YouSaid · the spoken record

Keating

lines on the record: 583
first: 1993-06-27
most recent: 2018-09-13
sittings or episodes: 64
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The security situation remains very challenging. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission will say more on that. We owe a great debt to the courage and dedication of AMISOM. soldiers. Somalia's security requires a comprehensive approach - a full-spectrum approach, as the Secretary- General indicated in his plan of action for preventing violent extremism. Our political, security, development and human rights efforts must proceed together and reinforce each other. Military and counter-terrorism efforts need to be accompanied by stronger policing and the rule of law. A priority must be to strengthen federal institutions and regional capabilities within Somalia as the basis for a longer-term transition plan for AMISOM.”
2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source
“In the wake of the terrible attacks at E1 Aade and Lido beach, their spirit is doubly impressive. I pay tribute to the bravery and dedication of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its troops and to the courage of the Somali people. Kenya has vowed not to be deterred by the attack against its soldiers. Equally, Somalis are neither cowed nor deflected from their goals by Al-Shabaab atrocities. That is not to underestimate the challenges ahead. But, as we enter a critical year for the country's transformation, Somalia's steady progress will continue. That will require Somali leadership and the sustained support of the Council. Success in Somalia in 2016 will depend upon managing threats, notably those posed by Al-Shabaab, as well as seizing the opportunities that political progress will bring about.”
2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source
“Let me begin with some first impressions. I was lucky enough to have spent some time in Somalia in my youth, when Mogadishu was thriving, and again in the 19905, when it was in turmoil. My two weeks as Special Representative of the Secretary-General have not been Somalia's easiest, marked as they have been by tough political negotiations and marred by two horrific terrorist attacks. Yet the Somalia I see today is closer to that of my childhood memory than to that of the nightmare of the civil war. It is a country of enormous potential, of determined people of entrepreneurial spirit, with extraordinary natural resources, a privileged geographic location and a natural gateway. Somalis know their potential, and they will not be deterred from realizing it.”
2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source
“Mr. Keating: I am delighted to speak to the Security Council so early in my tenure. It is a pleasure to brief the Council alongside Ambassador Madeira, who has been in-post since December 2015 and therefore is an old hand already as compared to me. Before I start, allow me to pay tribute to my predecessor, Nicholas Kay, who handed over a Mission that is in good shape. All my interlocutors in Mogadishu - Somali and international, African Union and United Nations - have stressed the critical role he and his team played in the past two and a half years. I would also like to pay tribute to the international community and to the Council, which has played a pivotal role on Somalia for several years. The unity of the Council is a fundamental requirement for progress in Somalia. I look forward to working closely with it.”
2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source
“I suggest that the costs of investing in such mechanisms would be insignificant when set alongside the dreadful human, political and financial costs of inaction that flowed from our collective failure in 1994 to respond to the genocide in Rwanda.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“That led directly to the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to human tragedy on an even more massive scale. Some estimates suggest that up to 5 million may have died. Major instability has afflicted the whole region. If we truly want prevention to work, then we need better political, operational and financial mechanisms for the Council and the wider United Nations system to achieve better outcomes. I believe that this means new mechanisms for improved early warning, better systems for briefing and presenting options to the Council at the early stages of potential crises, enhanced preventive diplomacy, more effective use of Chapter VI tools of the Charter of the United Nations, quick preventive deployment, and, if all else fails, robust deterrence.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“What was missing, both in Rwanda in 1994 and again in 1995 when the Council failed to act to establish security in the camps in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was political will. My third observation relates to the cascade of tragedy that can occur when there is a failure of political will, such as in 1994. The Deputy Secretary-General has already touched on this. A toxic accumulation of events unfolded and eventually embroiled the whole region. Twenty years later, we are still dealing with the consequences in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo. The failure in Rwanda in 1994 not only caused genocide, but also led to an appalling humanitarian catastrophe in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1995.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“My second observation relates to the belief in 1994 that the international community did not have the means to intervene in Rwanda; but it was false. In early April, just after the genocide began, a number of countries mounted a major unilateral military intervention in Rwanda. That was done to protect and extract foreign nationals, but those forces then departed. They left the Tutsi to their fate. Again in 1995, when the genocidaires and much of the civilian population had fled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a further major intervention was launched, this time in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Ironically, that was to help those who had undertaken the genocide. The truth is that there was no lack of capacity.