YouSaid · the spoken record

John Weston

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525
first
1995-08-07
most recent
1998-06-30
sittings or episodes
79
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un-security-council

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  1. Regrettably, similar invitations from the British Government to the Arab League and to the Organization of African Unity to send missions to Scotland to see Scottish justice at first hand rather than accept the Libyan Government's own propaganda were rejected. I find this hard to understand. Firsthand knowledge of the facts is always preferable to hearsay and unsubstantiated assumptions. The United Nations own two independent experts - both respected judges, one from Zimbabwe and one from the Netherlands - could not have been clearer. They concluded not just that the Scottish legal system was fair and independent.

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  2. On the subject of press reporting, the Libyan Ambassador himself distributed the videocassette of a recent BBC Scotland programme which argued that the Libyan suspects were innocent. So much for prejudicial publicity. This claim must, of course, be tested in a Scottish court. We are nevertheless grateful to the Libyan Ambassador for demonstrating that his contention that the Scottish press or indeed the Scottish people have made up their minds about the guilt of the two suspects in advance is patently false. The Secretary-General's own expert mission to Scotland late last year exposed the hollowness of Libyan arguments about a prejudicial climate for a trial in Scotland.

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  3. First let me deal with the question of the fairness of a trial of the two accused in Scotland. Libya has formally stated that it has no reservations about the fairness of Scottish justice. Instead Libya claims that the climate of press and public opinion in Scotland would render a fair trial impossible. This is simply untrue. There is no television in court and no media circus in Scotland. There are strict rules on prejudicial publicity and contempt of court within the Scottish legal system which are aimed at ensuring that no such prejudice can take place. Indeed, trials have been stopped in the United Kingdom on the rare occasions where press reporting was held to have prejudged the issue.

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  4. But we hope these organizations will not be used to undermine the Security Council's resolutions and that their influence will eventually be deployed to bring about Libya's acceptance of international law and justice for the victims. As President Mandela said last October in Libya itself, the United Nations must be respected. Making an exception for Libya would harm the United Nations and its authority more generally. Are we now to establish as a new norm that those accused of crimes of international terrorism may choose the place of their trial when it suits them? Which other Member States here present would countenance that, after the murder of innocent people in their own territory and jurisdiction? Let me address Libya's misrepresentations in detail.

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  5. Libya has only to comply with Security Council resolutions and hand over the two suspects in order for sanctions to be lifted. For whatever reasons, Libya has refused for over six years to comply. It has sought instead to enlist other members of the United Nations behind its policies of non-compliance, on the basis of misrepresentations about the trial process, about the impact of sanctions and, most recently, about the preliminary ruling of the International Court of Justice. We greatly respect the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States. We understand the pressures of regional solidarity.

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  6. Thank you, Sir, for presiding over this meeting. We are now in the tenth year since 270 innocent people were murdered when Pan Am flight 103 was blown up over the Scottish village of Lockerbie. They and their families are the victims of an appalling act of terrorism which the Security Council has unanimously condemned. Representatives of the British and other victims' families are present in this Chamber observing today's debate. My delegation pays tribute to them and to their fortitude in coping for so long with their grief and the denial of justice. It is high time that justice was done and that the two accused were handed over to face trial in Scotland. I welcome this opportunity once again to state the position of the British Government. The solution to this issue lies in the hands of the Libyan Government.

    1998-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3864 (1998) · source

  7. If the Iraqi regime doubts the will of the international community to make good on that warning, it will, not for the first time, be making a grave mistake. There is a great need at such moments to face up with courage and intellectual honesty to unpalatable truths. Regional security, the future of non-proliferation under international auspices, and the authority of the United Nations and its Secretary-General are all involved, and are all at stake, in our collective efforts to get the case of Iraq right. The sponsors draw encouragement from the Council's unity in backing the Secretary- General. Iraq must draw the lesson.

