools for addressing ICT threats. Various regional instruments are also i n place addressing specific aspects of ICT. While States carry primary responsibility for maintaining international security, ICT are an integral part of our societies and other stakeholders have a key role and interest, as well as responsibility, in securing cyberspace.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/621 (2021) · source
“As the most recent Group of Governmental Experts noted in its report, the measures recommended by the previous Groups of Governmental Experts and the Open-ended Working Group together represent an initial framework for responsible State behaviour in the use of ICT.2 A new, second Open-ended Working Group has also just held its organizational session and will begin its substantive work later this year. At the regional level, regional organizations are now undertaking key efforts on ICT issues. Regional approaches have taken various forms as determined by different priorities and needs.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/621 (2021) · source
“These two Groups affirmed a suite of voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour, recognizing that additional norms could be developed ___ _ _ _ _ _ 1 See www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-05-27/secretary-generals-remarks-the-security- council-open-debate-the-protection-of-civilians-armed-conflict-delivered. over time. They also reaffirmed that international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and essential to maintaining peace, security and stability in the ICT environment. The Groups recommended confidence-building, capacity- building and cooperation measures, building on the work of previous processes. The Open-ended Working Group additionally, in accordance with its mandate, made conclusions and recommendations on establishing regular institutional dialogue on the issue of ICT.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/621 (2021) · source
“Over the last one and a half decades at the United Nations, a series of five Groups of Governmental Experts have studied the existing and emerging threats of ICT to international security and recommended measures to address them. Two further United Nations processes, an Open-ended Working Group and a sixth Group of Governmental Experts, both established in 2018, have recently and successfully concluded their respective work, taking important steps forward on the topic through the adoption of concrete, action-oriented recommendations.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/621 (2021) · source
“The Secretary-General has drawn attention to cyberattacks on health-care facilities during the pandemic, calling on the international community to do more to prevent and end these new forms of aggression, which can cause further severe harm to civilians.1 Such ICT threats also have a gendered impact and must be examined through this lens. Online violent extremism and trafficking have an often-overlooked differentiated impact on women, men and children, as do other ICT-related threats such as cyberstalking, intimate partner violence and the non-consensual dissemination of intimate information and images. This is also why we need to make every effort to secure the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men in decision-making in the digital arena. ICT threats are increasing, but efforts are also under way to address them.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/621 (2021) · source
“They are also lowering barriers to access and opening new potential domains for conflict and the ability of both State and non-State actors to carry out attacks, including across international borders. Specifically on information and communications technologies (ICT), we have seen a dramatic increase in the frequency of malicious incidents in recent years. These incidents have come in many forms, from disinformation to the disruption of computer networks. Such acts are contributing to a diminishing trust and confidence among States. These developments also pose a specific risk to critical infrastructure that are enabled by ICT, such as the financial sector, electrical power grids and nuclear facilities.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/621 (2021) · source
“I wish to express my appreciation to Estonia for organizing this meeting and for inviting me to provide a briefing at this open debate on maintaining international peace and security in cyberspace. As of January this year, there are over 4.6 billion active users of the Internet worldwide. It is estimated that there will be 28.5 billion networked devices connected to the Internet by 2022, a significant increase from the 18 billion in 2017. As advances in digital technologies continue to revolutionize human life, we must remain vigilant in our understanding of the malicious use of such technologies that could imperil the security of future generations. Digital technologies are increasingly straining existing legal, humanitarian and ethical norms, non-proliferation, international stability, and peace and security.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/621 (2021) · source
“According to paragraph 8 of this decision, the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic will be reinstated once the OPCW Director-General has reported to the Executive Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the measures contained in paragraph 5 of Executive Council decision EC-94/ DEC.2. I therefore urge the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in that regard. Any use of chemical weapons is totally unacceptable and a serious violation of international law. Those responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable, no matter who they are. If we cannot do so, we allow the use of chemical weapons to take place with impunity, something that must not be tolerated. It is my sincere hope that members of the Security Council will unite on this issue.”