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, through its Capstone Project, had in place a useful set of doctrines. The TCCs showed courage and determination, and they were well supported by the United Nations. Most importantly, Council members were fully agreed on the need for limited robust action to ensure protection. I would like to add that the development of the principle of responsibility to protect, which is referenced so clearly in the draft resolution before the Council today, gives further reason for hope. Recent Council practice in Mali and the Central African Republic and with the Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo further demonstrates that some important lessons have been learned.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“Time does not permit a detailed discussion of events in the following months, such as the mistaken decision of the Council to authorize Operation Turquoise or the events leading up to the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. But please permit me to make some brief final observations. My first observation is a message ofhope. I think it is very important to contrast the failure in 1994 regarding Rwanda with what the Council did in 2010 concerning Cote d'Ivoire. On C6te d'Ivoire, the Council members knew that there was a serious risk of ethnically based mass atrocities. They had good information from the Secretariat. They had put in place a proper protection mandate. The United Nations had properly resourced the Mission.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“Ultimately, presidential statement S/PRST/ 1994/21 was agreed, condemning the atrocities in Rwanda, using all ofthe language that we had proposed from the Genocide Convention, but at the insistence of some permanent members, the specific word "genocide" was removed. In early May, New Zealand and Nigeria each introduced draft resolutions to reinforce the number of troops and to give the operation a formal mandate for the protection of civilians. But it took until 8 June before resolution 925 (1994) was adoped. Even then, the resolution was equivocal and did not allow full deployment. Ultimately, the genocide stopped only when the forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front took control of the whole country. That is the tragic history of April, May and June 1994.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“Their reasons varied, but the net result was that several members were blocking a draft presidential statement. As the days wore on and the end of the month approached, New Zealand put in blue a draft resolution condemning the genocide. The words were drawn exactly from the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. As President, I announced that unless there were agreement on a presidential statement based on the exact language of the Genocide Convention, I would convene an open meeting of the Council at 11.55 p.m. on Saturday 30 April and put the draft resolution to the vote.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“For me, the bottom line was to keep UNAMIR in existence and to retain as many of the most effective troops as possible, because we knew that the Force Commander would use whatever capacity he had to protect as many civilians as he could, and we hoped that this would be a foundation for the early reinforcement of UNAMIR. Perhaps this history demonstrates some lessons about the important and necessary interaction between the Council and troop contributors that I think are probably still relevant today. I will now turn to the efforts of New Zealand and the Czech Republic, with the support of Argentina and Spain, to name and condemn the genocide. Despite improved briefings by the Secretariat and the flow of information I was relaying to the Council from non-governmental organizations in the field, most of the permanent members were objecting.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“Some contingents, especially those that were lightly armed and lacked protective equipment, also feared for the safety of their personnel and wanted to leave. Thus, another challenge at that time was how to maintain the morale and confidence of the troop-contributing countries (TCCs). To that end, I organized daily informal meetings between the President and the TCCs, and at the same time with Nigeria and others, seeking to negotiate the best possible compromise on the future of UNAMIR. But that compromise inevitably had to be a downsizing rather than reinforcement.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“They had every reason to believe that all they had to do was to create conditions of chaos in Rwanda for the UNAMIR mandate to be terminated. Against this background, all Council members will appreciate the political difficulties for those of us who were arguing for a reinforcement of UNAMIR. To reinforce UNAMIR required a new formal decision, but it was absolutely clear from the negotiations that a draft resolution to strengthen the force would meet with a veto. The task became even more difficult once some major troop contributors decided unilaterally to withdraw. Belgium had suffered serious losses; it believed all its troops were at risk and it began lobbying the Council and other troop contributors to evacuate.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“I need to explain what led the Council in April to downsize UNAMIR. Some months earlier, a permanent member was seeking to reduce the number of peacekeeping missions. It selected UNAMIR as a target for a special attention because of the slow progress in the peace negotiations in Arusha. It pushed for UNAMIR to be put on a very short leash. Accordingly, resolution 909 (1994) scheduled a review of the mandate for mid-May. Clear signals were given in consultations that there would be no agreement to renew the UNAMIR mandate if there were further obstacles in the Arusha peace process. In hindsight, we can see that this was a naive gift to the genocidaires in Kigali. Their ambassador was sitting as a member of the Council. They were privy to all the discussions in the informal consultations. They knew that the mandate was at risk.