YouSaid · the spoken record

Kimani

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811
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2021-05-27
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2023-10-25
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un-security-council

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  1. We support the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia and regard it as a key support to the people and the Government of Colombia. We recognize the important role that the Peacebuilding Commission and United Nations agencies and programmes play in supporting the Government’s comprehensive implementation of the peace agreement. We thank Council members for supporting the language of the three African members of the Security Council — Gabon, Ghana and Kenya — which recognizes the role of those agencies in the agreement’s implementation. Kenya supports the request by the Government of Colombia for the expanded mandate of the Verification Mission to verify and monitor the implementation of the comprehensive rural reforms and the ethnic chapter.

    2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9169 (2022) · source

  2. Kenya thanks Mexico and the United Kingdom for their consultative effort in drafting resolution 2655 (2022), which we have just adopted. Kenya voted for the resolution to demonstrate 27/10/2022ColombiaS/PV.9169 its support for Colombia in its praiseworthy journey to achieving lasting peace after decades of war. Kenya commends President Gustavo Petro Urrego’s Administration for its stated determination to accelerate the implementation of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace. We further commend President Petro for his forthright acknowledgement of the disproportionate impact of violence and marginalization on Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities, and for his policy orientation to addressing those challenges.

    2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9169 (2022) · source

  3. We understand the complex and contentious nature of this situation and reaffirm our commitment to making every effort to help the parties to find a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, based on compromise. We urge all the parties to engage in good faith with the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy to achieve the long-delayed exercise of its right to self- determination by the people of Western Sahara.

    2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9168 (2022) · source

  4. Kenya stands by them not to alienate any party but in the conviction that they will protect all parties and the region from conflict and suffering and that they are sorely needed in many regions of the world. We further observe that the African Union, which counts both parties as its members, should not be ignored by any United Nations process, if only based on adherence to Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. The Personal Envoy should make every effort to cooperate with the African Union to find ways to bring all parties to a common position protective of peace, security and the holding of the agreed referendum. Kenya enjoys warm ties of friendship with both Morocco and Western Sahara. We aspire to further strengthen those ties through cooperation on matters of common interest at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

    2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9168 (2022) · source

  5. Underlying the United Nations recognition of the right to self-determination through a properly implemented referendum is the Charter of the United Nations, which holds that all peoples shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self- determination. Equally, key to the African Union’s recognition of Sahrawi and its full membership is the objective laid out in article 3 (h) of its Constitutive Act to “promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments”. Those are foundational principles for both the United Nations and the African Union.

    2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9168 (2022) · source

  6. Unfortunately, the constructive proposals we made during the negotiations that speak to the core matter of the mandate were not taken on board. For that reason, we abstained in the voting. We are concerned about the fact that this resolution does not substantively reflect the Security Council’s commitment — as reflected in the seventh preambular paragraph of resolution 2602 (2021) and in previous resolutions — to “provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect”.

    2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9168 (2022) · source

  7. Kenya fully supports the work of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and that of the Secretary- General’s Personal Envoy. That was reflected in our affirmative vote on resolution 2602 (2021) in October last year in our hope that the parties would engage the Personal Envoy in a way that returned MINURSO to its core objective of implementing a referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. Unfortunately, progress has been limited. Resolution 2654 (2022) continues a gradual but noticeable shift away from the mandate and will not assist the parties in achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, as originally intended.