    1998-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3858 (1998) · source

  8. There should be a time, to which the beleaguered Iraqi people can look forward, when Iraq is able to return to the respectable company of nations. If, on the other hand, Iraq fails to comply, continues to obstruct the Special Commission's work and fails to honour the agreement it has signed with the Secretary- General, the draft resolution is again absolutely clear: this will not be tolerated. The Council is determined that any Violation will result in the severest consequences. This is, at the very least, a statement of the facts which should by now be self-evident, as I explained in greater detail during the Council's earlier consultations. It is a statement of the facts, but it bears solemnly repeating in this draft resolution, since there are none so blind as those who will not see.

    1998-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3858 (1998) · source

  9. It sends two important messages: first, that the Security Council is giving its full support to the Secretary-General and to the Memorandum of Understanding which makes clear that Iraq is bound by all the relevant resolutions and is obliged to provide immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to the Special Commission anywhere in Iraq, not just in the eight so-called presidential sites which have up to now been the pretext for so much delay and obstruction. The second message is that the Iraqi regime has a choice. If it fulfils its commitments under the Memorandum of Understanding and complies with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions, the way will be open for the lifting of sanctions.

    1998-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3858 (1998) · source

  10. Whether this crisis is over and the Special Commission is able to complete its work depends on whether the Iraqi regime now implements in practice what it has signed on paper. We are not prepared to see a repeat of the Iraqi behaviour which led to the present crisis. It is for this reason that the United Kingdom, with the able and welcome additional sponsorship of Japan, proposed and sponsored the draft resolution on which the Council is about to vote. The draft resolution is short and to the point.

    1998-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3858 (1998) · source

  11. The Secretary-General deserves great credit for what he achieved in Baghdad. As the British Prime Minister said in the British Parliament on the day the Secretary-General returned to New York, "I am delighted that Kofi Annan, for whom I have the greatest respect and admiration, has succeeded in this mission and has brought back a signed agreement". But, as the Secretary-General has himself acknowledged - and has indeed repeated this evening - this was not a success for diplomacy alone but a success for diplomacy firmly backed by the willingness to use force if diplomacy should fail. Does anyone seriously imagine that the same result would have been obtained without this? Welcome though the agreement is, it is by itself not enough.

    1998-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3858 (1998) · source

  12. Allow me first, Sir, to express on behalf of the United Kingdom our welcome, and our pleasure in seeing you preside over this important meeting today. Seven years ago this Council established the United Nations Special Commission to destroy or render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction as an integral part of the conditions for the ceasefire which ended the Gulf War. The fact that the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission and his staff, for all their hard work and professionalism, have still not completed their task is the direct result of Iraqi deceit, obstruction and concealment. The crisis which led the Secretary-General to fly to Baghdad in a last-ditch effort to find a diplomatic solution is just the latest and the most serious in a series of Iraqi provocations.

    1998-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3858 (1998) · source

  13. They have prolonged the suffering of the Iraqi people for their own political ends. This draft resolution therefore rightly responds to the strong wish of every member of the Security Council to do everything possible to bring much-needed humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people, to increase the food ration and to restore medical facilities and agriculture. The Government of Iraq must accept this draft resolution so that the people of Iraq can get the help they so desperately need. If it does not, we know exactly who is to blame.

    1998-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3855 (1998) · source

  14. In 1995 we all tried again, adopting the oil-for-food resolution 986 (1995). The Iraqi regime opposed the resolution for over a year. For months afterwards they prevented its implementation. When they did sell oil, they used the money to lower, by an equivalent amount, their own spending on the welfare of the Iraqi people. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussain has spent at least $1 billion on his presidential palaces. We have said it many times before, but it needs to be repeated: all that the Government of Iraq has to do to bring about the lifting of sanctions is to comply with the resolutions of this Council. It is a simple enough demand, but one that the Government of Iraq persists in ignoring. Instead, the Iraqi regime has cynically manipulated the oil-for-food programme and slowed the delivery of supplies to the people who most need them.