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“Moreover, the Secretariat had concealed from the Council a critical piece of advice - a cable from the Force Commander in January 1994, which gave graphic early warning of probable genocide. And, in terms of early warning, a vital piece of evidence also existed in the United Nations system in Geneva - a report by a Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights warning of the likelihood of genocide. It was never drawn to the Council's attention. All this confirms that there are many lessons about information, about early warning and about how to use information that I believe are still relevant today. I know there are hesitations among some here about the value of horizon-scanning, but if they want to take prevention seriously, then some creative alternative is desperately needed.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“As President of the Council, I met with their New York representatives, usually every morning, and was able to update the Council with objective information from the field. We all know how important the flow of information to the Council can be - especially information during the early stages of an emerging conflict, when there are still options for prevention or deterrence. In March and April 1994, the Council was not getting useful reports from the Secretariat. Even after the genocide had begun, events were being described for several weeks as simply a resurgence of the civil war. The wholesale slaughter of civilians was not being conveyed to the Council.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“Force Commander General Romeo Dallaire is first among these, as are the brave soldiers from Belgium and Senegal who gave their lives. I want to pay tribute especially to the major contingents from Ghana, Senegal and Canada, which remained in Rwanda throughout the genocide. While sitting in Amahoro Stadium during the genocide commemoration in Kigali last week, I could not but recall the bravery of the United Nations soldiers who protected many thousands of Tutsi in that stadium during the genocide. I was also reminded that despite what many people believe, the United Nations did not desert Rwanda completely. I also want to pay tribute to two organizations: the International Committee of the Red Cross and Medecins sans frontieres. Both had their people in several locations outside Kigali.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“This briefing also provides a fitting opportunity, for me in my capacity as former President of the Council in April 1994, to apologize for what we failed to do in 1994 and for that to be formally recorded in the official records of the Security Council. Secondly, I want to acknowledge those Council members that joined with New Zealand in 1994 and supported our efforts to condemn the genocide and to reinforce the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). In this regard, Nigeria deserves great credit, as do the Czech Republic and Spain. Two other members that gave support and encouragement were Argentina and Djibouti. We must also remember those in the field who displayed great courage and did their best to protect civilians.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“Mr. Keating: I want to thank all of the members of the Security Council for inviting me to participate in this briefing. Twenty years ago, Madam President, your country, Nigeria, and mine, New Zealand, sat beside one another as members of the Council. I had the dreadful responsibility in April 1994 of presiding over a Council that refused to recognize that genocide was being perpetrated against the Tutsi in Rwanda and failed in its responsibilities to reinforce the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Rwanda in order to protect as many innocent civilians as possible. My first responsibility today is therefore to remember the Victims, the almost 1 million who died, and the survivors. It is good that the Council will today make its own commemoration of the genocide and discuss the need to prevent genocide in the future.”
2014-04-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7155 (2014) · source
“Germany's initiative in calling this meeting of the Security Council provides an important opportunity for doing this. Other, complementary, initiatives have been announced by Canada and Japan, and are strongly supported also by New Zealand. We welcome all of these as signs that the international community is determined to address head-on the land-mine threat. I can assure the Council of New Zealand's continuing commitment and support in that endeavour.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“New Zealand would see merit in examining, within the standby force concepts currently under investigation, the possibility of a rapid mine clearance capability that could be employed before or at the beginning of an operation. Consideration should also be given to acquiring greater numbers of mine- protected vehicles and developing operational concepts and standardized procedures to counter the mine threat. This is a further element which, we believe, could usefully be reflected in a statement by the Council. Clearly there are substantive issues requiring urgent action within the United Nations system if the United Nations is effectively to discharge its responsibilities in mine clearance in both the peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building settings.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“We would see merit in a structured review of the mine clearance issues from past peace-keeping operations, so that lessons could be drawn for the future. It would be very useful for the Council to request such a review in a presidential statement, as a follow-up to this meeting. Perhaps this task would be a valuable new project for the Department of Peace-keeping Operations "lessons learned unit". It is apparent that operations in areas with a significant mine threat also require special consideration. How best to achieve the mission in such a situation and how to ensure the safety of personnel are direct Security Council responsibilities. We believe that the demining effort must be timely, well-trained and properly equipped.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“This was recognized this year by the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, which called upon the Secretary-General to intensify his efforts to provide a more coordinated approach between the demining units of DHA and DPKO. Now once that is done, we would urge the Secretary-General, as a matter of the greatest priority, to seek the means to equip fully those with land-mine responsibilities at United Nations Headquarters. Until this is done, the effective implementation of mine clearance programmes will continue to be hindered, as will the ability to apply lessons learned to new missions. Similarly, the creation of uniform operating procedures and standards that will benefit both training and the conduct of operations awaits the formation of an effective United Nations Headquarters element.