YouSaid · the spoken record

John Weston

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525
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1995-08-07
most recent
1998-06-30
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79
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un-security-council

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  1. The United Kingdom warmly welcomes the signing of the final peace Agreement between the Guatemalan Government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) in Guatemala City on 29 December 1996. The Agreement signals the end of 36 years of conflict and marks the culmination of a long and complex process of negotiation. We pay tribute to both parties, who have demonstrated that when the political will exists, even the most intractable conflicts can be resolved. We also commend the role of the United Nations mediation team, who have worked tirelessly in pursuit of this achievement. The foundations for a lasting peace in Guatemala have been laid. A period of reconciliation and reconstruction is now necessary to insure a lasting peace for that country. Implementation of the Agreement will not be easy.

    1997-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3730 (1997) · source

  2. Underlying the approach set out in the Action Plan agreed with the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina last week in London is the principle that responsibility for promoting reconciliation lies with the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves and that the international community's willingness to help them by devoting significant resources will inevitably depend on the degree to which those authorities shoulder this responsibility, including implementing the Peace Agreement. One key area in this respect is compliance with the International Tribunal. The Peace Implementation Council last week formally reaffirmed its strong support for the work of the Tribunal. We particularly welcome the emphasis placed on the surrender of indictees in the draft resolution before us, of which my delegation is a sponsor.

    1996-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3723 (1996) · source

  3. The United Kingdom will increase its assistance to the United Nations International Police Task Force, including the deployment of 30 police officers to assist in the retraining of the local police forces, as well as providing training for senior police officers in the United Kingdom and on the ground. And the United Kingdom is significantly increasing its financial support to the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including the secondment of personnel to enhance the Tribunal's ability to track the whereabouts of war-crimes indictees. We urge others to join us in such undertakings.

    1996-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3723 (1996) · source

  4. That is why the international community decided, at the recent Peace Implementation Conference held in London, to continue to devote very significant resources to help the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina re-establish their own country. The United Kingdom, for its part, is contributing up to 5,000 troops as part of the Stabilization Force, which will involve the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in partnership with 17 or more other countries. We particularly welcome the participation of the Russian Federation in that Force.

    1996-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3723 (1996) · source

  5. And last week in London, for the first time since the Peace Agreement was signed, all members of that Presidency, together with the elected leaders of the two Entities, took part in an international Conference sitting behind a single name-plate labelled "Bosnia and Herzegovina" - a small but nevertheless significant step in itself. This is a good record and should be recognized as such. The British Government acknowledges the efforts of all those who have contributed and in particular, as other have said, the exceptional dedication shown by the High Representative, Mr. Carl Bildt. But, of course, such progress is not enough in itself.

    1996-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3723 (1996) · source

  6. Twelve months ago, this Council adopted a resolution which helped set in motion the largest and most complex operation to reconstruct a shattered European country to be undertaken by the international community for the last 50 years. Since then, much has been achieved. The guns have stayed silent. The armies are back in barracks. A quarter of a million refugees have returned. Reconstruction has begun in earnest. Sarajevo, so long under siege, has been transformed. Elections have been held. The newly elected Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina has begun its work.

    1996-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3723 (1996) · source

  7. But we must not now endanger our previous investment in peace in Haiti through precipitate actions that could threaten the stability of that country.

    1996-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3721 (1996) · source

  8. The Haitian National Police is still at the fledgling stage of its development and is not yet capable of taking full responsibility for public security. That is why the continuing support of the international community is so important. The United Kingdom commends the Government of Haiti for its efforts in support of UNSMIH. We must all work with the Government to ensure that governmental and judicial institutions are strengthened to give Haiti the necessary foundations for a stable democracy. We hope that the necessary reforms of the judiciary will be implemented soon, relieving the pressure on the court system. Haiti has been a success story for the United Nations. We recognize that the United Nations has remained in Haiti longer than originally envisaged.

    1996-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3721 (1996) · source

  9. The United Kingdom is in favour of extending the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), as proposed in the draft resolution before us. We are firmly of the view that the continuation of UNSMIH's work in Haiti is essential to maintain the peace and stability of that country. We are grateful to all the contributors to UNSMIH, in particular Canada and the United States, for their crucial role in ensuring the success of the Mission so far. We are pleased to note the Secretary-General's assessment that the security situation in Haiti continues to improve. However, the danger of destabilization by armed opposition groups remains. Violent crime is on the increase and is a cause for concern.

