YouSaid · the spoken record

Kimani

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811
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2021-05-27
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2023-10-25
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113
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un-security-council

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  1. In conclusion, the war between Israel and Hamas has disrupted a status quo that was unacceptable to Kenya, which understands the Palestinian yearning for independence and sovereignty. It was unacceptable to us, as we sympathize with Israel’s constant vigilance against existential threats. The path forward requires a renewed dedication to a peace process that rejects terrorism as an acceptable form of resistance and steers towards a two-State solution. Without women’s insights and interests at the core of the discussions with Israel, Palestine and the primary regional and global stakeholders, we jeopardize the potential for enduring peace and risk further calamity.

    2023-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9452Resumption2 (2023) · source

  2. That very marginalization spurred the creation of resolution 1325 (2000) nearly 25 years ago. The women and peace and security agenda can champion the inclusion of women’s perspectives in national and global dialogues concerning security, reconciliation and justice. Such an approach fosters unity in recognizing the shared challenges that girls and women encounter across divisive boundaries. There is a pressing demand for forums that promote dialogue, education, activism and policymaking. Those spaces can bolster collaborative networks that accentuate women’s voices, paving the way for their impactful roles in justice, accountability, peacebuilding and decision-making in both Israel and Palestine.

    2023-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9452Resumption2 (2023) · source

  3. United Nations agencies on the ground in Gaza are reporting an extensive humanitarian emergency. The United Nations Population Fund estimates that 50,000 women in Gaza are presently pregnant, with 5,500 expected to deliver next month. Together with other civilians, those women are facing significant hardships due to the ongoing military operations. They are often deprived of safe birthing services, vital supplies and essentials such as food, water and protection from air strikes. Immediate, unhindered humanitarian access is imperative to address the pressing needs of girls and women in Gaza. As the crisis escalates, it will be essential for the voices and stories of mothers and daughters to be heard and valued. Women are too often portrayed mainly as victims in the media, which sidelines their roles as leaders and decision-makers.

    2023-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9452Resumption2 (2023) · source

  4. I thank Foreign Minister Vieira for convening this important debate on the anniversary of resolution 1325 (2000). I also thank the Secretary-General and the briefers whom we heard yesterday for their insights. The role of women in peace and security is determined daily, as is evident in the frequent gendered violence that countless girls and women face, especially in armed conflict, where sexual assault is often weaponized. The current crisis in Israel and the Gaza Strip is only the latest example of such gendered impacts. The terrorist attacks by Hamas have severely harmed Israeli women in ways too distressing to detail here, and our deepest sympathies go to the victims and survivors. We unequivocally condemn this terrorism and acknowledge Israel’s right to defend its citizens against Hamas’s actions.

    2023-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9452Resumption2 (2023) · source

  5. In conclusion, I commend the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) for its admirable efforts to foster a Haitian-led political process that can lead to an orderly transition for preparing free, fair and credible elections in Haiti. I strongly urge the Council and its individual members to extend their full support to CARICOM and Haiti.

    2023-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9448Resumption1 (2023) · source

  6. Fourthly, in its deliberations and decisions, the Council should consistently consider the interplay between diversity and State-building in the quest for sustainable peace, which represents a key area of alignment between the Council and the PBC. That was the central focus of an open debate we initiated during Kenya’s most recent Council presidency in October 2021 (see S/PV.8877). It is imperative that both the Council and regional actors recognize that identity- based conflict is a significant catalyst for violence and that sustainable peace is most achievable when prevention, mediation and post-conflict initiatives actively incorporate the inclusive management of social and cultural differences as a core competence for any effective State.

    2023-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9448Resumption1 (2023) · source

  7. First, the Security Council presidency can foreground regional experiences and perspectives. Presidents can encourage the Council to conduct on-the-ground assessments jointly with regional entities to generate joint diagnoses of the complex factors leading to conflict. Secondly, the Council should be a learning environment. More regions should consider adopting a model similar to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa. Thirdly, the Council should deepen its cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), whose inclusive peacebuilding dialogue with regional mechanisms and national actors can produce useful insights. The existing role of informal coordinator between the Council and the PBC should be leveraged ambitiously to enhance the quality of advice that the Commission produces.