    1998-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3855 (1998) · source

  15. And, as a new measure, it will provide funds for Iraqi pilgrims to perform the Hajj. No one wishes to see sanctions maintained for one moment longer than necessary. We have always been determined that their impact on the Iraqi people be minimized and their impact on the Iraqi regime maximized. Despite Iraqi propaganda, we all know that food and medicine are not covered by United Nations sanctions, and thus it is not sanctions that have prevented food and medicine from getting to the Iraqi people. We have done our utmost to ensure that their needs are met. In 1991 we presented a resolution allowing Iraq to sell oil in return for humanitarian supplies. The Iraqi regime refused to implement it. We tried again later that year with another resolution. Again, the United Nations adopted it and Saddam Hussain rejected it.

    1998-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3855 (1998) · source

  16. This draft resolution, in whose preparation, along with Portugal and Sweden, the United Kingdom has played a major part, would implement the recommendations of the Secretary- General to expand the oil-for-food programme in Iraq. But it is more than just a technical draft resolution. It is a clear message that we are not prepared to see the Iraqi people suffer as a consequence of the actions of their leaders, a message that we will do everything we can to see that their urgent humanitarian needs are met. This draft resolution will mean a massive increase in the humanitarian programme in Iraq. It will pay for the food and medicines the Iraqi people so badly need. It will help restore clean water and proper sanitation to hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. It will restore schools and help farmers increase their output.

    1998-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3855 (1998) · source

  17. We admire the strength and courage shown by the Angolan people in times of great difficulty. It is essential now to ensure that the last remaining hurdles are successfully overcome so that Angolans now and in the future can experience the peace and stability they so clearly deserve.

    1998-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3850 (1998) · source

  18. We believe that the United Nations has a valuable role to play in overcoming those difficulties and in fostering an atmosphere of stability and national reconciliation. We welcome the decision to extend for a further three months the presence in Angola of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). We pay tribute to the men and women of MONUA and to the Secretary-General' s Special Representative, Maitre Blondin Beye, who are doing a difficult job in trying and often dangerous circumstances. We welcome and appreciate the efforts of the three observer States: Portugal, the United States and the Russian Federation. After so many years of conflict, Angola is now closer than at any other time since independence to establishing a lasting peace.

    1998-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3850 (1998) · source

  19. We provide critical assistance for the health sector, for agriculture and for rural development. And we will continue to assist the Angolan authorities to remove the scourge of mines in their country. But Angola's recovery depends not only on continued international assistance, but also on the willingness of both parties to bring the peace process to a successful conclusion. The European Union is encouraged by reports that a meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi is being prepared. This should take place in Angola as soon as possible. International and grass-roots efforts to promote national reconciliation can succeed only if there is a firm and unequivocal commitment at the highest political level. The European Union recognizes the difficulties which still lie ahead.

    1998-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3850 (1998) · source

  20. The European Union places the utmost importance on respect for human rights. We are concerned that human rights observers are present in only 7 of Angola's 18 provinces. We support the Secretary-General's intention to increase the number of observers to the mandated strength, and international efforts to increase respect for human rights and improve the free movement of people and goods in Angola. We underline the importance of the work of United Nations civilian police in promoting respect for human rights and in building a climate of trust in Angola. The European Union has invested heavily in the Angolan peace process and will continue to do so. We are the largest contributor to Angola's rehabilitation and a leading provider of humanitarian assistance.

    1998-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3850 (1998) · source

  21. UNITA must now declare itself completely demilitarized. This will open the way for its formal transition to a political party and allow it to participate fully and constructively in the democratic process and in the future development of Angola. We note the progress made in extending State administration. We call upon UNITA to cooperate fully and to avoid further delays. In particular, we urge the early extension of State administration to Bailundo and Andulo as a demonstration of UNITA's commitment to national reconciliation. We look forward to the completion of Radio Vorgan's transformation to "Radio Despertar". Non- partisan stations can play a positive role in increasing the flow of information throughout the country and in building confidence, as my colleague the Permanent Representative of Mozambique has just indicated.

