YouSaid · the spoken record

Landgren

lines on the record: 355
first: 2009-05-05
most recent: 2023-11-14
sittings or episodes: 20
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Since I last reported to the Security Council, in May (see S/PV.6538), there has been progress showing that Burundi is carrying forward its peacebuilding efforts largely as we had hoped. There have also been developments that could jeopardize that progress and a long-term socio-economic outlook rife with challenges. The massacre of 39 people on 18 September at a bar on the outskirts of Bujumbura reminded many people of Burundi's painful past. The following morning, the United Nations and the international community were invited to join President Nkumnziza in visiting the site of the devastating attack, where 23 corpses still lay. On 18 October a commission of inquiry presented its report to the country's Prosecutor.”
2011-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6677 (2011) · source
“In conclusion, I would like to thank the members of the Council and of the Peacebuilding Commission, the United Nations family and all other partners who have been so steadfast in their support of Burundi in its remarkable transition. The commendable efforts of the Burundian Government and people in consolidating the gains achieved in peacebuilding and paving the way for sustainable development deserve our strong and continued support.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“And BNUB is identifying possible areas of support with regard to the country's integration into the East African Community, which is determined to see Burundi move forward in peace and economic strength. In accordance with its mandate, BNUB is currently developing benchmarks for its exit and evolution into a regular United Nations country team presence. Discussions within the United Nations family have begun and will be followed by consultations with national and international partners. As the Council is aware, the Secretary-General has appointed Ms. Rosine Sori-Coulibaly as my Deputy and United Nations Resident Coordinator in Burundi. I look forward to working closely with her to maximize the impact of the United Nations system's efforts in support of the Burundian Government and people.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“We continue to work with the Government of Burundi to ensure that the needs of separated staff are dealt with in a responsible manner. Throughout the transition, BNUB has continued to carry out its core tasks in support of the consolidation of peace and democracy in Burundi. We continue to encourage efforts to promote inclusive political dialogue between the Government and the extra-parliamentary opposition. We are helping the Government to strengthen its key institutions and supporting efforts to professionalize and enhance the capacity of security and defence forces. We are working with civil society and other stakeholders to promote and protect human rights and prepare the ground for the establishment of viable transitional justice mechanisms.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“The $24 million programme would support labour-intensive projects targeting the demobilized, youth and other vulnerable groups. The programme is in line with the United Nations strategic development framework in Burundi for the period 2010 to 2014. We are working with the Peacebuilding Support Office to mobilize initial funding to launch the programme. As stipulated in resolution 1959 (2010), the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) has been succeeded by a scaled-down presence, namely, the United Nations Office in Burundi. I am pleased to report that the transition is going well. We expect to reach BNUB's authorized level of 134 staff by 1 July. That represents a 70 per cent reduction from BINUB. As difficult as it is for any staff member to lose his or her job in the current climate, the process has been peaceful.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“The United Nations looks forward to more detailed discussions with the Government, and remains ready to assist in the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms consistent with international standards. We anticipate that international financial support will also be needed in this area. The full reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants is crucial for sustained peace in the country. While they had all received reintegration assistance by the end of April, much still remains to be done to help them become productive members of society. To that end, the Government and BNUB have developed a proposal to support the continued socio- economic reintegration of people affected by the conflict, including ex-combatants.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“The Government intends to create a truth and reconciliation commission, to be operational by January 2012, and to establish a judicial mechanism to address impunity after the commission has completed its work. These are important commitments. The Government has underlined to BNUB that the truth and reconciliation commission process must be grounded in reconciliation and not in score-settling. For that, broad public awareness and orientation will be crucial. BNUB continues to sensitize the public through workshops where the results of the national consultations are shared and discussed. The Government will set up a seven-member preparatory committee to develop appropriate legislation and a budget and to review the experiences of other countries that have had truth and reconciliation commissions.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“Jean-Claude Kavumbagu, director of NetPress, was detained in July 2010 on a charge of treason. While the State Prosecutor sought a maximum life sentence, the court acquitted Mr. Kavumbagu of the treason charge last Friday, finding him guilty of violating press laws. He was fined and sentenced to eight months in prison. As he had been detained for 10 months, he was released yesterday. There are significant developments to report in the realm of transitional justice, where - following the national consultations that concluded in 2010 4 the Government is taking steps to set up these mechanisms. On 3 May, a delegation led by the Minister of External Affairs outlined the Government's transitional justice strategy during a meeting with United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. Navi Pillay.