    2023-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9448Resumption1 (2023) · source

  8. When the Council is fragmented by national interests or is used as a platform for geopolitical rivalries, regional peace initiatives can be weakened or even brought to a standstill. In simpler terms, the Council’s internal divisions can sometimes be transferred to those regional efforts, leaving them much like a boat that cannot move forward because its rowers are pulling in different directions. It is also important to recognize that not all regional and defence frameworks contribute positively to international peace and security. Some may actually heighten risks. We must therefore be discerning in our support, endorsing only those regional arrangements that align with the fundamental values and international laws that underpin the United Nations. Allow me to make four further recommendations.

    2023-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9448Resumption1 (2023) · source

  9. I would like to congratulate Brazil warmly on its assumption of the presidency for this month. I also thank your delegation, Mr. President, for its determined, cooperative and timely effort to negotiate a resolution on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. We value the Secretary-General’s strong endorsement of regional frameworks and entities for maintaining peace. However, let me add a layer of nuance to that applause. The success of arrangements under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations largely hinges on Security Council members’ fulfilment of their obligation under the Charter to focus solely on resolving specific threats to international peace.

    2023-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9448Resumption1 (2023) · source

  10. We join the members of the Security Council in again affirming our respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Haiti.

    2023-10-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9430 (2023) · source

  11. We now invite Member States to contribute as ac- tive participants, providing personnel, funds, vital equipment and logistical support to the Multinational Security Support Mission. Kenya reaffirms its com- mitment to closely collaborate with Haiti’s allies, espe- cially the member States of the Caribbean Community, represented here today by Jamaica and Guyana, and other nations of benevolent disposition, in constituting and operationalizing this Mission in accordance with this resolution. In the forthcoming weeks, Kenya, in concert with other contributing nations, will apprise the Council on the substantive preparations for the Mis- sion’s deployment. Once again, Kenya salutes the Security Council on this accomplishment and reaffirms its unwavering solidarity with Haiti and its resilient people.

    2023-10-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9430 (2023) · source

  12. We are steadfast in our belief that the Council’s adoption of this resolution will be a seminal contribution to the renaissance of Haiti’s security and a catalyst for the fortification of governance, socioeconomic uplift and the rule of law. In the spirit of solidarity and collective responsibility and in response to the clarion call of the Haitian authorities and the Secretary-General, Kenya signalled its willingness to spearhead the Council-mandated initiative. His Excellency President William Ruto, during his speech to the General Assembly on 21 September, echoed the call by Haiti and the Secretary-General and implored the Council to promulgate a tailored Chapter VII resolution to meet Haiti’s unique requirements. The members of the Council responded with an exemplary spirit of cooperation.

    2023-10-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9430 (2023) · source

  13. Kenya’s delegation congratulates Brazil on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October. We recognize His Excellency Mr. Jean Victor Généus, Haiti’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship, and his Mission, calling on our collective solidarity. We unreservedly commend the Security Council and its membership for the judicious adoption of resolution 2699 (2023). Our special accolades extend to the co-penholders, the United States and Ecuador, whose tireless efforts have yielded a balanced resolution that accords with Haiti’s imperative needs. With this action, the Council has ignited a beacon of hope for the beleaguered people of Haiti by authorizing Member States to inaugurate the Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti.

    2023-10-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9430 (2023) · source

  14. However, such a force, while necessary, is not sufficient on its own. We urge the United Nations and relevant actors to concurrently develop a coordinated package that learns from the past and at a minimum includes peacebuilding, constitutional review, institutional reforms, community mediation, support for victims of sexual violence and social and economic development, including the reconstruction of civilian infrastructure. Those interlocking initiatives must be anchored in strong partnerships, including with the Caribbean Community, to respond cohesively to Haiti’s urgent needs. It will be an opportunity to show solidarity with the people of Haiti, as well as to renew the faltering efforts of the United Nations in ensuring international peace and security.