    2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9168 (2022) · source

  8. In conclusion, we note with appreciation the Security Council’s support to the Nairobi and Luanda processes and encourage the continued partnership of the Secretary-General and the United Nations, including funding support. We commend and support the efforts of the Special Envoy and his able team in promoting peace and security in the region through good offices and advocacy and capacity-building programmes, which are beneficial to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region. The A3 and France have submitted a draft press statement for the Council’s consideration, and we hope to see a strong endorsement of that initiative by the Security Council.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  9. Meanwhile, the United Nations and regional organizations should forge collaborative efforts to support States emerging from conflict in the region, with due respect for their sovereignty over their natural resources. That can be achieved through capacity-building to strengthen national regulatory and law-enforcement capacities based on national priorities to lay the foundation for the lawful, transparent and sustainable use of natural resources. The A3 recognizes the valuable role of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund in supporting cross-border cooperation in the region. We therefore welcome the written advisory from the Peacebuilding Commission and urge for the Council’s support in the identified areas of work, including the implementation of the United Nations Strategy for the Great Lakes region.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  10. The A3 encourages States in the region to implement regulatory frameworks and strengthen accountability measures in order to manage the sustainable use of natural resources. We also urge States to effect necessary legislation and rules against conflicts of interest. We urge all entities all over the world importing and exporting natural resources to put in place conflict-mineral awareness and monitoring systems. We further urge States, particularly those that receive minerals from the Great Lakes region, to ensure compliance oversight, transparency in mineral flows and fair play to enable responsible mineral supply chains during the extraction, transport and sale of natural resources.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  11. We urge States in the region to strengthen governance frameworks, such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Pact on Security, Stability and Development, in order to promote a regional vision for addressing the root causes of conflict. There is a need to reinvigorate the Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre and the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism in order to ensure the collection of intelligence on armed group activities and the dissemination of that intelligence to national law enforcement agencies. On addressing the illegal exploitation of and trade in natural resources, the region must address with urgency the alarming competition for natural resources among illegal transnational actors and armed groups.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  12. Regional and national authorities should also ensure that those engaging in hate speech and incitement are held accountable, especially if they are political leaders. We welcome the Luanda road map aimed at normalizing the political relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. We commend the increasing coordination between the Nairobi and Luanda processes and call for that coordination to be strengthened in support of the priorities of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We encourage further regional confidence-building measures, particularly through economic cooperation.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  13. We note with concern the heightened levels of mistrust between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, which serve only to fuel unsustainable regional tensions. Both countries need each other for peace, security and prosperity. It is therefore crucial that they employ all efforts to prevent misunderstandings, build confidence and strengthen cooperation. We also strongly condemn the use of hate speech, disinformation and misinformation by some leaders, which contributes to mistrust, tension and animosity and even incites violence. We urge the Special Envoy and the Special Representative of the Secretary- General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo to proactively engage the major social media companies to encourage them to take swift and comprehensive action on hate speech.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  14. We further urge the provision of enhanced support to strengthen the capacity of the FARDC to consolidate State authority in conflict areas. We encourage the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to initiate a strategy for the ambitious reform of the FARDC and its security sector so that it may assume responsibility for the protection of civilians and ensure the rights and needs of all Congolese people after the withdrawal of United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). On confidence-building among leaders of the Great Lakes region, the A3 underscores that political will is the key ingredient for resolving the conflicts in the region.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  15. We further welcome the convening of the third inter-Congolese peace dialogue in Nairobi from 4 to 13 November. The A3 commends Angola, Senegal and Kenya for their contribution to the EAC peace fund based in Arusha to support the political process. We invite other countries to partner with the EAC by contributing to the fund. The success of the Nairobi processes depends on the effectiveness of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme. We urge the United Nations and the international community to make available the necessary resources for that exercise. We urge the Secretary-General to strengthen the coordination gap between the Contact and Coordination Group and the Nairobi process to best support the peace dialogue.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  16. Those groups are perpetrating mass atrocities and grave human rights violations. We note with concern that some of them, particularly the ADF, have links to terrorist networks, including the Islamic State. The threat they pose to regional peace and security calls for a robust regional response. We call for the swift implementation of the action plan of the 2021–2023 United Nations Strategy for Peace, Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region, as well as the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region. We welcome the inter-Congolese peace dialogue initiated by the East African Community (EAC) and the fact that many armed groups are already participating in it.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  17. On the threat posed by armed groups, the A3 is alarmed by the worsening situation resulting from the recent capture of the town of Bunagana in North Kivu by the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23). The A3 denounces the escalation of violence in Rutshuru since 20 October between the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and the rebels of the M-23, which left at least 10 people dead and dozens of people injured. We express our sincere condolences to the families of the victims and express our solidarity with the civilians affected by that violence. We condemn the illegal and inhumane activities of the M-23, the ADF, the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo, the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Forces combattantes Abacunguzi and the Résistance pour un État de droit au Burundi.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  18. I have the pleasure to deliver this statement on behalf of the three African members of the Security Council (A3), namely, Gabon, Ghana and Kenya. We thank Mr. Huang Xia, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, for his briefing. The A3 remains deeply concerned about the deteriorating security situation in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its effect on the stability of the Great Lakes region. Our statement will focus on three areas that require urgent action to address the root causes of conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region: first, the continuing threat of armed groups; secondly, reinforcing confidence-building among the leaders of the region; and thirdly, addressing the illegal exploitation of natural resources.