2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source
“3) The findings of the IIT’s second report are deeply concerning. There is no justification for the use of toxic chemicals as weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances. With the submission of the IIT’s second report, I want to reiterate my full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW. The Office for Disarmament Affairs has taken note of the decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” — document C-25/DEC.9, dated 21 April 2021 — adopted at the twenty- fifth session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, suspending the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention.”
2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source
“The second report of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) presents the findings of investigations conducted during the period between April 2020 and March 2021, focusing on the incident in Saraqib, in the Syrian Arab Republic, on 4 February 2018. As noted in the IIT report, on the basis of all the information obtained and analysed, the IIT concluded that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that at approximately 21:22 on 4 February 2018, during ongoing attacks against Saraqib, a military helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force under the control of the Tiger Forces hit eastern Saraqib by dropping at least one cylinder. The cylinder ruptured and released a toxic gas, chlorine, which dispersed over a large area [,] affecting 12 named individuals.” (S/1943/2021/para.”
2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source
“I have been advised that the FFM deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic between 29 March and 13 April 2021 to collect information and conduct interviews regarding an incident that took place in Kafr Zita, Hama, on 1 October 2016. The results of its activities will be reported by the FFM to the OPCW Executive Council in due course. On 12 April 2021, the OPCW Technical Secretariat submitted to the OPCW Executive Council and to the United Nations Secretary-General the note entitled “Second Report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 ‘Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use””.”
2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source
“I am advised that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the finding of a Schedule 2 chemical detected at the Barzah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre during the third round of inspections, held in 2018. With regard to the work of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), I note that the FFM remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and continues its engagement with the Syrian Government and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to a “variety of incidents”.”
2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source
“As I have noted on many prior occasions, the confidence of the international community in the complete elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme depends upon these issues being finalized. I have been advised that the outcome of the seventh round of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre, conducted by the OPCW Technical Secretariat in November 2020, will be reported to the OPCW Executive Council in due course. The conduct of further deployments remains subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.”
2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source
“Consequently, through a note verbale dated 16 April 2021, the OPCW Technical Secretariat informed the Syrian Arab Republic that a new outstanding issue would be opened and would be discussed at the next round of consultations with the DAT. These are currently planned to take place in mid-May 2021. As a result of the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The number of outstanding issues and their nature is concerning. I reiterate my call to the Syrian Arab Republic to extend its full cooperation to the OPCW Technical Secretariat to resolve all outstanding issues.”
2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source
“On 8 March 2021, the OPCW Technical Secretariat received a note verbale from the Syrian Arab Republic containing explanations regarding the results of the analysis of those samples. I have been advised that the DAT conducted a detailed analysis of all the information provided by the Syrian National Authority and assessed that the aforementioned explanations are not sufficient to explain the results from the sample analysis. According to the OPCW Technical Secretariat, one of the chemicals detected in these samples is a neat chemical warfare agent, the production of which has not been declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. The presence of this chemical inside storage containers of large volume at a previously declared chemical-weapons facility may imply undeclared production activities.”
2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source
“With regard to the issue of a former chemical-weapons production facility that was declared as never having been used to produce and/ or weaponize chemical weapons, the Syrian Arab Republic has reiterated that this facility was never used for the production of chemical weapons. However, the OPCW Technical Secretariat remains of the position that the Syrian Arab Republic must declare all chemical warfare agents produced and/or weaponized at this site. I am advised that, during the twenty-third round of consultations, held in September 2020, between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority, the DAT collected samples from several large-volume containers in the Syrian Arab Republic.”
2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source
“As I have previously informed the Council, the ongoing coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has affected the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic. Nevertheless, the Technical Secretariat maintains its readiness for deployments, which are being conducted subject to the evolution of the pandemic. Despite the travel restrictions, the Technical Secretariat has undertaken its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in this regard. Efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) are still ongoing to clarify all the outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration by the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW.”
