YouSaid · the spoken record

Keating

lines on the record: 583
first: 1993-06-27
most recent: 2018-09-13
sittings or episodes: 64
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The window of opportunity is still open but, as was always foreseen, the military umbrella, the blue blanket, could not be sustained by the United Nations forever. March 1995 has been underlined as the necessary and appropriate date for the final termination of the UNOSOM military presence. The demands on United Nations peace-keeping elsewhere, not least in other parts of Africa, mean that we cannot justify such an enormous military presence for a longer period. The natural question which follows is: what about the future? And this is indeed an important question which the Security Council mission had to address. We listened to the aid agencies working in Somalia. We met with the non-governmental organizations. We heard from the donor community working out of Nairobi. The Council has heard the mission's conclusions.”
1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3447 (1994) · source
“I believe we can look back and say that the risks that were taken, and the financial costs that were incurred were worth it. I believe that we can say with confidence that those who gave their lives in this cause did not die in vain. On the political front, we did not succeed in forcing peace and reconciliation on the Somali parties. But the Somali parties were given a reasonable period of relative stability, created by UNOSOM's military presence, in which to begin a serious process of political reconciliation. The fact that they chose not to make good use of this window of opportunity is to be greatly regretted. The Security Council mission told the faction leaders very bluntly when we were in Mogadishu last week that this failure and the future of their people rested squarely on their shoulders.”
1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3447 (1994) · source
“Neither the Somali parties nor the providers of humanitarian assistance requested that it be extended beyond the promised date of March next year. A great deal has been written and said about the international community's intervention to help the Somali people. Too much of it has been sensationalized. There will be a need, before long, for a detailed and dispassionate analysis of the lessons learned. But I believe that the international community has a great deal to take pride in. Nothing like the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and UNOSOM had ever been tried before. Mistakes along the way were inevitable. But the fundamental humanitarian goal was achieved. Famine no longer stalks the land in Somalia. Death by starvation no longer threatens a whole people.”
1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3447 (1994) · source
“And our concerns have always extended to the neighbouring and regional States whose voice is not able to be heard in the Council as easily as it should be. I have to admit that there have been times during the Council's debates on Somalia when we have felt distinctly lonely in speaking out in support of these principles and urging that the United Nations carry through its commitment to UNOSOM until March 1995, as set out in resolution 897 (1994). We are therefore very pleased that this draft resolution restores consensus in the Council. We believe that the Security Council mission played an important part in achieving this. It established a common understanding about the situation on the ground. It established that UNOSOM had, in effect, achieved all it could achieve in Somalia.”
1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3447 (1994) · source
“The situation in Somalia spread itself across borders, with flows of refugees, fighting, instability and very significant economic costs to neighbouring States, such as we have just heard from the Ambassador of Kenya. My country is far from Somalia and far from its region. We have almost no historical or other connections with it. But we are particularly sensitive to and supportive of requests that the collective security mechanisms of our Organization be equally available for the benefit of the small and underprivileged as they are for the larger and more powerful. In this regard, the needs and concerns of Africa have been heeded; whether it be Somalia, Rwanda, Mozambique or Angola - all these countries have found ready support from New Zealand in the Council.”
1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3447 (1994) · source
“This demonstrates, I think, a commitment to United Nations peace-keeping in Africa and a belief that if the United Nations is to be credible it needs to be consistent and to be willing to sustain its commitments in good times and in bad - to stay the course. But our reasons for participating so closely in the Council's work on Somalia go beyond that. We believe very strongly that the United Nations was right to respond to the crisis in Somalia in the way that it did. The humanitarian tragedy called out for a collective response. Intervention under Chapter VII was necessary and appropriate. But humanitarian concerns were not the only basis for action. The security of neighbouring countries was threatened.”
1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3447 (1994) · source
“New Zealanders were involved at the outset in the humanitarian relief efforts. New Zealand military forces with troops and aircraft served with the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), and thereafter a New Zealand military contingent has served with the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). Indeed, it was a matter of great pride for me, as leader of the Security Council Mission to Somalia last week, that when the Mission was briefed by the Force Commander in Mogadishu one of the principal briefers was a New Zealand officer. Most of the Western countries have long since removed all their troops. But New Zealand and Australia - although our contingents are small in number and are scheduled to depart towards the end of November - have remained.”