    2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9165 (2022) · source

  19. Finally, we reaffirm our respect for Libya’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and our support for a truly Libyan-led and Libyan-owned peace process.

    2022-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9162 (2022) · source

  20. We demand the humane treatment of the refugees, migrants and asylum seekers as a basic requirement of international law and associated conventions. We reiterate our call for closer monitoring by the United Nations of the resources and information channels that enable that mistreatment, as we did in our previous statement on 30 August (see S/PV.9120) Recognizing the gaps that long transitions can create, we caution against the politicization and manipulation of the Libyan oil sector by external forces. We also recall that Libya’s frozen assets belong to the Libyans and are protected and preserved for the Libyans. Their administration should be done strictly in consultation with the Libyan authorities.

    2022-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9162 (2022) · source

  21. Those efforts need to be supplemented with close collaboration among Libya, the United Nations, neighbouring countries and the African Union in monitoring the withdrawal. They should also incorporate deliberate corresponding disarmament, demobilization and reintegration — not only in Libya but also in the multiple countries of origin. That needs to be done in order to avoid cyclic conflict and fragility in the Sahel region, which is already facing the adverse cross-border effects of the conflict in Libya. The other disturbing regional dimension of the conflict that we must keep mentioning is the plight of migrants and refugees in Libya and in the Mediterranean. This conflict continues to expose the worst of humankind in the treatment of that vulnerable group of people, who seek better and safer lives.

    2022-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9162 (2022) · source

  22. We call on all sides to utilize the mediation support of the United Nations, as we recognize that all international support is valuable but should be coordinated by the United Nations for the sake of the coherence of efforts. Such coordination is also critical in preventing the negative external interference that has been characteristic of the conflict in Libya. We condemn such interference as also manifested through the presence of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries in Libya. We reiterate our demand for their immediate withdrawal. We commend the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and support its work in helping sustain the ceasefire agreement of October 2020. We urge it to continue the implementation of the action plan of October 2021 for the withdrawal of mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces.

    2022-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9162 (2022) · source

  23. We welcome the support of the African Union to the reconciliation process in Libya, and we look forward to the implementation of practical steps already agreed to, including the facilitation of a reconciliation meeting in Tripoli in the coming months. Using dialogue and a process of inclusive, comprehensive national reconciliation, Libyans can achieve a firm constitutional basis for elections. For that to happen most effectively, the mediating leadership of the Special Representative is critical. We therefore welcome his initial focus in engaging with all Libyan parties, including civil society, women and youth groups.

    2022-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9162 (2022) · source

  24. We therefore call for dialogue and reconciliation in a process owned by the people of Libya and lacking external dictates. For that reason, we fully support the Presidency Council’s efforts. The joint communiqué of the sixteenth Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between members of the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council on 14 October recognizes the importance of collaboration, coordination and cooperation in — among other things — national reconciliation. That should be “guided by the principles of national ownership and meaningful partnerships with subregional and regional organizations”.

    2022-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9162 (2022) · source

  25. A substantive one-year mandate will offer the Special Representative and the Mission the necessary stability to execute their mandate and will demonstrate the Council’s continued commitment. We are concerned about the persisting political stalemate, fully aware that the longer it continues, the deeper it entrenches divisions among the people. We reiterate our call to Libyan leaders to embrace the desire of the people of Libya for peace and stability and for prosperity in unity. The continued mobilization and movement of armed groups in and around Tripoli works against that common purpose. We are also concerned about the continued exchange of inflammatory rhetoric. Military means are not the solution; they only bring more suffering to civilians without winning peace.

    2022-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9162 (2022) · source

  26. I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the three African members of the Security Council, namely, Gabon, Ghana and Kenya. We warmly welcome the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Abdoulaye Bathily, and thank him for the briefing. We congratulate him on being appointed as Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and wish him every success. We also welcome the participation of Ambassador Taher Elsonni, Permanent Representative of Libya. We thank the Secretary-General that we now have a substantive Special Representative in Tripoli. His presence in Libya and interaction with the Libyan stakeholders is a strong signal of the Organization’s commitment to their country’s peace and security.