    1998-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3850 (1998) · source

  22. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union - Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia - and the associated country Cyprus, as well as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries members of the European Economic Area, Iceland and Norway, align themselves with this statement. The European Union welcomes the agreement by both parties on a timetable which foresees the completion of the outstanding provisions of the Lusaka Protocol by the end of February. We urge both the Government of Angola and UNITA to complete their tasks according to the agreed timetable. We welcome the conclusion of the registration and disarmament of residual UNITA military personnel.

    1998-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3850 (1998) · source

  23. No one expects it is going to be rebuilt in a day, and the United Kingdom is prepared to stay the course if others do. We have invested over £1 billion so far financially and militarily. I said at the beginning of my remarks that our goal was to see Bosnia participate fully in Europe. But that and the lasting peace which would underpin such a role is not in the international community's gift, however hard we work in Bosnia. Ultimately, it is the action of Bosnia's leaders that will determine how Bosnia meets the twenty-first century. They are accountable to history, to the international community and to their own people.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  24. The United Kingdom is a firm supporter of the strengthened role envisaged for them at Bonn, notably in training the Entity police forces so that these can serve their communities in a professional and non-discriminatory way in maintaining the rule of law. The United Kingdom is delighted that a British Deputy Chief Constable, Mr. Richard Monk, has been appointed as the new IPT F Commissioner. We shall give him every support in his important task. We believe that the extension of the IPTF mandate for six months - on a renewable basis to bring it in line with SFOR's mandate - is strategically coherent while offering the best way of meeting operational requirements. We hope that this extension will be agreed without difficulty. We all want to see Bosnia regain normality.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  25. British Ministers have made it clear that they are ready to stay for the foreseeable future if others are. We warmly welcome therefore President Clinton's commitment in principle to contribute United States troops and United States command to a follow-on force. This will help to ensure the success of a post-SFOR mission and to consolidate SFOR's considerable achievements in advancing civilian implementation. We look forward to the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia, including the International Police Task Force (IPTF). The commitment and professionalism of the IPTF's members is a major force for change in Bosnia.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  26. We regret that the parties fell at the first fence by failing to adopt the citizenship law. We welcome the move by the High Representative to have the law applied on an interim basis until passed by the parliamentary Assembly. The United Kingdom has welcomed the readiness this year to use SFOR directly to support civilian implementation. Continued success in this area will depend on maintaining a secure environment. Following the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 16 December, NATO is now examining possible options for a follow-on force to succeed SFOR when the latter's mandate expires in June of next year. British troops have been on the ground in Bosnia since the beginning of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and remain the largest European contingent.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  27. We expect action to allow refugees and displaced persons to return home and for property laws to be changed so that they are fair. We expect progress on consolidating the central institutions and on introducing good government practices, particularly in the area of transparency in public accounts. We hope that the new Republika Srpska Assembly and Government will meet soon and emphasize that all political institutions throughout Bosnia will be held to internationally accepted standards of democratization and accountability. And, as I said a moment ago, we expect action from the authorities in Bosnia and its neighbours to surrender those indicted for war crimes to the International Tribunal in The Hague, as they have committed themselves to do. We also expect the deadlines set at Bonn to be followed.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  28. The international community is putting enormous effort into this, and members of the United Nations and other international organizations engaged in Bosnia, especially Carlos Westendorp and Kai Eide and their teams, deserve our praise and support for their considerable achievements in the two years since Dayton. The tragic loss of 12 international personnel in a helicopter crash in Bosnia on 17 September bears witness to the courage and commitment of those who are trying to bring peace to this troubled country. We have kept our side of the bargain. It is now time for Bosnia's leaders to deliver theirs. The Bonn Peace Implementation Conference made this very clear. We expect action from the Bosnian authorities on media freedoms.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  29. Justice is indispensable for true peace and reconciliation in Bosnia. Last night's action by SFOR underscores this. The Bonn Peace Implementation Council set an accelerated agenda for civilian implementation for next year. It reaffirmed that the only way forward is a unified State of Bosnia and Herzegovina with two multi-ethnic entities, sovereign and secure within its existing borders. The United Kingdom is determined to put its whole weight behind the peace process. We strongly support the High Representative's intention to use his full authority under Dayton to drive implementation forward. Bonn reaffirmed the full backing of the international community for his efforts. Our goal, like that of all the international community, is a democratic and prosperous Bosnia taking its place as a modern nation in Europe.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  30. First of all, let me join others in extending to you personally, Mr. President, a welcome here this afternoon. Before beginning my prepared statement I should like on behalf of the British Government to welcome the latest action by the Stabilization Force (SFOR), acting under authority contained in the relevant Security Council resolutions, to detain two Bosnian Croats indicted for war crimes. We congratulate SFOR troops on a brave and successful operation. Other war crimes indictees still at large are hereby put on notice that they too remain accountable. They should surrender themselves to the International Criminal Tribunal without delay. And all the parties to the Peace Agreement should comply fully with their commitment to transfer those indicted for war crimes to The Hague.