    1996-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3721 (1996) · source

  10. What we are setting in motion today will, I trust, show that the United Nations and its Member States are able to make a difference and that we have the courage and determination to do so. It was once well said that the only real reason for doing something is that it is the right thing to do. All the others are reasons for doing nothing. The United Kingdom believes that, with the course charted by this draft resolution, the United Nations is doing the right thing.

    1996-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3713 (1996) · source

  11. It is right that we should learn the lessons of past mistakes. Now we face, in the challenge presented by the crisis in eastern Zaire, a new call to live up to the aims and ideals of the United Nations Charter. There are pitfalls. We should not underestimate the risks and the difficulties. Thorough preparation and planning, a clear mandate, achievable objectives and renewed efforts to reach a long-term political settlement are essential. But we should take encouragement from the rapid and effective work here at United Nations Headquarters over recent days and from the political signal that the unanimous adoption of this Security Council resolution will send.

    1996-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3713 (1996) · source

  12. We must help Rwanda create the conditions which are necessary to encouraging the refugees to return, including by increasing the number of human rights monitors working there. As the largest bilateral donor to the Rwanda Human Rights programme, Britain is playing a leading role in this, and we encourage others to do so, too. We agree with the point just made by the Ambassador of France that a Great Lakes conference would have a central role to play in securing a peaceful and stable future for the region. We agree that preparations should begin for such a conference under the auspices of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It is only right that the OAU should be closely involved in the search for a lasting political solution in the region. The United Nations has suffered some setbacks in recent years.

    1996-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3713 (1996) · source

  13. We hope that African States will play an important role in the multinational force and in the follow-on force that will succeed this operation. It is also important that they participate actively in the planning for both forces from the outset. All States can help in this endeavour. We look to those nations that are not providing troops to do everything they can to support it. We encourage them to contribute urgently to the Secretary-General's voluntary trust fund, which is established by this draft resolution. I said that the multinational force was not a panacea. It cannot resolve the problems of the region. The political dimension of this crisis remains paramount in order to achieve a lasting solution. We believe the regional Governments have a key role to play in this, and we welcome the lead that they took at the Nairobi Summit.

    1996-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3713 (1996) · source

  14. This could reduce the effectiveness of an operation limited purely to Goma and Bukavu. This crisis affects the region as a whole. The Governments of the region recognized this at their Summit in Nairobi on 5 November and made clear their willingness to play a full part in helping to resolve the crisis. A successful operation needs the full strategic consent of all the Governments concerned. As far as possible, it also need the acquiescence of the various militias active in the area. We believe that participation and cooperation by African States is very important. By authorizing the establishment of a multinational force, the Security Council is responding to African calls for a neutral force to alleviate the suffering and to promote the return of refugees.

    1996-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3713 (1996) · source

  15. Any serious attempt to meet the humanitarian crisis and to prevent further suffering must try to ensure that those refugees who want to return to their homes are not prevented from doing so by armed gangs or intimidators. Nor should this operation result in the re-establishment of camps in which armed elements are allowed to operate. We agree with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that the force should be able to ensure the exclusively humanitarian and civilian character of all refugee locations under the multinational force's control. This means it should be sufficiently large, and sufficiently well-equipped, to do the job properly. The geographical scope of the operation must also be matched to the force's capability. Many of the refugees have now spread out into the less-accessible areas of eastern Zaire.

    1996-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3713 (1996) · source

  16. It is also essential that the United Nations start work immediately on preparations for the necessary follow-on operation, in the context of an international humanitarian task force, so that this follow-on force is ready to take over before the mandate of the multinational force expires, at the latest on 31 March 1997. We also need to ensure that these immediate actions do not render the longer-term tasks more difficult. We do not want the previous unhappy situation, which led directly to the present crisis, to occur again. This deployment must not freeze the situation as it is, nor set back the efforts over the last two years to resolve the complex humanitarian situation in the region.

    1996-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3713 (1996) · source

  17. What we need is a properly balanced force, of a size adequate to the task and with a clear and achievable mandate. In such a force let there be no doubt that the British contribution would be substantial and prominent. As the British Defence Secretary told our Parliament yesterday, we recognize our obligations in the face of such a call to action. We are among the relatively few nations with the military capability to help, and we are proud that the British armed forces can make a difference. A British military reconnaissance team has already gone to the region to assess the conditions on the ground. The deployment of a multinational force is the only feasible option if we are to get people on the ground quickly. But it is important to recognize the temporary nature of this operation. It is an immediate response to an immediate crisis.