    2022-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9162 (2022) · source

  27. We reiterate our strong support for a Haitian-led and Haitian-owned solution to the current political crisis. We have every confidence that, despite their now divergent views, the Haitian political leaders will find the will and the capability to build consensus and chart a viable way forward for Haiti. As Kenya, we will continue to take a keen interest in the safety, security and prosperity of Haiti and to offer every support within our means, even after our tenure in the Security Council ends in December. I reaffirm Kenya’s solidarity with the people of Haiti and our commitment to the protection of Haiti’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

    2022-10-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9159 (2022) · source

  28. Kenya welcomes the specific and measurable benchmarks for the review of the sanctions. Such benchmarks will enable the Security Council to assess progress, with a view to progressively adjusting the measures as the situation improves. We congratulate the Council on taking that step, and we advocate for its continuation in other files. The implementation of the sanctions will rely heavily on the cooperation and support of the international community, particularly States of the region. It will require information-sharing and coordination to ensure that those responsible for the suffering of Haitians are held accountable. Further assistance to strengthen the capacity of Haitian institutions remains critical. In that regard, we welcome and support the recent initiatives by the Caribbean Community and other friends of Haiti.

    2022-10-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9159 (2022) · source

  29. Kenya thanks Mexico and the United States for their consultative efforts in drafting resolution 2653 (2022), which we just adopted. Kenya voted in favour of the resolution after making every effort, as one of the three African members of the Security Council (A3), to ensure that it had a review mechanism and that it targeted those compromising Haiti’s peace. We thank the co-penholders and other members for welcoming the A3’s proposals. This new resolution is one of the most tangible measures that the Security Council has recently taken. It represents the first real step upon which to build a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Haitian crisis. It is a strong signal of the Council’s determination to stand with the people of Haiti against the gangs and their sponsors.

    2022-10-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9159 (2022) · source

  30. We therefore continue to urge its further strengthening to provide the support that is commensurate with Haiti’s needs. In conclusion, the A3 stands in solidarity with Haiti. We will continue to do our utmost to listen to the people of Haiti and act in their interest during this moment of extreme peril.

    2022-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9153 (2022) · source

  31. We note from the lessons of history that peace and development are inseparable. The A3 reiterates that efforts aimed at addressing the political and security situation must be accompanied by the rollout of a comprehensive social and economic programme. In this regard, the International Monetary Fund must commit to pursuing this objective. We are disturbed by the inhumane large-scale deportations of Haitians in search of safety witnessed in recent weeks and months. We urge the strict observance of international human rights and refugee laws by all neighbouring and nearby States. We call on Haitians to rally around a common ideal of rebuilding their country. The A3 once again reaffirms its support for the work of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti. Its role in assisting Haiti to navigate its multiple crises is critical.

    2022-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9153 (2022) · source

  32. The A3 deplores the persistent human rights violations against vulnerable people. In particular, we regret the inability to enforce pending warrants for prominent individuals credibly linked to those violations. It is crucial to secure justice for all victims of atrocities. To cut off the flow of weapons and financing to the gangs, and to ensure accountability for human rights violations, we support the proposed sanctions resolution as an important step. Of critical importance is the need to resuscitate the entire criminal justice system. We call for urgent support for Haiti to carry out comprehensive justice sector reforms aimed at addressing prolonged pretrial detentions, the establishment of legal aid offices, the expediting of court cases and the setting up of functioning court registries.

    2022-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9153 (2022) · source

  33. We also support efforts by Member States and the international community to block the flow of weapons to gangs and any associated parties. However, this should not be done in a way that impedes the efforts of the police to enforce law and order. We encourage the actions already initiated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in particular through police training, to assist the Haitian authorities in border management, stopping illegal trafficking in arms and illicit drugs and countering organized crime, as well as in strengthening the State’s capacity in the collection of public revenues. We urge the Security Council and Member States to act not only against the gangs but also their sponsors and facilitators. To do this requires a clear process of investigation and reporting that needs urgently to be established.

    2022-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9153 (2022) · source

  34. We urge the international community to take this into account in making any offers for involvement. All efforts on behalf of Haiti should be sensitive to the need to ensure trust and to further, in a transparent manner, the security and humanitarian well-being of the people. Aware of the contribution that illicit arms make to worsening insecurity, the A3 welcomes the finalization of the National Action Plan to implement the Roadmap for Implementing the Caribbean Priority Actions on the Illicit Proliferation of Firearms and Ammunition across the Caribbean in a Sustainable Manner by 2030. We call upon the United Nations system and the international community to support national authorities in implementing the Action Plan.