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“There is a need for the mandates given by the Security Council to include strategic recognition and direction on mine issues, such as operational and humanitarian mine clearance, mine awareness, data base information gathering and the establishment, through training programmes, of indigenous demining capabilities. This would better enable the Secretary-General and mission planners to allocate appropriate resources towards achieving the objectives set, and ensuring a smooth transition from demining as a peace-keeping requirement to demining as a long-term peacebuilding activity. There is a role for the Council in more clearly defining the responsibilities for the various mine clearance tasks among the agencies involved in a peace-keeping operation. We believe that there is a need to rationalize in order to avoid duplication.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“New Zealand has welcomed the Secretary-General's moves to improve the ability of the United Nations to manage and conduct land-mine related operations: first, the establishment of the Voluntary Fund, which provides a necessary and timely mechanism to channel funding to demining operations; secondly, the establishment of specialized demining units within DPKO and DHA; and thirdly, the designation of DHA as the focal point for the United Nations for mine clearance activities. These are welcome first steps. But notwithstanding the progress that has been made to date, there remains much to be done to ensure a more seamless approach to the conduct of the various mine related tasks through the life of a mission and beyond.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“This year the Government increased the annual instalment to $250,000. In addition, New Zealand continues to provide substantial funding to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre and to the unexploded ordnance programme in Laos. New Zealand has also provided financial support for the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) Mine Clearance and Policy Unit, and two New Zealand Defence Force officers are currently attached to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) and the DHA respectively as demining advisers.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“New Zealand is proud to have been actively engaged in and to have made a significant contribution to mine clearance efforts by the international community over many years. New Zealand has contributed demining instructors and programme management personnel from the New Zealand Defence Force to United Nations operations in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mozambique and, most recently, Angola. New Zealand personnel continue to serve in this capacity in Cambodia, Mozambique and Angola. We have also provided financial support for United Nations efforts in demining. In July 1995 the New Zealand Government announced at the International Meeting on Mine Clearance a pledge of $100,000 per year for the next three years to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“It is our hope that the tide of international opinion will turn against the use of anti-personnel land-mines, and that other countries will soon join in renouncing their use. We call again for an immediate and unequivocal ban on all anti-personnel land-mines. The outcome of the recent Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects was disappointing because it did not go as far as we had hoped. Nevertheless it was a success in keeping the land-mines problem at the forefront of international attention. The next review conference will be in 2001. In the meantime we must take every opportunity to enhance the momentum in favour of a global ban.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“Given the scale of the problem, and its international dimension, it is indeed timely that the Security Council is now following up the efforts undertaken in the General Assembly to focus the attention of international public opinion on this problem. The Council must also take into account the threat posed by mines to the safety of peace-keeping personnel. As casualties in Bosnia and Angola have recently sadly demonstrated, the presence of land-mines is a major inhibition to the ability of United Nations personnel to carry out their duties in support of many missions. For all these reasons, in April this year the New Zealand Government renounced the operational use of anti- personnel land-mines by the New Zealand Defence Force.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“These same mines also undermine the efforts of local populations to realize the potential for economic development that peace brings. New Zealand therefore gave strong support to the action taken by the General Assembly in its resolution 49/215, to convene in 1995 the International Meeting on Mine Clearance. We all learned at that conference in Geneva that there are now more than 110 million land- mines in the ground of more than 60 countries, and even worse, that although we remove some 100,000 land-mines annually, millions of new ones are still being laid. That is a dreadful legacy for civilian populations around the globe. Hundreds of people are killed or maimed each week, most of them innocent civilians, many of them defenceless children.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“Let me start out, Sir, by conveying to you my congratulations: congratulations, first, on your initiative to put this item on the agenda of the Security Council; and secondly, congratulations on your assumption of the presidency. It is a great honour and privilege for me to sit here at this table with you as President. In that sense, I would also like to convey our thanks and congratulations to Ambassador Dejammet and all the French delegation on the work they accomplished for the Council last month. The scale of the problem caused by land-mines is immense. It presents a huge challenge to the international community. The devastation which mines wreak on the lives of thousands of people is one of the greatest outrages of our time.”