1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3447 (1994) · source
“Let me first offer my congratulations, Madam President, on your assumption of the presidency for this month of November and my thanks and the thanks of my delegation to Ambassador Hannay and his team for the excellent leadership they gave us during October. The draft resolution before the Council today envisages the end of the United Nations military involvement in Somalia. We are, therefore, at a turning point - a turning point not only in the history of Somalia, but also in the history of the United Nations. This is an issue to which my delegation has devoted a great deal of effort during our time on the Security Council. This is partly explained by the fact that New Zealanders have been involved in all stages of the international effort to rescue the Somali people from famine and the ravages of a horrible civil conflict.”
1994-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3447 (1994) · source
“Words have to be backed by visible and uncontrovertible proof of serious action to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions.”
1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source
“Other factors the Council will need to bear in mind when it comes to make political judgments will be other concrete evidence of Iraq's peaceful intentions, including progress on the restoration of stolen Kuwaiti property and cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross regarding missing persons. In our view, a willingness to accept seriousconfidence-building measures regarding troop deployments must now be another important test in the light of recent events. In conclusion, I want to reiterate that the view of my Government is that the troop deployments of early October have been a major setback in our assessment of Iraq's intentions. It is therefore all the more necessary that Iraq take steps to rebuild confidence.”
1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source
“We are now in the period of provisional implementation of the regime required under resolution 715 (1991) for the long-term monitoring of weapons of mass destruction. For us, this is a technical matter. UNSCOM must have whatever time it needs, based solely on its professional and objective analysis of the facts, to judge whether the regime in place is capable of being effective over the long term. This is not the time or the place for political intrusion into that process, although satisfactory achievement of UNSCOM's technical mandate is certainly a factor upon which the Council, further down the track, will be able to draw in making political judgments.”
1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source
“If it comes, and comes quickly, the Security Council will be able to reflect the significance of such a step in its consideration of Iraq's overall compliance with Security Council resolutions. It will not expunge the heightened anxieties of recent weeks about Iraq's peaceful intentions, but it will improve the political atmosphere in which the Council can proceed in its successive reviews to weigh Iraq's overall compliance with Security Council resolutions. At the heart of those reviews is the Council's need to be persuaded of Iraq's peaceful intentions over the long term. Recognition of Kuwait is therefore only part of the picture. The wider picture includes, of course, satisfactory cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).”
1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source
“The response would still have been a cautious one, because the matter of Kuwait's sovereignty and its borders is not a negotiable item. But the Security Council would have seen the statement as a very positive step forward. But the events of the past two weeks have, unfortunately, reopened and poured salt into the wounds of 1990. Our approach to the future, therefore, in the light of these events, now has to reflect not just caution, but, rather, some scepticism. As I have said, this promise contained in the 13 October statement must be followed up within a short time by full formal recognition in constitutional form of Kuwait and its borders, in accordance with resolution 833 (1993). That is the only way forward.”
1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source
“On Saturday evening we adopted unanimously a resolution which contained the Council's response to the misguided and dangerous events of the previous weeks. As we look ahead, we want to say that the public statement of 13 October by Iraq that it is ready to recognize Kuwait and its borders is positive. Iraq had hinted many times in the past that it was willing to recognize Kuwait. But a public announcement is only a small step forward. My delegation believes that, as the days go by and no concrete action is taken to turn it into a reality, this promise will steadily lose credibility. Three weeks ago the news contained in the 13 October communique might have been received by this Council with more enthusiasm.”
1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source
“I would like to join the other members of the Council in welcoming today the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Mr. Andrei Kozyrev. The New Zealand delegation admires the efforts which the Russian Federation has been making to promote peace in the Gulf region. The role of the peacemaker is never easy. It is always a hard and lengthy road, and it is often a thankless task. It is therefore all the more appropriate that we in the Security Council record today our appreciation of the Federation's efforts. I would also like to welcome amongst us today the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz. He is of course no stranger to us; we have had many discussions with him over the past year or so. Today we have the opportunity, in discussing again the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, to look ahead.”
1994-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3439 (1994) · source
“Given its past aggressive wars, its equivocation about the sovereignty of its neighbour and its threatening moves last week, the Security Council has a responsibility to take certain protective measures, including requiring Iraq not to redeploy its forces to the south again.”
1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source
“The situation is further compounded by the fact that Iraq also defies its legal obligations under the United Nations Charter by virtue of resolutions of this Council. In the face of such an aggressive threat, in the face of such equivocation and defiance, it is necessary for the Council to again exercise its responsibilities under Chapter VII of the Charter. We must make it plain to Iraq, as we have done tonight in resolution 949 (1994), that such threatening behaviour is unacceptable. It must not be repeated. Because Iraq has raised new doubts about its peaceful intentions, it was necessary and desirable that this resolution lay down some very clear markers about future troop deployments. We reject the argument that Iraq is free to deploy its forces however it wishes within its borders.”