    2022-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9153 (2022) · source

  35. We strongly condemn all actors that are blocking the movement of food and fuel and in any way impeding trade and humanitarian access, leading to severe shortages in food supplies, access to water, electricity and other essential public services. If this situation continues, what is already an emergency will further worsen. The A3 therefore welcomes the request by the Government of Haiti for international support to counter the armed gangs and restore normalcy. We also welcome the Secretary-General’s timely letter (S/2022/747) detailing the options available to support this request. We therefore reiterate our call for urgent international support to counter gang violence and strengthen the capacity of the Haitian National Police. We recognize Haiti’s difficult and tragic experience with external intervention.

    2022-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9153 (2022) · source

  36. We encourage them to take advantage of the instruments available to them through regional organizations, particularly the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). In this regard, we therefore welcome the commitment of support made by the forty-third regular meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, held from 3 to 5 July, in Suriname. We urge the African Union and African States to work with CARICOM in support of Haiti. The A3 is exceedingly troubled by the surge in violence and the impunity benefiting armed gangs. We commend the bravery and dedicated efforts by the Haitian National Police to address the situation. But amid insurmountable odds, gang violence, sexual and gender-based violence and kidnappings have all continued unabated.

    2022-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9153 (2022) · source

  37. At a minimum, dialogue must achieve an agreed common approach to deliver political reforms that include a constitutional basis and then free and fair democratic elections. All attempts should be made to make the dialogue inclusive, particularly by ensuring that it has the strong participation of women and youth. All stakeholders need to respond to the urgency of the situation. Lack of agreement on a way forward threatens to make the security and humanitarian situation slide out of control, with dire costs for the people of Haiti, and particularly the most vulnerable. It makes it more difficult for even the most well- intentioned external actors to offer the immediate relief that millions of Haitians desperately need. The people of Haiti do not have to walk alone.

    2022-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9153 (2022) · source

  38. Witnessing the widespread lack of security, the growing deterioration of the humanitarian and public-health situation status, and the lack of political cohesion, we recognize historical and global causal factors that we have also suffered from. Since our last meeting (see S/PV.9136), the situation has not improved. It has sadly worsened. We again reiterate our call for action that is supported and accepted by Haitian-led and Haitian- owned political, humanitarian and security initiatives. We therefore urge Haiti’s Government, political class and civil society to deliver mediated starting points on a process that will overcome the political impasse, address insecurity, begin the recovery of the rule of law, deliver humanitarian aid and offer economic relief.

    2022-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9153 (2022) · source

  39. I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the three African members of the Security Council (A3), namely, Ghana, Kenya and Gabon. We thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Helen La Lime for her briefing. We also welcome the participation of His Excellency Mr. Jean Victor Généus, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship of Haiti, His Excellency Mr. Roberto Álvarez Gil, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic, the Permanent Representative of Belize, and Her Excellency Ms. Ifigeneia Kontoleontos, Permanent Observer for the International Organization of the Francophonie to the United Nations. We the African members of the Security Council have every reason to be extremely unsettled by the situation in Haiti.