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“BNUB investigated 11-34143 and documented nine such cases between January and Much 2011 alone, and several other cases reported in April are under investigation. Between August and November last year, BNUB documented 11 extrajudicial executions. The Government set up a commission of inquiry in October 2010 to investigate specific allegations made against the security forces in this regard. It remained dormant until the end of April, when the Government announced that the commission had resumed work. We encourage the Government and the commission to establish the facts and make actionable recommendations where Violations are established. I want to acknowledge the relatively vibrant media that exists in Burundi, and the recent resolution of a case that had raised concerns.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“Twenty-one names were submitted to the National Assembly, which is expected to nominate seven as commissioners. I understand that this issue will be taken up today during a three-day extraordinary session of the National Assembly. An impartial and independent national human rights commission can strengthen Burundi's compliance with its international obligations and enhance the protection and promotion of human rights, thus promoting national stability. In a related positive development, the Government responded favourably to a request for a return visit by the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Burundi, Mr. Fatsah Ouguergouz. His visit began yesterday. A persistent concern has been the continued reports of extrajudicial executions.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“Other steps include the introduction of performance contracts for all officials, including ministers, since the beginning of the year. Their work will be evaluated every six months. All Government ministers have also presented their work plans to Parliament. In his Labour Day address to the nation on 1 May, President Nkurunziza reiterated the need to meet performance targets, warning that underperforming public officials would be dismissed. I am pleased to report that the process of establishing an independent national human rights commission has moved steadily forward. On 5 January, the law creating the commission was promulgated by President Nkurunziza. An ad hoc parliamentary commission was then set up and vetted a large number of candidates.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“These issues are among the daunting socio-economic challenges that need to be addressed to help consolidate peace in the country, as highlighted during the meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission on 21 April. Graft remains a problem in Burundi. In April, the Ministry of Good Governance presented a broad-based national plan on good governance and the fight against corruption, taking on board substantive comments from the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme and bilateral partners. This is intended as a framework for all partners and includes elements related to elections; judicial, legal and public sector reforms; human rights; and the media. This strategy is expected to be adopted on 23 May.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“The cost of fuel has increased by over 20 per cent since October, raising the prices of all basic commodities in turn and placing severe strains on many families. Burundi was traditionally self-sufficient in food production, but this is no longer the case, and 90 per cent of Burundian families now live on an average of half a hectare of eroded land. Agricultural tools and technology remain poor, and market incentives are limited. Land has been the cause of many past conflicts in Burundi and remains an emotive issue. Parliament adopted a revised land code in April that includes the decentralization of land issues to the communes and 11-34143 the establishment of a National Land Commission tasked with managing the redistribution of land and resolving disputes.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“The Government has launched important initiatives in the province, to include socio-economic recovery activities and the mandatory collection of weapons held illegally by the population. In a speech in Bujumbura Rural on 6 May, President Nkurunziza reassured the population that security would be re-established within two months. (spoke in English) The Government is preparing the second poverty reduction strategy paper. It will incorporate key elements of the Strategic Framework For Peacebuilding and harmonize efforts in both peace consolidation and development planning. This document, anticipated for July, will give focus to governance goals and resource mobilization efforts. Burundi faces severe poverty and high unemployment, including among young people.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“On 14 March, the Executive Committee of the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie- Forces nationales pour la defense de la democratie (CNDD-FDD) expelled a party executive, the Secretary of its Council of Elders, following his allegations of corruption and impunity within the party. He was replaced during the course of a special party congress on 14 May, during which congress members assessed the achievements of the CNDD-FDD since 2005. While the security situation is generally calm, there has been an increase in violent incidents in Bujumbura Rural province in April. Until recently, the violence was attributed to bandits, but the Defence Ministry has just publicly blamed the lack of security on Mr. Agathon Rwasa and Mr. Leonard Nyangoma.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“The Government is also in the process of drafting a bill on the status of political parties in the opposition that would allow the creation of an official post of leader of the opposition, and on the funding of political parties and the functions of civil society organizations. National, regional and international actors, including the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB), continue to encourage initiatives to promote dialogue between the Government and the extra- parliamentary opposition. To date, none of these initiatives has had the desired result of returning the 2 main leaders of the opposition to Burundi so that they can again participate in the political life of the country.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“Since the last meeting of the Security Council on the situation in Burundi (see S/PV.6439) five months ago, developments have taken place in the country, in particular with respect to transitional justice, human rights and laws governing the political parties. Last month, Parliament adopted a law on the functioning and organization of political parties. The extra-parliamentary opposition, fearing an attempt to constrain its activities, followed this process closely. In response to that concern, an amendment that would have required all political parties to obtain new authorization was modified. Some opposition political parties still believe that the new law restricts the political space and have announced that they will not comply with it.”