    1996-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3713 (1996) · source

  18. There is no disputing the gravity and complexity of the crisis that has erupted in eastern Zaire. It is one of the largest and most challenging tasks the United Nations has faced. The potential for a humanitarian catastrophe is real. The international community has a moral obligation to help where we can, and to do so urgently. We pay tribute to Canada for offering to take on the leadership role in the organization of a multinational force. The United Kingdom is ready to play a full part in this. We cosponsored the draft resolution before us, and we intend to vote in favour of it. We have been actively involved in contingency planning since the Council adopted resolution 1078 (1996). A multinational force is not a panacea, but it must be able to meet the task we are setting for it.

    1996-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3713 (1996) · source

  19. The United Kingdom will continue to work towards the goal we all share: the peaceful settlement of the conflict, and an end to the suffering of all Afghan people.

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

  20. The Security Council and the international community as a whole must keep a close watch on the rapidly changing situation in Afghanistan. Coordination of all our efforts, through support for the activities of Mr. Holl and the United Nations Special Mission, must remain our priority. We look forward to hearing the considered views of the Special Mission on the best way for the Security Council to support its efforts, but there is a risk that precipitate action by the Security Council might even jeopardize those. We hope that recent events have impressed on all the parties that a military solution is not possible and that there is no alternative to negotiation and compromise. If there is an opportunity, however small, in the coming days or weeks to begin that process of negotiation, the parties must seize that opportunity.

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

  21. This collective effort by the international community deserves to be recognized on an occasion like this. We have made clear our strong objections to violations of fundamental human rights. In particular, we are gravely concerned about measures implemented to restrict girls' rights to education and women's rights to employment. We have major concerns in this regard about the prospects for many households where women in that country are the only providers. They face destitution as a result of these measures. We call on all the factions to respect international human rights norms and to act in accordance with those international instruments which Afghanistan has signed and ratified, for example the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

  22. The United Kingdom will continue to support the United Nations coordinating role in assistance programmes in that country. And again, when the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan said that the only United Nations actions in Afghanistan were resolutions and statements, I am sure he did not mean to imply that he did not recognize the very considerable role being played by the United Nations in coordinating humanitarian assistance. We, the United Kingdom, remain one of the major aid donors to Afghanistan, contributing around $10 million annually through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other United Nations agencies, as well as through the International Committee of the Red Cross and major British non-governmental organizations.

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

  23. For too long, Afghanistan has been subjected to interference from outside, which has only served to prolong the conflict. We call, like others, for an end to such interference, and an end to the continuing supply of arms and ammunition to the factions. We remain concerned about the use of the territory of Afghanistan for the production of drugs and for the training of terrorists. The continuation of such activities will only hinder the acceptance of Afghanistan back into the community of nations. The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan continues to cause grave concern. We too call on all factions to cooperate in the delivery of humanitarian aid to all people of Afghanistan, irrespective of ethnic group, race or gender.

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

  24. While I listened with great interest to the statement made by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and noted in particular his call for the dispatch of a United Nations fact-finding mission, I was a little surprised - if he will allow me to say so - to find no word of recognition in his speech that there is, in fact, already a United Nations Special Mission there on the ground. The United Kingdom strongly supports the efforts of Mr. Norbert H011 and his team. We call on all parties to cooperate with them. In the present fluid circumstances, the Special Mission has an opportunity now to make a real impact. The strongest possible political support must be given to those efforts. The international community stands ready to help, but the responsibility to achieve a settlement lies with the parties themselves.

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

  25. The United Kingdom welcomes this opportunity to address the situation in Afghanistan. There are continuing military and political developments taking place almost hourly. The kaleidoscope of alliances has shifted markedly in the past few weeks. While events are moving so fast, it would be a mistake to rush to judgment. In this maelstrom of political and military activity, we should not lose sight of some fundamental objectives. The aims of the international community must be an agreement to an immediate ceasefire, negotiations between all the parties, and the establishment of a peace process leading to the formation of a broad-based representative government which respects human rights. The United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan has a critical role in achieving these aims.

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

  26. We welcome and support their engagement in the Angolan peace process and we share their determination to ensure that UNITA complies with its peace process commitments. Finally, on the question of the extension of the mandate of UNAVEM. III, we agree with the Secretary- General that the mandate of UNAVEM. III should be renewed only until 11 December 1996. The Council will no doubt want to send a clear and unmistakable signal regarding the need for progress, and we shall want to consider carefully the various suggestions made in this debate and in other consultations over recent days as to how this is best expressed in a Security Council resolution at this critical juncture.

