YouSaid · the spoken record

Izumi Nakamitsu

lines on the record
82
first
2020-09-10
most recent
2021-06-29
sittings or episodes
9
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. I take this opportunity to once again reiterate my full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW. With regard to the inspections mandated by paragraph 8 of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-94/DEC.2, entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (see S/2020/724), the OPCW Technical Secretariat is monitoring the current situation and will inform the Syrian Arab Republic when it is prepared to deploy for that purpose. It cannot be repeated often enough: there is no justification for the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances. The use of such weapons with impunity and without accountability is a threat to international peace and security and a danger to us all.

    2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source

  2. I note that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) is still in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and continues its engagement with the Syrian Government and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to a variety of incidents. As previously reported, further FFM deployments will be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Investigation and Identification Team continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic, and it will issue further reports in due course.

    2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source

  3. I take this opportunity to reiterate that until those outstanding issues are closed, the international community cannot have full confidence that the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons programme has been eliminated. I have been advised that the outcome of the seventh round of inspections conducted by the OPCW Technical Secretariat at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in November will be reported to the OPCW Executive Council in due course. I also understand that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the finding of a Schedule 2 chemical detected at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC during the third round of inspections held in 2018.

    2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source

  4. However, the review of all the information and other materials gathered by the DAT since 2014 indicates that the production and/or weaponization of chemical warfare nerve agents took place at that facility. The OPCW Technical Secretariat therefore requested that the Syrian Arab Republic declare the exact types and quantities of chemical agents produced and/or weaponized at the site. I understand from the OPCW Technical Secretariat that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to respond to that request. Consequently, the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to assess that at this stage, due to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source

  5. The OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) is persevering in its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration to the OPCW. As reported by the OPCW Director-General during his briefing to the Security Council on 11 December 2020 (see S/2020/1202, annex II), while some progress was made during the most recent round of consultations with the Syrian National Authority, with three outstanding issues related to the Syrian initial declaration being closed, 19 issues remain outstanding. One of those outstanding issues pertains to a chemical weapons production facility declared by the Syrian National Authority as never having been used for the production of chemical weapons.

    2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source

  6. In addition, on 14, 18 and 28 December 2020, the Office for Disarmament Affairs received information from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic concerning chemical issues for this period. That information was studied carefully and was forwarded to the OPCW Technical Secretariat. As I previously informed the Security Council, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic continues to affect the OPCW’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic. The Technical Secretariat has nevertheless continued with its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in that regard.

    2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source

  7. I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. I also take this opportunity to welcome the new non-permanent members of the Council — India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico and Norway. I look forward to working closely with all of them on this important issue. Since my previous briefing, on 11 December 2020 (see S/2020/1202, annex I), the Office for Disarmament Affairs has continued to maintain regular contact with counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter.

    2021-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/22 (2021) · source

  8. Before concluding, I wish to echo the Secretary-General’s message on the Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare, which was commemorated on 30 November: “The use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances is intolerable and a serious violation of international law…. There can be no justification for the use of these abhorrent weapons. We must remain united and determined in preventing their use or the threat of their use…. It is imperative that those who use or have used chemical weapons are identified and held accountable. That is the only way to meet our moral responsibility to the victims of chemical warfare.” As the Secretary-General urged, “[L]et us renew our unequivocal commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention and our support to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  9. The Investigation and Identification Team is continuing its investigations into incidents in the Syrian Arab Republic in which the Fact-Finding Mission has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used and will issue further reports in due course. I would like to take this opportunity to once again reiterate my full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW. With regard to the implementation of Executive Council decision EC-94/ DEC.2, of 9 July, entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (see S/2020/724), I look forward to Director-General Arias’s update on that matter.