1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source
“In 1990 and 1991 the Security Council did what it had to do: it exercised its responsibilities under the Charter in the face of aggression and took the necessary measures to restore international peace and security. Last week it seemed possible that an attempt was being made to repeat that history. A large and aggressively configured military force was deployed by Iraq towards Kuwait. That deployment constituted a threat to regional peace and security, and the gravity of the threat is exacerbated not only by the events of 1990 but all the more by the fact that in the intervening period Iraq has stubbornly failed to recognize Kuwait's sovereignty and its borders. This kind of equivocation leaves doubt about Iraq's peaceful intentions. It raises fears that Iraq continues to harbour aggressive designs towards Kuwait.”
1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source
“Congratulations, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency this month. Our thanks go also to the Ambassador of Spain for his work as President last month. For New Zealand - and, I think, for all the small countries of the world - the great importance of the United Nations is that it provides a framework for collective security. It provides hope for small countries that cannot defend themselves against aggression. Four years ago, Iraq, a large and very powerful country, brutally attacked and occupied its small neighbour, Kuwait. Then, as now, New Zealand gave very strong support to Kuwait. We also supported the firm and determined response by the United Nations to evict Iraq's forces from Kuwait.”
1994-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3438 (1994) · source
“It is implicit or explicit in all the peace plans that have been put forward. It cannot any longer be a subject for negotiation. Any State that equivocates on this matter runs the risk of having its bona fides in the peace process called into question.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“The Council has today adopted a presidential statement that begins to address some of these points, but in our view this is only a beginning. We think that it is quite reasonable for the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Government of Croatia to expect progress to have made been on all these fronts when the mandate of UNPROFOR next comes up for renewal. In this connection, I note that the resolution we have just adopted is much less specific than we would have liked on a question which, in the view of my Government, is of the utmost importance - that is, the mutual recognition of the respective international boundaries by the States in the region of the former Yugoslavia. I wish to emphasize that, in our view, mutual recognition should be a starting point for the overall settlement of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“We said, first, that there should be early recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia; secondly, that there needed to be firm and united resolve on the part of UNPROFOR and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to use. force where that is warranted for the protection of the safe areas and the enforcement of the exclusion zones. We know that the use of force has to be carefully calibrated, but in our view its use has contributed to stability. i is Thirdly, the Council has made it clear on a number of occasions - most recently today - that the strangulation of Sarajevo must cease. Demilitarized lines of access to the city must be implemented. Fourthly, we believe that the progressive withdrawal -of the Bosnian Serbs to positions that are consistent with the territorial settlement proposal should be seriously pursued.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“We know that the Government of Croatia is committed to the peaceful settlement of this problem, but it is rightly impatient at the slow progress on this front. It is unacceptable that a peace plan - a plan agreed some ', years ago and the subject of subsequent discussion - should still not be implemented. We therefore urge the parties, with the active assistance of the United Nations, to reinvigorate the progress towards implementation of the peace plan. Secondly, in respect of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a number of steps were taken in the package of resolutions that this Council adopted last week. As we said at the time of the adoption of those resolutions, those measures needed to be followed up with further specific steps.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“We thank the men and women serving the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia for performing this task in difficult and dangerous conditions. They deserve our support, and in this context we find it hard to understand that two States in whose territory UNPROFOR is deployed have yet to sign status-of-forces agreements . with the United Nations in respect of the UNPROFOR deployment. This is long overdue and we believe that it is urgent to remedy this situation. But if UNPROFOR is to continue to be supported, the status quo cannot be continued. UNPROFOR'S ongoing operation must be complemented by efforts on other fronts, first with respect to Croatia. The resolution that we have just adopted makes provision for the situation in the United Nations Protected Areas to be reviewed.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“New Zealand is pleased that the Security Council has decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for a further six months. The various missions of UNPROFOR - humanitarian, peace-keeping, the protection of "safe areas", preventive deployment - all help reduce the adverse consequences of the political and military conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and all help reduce the possibility that that conflict will become more widespread, more intense and more violent. UNPROFOR's mission is not an easy one, The States and parties involved have a range of expectations of the United Nations, not all of which UNPROFOR is able to fulfil. We believe that UNPROFOR is doing an outstanding job of alleviating suffering and maintaining a fragile peace.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“Responses to the situation in Bosnia which would complicate the objective of a peaceful settlement should be approached with extreme caution. I include in that category a decision to lift the arms embargo. We can see much danger and little immediate benefit in such a step. We strongly believe that the package of measures contained in today's resolutions should be allowed time to have an effect before any further, drastic step is taken.