    1997-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3842 (1997) · source

  31. Let us be clear that until and unless Iraq cooperates with the Special Commission and tells the whole truth about its programmes of illegal weapons of mass destruction, there can be no prospect of the Council considering whether the demands of Section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) have been met. The reviews for that purpose remain in suspension. Finally, this is not a sanctions review. But on this occasion it is worth reminding ourselves that Iraq has still failed to meet its obligations on missing Kuwaiti prisoners of war, property and the national archives of Kuwait. For the United Kingdom, the successful resolution of these issues is no less important than that of the destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. It is high time for Iraq to commit itself to addressing seriously these matters as well.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  32. These facts are borne out in the latest report of the Special Commission, which clearly states that, while progress has been made, serious deficiencies remain in all three weapons areas, in particular on chemical and biological warfare agents. The United Kingdom congratulates the Executive Chairman and his staff for the progress which has been made. In the light of Iraqi behaviour, it is nonsense to suggest that Iraq deserves to share the credit. The progress which has been achieved is due solely to the dedication of numerous international experts drawn from many Member States, for whom Iraqi harassment, obstruction, lies and half-truths have been and continue to be a daily fare. The Special Commission and its staff will continue to have our full support.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  33. The United Kingdom, for its part, remains determined to ensure that Iraq complies fully with the decision of the international community that it should give up its weapons of mass destruction and any ambitions it may have to retain or acquire them. This can only be achieved if Saddam Hussain takes the political decision to cooperate fully with the Special Commission. The regularity with which this Council has had to address this issue confirms that this decision has still not been taken. All we have heard from the Iraqi regime for the past six and half years are lies and empty promises, while on the ground they have actively obstructed the Special Commission and concealed from it details of its illegal weapons programmes.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  34. We have worked hard and in good faith to accommodate all members' preoccupations on the text. But we were not willing to compromise the underlying purpose of the resolution or the responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council in order to appease Iraq - an Iraq, by the way, whose spokesmen have unwisely tried to threaten and intimidate the United Nations in recent days. This Council will not be deflected from its course by unacceptable Iraqi attempts at blackmail. The message which needs to be sent clearly is that if the Government of Iraq chooses to challenge the will and authority of the United Nations Security Council, it can be sure of a firm and principled response. If Iraq has not yet understood this, it has understood nothing.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  35. access to sites in Iraq since the passage of resolution 1115 (1997). It condemns these incidents, as well as the endangering of the safety of UNSCOM. staff, the destruction of documents of interest to the Special Commission and the interference with the freedom of movement of UNSCOM personnel. It decides that these incidents of Iraqi non- compliance are a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions. It notes that, in his report, the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission was unable to advise this Council that Iraq was in substantial compliance with the demands of resolution 1115 (1997). To us and our fellow co-sponsors this provides adequate justification to move forward from the decision we took in June. We shall regret it if a few Council members, for whatever reasons of their own, are unable to subscribe to this View.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  36. It spells out those measures - what they are and to whom they will apply - while generously providing a further opportunity over the next six months for Iraq to demonstrate by its good faith that they are unnecessary. It begins straight away the process of designating, on the basis of incidents recorded since the adoption of resolution 1115 (1997), who some of the targeted individuals would be, so that action on paragraph 6 of the resolution could begin at once, if needed. It also postpones any further sanctions reviews until next April, because Iraq's obstruction has made it impossible for the Special Commission to complete its work. The basis for these decisions is clearly set out in the resolution. It expresses grave concern at the additional incidents of Iraqi refusal to allow UNSCOM.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  37. The incidents described by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission in his report of 6 October 1997 show that the Iraqi regime chose to ignore that warning. We, together with our fellow co-sponsors, believe, therefore, that the Council should react robustly to continued Iraqi flouting of Security Council resolutions. We further believe that the resolution on which we are about to vote is a reasonable, proportionate and focused response to repeated Iraqi failures. It contains a firm and consistent decision which builds on and develops the firmly stated intention in resolution 1115 (1997) "to impose additional measures".