    2023-08-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9392Resumption1 (2023) · source

  15. Nearly half of the country’s population struggles to find enough to eat, and 1.8 million are facing emergency levels of food insecurity. The situation is particularly dire for children, 22 per cent of whom are chronically malnourished, with 66 per cent of those under five years of age suffering from anaemia. The contributing factors are diverse. In the context of today’s debate, they include the gangs that are controlling large parts of the country. Kenya is encouraged by the Security Council’s willingness to consider authorizing a multinational police force to work with the Haitian authorities to counter gang violence and secure critical infrastructure. We recently announced our readiness to volunteer a police contingent and look forward to working with the Bahamas and other Member States willing to step up to fulfil that responsibility.

    2023-08-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9392Resumption1 (2023) · source

  16. We urge the membership to embrace those recommendations at the inaugural Africa Climate Summit, to be held in Nairobi, and at the Sustainable Development Goal Summit in September and COP28, in November. We also call for a ceasefire in Ukraine, and a resumption of negotiations on and ultimately the unconditional renewal and reinvigoration of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which facilitates the exports of both Ukrainian and Russian food and fertilizers. In the face of dire emergencies, we must do more than express alarm without taking action. I would like to direct the Council’s attention to Haiti, a nation grappling with unprecedented food insecurity. The World Food Programme has reported that the number of food-insecure Haitians has tripled since 2016.

    2023-08-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9392Resumption1 (2023) · source

  17. We are encouraged to suggest that the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and mediation emerges as the most important intervening factor in this area. United Nations specialized agencies, and their international and regional counterparts, must also strive to do a better job of linking humanitarian action with development and livelihood support. Strong climate action linked to peacebuilding and security, including robust investment in the Loss and Damage Fund agreed to at the twenty- seventh Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27), will be indispensable to addressing global food insecurity.

    2023-08-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9392Resumption1 (2023) · source

  18. I would like to warmly congratulate the United States on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the month of August. Food is the most fundamental human need and therefore pivotal to any comprehensive discussion of international security, development and human rights. In the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, to take just two prominent examples, more than 29 million people are food insecure today. The crisis is directly linked to civil wars, terrorism, regional conflicts and inadequate development models. It is also reasonable to argue that the military coups across the Sahel may lead to serious shortfalls in trade and investment, potentially restricting people’s access to affordable nutrition.

    2023-08-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9392Resumption1 (2023) · source

  19. Enhanced coordination will be even more effective if efforts are made to reinforce the Peacebuilding Commission and deliver an adequately resourced Peacebuilding Fund. Fifthly and lastly, trust will be increased if States ensure that the Fifth Committee acts on General Assembly resolution 76/305, of 8 September 2022, on financing for peacebuilding. The current delay is degrading trust. Let us deliver a way forward that includes assessed funding. There is a famous saying that a single thread of trust can hold together the strongest bond. Our suggestions can be taken as the threads that we all urgently need.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315Resumption1 (2023) · source

  20. They should start immediately by showing concretely that they are listening and responding positively to the views of the African Union, African countries and small island developing States. Trust demands new permanent members that will stand for our values and collective interests, not the narrow pursuit of national interests. Thirdly, during the annual consultations between members of the Security Council and members of the African Union Peace and Security Council, participation by all at the level of permanent representatives, will increase trust, as will ensuring that every annual meeting has at least one practical and impactful outcome. Let us move beyond ceremonial meetings. Fourthly, the Council needs to be more welcoming and actioning of the advisories of the Peacebuilding Commission.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315Resumption1 (2023) · source

  21. Specifically, we would like to see Africa files with African penholders and co-penholders. That does not require elaborate reform; it can be implemented in January 2024 and beyond. Secondly, there will be little trust if there is no urgent reform of the Council’s membership. The attitude of the permanent members to the intergovernmental negotiation process will reveal their individual commitment to reform and rebuilding trust. The New Agenda for Peace will be made new by furthering the demand for reform. Trust will also be built by the countries that aspire to permanent membership demonstrating, through action and not just through rhetoric, that they will take their responsibilities seriously.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315Resumption1 (2023) · source