1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source
“This is an area in which, as I have said, New Zealand is making a major contribution and in which we would like the Council to send a clear message to the parties to meet their obligations in this regard - but also a message to UNAVEM. III and the Secretariat about the need to maintain an integrated approach to the management of the demining programme. We believe that we need an action-oriented approach if the problem of mines is ever to be resolved. Finally, can the Council please find an acceptable way in its draft resolution to reinforce the importance of the human rights component in the United Nations presence in Angola?”
1996-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3628 (1996) · source
“In the end, it only backfires against the Organization itself. It ruins planning and undermines proper financial management of the operation. So, if we are to go forward, let us go forward for a full six-month mandate period. In our View, the best way to signal a determination to keep up the pressure is by insisting on regular review periods within the mandate. Secondly, could we request that the draft resolution take a firm and even-handed approach to both of the parties in Angola, holding them both responsible for honouring the promises made to the people of Angola that there would be peace? Can we also request that the draft resolution take a firm approach on the question of mine clearance?”
1996-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3628 (1996) · source
“There will not be national reconciliation unless all the people of Angola have a reasonable prospect that their human rights will be respected if they lay down their arms. We are therefore strongly of the View that human rights capabilities in the context of peace-keeping operations need to be better integrated, better funded and better recognized within the United Nations system. In conclusion, I should like to say a few words about the draft resolution which I know the Council members will begin to consider shortly. First, we believe that it would be a mistake to try to put pressure on the parties by establishing an artificially short time-period for the mandate. This has been tried in the past in different situations, and it has been clearly demonstrated in the past that this tactic does not work.”
1996-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3628 (1996) · source
“The carry-over of unexpended funds should put the programme on a sound financial footing, but the key to the future will be the integration of the programme into the work of UNAVEM 111. As the report notes, it will need to operate under the control of the UNAVEM. III Force Commander until 1997. We believe that the structure is now in place to build a national capacity that will enable the Angolan people to reduce and maybe one day remove the threat posed by land-mines in their country. We are also somewhat encouraged by the positive references in the Secretary-General' s report to human rights activities being conducted under United Nations auspices in Angola. But there is a need for much greater assistance and much more action in this regard.”
1996-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3628 (1996) · source
“We see this as one, small, positive note. We are pleased at the report which the Secretary-General has been able to make of progress in the area of mine clearance. New Zealand has made a serious commitment to mine clearance in Angola, seeing it as a crucial element of longer-term stability. But mine clearance in Angola has not been without its problems. It has taken a considerable effort to turn the programme around so that an efficient and coordinated approach can be taken in support of the peace-keeping operation and humanitarian requirements. New Zealand is pleased that its military personnel have been able to play a practical role in achieving this turnaround.”
1996-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3628 (1996) · source
“Visits, such as your own, Madam President; missions by the Council itself; statements by the presidency; bilateral representations; United Nations special envoys; debates such as this; and the constant use of the media - both the international media and within Angola itself - to remind the parties of their obligations: these are the things which we believe can play an important, positive role. We want to commend very highly the members of the Council for their willingness to be pro-active in support of the peace process over the past 12 months. You yourself, Madam President, described yesterday to the troop contributors the horrible sight of mine-crippled children. On the other hand, you also told us about how eagerly local villagers moved to turn areas that had been cleared of mines into productive fields.”
1996-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3628 (1996) · source
“The Secretary-General correctly observes that we will want to respond positively to all constructive initiatives by the parties. But there seem at present to be all too few of these constructive initiatives. We believe, therefore, that it is all the more important that the Security Council continue its policy of vigilance and active involvement to put pressure on both parties to cease this cat-and-mouse game. A pro-active Security Council, using the various tools at its disposal under Chapter VI of the Charter, is the best response to the current situation.”
1996-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3628 (1996) · source
“III in building quartering areas and imposing restrictions on the movement of the Mission. As you told the troop contributors yesterday, Madam President, even worse, most relief operations in UNITA-held territory ceased in December. Since then, there has been some positive progress registered, but it is of a limited nature. As you reported to us this afternoon, Madam President, UNITA troops entering quartering areas are still behind schedule. We are still far short of the 16,500 whom Mr. Savimbi promised you would be quartered by Thursday. We are equally worried by reports that many entering the quartering areas are under age and carrying only old weapons or none at all. Against this background, the international community has the right to be very concerned about the peace process.”