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  38. The resolution which is before us, co-sponsored by the United Kingdom and eight other members of this Council, is in direct response to continued Iraqi obstruction of the Special Commission (UNSCOM) in the execution of the mandate given to it by this Council, in contravention of the demands of Security Council resolution 1115 (1997), adopted unanimously by the Council on 21 June 1997. In that resolution, the Council stated its firm intention to impose additional measures on those Iraqi officials responsible for instances of non-cooperation with the Special Commission and those which had not allowed the Special Commission's inspection teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi facilities and personnel.

    1997-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3826 (1997) · source

  39. The draft resolution before the Council today provides practical backing for ECOWAS. By establishing an international arms and oil embargo, and visa restrictions on members of the junta, the Security Council will be making clear to the illegal regime in Freetown that the entire international community is committed to reversing the military coup and restoring the democratically elected Government. The draft resolution has our full support.

    1997-10-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3822 (1997) · source

  40. And the people of Sierra Leone have the right to expect their Constitution, the rule of law and the results of free and fair elections to be respected. The United Kingdom pays tribute to the dedicated efforts of the countries of ECOWAS, and in particular of the Committee of Five Foreign Ministers, to achieve a peaceful solution to this crisis. Unfortunately, their efforts to negotiate with the military junta to bring about a voluntary surrender of power have been thwarted by the junta's intransigence and lack of good faith. Only two weeks ago, in this Chamber, many members of the Council, as well as the Chairman and the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, drew particular attention to the importance of regional initiatives in dealing with the threats to peace and security in the region.

    1997-10-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3822 (1997) · source

  41. Tragically for the people of Sierra Leone, the peace process suffered a grave setback when the RUF refused to cooperate with United Nations proposals for a military observer force. In May 1997, a military coup was launched against President Kabbah's Government. The United Kingdom, which had helped with the organization of the elections in March 1996, was appalled by this turn of events. We have joined the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the rest of the international community in condemning unequivocally the seizure of power by Major Koroma and his associates. The international community cannot afford to acquiesce in the arbitrary and unconstitutional overthrow of a democratic Government.

    1997-10-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3822 (1997) · source

  42. Some 19 months ago democratic elections were held in Sierra Leone and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected President. Eight months later the Government of Sierra Leone under President Kabbah signed the Abidjan peace accord with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone in Abidjan. The signing of this peace agreement signalled the end of five years of civil war and a chance for the people of Sierra Leone to look forward to a period of peace and stability in which much needed development could take root. The United Nations, as a moral guarantor of the Abidjan accord, was actively engaged in the peace process. The Security Council was involved in exploring ways in which it could help assist the implementation of the accord.