2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source
“I thank the members of the Security Council for this opportunity to brief you again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since the previous Security Council meeting on resolution 2118 (2013), held on 6 April 2021 (see S/2021/337), the Office for Disarmament Affairs has maintained regular contact with counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter and, consistent with established practice, I held a monthly call with the OPCW Director-General on 5 May 2021, to receive an update and ascertain his views.”
2021-05-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/446 (2021) · source
“Before concluding, I wish to echo the Secretary-General’s remarks at the General Assembly on the situation in Syria, delivered on 30 March 2021. “After a decade of war, many Syrians have lost confidence that the international community can help them forge an agreed path out of the conflict. I am convinced that we still can. We will be relentless in our pursuit of a negotiated political settlement in line with Security Council resolution 2254 (2015). [...] A solution that meets the legitimate aspirations of all Syrians. The war in Syria is not only Syria’s war. Ending it and the tremendous suffering it continues to cause is a collective responsibility. Today we must all commit fully to achieving that goal.””
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source
“Those inspections will also be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although almost eight years have now passed since the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), there is still much work to be done before the resolution can be considered fully implemented. Moreover, as long as the use of chemical weapons continues, or the threat of their use remains, we must retain our focus on preventing those threats and not allow ourselves to become inured to them. Unity in the Security Council is required to re-establish the norm against chemical weapons. The vitality and credibility of the broader disarmament and non-proliferation architecture depends upon it. The use of these weapons must always be seen as a clear violation of a deeply held taboo. Accordingly, the identification and accountability of those responsible is imperative.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source
“I have also been advised that the Investigation and Identification Team continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used, or likely used, in the Syrian Arab Republic and will issue further reports in due course. I take this opportunity to reiterate my full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW. With regard to the inspections mandated by paragraph 8 of Executive Council decision EC-94/DEC.2 entitled, “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to monitor the security situation and will inform the Syrian Arab Republic when it is prepared to deploy for that purpose.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source
“With regard to the finding of a Schedule 2 chemical detected at the Barzah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre during the third round of inspections, held in 2018, I understand that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close this issue. I note that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and continues its engagement with the Syrian Government and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to a “variety of incidents”. As previously reported, further FFM deployments will be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source
“As a result of the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. As has been stressed on multiple occasions, engagement and dialogue by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is critical to closing these outstanding issues. As I have previously informed the Security Council, the OPCW Technical Secretariat conducted the seventh round of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre in November 2020. The outcome of that round of inspections will be reported to the OPCW Executive Council in due course.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source
“I have been advised that, on 8 March 2021, the OPCW Technical Secretariat received a note verbale from the Syrian Arab Republic containing further explanations regarding the sample analysis results. The Technical Secretariat is analysing those explanations and will engage with the Syrian National Authority accordingly. I have also been advised that, on 9 March 2021, the Syrian Arab Republic replied through a note verbale to the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s assessment pertaining to a former chemical weapons production facility that was declared as never having been used to produce and/or weaponize chemical weapons. In that note verbale, the Syrian Arab Republic reiterated that that former chemical weapons production facility was never used for the production of chemical weapons.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source
“During the twenty- fourth round of consultations between the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) and the Syrian National Authority, held from 7 to 25 February 2021 in Damascus, the DAT conducted technical meetings with representatives of the Syrian National Authority, visited three declared sites and conducted two interviews regarding an outstanding issue. During that deployment, the Declaration Assessment Team also shared with the Syrian National Authority the results of the analysis of the samples collected in the Syrian Arab Republic during the twenty-third round of consultations, in September 2020. The DAT received preliminary comments from the Syrian technical experts regarding the presence of chemicals identified in those samples, some of which were unexpected.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source
“As I previously informed the Council, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic continues to impact the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic. However, the Technical Secretariat maintains its readiness for deployments, which are being conducted subject to the evolution of the pandemic. Despite the travel restrictions, the Technical Secretariat has continued with its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in this regard. Efforts to clarify the remaining outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW are ongoing.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source