  22. As we all know, trust is in short supply in the United Nations. We are ranked in our regional and economic groupings, debating each other across gulfs of understanding, of solidarity and sometimes even of goodwill. We fully subscribe to your concept note (S/2023/283, annex), Madam President, which embraces strengthening trust through inclusion, implementing the norms of accountability and predictability for all States in all situations and making decisions on the basis of objective evidence. Those are fine principles, and we will join with other Members in realizing them practically. However, given the current low levels of trust, we want to propose specific actions by the Security Council, which we believe is suffering the greatest trust deficit. First, existing pen-holding responsibilities should be shared with non-permanent members.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315Resumption1 (2023) · source

  23. Africa’s peace and security architecture has valuable lessons that I am certain African countries and institutions would be willing to share. From mediation to local peace work, anti-militia demobilization and reintegration and enforcement, we have experience in it. Haiti inspired a worldwide movement for freedom. Its revolutionary actions even led directly to the major developments in the establishment of our host country. Now we urge Haiti to look to the rest of its region and to Africa for inspiration. Kenya will continue to support Haiti bilaterally and in the multilateral arena, including with the Economic and Social Council’s Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti and any other efforts that are for the good of the Haitian people.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  24. This being the last scheduled briefing before the end of our present term, allow me to take the opportunity to reflect on what we have learned about the Security Council that can best be of service to Haiti in our opinion. All conflict — and especially political division — leads to exceptional levels of division and mistrust. Such levels of mistrust can be identified in today’s briefing. In Africa, the dynamics of internal economic and political crisis and the mistrust of outside intervention are familiar. What Africa has built Haiti needs, namely, to be part of a strong regional initiative that includes Haiti’s neighbours and the CARICOM region. Our linkage with peers and peer leaders, the use of regional consultations and the rallying of international support to buttress regional work have served us well.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  25. Our sense of fairness and inclusion has impelled us, and we have also paid heed to the African Union’s recognition of our duty to reconnect with the African diaspora. We have tried listening keenly to Haitians and about the Haiti they want. In 2021, Kenya, along with the other two African members of the Council, the Niger and Tunisia, as well as Saint Vincent and the Grenadines — known then as the A3+1 — worked to that end. We have also made such efforts as part of this year’s A3, consisting of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya, alongside other Council members, to strengthen the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti and to apply sanctions to the gangs and those who support and fund them, in order to stop illegal arms trafficking and money laundering.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  26. International financial institutions should align their work in Haiti with the efforts to provide security and a political transition, strengthen critical governance institutions and provide environmental-crisis recovery. The authorities in Haiti should also consider engaging with the Peacebuilding Commission and undertaking a nationally owned and inclusive process alongside the political transition. Next for consideration is a neutral and transparent inquiry into the international and historical dimensions of the multigenerational crises the Haitian people have suffered. It should offer recommendations for the international community and Haiti on a way forward. From the beginning of our term as a member on the Council, Kenya has engaged vigorously and in good faith on this file.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  27. A new intervention backed by the Security Council should apply the valuable lessons learned in the past without repeating the disastrous mistakes. It would have a clear scope of tasks, a concept of operations and an exit strategy. Moreover, in order to gain the confidence of the Haitian people, it would consider including key African and Caribbean contributions. The actions I have recommended are necessary but insufficient. If they are to succeed and if a newly optimistic Haiti is to be reborn, the root causes of the crisis need to be addressed. One way to do that is by ensuring an inclusive political transition that is committed to a national dialogue that delivers political reforms that are embedded in a legal and — even possibly — a constitutional dispensation.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  28. On the aspect of institutions, it is crucial that immediate support be given to strengthening the most important sections of the criminal justice system that are required by an active police service. That includes addressing prolonged pre-trial detentions, expediting court cases and establishing functioning court registries. In addition to those efforts, the Haiti Sanctions Committee should closely align its listings to cause maximum disruption to the nexus between transnational crime, illicit business and the gangs. The United Nations and the international community will also need to support Haiti to implement its national action plan on the Caribbean Community Road Map on the Illicit Proliferation of Firearms and Ammunition.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  29. We welcome the Government of Haiti’s request to receive multinational support that provides targeted assistance to the Haitian National Police, as well as support for vetting, intelligence and rapid deployment. Kenya is ready to contribute to such an effort. Our assessment of the gangs and their links to transnational crime, as well as their political patronage and their recruitment of young people who are unemployed, suggests that they operate like the militias that the Security Council is familiar with. Experience shows that they can be overcome by coordinating mediation, a credible political process, a strong enforcement capability, livelihood support and institutional support.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  30. The HNP should receive training, adequate equipment and capabilities that it may not yet possess in adequate quantities. The focus should be to make the HNP able to guarantee the safe and reliable provision of emergency supplies of food, fuel and health care, as well as to put a stop to the kidnappings and the control of roads and other critical infrastructure by gangs. Without such action to establish a floor to Haitian misery, a transition to better governance and credible elections will not succeed. We commend Canada, the United States and other international partners for their efforts so far to assist the Haitian National Police with training and equipment. More such support is still needed.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  31. That deficit is the outcome of an outrageous history of economic punishment for Haiti’s revolution against slavery and colonialism. It has been worsened by failed foreign interventions and the unholy alliance among gangs, politicians and business elites. Such is the scale of the immediate emergency that it often obscures how critical it is to address those root causes if Haiti is to truly recover. We therefore urge the members of the Security Council and the international community to ensure that action with and for Haiti concurrently deploy emergency measures alongside more structural efforts to provide credible, competent and responsible governance. In the short term, Haitians need more operational support for the brave and dedicated Haitian National Police (HNP).