    1997-10-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3822 (1997) · source

  43. That is why the United Kingdom has taken the initiative in putting forward and co-sponsoring this draft resolution. It enables Iraq to make up the shortfall in oil. sales and thus to ensure that the full amount of revenue is made available for the purchase of humanitarian supplies for the benefit of the Iraqi people. 'The United Kingdom hopes that from now on the Government of Iraq will assume its full responsibilities under resolution 986 (1995), resolution 1111 (1997) and all other relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

    1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3817 (1997) · source

  44. I shall be very brief. The United Kingdom regrets that the decision of the Government of Iraq not to export oil under Security Council resolution 1111 (1997) until 13 August this year has resulted in Iraq's being unable to take advantage of the full quota provided for in the first 90-day period under Security Council resolution l. I ll (1997). Unless the Council was prepared to amend the provisions of Security Council resolution 1111 (1997), this would mean less revenue for the purchase of humanitarian supplies for the Iraqi people. Through no fault of their own, the Iraqi people would be denied the full allowance of humanitarian supplies. Let me be quite clear. The United Kingdom is determined to ensure that the Iraqi people receive the maximum benefit from Security Council resolution 111] (1997).

    1997-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3817 (1997) · source

  45. Egypt, France, Guinea- Bissau, Japan, Kenya, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution, as orally revised in its provisional form, has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1127 (1997). There are no further speakers on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter. The meeting rose at 1.50 pm.

    1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source

  46. Savimbi in Angola could help to lower the political temperature and make a positive contribution to the peace process. We urge both of them to meet so that they may resolve the remaining differences. In closing, I pay tribute to the men and women of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), to the Secretary-General's Special Representative and to the representatives of the three observer States in Luanda, who have done so much to bring the peace process to its present stage. Let us hope their efforts are not in vain. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. I now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/1997/669, as orally revised in its provisional form. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Chile. China, Costa Rica.

    1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source

  47. Indeed, we hope that these measures will not have to come into effect; there is more than enough time for UNITA to respond. It is not only in their interests but those of all the Angolan people. We are very concerned at recent military tensions in Angola. Both UNITA and the Government have contributed to these. We are not about to apportion blame, but we do think both parties should make every effort not to resort to military measures. A return to military confrontation only sets back the international community's heavy investment in trying to make Angola a success story. It would be a tragedy if, after all the progress achieved since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, the Angolan leaders were to allow this to happen. In this respect, we believe that a meeting between President Dos Santos and Mr.

    1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source

  48. Two months have elapsed since the Security Council demanded that UNITA provide credible information on its troops, enable the extension of State administration, and transform Radio VORGAN into a non-partisan radio station. Yet UNITA headquarters have delayed, or provided only incomplete or implausible information. Repeated reminders have fallen on deaf ears. UNITA should now be in no doubt about the resolve of the Security Council. We will do everything we can to keep the peace process from slipping. We agree that, regrettably, the time has come for additional measures against UNITA. They are carefully drafted to send a message to the leaders of UNITA that they must fully meet their obligations under the Lusaka Protocol.

    1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source

  49. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom. The Secretary-General describes the current phase of the Angolan peace process as the most difficult since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol. UNITA is clearly not doing what it agreed to do in 1994 - namely, to transform itself from a military organization into a legitimate opposition party. UNITA has already come a long way, and we welcome its participation in the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, the unified Angolan Armed Forces and the National Assembly. We have no illusions about the difficulty of those steps. Indeed, we pay tribute to those members of UNITA who have had the courage to work with their former opponents. But UNITA as such has been unwilling to take the final steps.

    1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source

  50. I invite the representative of Guinea to resume the seat reserved for her at the side of the Council Chamber. At this point the Presidency would just like to thank the distinguished speakers so far for the way they have enriched the Council's discussions. I think it is clear from the 11 interventions this morning that those who have spoken under rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure share comprehensively the approach which underlines the draft resolution on which we are about to vote. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it, as orally revised in its provisional form. If I hear no objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote. There being no objection, it is so decided.

    1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source