2011-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6538 (2011) · source
“Finally, I would like to express my profound personal gratitude to all my devoted colleagues, and especially to Ian Martin, Tamrat Samuel and Under- Secretary-General B. Lynn Pascoe, for our close and supportive working relationships. 7”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“We have worked closely with the national and international media in Nepal and beyond, and I appreciate the interest they have taken in UNMIN's role in the peace process. UNMIN has benefited from close consultation and communication with the international diplomatic and development community in Nepal, and especially the Council members represented there. On behalf of the Secretary-General, all my dedicated colleagues in UNMIN, the United Nations family in Kathmandu, and the Department of Political Affairs, I would like to thank the Council and Member States, for the support they have given UNMIN over the last four years and will continue to give to Nepal's remarkable peace process.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“Consistent with the strong and sustained support of the Secretary-General and the United Nations over the past several years for peace efforts in Nepal, principally through the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, the United Nations will remain engaged and continue to make its contribution to the success of this process. This is my final briefing to the Council on Nepal. I would like to thank the Government of Nepal and the political parties for their engagement with UNMIN, and likewise the Nepal Army and the Maoist army for their professional and profound commitment to our cooperation, particularly in the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee. I want to acknowledge the role played by sectors of civil society in Nepal's peace process and the knowledge and advice that they have shared with the Mission.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“The parties can build on the dialogue that has been their long-standing strength, shun the demonizing of one another, and sidestep the broad array of spoilers. At this moment, we encourage them to come to rapid agreement on the future of the monitoring of arms and armies. It remains vital that the international community speak with one voice on the need for the peace process to continue on the basis of dialogue and compromise, for Nepal to have a new constitution by the end of May as agreed by the parties, and for a smooth election under the new constitution. The matter of Nepal's peace process will now remain on the agenda of the Council for a further three years.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“The traditional parties need to demonstrate that their intention was not simply to marginalize the Maoists through day-to-day politics, while the Maoists must demonstrate unambiguously that they intend to abide by democratic politics. This peace process can be brought to a close in two ways: satisfactorily, through the negotiated resolution of outstanding issues, or abortively, with one or more parties reneging on their solemn commitments. Setbacks and challenges are inevitable, but it is in the interest of the country, the region and the international community as a whole that the peace process be maintained, respected and steered to a proper close. UNMIN has continued to encourage dignified negotiated solutions, which require a moderation of positions on all sides.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“There have at times been fears among many Nepalis over the prospect of a "peoples' revolt", which remains an explicit Maoist threat; of the President stepping in, as recently called for by the Vice-President, should the parties fail to find a way forward; or of an army- backed coup. Any such measures would sorely threaten peace and Nepal's fragile democracy. Adopting the new constitution should close the door firmly on any undemocratic governance alternatives, of which the United Nations has also repeatedly warned. Parties on both the left and the right will need to show patience and remain faithful to the core documents of the peace process.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“Four years on, it should be recognized that Nepal has undertaken a complex long-term project of peace, democracy and State transformation. The historic Twelve-point Understanding which the warring parties signed in 2005 committed them to establishing absolute democracy in Nepal, but completing the course and managing the process have now become acutely challenging. Deep divisions have emerged over its direction and the sequencing of steps, especially with respect to the future of Maoist army personnel and the promulgation of the new constitution. While Nepal's dramatic political gains are not likely to be reversed, the risks have clearly grown.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“Upon its completion, the monitoring task was extended repeatedly, while relations among the parties continued to erode. The Mission would have benefited from a review of the mandate after the elections. Stronger support to the peace process overall, possibly including monitoring of the peace agreements more broadly, as well as technical support, particularly to the integration and rehabilitation process, should have been considered seriously. Some parties did ask UNMIN to take on elements of these roles. UNMIN has been an expression of the international community's support for and investment in Nepal's peace process. There has been understandable frustration with an attenuated process far removed from the optimistic 12-month period originally mandated by the Council.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“Child protection issues, especially the discharge of Maoist army personnel disqualified as minors, has involved solid coordination among UNMIN, the Office of the Resident Coordinator, the United Nations Development Programme, UNICEF, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. Although the process is still incomplete, the Mission has performed its mandated tasks and has, I am convinced, contributed significantly to the peace process. The Mission has faced high expectations from the public and the parties, well beyond its limited mandate, as core political disputes can be resolved only by the parties themselves. The primary objective of the Mission's establishment was the successful election of the Constituent Assembly.