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“First, as demonstrated by the events of this week, there must be a firm resolve by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to use force where it is warranted for the protection of safe areas and enforcement of the exclusion zones; secondly, the humanitarian mission for the alleviation of suffering must continue, and include relieving the strangulation of Sarajevo; thirdly, we should be looking at efforts to secure the progressive withdrawal of the Bosnian Serbs to positions which are consistent with the territorial settlement proposal put forward by the Contact Group; and, fourthly, recognition by Serbia and Montenegro of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Croatia should be an essential next step.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“We note that the conditions under which that Mission will operate and the tasks it will perform have been accepted in full by the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro, and this is acknowledged in the resolution. Despite this development, the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina is still bleak, with continuing hostilities and a deteriorating security situation. We believe that efforts have to proceed on several fronts if this situation is to be halted, let alone reversed.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“Provided independent monitors verify the ongoing closure of the border, we believe that it is appropriate to suspend a very limited set of sanctions imposed by the Council against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). But let us be clear: all that this suspension involves is the restoration of sporting and cultural links and of two communications routes; the full weight of economic sanctions remains. But tonight's resolution is a signal that the Council will respond positively to positive actions. There should be no doubt that this limited step is a direct consequence of a positive decision by President Milosevic. New Zealand fully supports the deployment of the Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to verify the closure of the border.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“If saner counsels are to have any hearing among them, either the leaders must change their views or the leaders must be changed. The third resolution which the Security Council considered today demonstrates that the United Nations will respond to those who are willing to change their policy and opt for peace. President Milosevic has accepted the Contact Group peace plan as a fair settlement. He has urged the Bosnian Serbs to come to their senses and do the same. To this end, he has closed the international border between Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina and cut off all but humanitarian supplies to the Bosnian Serbs. New Zealand has welcomed this change of policy, and we supported the resolution adopted today.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“What makes their decision even more culpable is that by their rejection they have condemned their neighbours and the innocent populations of the region to a perpetuation of the conflict. An end to the killing and suffering in Bosnia is achievable. A balanced and reasonable peace plan is on the table. It could still be accepted by the Bosnian Serbs. But if greed, arrogance and a determination to retain by force what they have gained by force prevails, they will face total isolation from the world. The increased sanctions included in the second resolution comprise a number directed at the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs and at all who continue to aid and abet them. This resolution makes clear where responsibility for the disastrous policy of the Bosnian Serbs lies.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“The Security Council demands that the Bosnian Serbs accord access to senior representatives of the United Nations, and requests the Secretary-General to arrange appropriate deployments of UNPROFOR troops and United Nations monitors. We expect and hope that the presence of United Nations personnel will be able to be arranged quickly and that their presence will help bring an end to ethnic cleansing. The second resolution responds to the refusal of the Bosnian Serbs authorities to accept the territorial settlement included in the peace plan prepared by the member nations of the Contact Group. In rejecting that settlement, the Bosnian Serbs have again wilfully defied the international community and asked for further measures to be adopted against them.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“And those who use it must understand that they will not be able to reap any reward from these actions. To the contrary, they will one day face international justice before the Tribunal which is now functioning in The Hague. Unwilling to permit the United Nations access to the territories it controls, the Bosnian Serb party has carried out ethnic cleansing on the widest scale. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have reported that the non-Serb population in Serb-held areas suffers in a particularly cruel way from this practice. The dislocation of population from Bosnian Serb-controlled territories has been immense. The measures embodied in this resolution again give a clear message to the Bosnian Serbs and a clear direction to the United Nations.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“That root cause is the insistence of some groups and factions to live in an ethnically homogeneous State, or one in which the control exercised by one community is so absolute that it might just as well be ethnically homogeneous. That insistence runs directly counter to the purposes and principles of this Organization, and, if taken to its logical consequence, would undermine the very foundations which bring us together in this house. What makes ethnic cleansing so appalling is that it is systematically directed. It is not just occurring through random individual acts, although these are bad enough. The evidence is compelling that the purported authorities in the districts where ethnic cleansing is occurring are using it as a principal instrument of their long-term policy. It is an instrument of terror; it is the weapon of cowards.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“Let me first congratulate you, Sir, on the assumption of the presidency and again ask our colleagues from the Russian Federation to convey our warmest thanks to Ambassador Vorontsov for his excellent stewardship as President of the Council last month. The Security Council has taken action today on three draft resolutions. New Zealand supported the adoption of all three. We believe that those resolutions constitute a 36 comprehensive and balanced response to the recent developments in the situation in the former Yugoslavia. The first resolution deals with what is the most vicious manifestation of the root cause of the Yugoslav conflicts.