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  10. I understand that the Syrian Arab Republic was informed by the Technical Secretariat that the underground structures should remain sealed as part of the destruction plan agreed by the Executive Council. I note that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission is still in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and is continuing its engagement with the Syrian Government and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to a variety of incidents. As previously reported, further deployments of the Fact-Finding Mission will be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  11. I am sure that the Director-General of the OPCW will provide an update on the activities conducted by the Technical Secretariat, including in relation to the seventh round of inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre between 8 and 13 November. Pursuant to OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-43/DEC.1, dated 24 July 2014, the Technical Secretariat has been monitoring and maintaining the remote monitoring systems installed at four sealed underground structures within the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. In accordance with the Executive Council’s decision, the Technical Secretariat was deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic between 15 and 18 November to conduct its final visit to the underground structures and to observe the removal of the monitoring equipment.

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  12. It is therefore the continuing assessment of the Technical Secretariat that at this stage, owing to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete, in accordance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. During the September-October deployment, the DAT also collected samples to replace those taken during its previous deployment.

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  13. As I mentioned in my previous briefing to the Council, the DAT was deployed to Damascus between 22 September and 3 October to conduct the twenty- third round of consultations with the Syrian National Authority. As reported to the Executive Council through an addendum dated 18 November to the note by the Director-General entitled “Report on the Work of the Declaration Assessment Team” (EC-95/HP/DG.2), dated 1 October, and through a further note by the Director- General entitled “Report on the Work of the Declaration Assessment Team” (EC- 95/HP/DG.3), dated 18 November, some progress was made during that round of consultations, with three outstanding issues being closed related to the Syrian National Authority’s initial declaration. However, as the Director-General also reported, 19 issues remain outstanding.

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  14. On 2 December, we received information from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic concerning chemical issues for the current period. That information was studied carefully and was also forwarded to the OPCW Technical Secretariat. The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic continues to affect the OPCW’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic. The Technical Secretariat has nonetheless continued with its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with Syria in that regard. The Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) is continuing its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration to the OPCW.

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  15. I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief the Council on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. I hope that today’s format will enable a substantive, informative and civilized debate on this important international security issue. It is a pleasure to be joined here today, virtually, by the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Mr. Fernando Arias, who will update the Council on the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons programme. Since my last briefing, on 5 November (see S/2020/1088, annex I), the Office for Disarmament Affairs has continued to maintain regular contact with its counterparts at the OPCW on its activities related to this matter.

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  16. Those who have used chemical weapons must be identified and held to account. It is my sincere hope that members of the Council will unite on this issue.

    2020-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1088 (2020) · source

  17. On 14 October 2020, the OPCW Director General submitted to the OPCW Executive Council a report entitled “Implementation of EC-94/DEC.2 on addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”. That report states that the Syrian Arab Republic did not complete the measures set out in paragraph 5 of the decision within the 90-day period specified therein. A copy of that report was shared with the Security Council and with the General Assembly as document A/75/536-S/2020/1033, pursuant to paragraph 12 of the aforementioned decision of the OPCW Executive Council. It cannot be repeated often enough: there is no justification for the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances. There are no excuses for an inexcusable act.

    2020-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1088 (2020) · source

  18. According to the FFM report, all the information obtained and analysed, the composite summary of the interviews and the results of the laboratory analyses did not allow it to establish whether or not chemicals had been used as a weapon in the incident. A copy of both reports was shared with the members of the Security Council as document S/2020/1082. The Investigation and Identification Team continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic, and it will issue further reports in due course. I take this opportunity once again to underscore my full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW.

    2020-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1088 (2020) · source

  19. Further FFM deployments will be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. As I have previously informed the Security Council, on 1 October 2020 the OPCW Technical Secretariat issued the “Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria regarding the incident of alleged use of chemicals as a weapon in Saraqib, Syrian Arab Republic, on 1 August 2016”, which concluded that the analysis of all available data obtained up until the issuance of that report did not allow the FFM to establish whether or not chemicals had been used as a weapon in the incident. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has also issued the “Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria regarding the incident in Aleppo, Syrian Arab Republic, on 24 November 2018”.

    2020-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1088 (2020) · source

  20. However, the undertaking of further inspections to these facilities will be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. With regard to the finding of a Schedule 2 chemical detected at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC during the third round of inspections held in 2018, I understand that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close this issue. I note that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) is still in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and continues its engagement with the Syrian Government and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to a variety of incidents.

