YouSaid · the spoken record

Landgren

lines on the record: 355
first: 2009-05-05
most recent: 2023-11-14
sittings or episodes: 20
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Ms. Landgren: The Council has before it the Secretary-General's sixteenth and final report on Nepal's request for support to its peace process (S/20lO/658). Since the issuance of the previous report of the Secretary-General of 2 September (S/2010/453) and my briefing on 7 September (see S/PV.6377), the Council has also heard two oral reports on this issue by Under-Secretary-General B. Lynn Pascoe. The Council decided on 15 September (see S/PV.6385) that the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) would terminate on 15 January 2011. Since then, UNMIN has continued to encourage the early resolution of issues that would contribute to the Mission's orderly departure and, furthermore, would give the United Nations, the Council and above all the people of Nepal confidence that the peace process is on track.”
2011-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6465 (2011) · source
“The original ambitious timelines have not been maintained on any count, and this is likely to be a protracted endeavour. For well over a year now, the process has essentially stalled and the level of mistrust has risen. The process can be brought back on track if the political leadership is ready to reassess priorities and place this process at the front and centre of its political activity, recognizing that only through continued and persistent negotiation can it move forward. At a time when political moderation is in short supply, the parties have a great deal of work to do in order to make the case that they intend Nepal's peace to be permanent and irreversible.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“The Secretary-General would then report back to the Council, and in the event of there being neither clarity nor consensus in this regard, would propose alternative measures, including the possible termination of the mandate. I would like once again to make clear that the desire of the Secretary-General is to see the Mission complete its tasks and withdraw in a manner that does not jeopardize the peace process and maintains continued international support for peace consolidation. The United Nations has no interest in or desire to prolong the life of the Mission by a day more than necessary. Nepal's peace process has not failed, even though it has moved far more slowly and unevenly than anticipated by either the parties or the Council.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“Its role is supportive. Ascribing to the United Nations the blame for the parties' failure to move forward politically is not a new phenomenon, but it has grown incrementally and in intensity. The hard political decisions needed to take Nepal's peace process forward are beyond UNMIN's mandate and capacity, and lie firmly in the hands of Nepal's political leaders. As the report of the Secretary-General indicates, some things need to change if the peace process is to be brought to a successful end. With respect to UNMIN, it is proposed that in the first instance the mandate be discussed with a new, duly formed Government, in the context of the parties' fulfilment of their commitments and the phasing-out of the Mission.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“In late July, the Government decided to give special protection to village development committee secretaries across the country, after more than 1,200 secretaries in 31 districts tendered a collective resignation, citing insecurity. The risks include threats to journalistic independence, with killings of media personnel earlier in the year followed by death threats to senior editors and other acute constraints on their operations and reporting. They include a contested end to the monitoring of arms and armies, with unpredictable consequences. The biggest risk of all may be that the peace process and parliamentary processes appear discredited, sending a discouraging signal to existing and emerging groups about taking the democratic route to push for change. UNMIN's tasks can succeed only if there is overall political progress in Nepal.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“The Prime Minister, however, declared that UNMIN had stepped beyond its jurisdiction. UNMIN has continued to press for interim actions, including profiling in the cantonments and a labour market survey. The recent direct challenge to the Arms Monitoring Agreement takes the peace process in a sharply wrong direction. Risks to the peace process and to democratic governance in Nepal are real. The risks include an unresolved leadership battle, which may keep critical decisions in limbo and, at this point, appears unlikely to deliver the consensus Government that would form a stronger basis for concluding the peace process. They include the risk that the Constituent Assembly, even after a l2-month extension, will expire without a new constitution having been drafted. They also include a climate in the country of deteriorating security.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“As the Secretary-General's report notes, this placed along a hypothetical timeline the technical elements broadly agreed among the parties and in the Technical Committee. Based principally on advice from Nepali experts and on the experience of the discharge of the disqualified Maoist army personnel earlier this year, it posited the reinforcement of Government implementing institutions, notably a secretariat to the Special Committee; in-cantonment consultations, briefing, registration and choices by personnel; separation into groups; the detailed plan for integration following political agreement on entry norms, rank harmonization and so on; and final briefings on choices. Discharge would follow at the end of week 39. This was a non-prescriptive effort to stimulate reflection and technical planning.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“The parties' elaboration of proposals is useful, but they remain far apart on the numbers to be integrated as well as on the modalities of integration. In common with many past agreements, these too rely heavily on a minimum level of trust, consensus and goodwill as a modality for moving forward. The Special Committee met on 5 September, however with Maoist participation for the first time in many months. Our counterparts had identified support to the Special Committee, including on the planning and implementation of integration and rehabilitation, as an area where UNMIN could be of greater assistance. Consistent also with the Council's calls for a timeline on this issue, we shared a non-paper on this with senior party representatives as a way of encouraging forward thinking.