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“The United Nations must be able, as in the case of Haiti, to count on political will and support when it is needed elsewhere. In conclusion, I want to refer to the question that was raised in the debate today by the representative of Mexico. He argued that the Security Council was writing a blank cheque with this resolution. I would like to say that while this may perhaps have been an understandable criticism of earlier versions of the draft resolution, the resolution adopted today contains some elements - which I am pleased to say were introduced in part as a result of proposals from my delegation - which clearly indicate that the operation would be of a temporary nature and would be focused specifically on a specific point in history.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“Secondly, I have to record our concern about the resources being devoted to this operation. As I have said, we are ready and prepared to support the devotion of United Nations resources to the restoration of democracy in Haiti. But we believe that the commitment of international resources to Haiti necessarily raises questions about claims elsewhere in the world on equivalent resources. In supporting a multinational intervention and a United Nations force for Haiti, we have the hope and the expectation that when the call next goes out for international assistance to restore democracy or to protect people in a humanitarian disaster in some other small and distant country, the United Nations and all the members of the Council will not be found wanting.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“This is not to say that we have reservations about the use of Chapter VII, either in this case or other specific cases where it is appropriate. However, we believe very strongly that unless absolutely exceptional circumstances exist the United Nations itself should assume such responsibilities. In this regard, we have to record also that we do not agree with the Secretary-General's conclusion that this was not feasible in the case of Haiti. The resource and management difficulties that the United Nations faces are 21 undeniable, but we believe they should be seen as challenges to be overcome, not as excuses for throwing in the towel and abrogating the responsibilities for international-dispute settlement under United Nations auspices which New Zealand and other Governments expect this Organization to fulfil.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“For all these reasons, New Zealand supports the formal request by the legitimate Government of Haiti for decisive action to be taken by the United Nations at this time to enable the legitimate Government of Haiti to be restored and constitutional order in that country to be re-established. In supporting this resolution, however, New Zealand has had a number of broad concerns about the manner in which the Council has had to come to deal with this and other recent situations. Firstly, I need to record that New Zealand's preference has always been and will always be for collective security to be undertaken by the United Nations itself. That provides the reassurance that small countries seek from the United Nations when Chapter VII is being invoked.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“The expulsion of members of the United Nations Civilian Mission demonstrated further that scrutiny by the international community of the situation in Haiti is not being tolerated. It is therefore necessary to increase the pressure on the military regime. Approval now by the Security Council of an intervention force should persuade that regime that the only sensible course of action now left is for it to comply with the Governors Island Agreement voluntarily. This resolution is also about peaceful settlement of problems. It gives them one last chance, and we urge the military leadership in Haiti to honour the commitments that they made last year and to allow this issue to be resolved peacefully.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“And we are very conscious that in the meantime, the economic impact is being felt most acutely by the truly innocent: the long-suffering people of Haiti. The willingness of the United Nations to contemplate more stringent forms of action has been clearly on the table for some time, set out in warnings in Security Council resolutions. The resolution we have adopted today takes the next step. It is a matter of real regret to us that things have come to this point, but it is clear from events of recent weeks that there is no evidence at all of any willingness by the military leadership to step back from the course of action on which they seem determined. On the contrary, the installation of a puppet president is just the most flagrant example of the continuing violation of constitutional order.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“On that foundation, the people of Haiti can establish a civil society in which the military will perform the tasks assigned to them in Haiti's constitution and no longer threaten the people they are meant to protect. I think it is important to underline that the international community has not been precipitate in this matter. Sanctions were the first step, and these were reimposed as long ago as last October, after General Cedras repudiated the Governors Island Agreement. Sanctions were strengthened some months later in a further effort to persuade the leaders of Haiti to comply with the agreements that they had entered into. We accept that time has been given for sanctions to work, and the answer is clear: they are not going to produce a quick departure by the illegal military regime.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“It is no coincidence that a series of irresponsible, unaccountable regimes has left the people of Haiti the most miserable in the Western hemisphere - so much so that we remember that, when President Aristide was elected, his promise was merely to lift his people from misery to poverty. It is also no coincidence that under the latest usurping regime, the rights of the people of Haiti have been further abused and trammelled, and that many Haitians see flight in perilous circumstances as preferable to life in their own country. The restoration of democracy in Haiti goes hand in hand with guarantees of the rights of all the people of Haiti, not just those with power and wealth and access to the external world.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“It is now a year since the Haitian military regime led by General Cedras signed the Governors Island Agreement and agreed to step aside and allow the return of President Aristide. New Zealand welcomed that decision and has consistently supported the United Nations-sponsored peace process to restore democratic Government in Haiti. Some months later, and two years after his initial usurpation of power, General Cedras repudiated that Agreement, and he rejected the firmly expressed position of the international community. Since then, he has continued to demonstrate a complete disregard for the rule of law in Haiti and for the commitments that he himself entered into at Governors Island. When the rule of law is violated, as it has been in Haiti and, regrettably, by very many regimes over very many decades, it is the people who suffer.”