“I thank you for this opportunity to once again brief the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since my previous briefing (see S/2021/226), on 4 March 2021, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has continued to maintain regular contact with counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter. As per established practice, I held a monthly call with the OPCW Director-General on Thursday, 1 April 2021, to receive an update and ascertain his views. I also met with the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, who reaffirmed the Syrian Government’s commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention and cooperation with the OPCW Technical Secretariat.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/337 (2021) · source
“It is my sincere hope that the members of the Council will unite on this issue. Before concluding, I wish to echo the Secretary-General’s remarks at the Munich Security Conference segment on “Priorities for Global Action”, delivered on 19 February 2021: “Now is the time for solidarity and international cooperation to tackle our even bigger and more complex challenges. I am convinced that, if we are determined, we can achieve our shared goals”.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“Moving forward, I have been advised that the main focus for future activities of the OPCW mission in the Syrian Arab Republic will continue to be, in no particular order of priority: the Fact-Finding Mission; the implementation of Council decisions EC-83/DEC.5 and EC-81/DEC.4, including declaration-related issues; the inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah sites of the Research Centre and the implementation of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 and Council decision EC-94/DEC.2. The use of chemical weapons is a grave threat to peace and security, as well as to the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, which was painstakingly constructed over past decades. There is no justification for the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances. Those who have used them must be identified and held to account.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“I take this opportunity to once again reiterate my full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW. With regard to the inspections mandated by paragraph 8 of Executive Council decision EC-94/DEC.2, entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, the Technical Secretariat continues to monitor the security situation and will inform the Syrian Arab Republic when it is prepared to deploy for that purpose.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“I note that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) is still in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and continues its engagement with the Syrian Government and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to a variety of incidents. As previously reported, further FFM deployments will be subject to the evolving pandemic. I have also been advised that the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) is continuing its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic, and will issue further reports in due course.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“The Technical Secretariat conducted the seventh round of inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre from 8 to 13 November. I understand that the samples collected during those inspections were split at a OPCW laboratory in the presence of a representative of the Syrian Arab Republic and sent to designated laboratories for analysis. I look forward to the findings of this round of inspections, which will be reported to the Executive Council in due course. I also understand that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the finding of a Schedule 2 chemical detected at the Barzah facilities of the Research Centre during the third round of inspections, in 2018.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“As a result, the Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, due to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. I would like to remind Council members that efforts to resolve these outstanding issues have been ongoing since 2014. As it has been noted on many occasions, the confidence of the international community in the complete elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme depends upon these issues being finalized. I therefore reiterate my call to the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the Technical Secretariat in that regard.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“However, a review of all the information and other materials gathered by the DAT since 2014 indicates that production and/ or weaponization of chemical warfare nerve agents did in fact take place at this facility. Consequently, the Technical Secretariat has requested that the Syrian Arab Republic declare the exact types and quantities of chemical agents produced and/or weaponized at this site. I understand from the Technical Secretariat that the Syrian National Authority has yet to respond to that request.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat will report the results of that deployment to the OPCW Executive Council in due course. I would like to reiterate my appreciation for the DAT, which recently returned to The Hague and is continuing its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration to the OPCW, despite pandemic- related challenges. As reported by the OPCW Director-General, 19 declaration-related issues remain outstanding. One such issue pertains to a chemical weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian National Authority as never having been used for the production of chemical weapons.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“I would like to note that, since I last briefed the Council one month ago (see S/2021/109, annex I), there have been limited developments in the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013). The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic continues to impact the OPCW’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic. However, the OPCW Technical Secretariat maintains its readiness to deploy, subject to the evolving pandemic. In spite of the travel restrictions, the Technical Secretariat has continued its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in that regard. The OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic from 7 to 25 February for the twenty-fourth round of consultations.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“It is my pleasure to once again brief the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. The Office for Disarmament Affairs has continued to maintain regular contact with its counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter. In that context, as per established practice, I held a monthly call with the OPCW Director-General on Tuesday, 2 March, to receive an update and ascertain his views. The Office for Disarmament Affairs also received information from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic concerning chemical issues for this period. That information was studied carefully and forwarded to the OPCW Technical Secretariat.”