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“6 UNMIN brought expertise and impartiality to the support of the elections; to the monitoring of arms and armies and the convening of 134 sessions of the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee, which has resolved many issues and prevented their politicization; to the registration and verification of Maoist personnel in cantonments; and to the negotiation of the discharge of the disqualified. UNMIN also maintained steadfast impartiality in investigating and assessing reported violations of the Arms Monitoring Agreement. Cooperation between UNMIN and the United Nations country team has been high. By the middle of 2008, responsibility for mine action had been transferred to the country team, as had, by early 2009, leadership of the United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“Nepal's new constitution is expected to reflect the most important commitments of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, making that constitution perhaps the single most critical milestone in the country's democratic transition. As UNMIN prepares to leave Nepal after four years, its work should be a source of pride to the United Nations. The Mission's rapid deployment came about with strong support from regional and other actors, notably the Governments of India and Norway. UNMIN was fortunate in securing deeply dedicated personnel, and was able to include among its national staff a high proportion of traditionally marginalized groups.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“While the high-level task force that helped achieve this was dissolved in December, the 28 parties represented in the Constituent Assembly have decided to meet regularly under the leadership of the Speaker to address the remaining 83 contentious issues in the constitution-drafting process. The parties will seek to amend parliamentary regulations in order to send unresolved issues to the Constitutional Committee. Time is short for these tasks to be accomplished before the 28 May deadline for promulgation. The political parties showed significant flexibility in the high-level task force, chaired by UCPN-M Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, in rapidly resolving several issues. Serious differences still remain, however, on the names, numbers and boundaries of federal states and on forms of governance.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“As the Council is aware, some journalists have been killed, while others have been threatened. Efforts to establish a truth and reconciliation commission and a commission of inquiry on disappearances have slowed. Security in the Terai remains fragile and the region has experienced a spate of extrajudicial killings. Violent youth groups, including the Young Communist League and the Youth Force, engaged in especially significant Violence between February and May 2010, and reportedly remain embroiled in extortion activities. Despite the stalemate over many critical matters, there has been some encouraging progress in reducing contentious issues in the new constitution.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“Many ethnic and traditionally marginalized groups now anticipate their improved representation at all levels of society and Government, and the benefits of greater decentralization. The contestation over resources and a share in decision-making is now heightened and can be expected to be a source of future tension and potential instability. Issues related to ownership of land and property are central to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and subsequent agreements. But land-reform efforts have stalled, and the provision of land to economically backward classes has been limited and incomplete, as has the return of land and property seized by the Maoists during the conflict. 5 The human rights situation continues to be characterized by a general atmosphere of impunity and lack of accountability.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“This is the first formal mechanism aimed at better coordination between the Nepal Army and the Ministry of Defence. The Council and UNMIN have urged the parties to find a consensual way forward through flexibility and compromise, while remaining true to their commitments to the fundamental principles and goals set out in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including multiparty democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the fundamental transformation of the State to address the problems based on class, caste, region and sex. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement remains a lodestar for Nepal, pinpointing the issues that hold the key to sustainable peace and development.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“The international community has long been ready to provide support to rehabilitation options. It is past time for addressing the largely unproductive lives led by young people in cantonments, notwithstanding the training provided to many and their completion of school-leaving certificates. The United Nations has also consistently pointed to the importance of establishing the right size for the Nepal Army and bringing it under democratic control, as foreseen in the Interim Constitution. A Cabinet meeting on 26 December decided to form a three- member defence directorate committee headed by the Defence Minister to oversee the process of democratization and civilian control of the Nepal Army. The Chief of Army Staff is a member, and the Defence Secretary is a member-secretary.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“At a meeting of the Special Committee on 19 December, its secretariat presented a work plan for the supervision, integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army. The meeting concluded without agreement on the work plan, however, as Maoist members lodged a written dissent, citing the need to resolve the future of the Arms Monitoring Agreement and the modalities and numbers for integration and rehabilitation. Major issues pertaining to integration and rehabilitation remain unresolved. These include the numbers, norms and modalities for integration into the 11-20103 security forces; whether the combatants will be integrated principally into the Nepal Army and Armed Police Force or into other forces; and the value of the proposed rehabilitation packages.