    1996-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3702 (1996) · source

  27. A new spirit of cooperation and mutual trust between the parties is essential for the peace process to enter its final phase. We believe that an early meeting between His Excellency President Dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi should take place to resolve the outstanding matters, and to create an atmosphere of genuine trust between the parties. In this respect, Mr. Savimbi clearly missed an important opportunity for such a meeting when he failed to attend the Southern African Development Community summit in Luanda on 2 October, and we share the Secretary-General's disappointment at this. We have listened very carefully to the views of the distinguished Foreign Ministers and other representatives of the Southern African Development Community.

    1996-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3702 (1996) · source

  28. III must be able to count on the support of the parties to conduct its work. It is particularly important that the parties cooperate with mine-clearance operations, as some of my colleagues have already pointed out this morning. The reported restrictions on UNAVEM. III and on humanitarian demining operations are unacceptable. We are also concerned at reports of more general harassment of the humanitarian organizations in Angola. The parties, particularly UNITA, should make every effort to allow freedom of movement and security for the non-governmental organizations. The innternational community has invested heavily in this peace process, and is not prepared to see that process fail. We agree with the Secretary-General that continuing delays and unfulfilled promises are unacceptable.

    1996-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3702 (1996) · source

  29. There are several outstanding issues which we had expected to see resolved by now: the integration of the armed forces, a special status for Mr. Savimbi, the return of all 10 UNITA generals to posts in Luanda, and the return of UNIT A Deputies to the National Assembly. But all these issues are still pending. And, while UNITA have quartered in excess of 62,000 troops, the high level of desertions is worrying. UNITA should spare no effort to ensure the immediate return of troops already registered at the quartering sites. It is also important that the orderly demobilization of quartered troops should be undertaken without delay to prevent further desertions and unrest in the camps, and that the process for selecting UNITA troops to be integrated into the Angolan Armed Forces should be accelerated. UNAVEM.

    1996-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3702 (1996) · source

  30. Almost two years ago the Government of Angola and UNITA agreed to a ceasefire and to a process of military and political steps aimed at achieving a durable peace in Angola. They appealed to the international community to assist them to achieve that peace. The Council responded by deploying what is now the largest United Nations peacekeeping operation in the world. Since then, both sides have worked towards the achievement of a durable peace. This is not an easy process, and we are aware that sacrifices have been demanded of both sides. Nevertheless, the goals that have to be achieved and the steps needed to reach them are clearly set out in the Lusaka Protocol. The lack of progress over the last three months has cast doubt on UNITA's willingness to abide by their commitments to the peace process.

    1996-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3702 (1996) · source

  31. We have noted with interest the moves Sudan has made to distance itself from some of the terrorist groups it has supported, and we have noted the claims made by the Government of Sudan that it has demonstrated its readiness to cooperate with all parties concerned in seeking and apprehending the suspects. But we consider that it still needs to do more to comply with the demands of Security Council resolution 1044 (1996). By adopting this draft resolution the Security Council will show the Government of Sudan that it remains engaged in this matter, and that it will not hesitate to implement air sanctions after a period of 90 days if Sudanese compliance is not forthcoming. Finally, we urge those States that have not yet reported to the Secretary-General on the steps they have taken to implement resolution 1054 (1996) to do so.

    1996-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3690 (1996) · source

  32. If they are still in Sudan, the answer is straightforward: the Government must extradite them to Ethiopia under the terms of the bilateral extradition treaty. If, as may be the case, Sudan has helped at least one of the three to leave the country, this draft resolution clearly requires that the Government of Sudan must take immediate action, including, for example, by providing the necessary evidence, to bring about extradition to Ethiopia. We will not be satisfied until Sudan has secured this objective, and has also ceased to support international terrorism.

    1996-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3690 (1996) · source

  33. We therefore welcome the initiative of Egypt in bringing forward the draft resolution on which we are about to vote. We fully support the measures it contains, and we hope that they will contribute to an early change of heart in Khartoum. The solution to the problem is simple: the Government of Sudan must recognize international concern about its behaviour and comply with the demands of the Security Council and the OAU. One of the principal demands of this draft resolution and the previous resolutions is the requirement for Sudan to ensure that the three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination attempt on President Mubarak are brought to justice in Ethiopia. We remain convinced that the Government of Sudan knows where they are.