2021-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/226 (2021) · source
“I say this every month because it bears consistent repeating — there is an urgent need to not only identify but hold accountable all those who have used chemical weapons, in violation of international law. Otherwise, we are allowing the use of chemical weapons to take place with impunity. It is imperative that the Council show leadership in demonstrating that impunity in the use of such weapons will not be tolerated. The Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can. Before concluding, I wish to echo the Secretary-General’s 28 January remarks to Members States on his priorities for 2021: “Our seventh priority for the year must be to heal geopolitical rifts and find common ground. To address today’s roiling peace and security threats, we need to find a bridge back to common sense.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“As previously reported, further Fact-Finding Mission deployments will be subject to the evolving COVID-19 pandemic. The Investigation and Identification Team continues its investigations into incidents in which the Fact-Finding Mission has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic, and will issue further reports in due course. With regard to the inspections mandated by paragraph 8 of Executive Council decision EC-94/DEC.2, entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, I have been advised that the Technical Secretariat continues to monitor the security situation and will inform the Syrian Arab Republic when it is prepared to deploy for that purpose. Those inspections will also be subject to the evolving pandemic.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“The outcome of that round of inspections will be reported to the OPCW Executive Council in due course. With regard to the finding of a Schedule 2 chemical detected at the Barzah facilities of the Research Centre during the third round of inspections held in 2018, I understand that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the Technical Secretariat to close that issue. The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission continues to study all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and continues its engagement with the Syrian Government and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to a variety of incidents.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“As I have noted on many occasions, the confidence of the international community in the full elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme depends upon the OPCW being able to close these outstanding issues. I hope that during the next round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority, to be held later this month, further progress will be made to resolve these issues. I have been advised that the samples collected during the seventh round of inspections conducted in November by the Technical Secretariat at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre were split at a OPCW laboratory in the presence of a representative of the Syrian Arab Republic and sent to designated laboratories for analysis.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“Consequently, the Technical Secretariat has requested that the Syrian Arab Republic declare the exact types and quantities of chemical agents produced and/or weaponized at that site. I understand from the Technical Secretariat that the Syrian National Authority has yet to respond to that request. As a result, the Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, due to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. I urge the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the Technical Secretariat in that regard.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“As reported by the OPCW Director-General during his briefing to the Security Council on 11 December 2020 (see S/2020/1202, annex II), while three outstanding issues related to the Syrian Arab Republic initial declaration were closed during the twenty-third round of consultations with the Syrian National Authority, held in Damascus from 22 September to 3 October 2020, 19 issues remain outstanding. I note that one of the outstanding issues pertains to a chemical weapons production facility declared by the Syrian National Authority as never having produced chemical weapons. However, a review of all the information and other materials gathered by the DAT since 2014 indicates that production and/or weaponization of chemical warfare nerve agents did take place at this facility.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“As I have previously informed the Security Council, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic continues to impact the OPCW’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic. The OPCW Technical Secretariat maintains its readiness to deploy, subject to the evolving pandemic. In spite of the travel restrictions, the Technical Secretariat has continued with its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in that regard. Efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration to the OPCW are ongoing.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“I thank you for the opportunity to brief the Council on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. As always, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has maintained ongoing communication with its counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities. In that context, per established practice, I held my monthly call yesterday, 2 February, with the OPCW Director- General to receive an update and ascertain his views on the matter. In addition, on 6 and 14 January, the Office for Disarmament Affairs received information from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic concerning chemical issues for this period. That information was studied carefully and forwarded to the OPCW Technical Secretariat.”
2021-02-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/109 (2021) · source
“It is therefore imperative to hold accountable all those who have used chemical weapons. As we start the new year, I state my sincere hope once again that members of the Council will unite on this issue. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can. Before concluding, I wish to echo the Secretary-General’s New Year message: “Together, let’s make peace among ourselves and with nature, tackle the climate crisis, stop the spread of COVID-19 and make 2021 a year of healing.””
2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source