1996-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3628 (1996) · source
“Orientation meetings are a useful complement to meetings like the one which you convened yesterday between Council members, troop contributors and the Secretariat. We hope that from both meetings Council members will be able to draw useful suggestions as they consider the extension of the mandate of UNAVEM. III. For, as the Secretary-General's report makes clear, the extension of the mandate is by no means an easy decision. His report is, in many places, very disappointing reading. As he says, "progress in the peace process in Angola has been very slow." (S/1996/75, para. 2) The setback to the process at the end of 1995 was a serious one. An offensive by government troops around Soyo saw UNITA respond by suspending the quartering of its troops, withdrawing its assistance to UNAVEM.”
1996-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3628 (1996) · source
“New Zealand very much welcomes the opportunity to participate in this orientation debate in connection with the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM. 111). As members of the Council will recall, New Zealand was the first country to support France's proposal for public orientation meetings of this sort in the Security Council. We believe that it is very important that the non- members of the Council have the opportunity to express their views in a way that can be fed into the Council's informal deliberations. All too often in the past, the only chance for public debate has been after the Council has come to its decision. So we very much commend you, Madam President, for your initiative in calling this meeting.”
1996-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3628 (1996) · source
“I congratulate you, Madam President, on assuming the presidency of the Council for this month of February. In fact, I believe that special congratulations are in order, because, if I recall rightly, this is the third time I have seen you as President of the Council. And of course it is a very rare distinction for any Permanent Representative to serve as President of the Council on three occasions. So we are particularly privileged to have your experienced leadership. I also want to convey special thanks to His Excellency the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom. I think that the United Kingdom delegation presided over the Council during a very productive and important month of January. We are all very grateful for their efforts.”
1996-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3628 (1996) · source
“President - in the role of Bad King John, so I take this opportunity to wish you and all of the members of the Council a happy Christmas and a peaceful New Year.”
1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source
“I can imagine that in that very difficult situation King John, who had a royal court that may be compared to this Council, made all the same argument as some have made today: that there should be no new institution or no new subsidiary organ. He would have argued that his operational effectiveness would have been impaired. He would have argued that his Royal Council would not have been able to respond quickly if it had to stop and consult with the troop contributors. But King John was swimming against the tide of history, and we feel that the same historical tide is flowing very strongly here in the United Nations at the end of this century and that it is time for change and time for genuine, substantive change. In making this somewhat flippant comment, I do not want to paint any members of the Council - and certainly not you, Mr.”
1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source
“I should like to conclude by offering a few thoughts about what I believe is a long and respectable tradition of concern for participation by troop contributors in decisions. I have heard the reservations raised about institutionalization or the establishment of new institutions for participation in this regard. I think that I recall that as far back as 1215 a very important event took place. The Magna Carta is best remembered as a compact that began the evolution of parliamentary democracy. But, while all that is true, it seems to me that in 1215 the most important common element among the barons who gathered at Runnymede on the banks of the Thames was that they were troop contributors and that they wanted an institution in which they could participate in decisions about the deployment of their troops.”
1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source
“From what we have seen in Somalia, from what we have seen in Bosnia and from my own personal experience as President of the Security Council in April of last year during the crisis in Rwanda, when I convened meetings of troop contributors on a daily basis simply to ensure that we actually had an operation that would continue, it seems to me that it has been critically demonstrated that the Member States that are troop contributors do make the difference between the success or non-existence of a peace-keeping operation, and that structured consultations with those troop contributors are of critical importance. It seems to me that this is a classic example of how it should be continued in the future.”
1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source
“There are two ways of involving representatives of Member States in such important decisions that need to be taken, decisions that are often of great moment and consequence both for the peace-keeping operation itself and for the lives of the soldiers on the ground. One is that they be taken behind the scenes through informal, non-existent, non-institutional processes. The other is that they be taken in a clearly open and transparent process that involves all of those who have serious interests engaged, and that is the Security Council, which has the final responsibility to decide, and the troop-contributing countries, which have a responsibility to have and to contribute input to that decision.”
1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source
“But the situation, as several colleagues have indicated this morning, can be, and is, very different where peace- keeping forces are inserted into a situation of active hostilities. The cases of Somalia, of Bosnia, of Rwanda, have all been cited by various members of the Council, and we all know that the practical reality is that where peace- keeping forces are engaged in a situation where there is active hostility, the Governments of Member States regard themselves as being very much accountable to their parliaments for what happens in the day-to-day operations of those peace-keeping situations.”
1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source