    1996-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3690 (1996) · source

  34. Despite everything that has just been said by the representative of Sudan, to which I listened carefully, my delegation is unfortunately not persuaded that Sudan has yet complied with the Council's demands in resolutions 1044 (1996) and 1054 (1996). Sudan has not extradited the three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination attempt on President Mubarak, and many of Sudan's neighbours remain concerned about its support for terrorist activities within their territories. That is why the Council has to take further action. It has nothing to do with the orientation of the current Government in Sudan: it is purely and simply a necessary response to Sudan's failure to respond adequately to the demands of this Council and of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

    1996-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3690 (1996) · source

  35. The humanitarian disasters caused by the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of land-mines are, of course, of concern to us all. This problem fully deserves the increased attention of the international community, and the United Kingdom is committed to ensuring that we address these issues urgently and effectively.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  36. The United Kingdom has handed over to the Egyptian Government all maps and other information in our possession about Second World War minefields in Egypt. When he visited Egypt in November 1995, Mr. Rifldnd, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, offered our assistance in clearing Second World War land-mines. As a result of subsequent discussions, we have provided a substantial package of assistance which includes mine detectors. Finally let me thank you, Mr. President, for giving us the opportunity to discuss this important issue. We hope that what we and others have to say today will provide food for thought for the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  37. We understand that some speakers today will suggest that there is a case for the establishment of a demining stand-by force. For our part, we rather question this. The international community is normally aware in advance of the need for mine-clearance operations, which are usually undertaken only when a conflict is over. Donor countries are unlikely, in our view, to be willing to designate equipment or facilities which, if they are to be available at short notice, would sit idle in the meantime. The United Kingdom would not be able to put mine- clearance trainers on permanent stand-by, but we do remain ready to consider each request on its merits. During his statement, my colleague the Ambassador of Egypt referred to the problem of Second World War minefields in the Western Desert.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  38. There are many non-governmental organizations and private companies which, under the coordination of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, are better suited to the task of humanitarian demining. Wherever there is a serious mine threat to United Nations peace-keepers, adequate detection, clearance and protection capabilities must be urgently provided to enable them to fulfil their mandate. But not all United Nations peace-keeping operations face similar mine threats. Demining might not always be necessary, and in some circumstances the premature removal of long- established minefields might even add to instability. But in all cases it is essential that the parties to a conflict should guarantee that they will desist from further mine- laying once a peace-keeping operation is established.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  39. Responsibility for establishing such humanitarian clearance programmes must, in our view, remain with the humanitarian and development agencies, under the overall guidance of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. The military undoubtedly has a valuable contribution to make to mine clearance, but the precise nature of this contribution needs to be defined at the outset of a particular peace-keeping operation. Demining as undertaken by the military may not be the most cost- effective means of humanitarian land-mine clearance, and military clearance standards and techniques may not be compatible with the humanitarian standards recommended by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Humanitarian mine clearance is a slow, painstaking and methodical process.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  40. The United Kingdom armed forces have undertaken mine clearance training for the United Nations in countries such as Pakistan and Cambodia. But, in common with the forces of a number of other European nations, they undertake mine clearance work only where it is necessary for the success of the military operation in hand: their aim is to clear sufficient mines to allow them to complete their mission. Humanitarian demining, on the other hand, requires the methodical removal of all mines in a given area. It seeks to reduce risks to civilians, enables local populations to become more self-sufficient, helps the displaced to resettle, and promotes the resumption of normal development.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  41. It is also important to distinguish between mine clearance and activities such as training and mine awareness. The difficulties encountered in establishing viable national solutions to mine pollution in countries such as Angola and Cambodia resulted, in part, from the ambiguities in mandates between peace-keepers and humanitarian agencies. We question therefore whether the Department of Peace-keeping Operations should be the focus for humanitarian mine clearance and mine awareness, given the coordinating role now undertaken by the Mine Clearance and Policy Unit of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. It is clear that there should be close coordination between the two organizations, but their tasks are not the same.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  42. We fully support the United Nations mine clearance policy, which is based on the fundamental principle that the primary responsibility for taking action must lie with the host country and not, therefore, with an individual peace- keeping operation. We also support the role of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in providing assistance and training to build up the host country's capabilities and to take on demining operations. But we believe that the United Nations must draw a clear distinction between mine clearance for the operational needs of peace-keeping operations, which is the responsibility of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, and other humanitarian demining requirements, which fall under the responsibility of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  43. We have announced that we shall destroy almost half our stocks as soon as possible, without replacement, and we have recommitted ourselves publicly to a complete ban on exports of anti-personnel land-mines. The United Kingdom is committed to reducing the danger that anti-personnel land-mines pose for civilians and those who serve in peace-keeping operations throughout the world. It is clear that substantial support for humanitarian demining efforts continues to be essential. The United Kingdom is one of the largest contributors to these efforts. Since 1993 we have donated, bilaterally and through the European Union, a total of £175 million to humanitarian mine clearance and mine awareness programmes.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  44. The United Kingdom welcomes this open debate because this is an important subject which needs to be discussed. However, we strongly believe that today's debate should focus on demining in the context of United Nations peace-keeping operations, as the President himself emphasized at the outset. The Security Council is not the forum for the discussion of general land-mine issues. There will be a number of opportunities for that in the coming months, such as the meetings of the First Committee during the fifty-first session of the General Assembly and the Ottawa Conference in October. But just to be quite clear on this, let me state that the United Kingdom supports a total ban on anti-personnel land-mines.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  45. My delegation hopes that all States will take due note, acknowledge their obligations and take every possible measure to ensure that the tragic events of 24 February are not repeated. In taking action this day, the Security Council is doing no more than upholding the principles of international law and fulfilling its responsibilities to safeguard international peace and security. It is with this in mind that I commend the draft resolution to colleagues in this Council, and that is why we shall vote for it ourselves.