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  32. We thank Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Helen La Lime, as well as Ambassador Michel Biang, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022), concerning Haiti, and Mr. Kim Ives, Editor of Haiti Liberté, for their briefings. We also welcome the participation of Mr. Jean Victor Généus, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship of Haiti, and Mr. Roberto Álvarez Gil, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic, in today’s meeting. I also look forward to the statement to be delivered by Ambassador Bob Rae of Canada on behalf of the Economic and Social Council Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti. Looking back at the past two years, the situation in Haiti has gone from bad to worse. At the root of the crisis is a governance deficit that must be addressed.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  33. In particular, we will continue to play an effective role as a MONUSCO troop-contributing country, as a facilitator of the East African Community-led process and as a key economic partner of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the coming weeks and months, our decisions today will enable greater cooperation between the Council, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and regional mechanisms to deliver stability and the basis for a long- term peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that supports its sovereignty, territorial integrity and development aspirations.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9226 (2022) · source

  34. That dovetails with a recent call by the three African members of the Security Council — Gabon, Ghana and Kenya — for the setting up of a joint coordination framework for all troops deployed in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the direction of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the protection of civilians, communications and information-sharing, operational support and training, and demobillization, disarmament, community recovery and stabilization programmes. As Kenya completes its two-year tenure as an elected member of the Council, we will continue to work closely with the Democratic Republic of the Congo to achieve its long-desired peace, stability and socioeconomic progress.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9226 (2022) · source

  35. Alongside the protection of civilians are other priority tasks in support of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform. Those are essential to the success of the ongoing peace process, including the East African Community-led inter-Congolese dialogue. MONUSCO is an important partner to the Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We are confident that the renewed mandate, if robustly implemented, will accelerate the ongoing stabilization efforts. We encourage strengthened collaboration between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO to sustain the current momentum of the peace efforts. We welcome the incorporation in MONUSCO’s mandate of an aspect of support for the East African Community regional force.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9226 (2022) · source

  36. Kenya thanks France for successfully coordinating the negotiations for the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Kenya voted in favour of resolution 2666 (2022) because it lays emphasis on the protection of civilians. It makes clear that the Mission’s mandate to protect civilians entails taking all necessary measures to prevent, deter and stop armed groups and local militias from inflicting violence on civilians. By taking such a robust posture, we believe that MONUSCO will be able to gain the trust and confidence of the host communities. That is critical if the peacekeepers are to succeed in supporting the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to better perform its primary responsibility to protect civilians.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9226 (2022) · source