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“It is not an option for us to hand over monitoring-related United Nations equipment to the Government without agreement between the Government and the UCPN-M on the nature and form of future monitoring. UNMIN alerted the parties in our letter of 13 December that without such agreement, the Mission would dismantle and remove valuable United Nations-owned assets from the cantonments on 15 January, in line with standard procedures. Under the four-point agreement concluded last September, the Government and the UCPN-M. were to basically complete the remaining tasks of the peace process by 14 January 2011. UNMIN has long pressed the parties to expedite solutions for the Maoist army and the Nepal Army.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“We have explained that the United Nations-owned vehicles will, as a priority, be sent to other missions. If the other equipment is not needed by other missions or United Nations agencies, it may be available for donation or, in the shorter term, for loan. As we have underlined, however, the arms- monitoring function is based on agreement, and UNMIN requires a clear and consensual response as to how the monitoring equipment would be used. The Council has consistently urged the parties "to agree and implement a timetabled action plan with clear benchmarks for the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel" (resolution 192] (2010), para. 4), and decided that, working with the parties, UNMIN should make the necessary arrangements for its withdrawal, including handing over any residual monitoring responsibilities.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“With respect to the request by the Prime Minister's Office for the transfer of UNMIN documents and equipment, UNMIN has underlined its readiness to provide all possible support to agreed follow-on arrangements. UNMIN arms monitoring officers briefed the Special Committee on the monitoring modalities and equipment during their visit to main cantonment site 3, in Chitwan, on 26 December 2010. In numerous discussions with the Government about the disposal of monitoring-related United 11-20103 Nations assets, UNMIN has set out the relevant United Nations administrative procedures. It should be noted that the stored arms and ammunition belong to the parties. UNMIN's responsibility has been to monitor it, but the Mission has no authority for its disposal.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“Expunging these agreements would create grave uncertainties and can be expected to erode the confidence that has been built up around arms monitoring and through the important achievements of the peace process so far. UNMIN has consistently pressed for action by the Special Committee on the supervision, integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel, as constitutionally mandated. The Special Committee is a political body, its nine appointees designated by six political parties, four of which are members of the current Government. Its reduced ability to work by consensus reflects the hardened political divisions overall. It is in no position to resolve highly politicized disputes.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“And, finally, the Government reiterates the request that all relevant documents, United Nations equipment and logistics, including the containers with arms and ammunition, be handed over by UNMIN to the Special Committee or designated mechanism. The proposal for monitoring the Maoist army presented by the office of the Prime Minister had already been rejected formally by the UCPN-M, a position repeated in a letter of 4 January 2011 from the UCPN-M. to UNMIN. These monitoring arrangements are not agreed. Nor is there agreement to end the monitoring of the Nepal Army. This proposal would effectively abrogate critical agreements, with potentially far-reaching political consequences that should be well understood by the Council.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“The Office of the Prime Minister states that the Special Committee will, through its secretariat, take charge of the monitoring functions currently carried out by UNMIN, and any issues not covered by its directives will be addressed by the Special Committee as and when required. Secondly, the letter makes clear that the Nepal Army will no longer be subject to monitoring, as set out in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the arms monitoring Agreement, but will be managed under other existing constitutional and legal provisions. Thirdly, the Prime Minister's Office states that there is no longer a need for any dispute resolution mechanism in connection with monitoring arrangements, as any disputes will be resolved by consensus in the Special Committee.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, with copy to the relevant political parties. The Prime Minister told me on 22 December that the Government would draw up and present to the Maoists a separate agreement covering the gaps between the Special Committee's supervisory regime and the existing arms monitoring regime. This does not appear to have been done, however, and on 3 January UNMIN received a response to our letter from the Prime Minister's Office. I must state clearly that the positions presented in this letter do not reflect consensus in the Special Committee and appear to deviate significantly from the interim constitution.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“In September, the Special Committee adopted a directive for the supervision, control and direction, and code of conduct for the Maoist army personnel. The directive itself was not foreseen as substituting for the arms monitoring Agreement, nor as making the Special Committee the replacement of UNMIN. The arms monitoring Agreement is carefully worded. The 24-hour monitoring of weapons belonging to the Maoist army and the Nepal Army is set out in some detail, as are the permitted and restricted activities for both armies and the mechanism for resolving any disputes that arise in this regard. Since October, I have raised repeatedly with the parties the need for clarity on the monitoring arrangements that will be in place after UNMIN's exit. On 13 December 2010, I wrote to Prime Minister Nepal and UCPN-M.