    2022-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9153 (2022) · source

  40. It is now for those with the urgency, the responsibility and, most importantly, the vision to do it. Kenya will walk with all States and institutions that are ready to act.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  41. Fifthly and finally, the Security Council cannot remain on the sidelines when major threats to regional and international peace and security are made much worse by climate crises. Let us attempt to deliver a resolution that leads to pragmatic actions that further the security of communities in conflict areas within the purview of the Security Council. That resolution could promote the requirement that peacekeeping missions have tactical, operational and strategic environmental planning based on meeting mandate objectives and desired end-states. It could encourage the consideration of environmental initiatives in improving community- mission relations, preserving and protecting critical environmental infrastructure, and increasing the impact on mission transition and longer-term reconstruction. We know what needs to be done.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  42. To get to 100 per cent renewables for total energy generation as we rapidly grow our manufacturing sector and industrialize, major equity investment and technology are urgently required. The bottom line is that climate-change mitigation and adaptation cannot be on the backs of the poorest, and we hope that such views will not be brought forward at the negotiating table next month in Egypt. Fourthly, we need immediate action on the ground. The link between extreme-weather events — the majority caused by climate change — and conflicts within the purview of the Council is undeniable. It is equally clear that climate-change adaptation is the most peace-positive undertaking in such regions as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. It is critical that a surge in investments into these regions be made for the sake of sustained peace and security.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  43. The imperative to protect Africa’s natural wealth is a global priority to the extent that it should be one of the drivers of global reform. Our third recommendation is to remove the barriers to a high-energy future for all countries, particularly those in Africa. Industry, commerce, jobs and inclusive growth are powered by energy. Not having that energy consigns billions to grinding poverty, heightened security threats and unstable political life. The transition from a low-energy to a high-energy country must be as green as possible and be aided by adequate technology transfer and investment. Kenya has committed to a 100 per cent use of renewables for electricity by 2030. We are at 90 per cent today.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  44. Let us have prompt action by the Resilience and Sustainability Trust, which is administered by the International Monetary Fund, in equitably reallocating the $650 billion in special drawing rights for global public policy, and in particular for climate adaptation. Let us see the African Union with a permanent seat at the G-20. Secondly, let us understand and act on the fact that Africa is a natural-capital superpower that holds the key to the global transition to green. We are not just victims of the climate crisis; we are the mineral-sourcing key to its global solutions. It is time that African countries and regional organizations acted on this knowledge and claimed our natural resources for our people, captured more of their value and ensured stable democratic political systems that can resist external exploitation.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  45. Our first recommendation is that Charter-level reforms of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions and the Group of 20 (G-20) are overdue. Responding to this demand by labelling it wishful thinking is tantamount to announcing the system’s irrelevance. It invites, almost inevitably, the emergence of parallel, and probably conflicting, geopolitical orders. Let us bring balance to the permanent membership of the Security Council through the addition not only of great Powers but of States that can best represent the voice of the most climate-change-affected and developing countries.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  46. From the response to coronavirus disease to climate emergencies, and even combatting Al-Qaida terrorist groups in Africa, the shortcomings are glaring. They are deadly. They sap hope in institutions and in the future that they promise. To repeat our old arguments is to expect that they were not heard or that they have been forgotten. But they have not. The bulk of the public and experts all over the world, especially in the industrialized countries, are calling for bold action. We must therefore return to the insistence that without reforms in the global system, humankind’s well-being and international peace and security will be imperilled. For the sake of today’s debate, and despite the failings of the past, it is important that we offer a way forward. To that end, we have five recommendations.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  47. For every heatwave in a wealthy city, there are biblical floods elsewhere. And multi-year droughts in such regions as the Horn of Africa are leading to extreme food insecurity and the reversal of years of development gains. This sad litany of short-sighted manoeuvring, resistance to responsibility and double standards is where we find ourselves today. It is important that we establish our precise situation to better debate where we go from here. It should now be clear that the key institutions in global governance are not fit for purpose in advancing peace, climate justice, pandemic responses and inclusion. They respond to the crises of the richest and most powerful while standing on the sidelines for the rest.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  48. The energy-supply gaps in Europe resulting from the war in Ukraine have led to a mass return to its exploitation of fossil fuels. These are the fossil fuels that many European and Western Governments insisted not be developed in Africa during negotiations in Glasgow, despite the fact that they are still the heaviest consumers and are responsible for the overwhelming amount of greenhouse-gas emissions. To make the double standard even more glaring, Africa suffers from tremendous deficits in energy, which is a major factor in its disproportionate poverty and underdevelopment. Even the fact that closing the energy deficit for Africa and the continent’s rapid development are key to its climate-change adaptation was resisted in Glasgow. Meanwhile, the climate crisis is manifesting more destructively in our daily lives.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  49. Unfortunately, the expected sense of alarm among world leaders was muted. In November, at the twenty-sixth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 26), in Glasgow, industrialized countries mostly waxed lyrical in front of cameras and then limited action during negotiations. The result was a limp outcome, and a kicking of the can down the road. In December 2021, a draft resolution on climate and security was proposed to the Security Council (S/2021/990). Despite earning sufficient votes, and strong support by Member States, it was vetoed by a permanent member of the Council (see S/PV.8926). In the year since, the response to what is still named “climate change”, but that billions experience as a climate crisis, has only worsened.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  50. I thank Mrs. Martha Pobee, Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Mr. Tanguy Gahouma-Bekale, Permanent Secretary of the Climate Council and Former Chair of the African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change, and Mr. Patrick Youssef, Regional Director for Africa of the International Committee of the Red Cross, for their briefings. I have a prediction. In time, we shall all agree about the vital link between responding to the climate crisis and the protection of international peace and security. The question is how much suffering there will have to be — and by how many millions — before we all reach that agreement. In August 2021, the Secretary-General, referring to a just-released report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, called the report a “code red for humanity”.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source