  37. Kenya calls on all parties concerned, including communal, political and religious leaders, to stop the inflammatory rhetoric in the interest of the promotion of peace and security. They should speak up against incitement and support the daily dividends of constructive grassroots efforts in mitigating the cycles of conflict. In conclusion, and considering that this is Kenya’s last engagement on this file before the end of our two- year tenure, I wish to thank the Special Coordinator and his team for their continued tireless engagement with both Israeli and Palestinian officials. The Council can continue to count on Kenya’s support. I reaffirm Kenya’s commitment to the two-State solution, along the 1967 lines, with an independent and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security with the State of Israel.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9224 (2022) · source

  38. Our delegation is concerned about the report of the presence of a man-made cavity underneath the grounds of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East school in Gaza. That poses security and safety risks to the children and staff and is a serious violation of the Agency’s neutrality and a breach of international law. The neutrality and inviolability of United Nations premises must be protected. The report also indicates that settlements, as well as demolitions, including the recent demolition of the school in Masafer Yatta, and evictions continue to increase in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, in violation of international law.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9224 (2022) · source

  39. The statistics relating to violent incidents, arrests, and fatalities reflected in the barely three months of the reporting period are alarming and unacceptable. In particular, all effort must be expended to ensure the protection of children. In line with resolution 2334 (2016), there is a need to strengthen efforts to prevent, ensure accountability for and address violence against civilians, including acts of terrorism perpetrated by Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other militant groups in Israel. The indiscriminate launching of rockets, including from residential neighbourhoods in Gaza, towards Israeli civilian population centres must stop.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9224 (2022) · source

  40. Our delegation continues to urge that reporting from the good offices of the Secretary-General be undergirded by an emphasis on paragraph 11 of the resolution, which calls for presenting clear objectives, timelines and feasible solutions to resolve the pending issues. That way the Council will be better positioned to examine practical ways and means to secure the full implementation of its relevant resolutions. The Council must remain seized of the issue and take urgent action on the objectives of resolution 2334 (2016). They speak to the vital importance of stabilizing the situation and reversing the negative trends on the ground, which are undermining the prospects of a two- State solution along the 1967 lines, with an independent and viable State of Palestine living side by side in peace and security with the State of Israel.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9224 (2022) · source

  41. In recognition of the absence of a genuine Israeli-Palestinian peace process underpinned by direct dialogue, we must sustain the urgency and continued engagement, commitment and focus on this issue. Efforts to create conditions conducive to negotiating all the final-status issues in a manner that takes into account the legitimate concerns of both the Palestinian and Israeli sides must be more robust. Like its predecessors in past decades, the report points to the lack of meaningful progress on the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016). Its implementation requires the political will of both the Israeli and Palestinian authorities.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9224 (2022) · source

  42. I thank Special Coordinator Wennesland for his presentation of the Secretary- General’s report and his continued engagement with both Israeli and Palestinian officials. Our delegation has taken note of the report’s summation of efforts by the parties and the international community to advance peace efforts. We welcome all the affirmative steps taken at the grass-roots and regional levels aimed at improving the current conditions in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Nevertheless, we can all agree that there is much more that needs to be done to bridge the gap between the current engagement and the situation on the ground, and to bring the Council’s decisions closer to the aspiration of two States for the two peoples.

    2022-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9224 (2022) · source

  43. Before I finish, I wish to make some remarks in my national capacity. This is the last briefing on the situation in Libya in which Kenya is participating as an elected member of the Security Council for the period 2021–2022. As we covered the Libya file, we sought to speak for the people of Libya. We thank Ambassador Taher Elsonni, Permanent Representative of Libya, for helping us to see and understand the aspirations of Libyans. We assure him, and through him the people of Libya, that Kenya will continue to support them in their aspirations for peace and stability. Finally, my delegation found great strength in the unity of the A3, so I thank Gabon and Ghana for their great support. We will keep our doors of cooperation open.