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“This situation presents potential risks, and I would like to set out some legal, political and practical 3 considerations in this regard. The Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies of 26 November 2006, witnessed by UNMIN, spells out the role of the United Nations Mission as the monitor of these arrangements, as does the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 21 November 2006, both referred to in the interim constitution of 2007. These agreements are binding on the parties, and become no less so after UNMIN departs. All the agreements can be revised by the parties, for example to provide for an alternative monitoring agent, but they have yet to do so. The departure of UNMIN, the designated monitor, seems set to create a legal void.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“At the same time, our strong advice to the parties has been that, rather than simply replicating a monitoring regime, they should move forward more swiftly on finding solutions for the 19,000 Maoist army personnel. UNMIN itself sought to generate discussion and planning, and many potential donors have also been active on this front. Following September's four-point agreement, there has been some movement in the secretariat of the Special Committee, as described in the Secretary- General's report. But there is considerable confusion and disagreement on how and by whom monitoring will be conducted after UNMIN. Today, 10 days before the end of the Mission, there is yet no consensus mechanism to which UNMIN can hand over its monitoring responsibilities. It is not clear what will happen after UNMIN withdraws.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“Based on a legal agreement and a light presence of United Nations arms monitors, the main ingredients have been the armies' self-discipline and the United Nations-chaired Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee, a reliable mechanism for building confidence, addressing violations and resolving disputes. Since March 2010, and as requested by the Council, UNMIN has consulted intensively with the parties on options for a transfer of monitoring responsibilities. We put forward examples of alternative arrangements - recalling, for instance, the original joint monitoring teams of 2007, with membership of the Nepal Army, the Maoist army and UNMIN.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“The independent, interim monitoring of the armies was intended initially to help create confidence for the election of the Constituent Assembly, and thereafter for the completion of the remaining key tasks of the peace process. The natural end to monitoring would have come with the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel and the Army's democratic reform and rightsizing, both activities which should have gotten under way with the interim Government in 2007. Despite many challenges, Nepal's arms monitoring regime has been strikingly successful. There have been Violations, as reported to the Council, but these have been the exception.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“No party on its own can identify and implement satisfactory solutions. But the failure of the peace process to advance has strengthened the hand of those on all sides who deride it as unproductive or far too slow. The Council will recall how close the Constituent Assembly had come to a premature end last May for similar reasons. Now, there is a real risk that the failure of the peace process will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The parties have not resolved the issue of the future monitoring of arms and armies after UNMIN's exit. Restrictions on the formerly warring armies have 11-20103 been a cornerstone of Nepal's peace, and as such the monitoring arrangements are also a potential flashpoint for failure.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“Growing differences within the major political parties continue to add to the mistrust between the parties. In recent years, the internal processes of all major parties have arguably become significantly more open, participatory, inclusive and democratic, in line with provisions of the interim constitution, but there is divergence, within the parties on the peace process itself. Strong voices in the traditional parties demand an unambiguous embrace of multiparty democracy and pluralism by the Maoists. Within the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M), there is a perception of being marginalized and deliberately excluded from a leadership role in Government. The remaining tasks of the peace process, and particularly the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel, require collective political will.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“At issue is not merely whether a new Government can be formed, but whether Nepal's peace process can move forward without it. Voting for a new prime minister has been halted since the President prorogued Parliament on 20 November, under circumstances described in the Secretary-General's report. Thereafter, the Government was not legally obliged to reconvene Parliament, and indeed Prime Minister Nepal had suggested that he might not do so until the Maoist army came under the effective supervision of the Special Committee. After a special session of Parliament convened at the request of over one-quarter of its members, it was agreed on 23 December to hold the regular session at the earliest. Parliament has now been summoned for 9 January, and it appears unlikely that a new Government will be in place by the time UNMIN's mandate expires.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“Nepal's peace process has remained largely deadlocked following the resignation of Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal in June 2010. There has been little progress on the most critical issues of forming a new Government and integrating and rehabilitating the personnel of the Maoist army. Some progress has been made on the new constitution, but it may be difficult to meet the promulgation deadline of May 2011. Despite many problems, Nepal's interim Government between April 2007 and August 2008 reflected agreement to share power. Since the elections, the parties have found it extremely difficult to maintain 11-20103 consensus and to find satisfactory power-sharing arrangements. They recently floated the idea of a rotational system of leadership, but did not reach agreement.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source