1994-07-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3413 (1994) · source
“Finally, a few words about our reservations regarding this resolution: our reservations stem from the fact that this resolution acknowledges the reality that the United Nations is not alone in Georgia monitoring the cease-fire agreement. Also in the field is the CIS force. My delegation does not believe that it is a good precedent for a neighbouring State to play such a predominant role in such a force. We believe that any operation which calls itself a peace-keeping force should be conducted strictly in accordance with United Nations peace-keeping principles. If it does not accept in a transparent way such an operational framework, then it is appropriate for the international community to proceed with caution. For these reasons, my delegation does not agree that this operation sets a good precedent.”
1994-07-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3407 (1994) · source
“We urge these parties to keep up the momentum of these negotiations. It is therefore pleasing that the cease-fire agreed upon by the parties on 14 May has held. But a political settlement cannot be attained until refugees and displaced persons are able to return to their homes. The Quadripartite Agreement of 4 April sets out the basis on which that can occur, and we urge the parties to realize that objective as quickly as possible. One of the tasks of the expanded UNOMIG is to contribute by its presence in the area to conditions conducive to the safe and orderly return of those who have had to leave their homes.”
1994-07-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3407 (1994) · source
“The honouring of these assurances is one of the means by which the United Nations will judge the commitment of the parties to a political settlement of the conflict. My delegation also attaches importance to the provision of this resolution that UNOMIG's new mandate will include the task of observing the operation of the CIS peace-keeping force within the framework of the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. The political and military situation in Georgia is now more stable, owing in large part to the political involvement of a number of external bodies that have committed themselves to assisting the parties to find a peaceful solution to the conflict: the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the CIS and the Russian Federation.”
1994-07-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3407 (1994) · source
“My delegation welcomes the fact that the mandate of UNOMIG has now been extended for a full six months, which we believe is the minimum period of time for which it is reasonable to assign new tasks to a peace-keeping operation and expect them to be fulfilled. We are also pleased that the mandate of the expanded force is set out with clarity and precision in the resolution. It is important for all peace-keeping operations, given the political climate in which they necessarily operate, that the parties to a conflict are in no doubt as to what the United Nations operation is doing and what it is not doing. The resolution refers to the assurances of freedom of movement given to the Mission by the parties. This is a fundamental ingredient in any peace-keeping mission operating, as UNOMIG does, with the consent of the parties.”
1994-07-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3407 (1994) · source
“The Secretary-General's report sets out four levels of communication, from force headquarters to patrols, all of which need to be in good working order at all times. The resolution requests the respective commanders to conclude and implement these arrangements for coordination and cooperation. This is a very important task, as relevant at the bottom of the chain of command as it is at the top. These various elements will help the interaction between the two forces and diminish the risk that the problems which have affected earlier peace-keeping operations in which a national or multinational contingent has sat alongside a United Nations force will be repeated. But that risk remains, and all involved must be particularly vigilant.”
1994-07-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3407 (1994) · source
“These include, of course, those relating to peace-keeping, and it is worth recalling that the Security Council itself has approved a number of operational principles for peace- keeping, many of which would be applicable to non- United Nations forces which might be involved in peace- keeping. But I do have to say that we find this aspect of the resolution much less than satisfactory. Thirdly, there is a need for satisfactory arrangements for interaction between the forces. The Secretary-General has indicated that, following the adoption of this resolution, he will write to the President of the Council of the CIS defining the respective roles and responsibilities of the two forces. The resolution requests him to establish an appropriate arrangement to this effect. Fourthly, we have the question of communication.”
1994-07-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3407 (1994) · source