    2022-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9223 (2022) · source

  44. Including representatives of the United Nations agencies for refugees and migration as briefers in Council meetings on Libya would also be informative. We acknowledge the work of the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) and recall that sanctions are not perpetual but are a means towards the ultimate goal, which is the peace and stability of Libya. In that regard, there should be close coordination with Libyan authorities in the administration of sanctions. We emphasize that all Libya’s frozen assets belong to Libyans and therefore should be preserved for the eventual return to and benefit of Libyans. Finally, we reaffirm our respect for Libya’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and support for the people of Libya for a truly Libyan-led and -owned peace process.

    2022-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9223 (2022) · source

  45. We have repeatedly called for closer monitoring of resources and information channelled towards tackling illegal and irregular migration in Libya through the Mediterranean Sea and to the southern outline of the European coast. We reiterate that call. Given the magnitude of the issue, support for border and migration management programmes on the northern frontier of the African continent needs to have international transparency and corresponding systems of accountability. We call on the European Union and its members to factor that into their migration policies. We demand that refugees, migrants and asylum seekers be treated with dignity as a basic requirement of international law. To provide a clearer status of the intensity of the problem, we request a more comprehensive segment on the same in the Secretary- General’s report.

    2022-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9223 (2022) · source

  46. Libya is inextricably linked with its neighbours in history, culture, politics and economics, among other areas — hence the direct bearing of the conflict on the region. We call for active coordination and collaboration by the United Nations-led process with neighbouring States and regional initiatives. That is indispensable to a successful peace process in Libya and a stable region. We urge coordination and cooperation in, among other areas, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; counter-terrorism; and the trafficking and smuggling of arms and humans. The inhumane treatment of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers continues unabated, despite our repeated calls for further action to tackle it.

    2022-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9223 (2022) · source

  47. Some of it is driven by narrow foreign interests in Libyan resources, while others are doing it to advance proxy wars. In that regard, we call on all Libyan political actors, especially those who may be advancing the cause of foreign interests, to consider the overall interests of Libyans as a matter of urgency. To counter that, any international assistance offered to Libya for the peace process should respect the United Nations-mandated leadership of the process, as stipulated under resolution 2542 (2020). International assistance is important, but should be channelled in a manner that does not feed the ongoing political impasse to further divide Libyans and advance foreign agendas on Libyan soil. The fourth and final element is the critical role of neighbouring States and regional and subregional organizations.

    2022-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9223 (2022) · source

  48. UNSMIL should be strengthened to enable it to provide the requisite support, not only at the central political level but in grass-roots engagement as well. We commend the Presidential Council for taking leadership of the national reconciliation process, including the drafting of a reconciliation law and the plans for a national reconciliation conference, with the support of the African Union. An inclusive national dialogue and reconciliation process will make for the firmest foundation for the development of a consensus constitutional basis on which credible national elections can be conducted as the people of Libya desire. The third element is the coordination of international support through the United Nations-led process. Foreign interference in Libya is also manifest through uncoordinated international support.

    2022-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9223 (2022) · source

  49. For that to happen, the international community should refrain from dictating solutions, which is tantamount to foreign interference. When played out in public, it is utterly careless and leads to confusion. We demand the departure of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya, as they undermine Libya’s territorial integrity and national ownership of the peace process. Secondly, if Libyans are to be able to make such Libyan-led and -owned decisions, we must provide them with the space for dialogue and national reconciliation, linked to every stage and track of the peace process as acknowledged under resolution 2656 (2022). Intra-Libyan dialogue is critical and should include all Libyan stakeholders, including the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and young people.

    2022-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9223 (2022) · source

  50. However, we are acutely aware of how delicately the ceasefire is holding. Any more time that we spend on this file should therefore be geared to a serious dive into the practical aspects of guiding and supporting the peace process. That is why we are particularly keen on the Special Representative of the Secretary-General’s plan of action, informed by wide consultations with Libyan stakeholders. In that regard, we propose four elements that we consider critical to the success of the peace process. First, the process must be truly Libyan-led and -owned. The people of Libya are capable of deciding what is best for Libya. As Libyans, they understand their history and the vision of their country. They know what has worked, what has not and why. They understand the psyche of the people and are able to prescribe practical solutions.

    2022-12-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9223 (2022) · source