    1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source

  46. I myself remember very clearly first hearing that kind of approach one autumn day in the year 1962 in this very Chamber. It brings to mind something that I might call the tactic of the Whopper. I make no accusations. But the tactic of the Whopper applies when one wants to take liberties with the truth and rather than indulging in what Churchill would have called a little terminological inexactitude, the tactic of the Whopper dictates that if you tell it long enough and you tell it big enough, there is a sporting chance that someone will believe part of it, even if only out of sheer exhaustion. Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose. But this draft resolution also looks forward and seeks to prevent the recurrence of similar actions which put at risk the lives of those travelling in civil aircraft in the future.

    1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source

  47. We urge all States who have not yet ratified the Protocol adding Article 3 his to the Chicago Convention to take the necessary steps to do so as soon as possible. The purpose of this draft resolution is firstly to draw attention to the illegal use of weapons in this incident. And I think it really is important to recall this afternoon against the background of what I might call the cloud of unknowing to which we had to listen earlier - a virtuoso demonstration of the art of filibuster in the grand manner. I heard the representative of Cuba say in part of his statement that Cuba had a lot of very long experience of this and that. Well, I think this Council also has very long experience - experience, among other things, of tactics deployed in this Chamber in relation to the policy of the Government of Cuba.

    1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source

  48. There can be no doubt that Cuba has contravened principles of international law in using force against civil aircraft and in not following established international procedures on interception of such aircraft. The message in this draft resolution is clear. Such incidents are unacceptable to the international community. There is an obligation on all States to comply with the provisions of international law and the standards and recommended practices set down in the Chicago Convention and its annexes, and to cooperate fully with the International Civil Aviation Organization. The United Kingdom looks to all States to abide by their obligations in this regard. The United Kingdom would draw the Council's attention to paragraph 7 of the resolution before us.

    1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source

  49. Conclusion 3.13 is that the second aircraft was destroyed by an air-to-air missile fired by a Cuban MiG-29 military aircraft. Conclusion 3.18 is that means other than interception were available to Cuba, but had not been utilized. Conclusion 3.19 is that during the interceptions no attempt was made to guide them away or instruct them to effect a landing at a designated aerodrome. Conclusion 3.20 is that the standard procedures for manoeuvring and signals by the military interceptor aircraft were not followed. Conclusion 3.22 is that the rule of customary international law that States must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons, as codified in article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention, apply irrespective of whether or not such aircraft is within the territorial airspace of that State.

    1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source

  50. The United Kingdom would like to take this opportunity to express its deep condolences to the families of those who were killed on 24 February 1996. In the Council President's statement of 27 February 1996, the Council strongly deplored the shooting down by the Cuban Air Force of two civil aircraft on 24 February and requested the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to investigate this incident and to report its findings to the Security Council. The United Kingdom strongly supports the draft resolution's endorsement of the ICAO report and resolution. And I think it is fair in the context of this afternoon's discussion to remind ourselves of what some of the conclusions of that report are. Conclusion 3.12 is that the first aircraft was destroyed by an air-to-air missile fired by a Cuban MiG-29 aircraft.

    1996-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3683 (1996) · source