    2020-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1088 (2020) · source

  21. At this stage, due to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has assessed that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. I want to remind Council members that efforts to resolve these outstanding issues have been ongoing since 2014. As has been noted on many occasions, the confidence of the international community in the complete elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme depends upon these issues being finalized. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat still plans to conduct two rounds of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in 2020.

    2020-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1088 (2020) · source

  22. In this context, I would like to express my appreciation to the members of the Declaration Assessment Team who deployed to Damascus from 22 September to 3 October 2020 to conduct the twenty-third round of consultations with the Syrian National Authority despite the COVID-19 pandemic and other logistical and security challenges. During this deployment, the Declaration Assessment Team collected samples to replace those taken during its previous deployment and discussed the current status of all outstanding issues. The outcome of these activities will be reported to the OPCW Executive Council in due course.

    2020-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1088 (2020) · source

  23. As I previously informed the Security Council, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic continues to impact the OPCW’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic. Nonetheless, the Technical Secretariat has continued with its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in this regard. The OPCW Declaration Assessment Team is persevering in its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration to the OPCW.

    2020-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1088 (2020) · source

  24. I thank you, Madam President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since my previous briefing, on 5 October 2020 (see S/PV.8764), the Office for Disarmament Affairs has continued to maintain regular contact with counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter. To date, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has not received any further information from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic concerning issues related to resolution 2118 (2013) for this period.

    2020-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1088 (2020) · source

  25. The requirement for those responsible to be identified and held accountable is paramount. Ensuring accountability for chemical weapons use is our responsibility, not least to the victims of such attacks. It is my sincere hope that the members of the Council will unite on this issue. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  26. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has yet to receive a response from the Syrian Arab Republic to the letter sent to the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic by the OPCW Director- General on 20 July 2020, outlining the obligations of the Syrian Arab Republic under OPCW Executive Council decision EC-94/DEC.2, entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (see A/74/959). As conveyed by the Director-General in the aforementioned letter, the OPCW Technical Secretariat is ready to assist the Syrian Government in the fulfilment of those obligations within the required period of 90 days. I take this opportunity to reiterate that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  27. As I have previously informed Council members, further deployments of the mission will be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on OPCW activities. Following its first report, issued on 8 April 2020, the Investigation and Identification Team is continuing its investigations into incidents in which the Team has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic and will issue further reports in due course.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  28. I understand that the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet provided sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the finding of a Schedule 2 chemical detected at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC. The OPCW Technical Secretariat will continue to engage with the Syrian authorities and will inform the OPCW Executive Council of any progress in due course. The OPCW fact-finding mission remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and continues its engagement with the Syrian Government and other States parties to the CWC with regard to a variety of incidents.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  29. At the technical level, the engagement between the OPCW Secretariat and the Syrian National Authority continued, including through a video-teleconference held on 20 July 2020 followed by a note verbale from the Syrian Government dated 27 July 2020. I take this opportunity to once again stress that until these outstanding issues are closed, the international community cannot have full confidence that the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons programme has been eliminated. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat still plans to conduct two rounds of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in 2020. However, the undertaking of those inspections will be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on OPCW activities.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  30. The OPCW Declaration Assessment Team is continuing its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration to the OPCW. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat received a response from the Syrian Arab Republic to the letter sent by the OPCW Director- General to the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic dated 21 April 2020. That response submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic is being translated and will be reviewed and analysed by OPCW Technical Secretariat experts. The Technical Secretariat will inform the Executive Council of any developments in due course.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  31. As I have previously informed the Security Council, all scheduled deployments and missions of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, including missions to take place in the Syrian Arab Republic, have been postponed until further notice owing to the impact of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Nonetheless, the Technical Secretariat has continued with its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in that regard. The OPCW Technical Secretariat will continue to closely monitor the situation and will keep States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) duly informed of any developments.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source

  32. I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief the Council on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. I hope that today’s format will allow for a substantive debate on this very important international security issue. As is established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has maintained regular contact over the last month with counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter.

    2020-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/902 (2020) · source