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“In the present polarised climate, a national monitoring mechanism can expect to find its credibility challenged even more severely than that of UNMIN. In the absence of credible monitoring alternatives, UNMIN has continued to encourage the parties to focus on reaching an agreement on integration and rehabilitation and related commitments so that the need for monitoring the armies could end. In the meantime it has also continued to press for improving the effectiveness of its monitoring role. The Nepali Congress, the UML and the UCPN-M. have all presented proposals on integration and rehabilitation, and agree that three options are open to Maoist army personnel: voluntary separation, integration into the security forces and rehabilitation.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“Following discussions between the Peace Ministry and the UCPN-M, payments resumed and the minister expressed his satisfaction. UNMIN has, however, continued to raise concerns in that regard and has recently agreed with the UCPN-M. that arms monitors will conduct a fresh head count in the cantonments in the near future. UNMIN's aim is to complete our support to the peace process effectively and wind up our presence with minimal disruption to that process. Since March, UNMIN has actively explored how best to do so, in extensive consultation with senior leaders of the three main parties. As the Secretary-General has now reported twice, the parties have consistently maintained to us that the handover of monitoring responsibilities would be premature and that there is no mechanism to take over this responsibility.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“UNMIN has repeatedly called for those involved in ordering and carrying out the abduction and killing of Ram Hari Shrestha to be brought to justice. In Kapilvastu, UNMIN went immediately to the site to identify the weapons. Following the engagement of senior Government officials, the matter was brought to a peaceful resolution and agreed steps were taken, including the return of the weapons to the cantonment. UNMIN does not control or enforce Maoist army or Nepal Army movements. As has been reported to the Council, UNMIN has pressed both armies, since last year, for greater cooperation in the monitoring of troop strength. Doubts that Maoists were exceeding the agreed 12 per cent rate of absence in the cantonment sites led the Government to halt payments to them earlier this year.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“One is the claim that UNMIN neither prevented nor reacted to the torture and murder, in May 2008 in the Shaktikhor cantonment, of businessman Ram Hari Shrestha by Maoist army personnel. The other is the allegation that UNMIN intervened to prevent justice being done in August 2009, when 19 Maoist army personnel were found in Kapilvastu in possession of nine United Nations-registered perimeter weapons. Both of these incidents were serious breaches of the Arms Monitoring Agreement. As the record shows, UNMIN condemned both immediately, issued press releases underlining the Mission's concerns and also conveyed these messages strongly in private. Both cases were brought to the JMCC, along with UNMIN's findings, and were unanimously found to be violations.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“The JMCC has never reviewed actions by or on behalf of entities other than the Nepal Army and the Maoist army. Soon afterwards, records of confidential JMCC proceedings were leaked to the press, as were the names of all 19,602 Maoists registered and verified in the cantonment sites in 2007. 10-50627 Let me emphasize that the true risks of this moment pertain less to UNMIN than to the gulf of mistrust between the parties that has paralysed the political process. Along with this has come significant distortion of Nepal's comparatively successful arms monitoring regime and unfounded allegations of UNMIN bias. These include two matters perpetually recycled as evidence of UNMIN monitoring failures, on which I would like to set the record straight.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“As has been reported to the Council in the past, the Nepal Army has since 2007 continued to recruit personnel in defiance of the arms monitoring agreement and bypassing the JMCC. Reports of recruitment by the Nepal Army and by the Maoist army have been brought to the JMCC for discussion and review, as is appropriate. The Nepal Army has now refused to accept any future discussion of its recruitment in the JMCC, and has said it will not take part in JMCC meetings if this issue is on the agenda. Seeking to restrict discussion in the designated forum - the JMCC - undermines the agreed arms monitoring regime. As recently as May, the Nepal Army had sought to expand the work of the JMCC to cover the activities of the Maoists' Young Communist League, sending four letters of protest in that regard.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“A Nepal Army internal document, entitled "The basis for UNMIN's exit", which has been leaked to the press, asserts that UNMIN is siding with the Maoists, is not impartial and is obstructing the Nepal Army and the Nepal Government in fulfilling their national duty. The Chief of Army Staff has been visible and vocal in lobbying the political leadership and diplomatic representatives for UNMIN's departure. This activism by the Army on issues within the political sphere seems, however, to have been encouraged by some senior political leaders, with the Defence Minister publicly accusing UNMIN of being the mouthpiece of the Maoists. UNMIN has protested the Army's impugning of the integrity of the United Nations. The caretaker Government has yet to repudiate the actions or remarks of its army and its ministers.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“Any unilateral decision in this regard may have the effect of abrogating the treaty. These developments have direct and immediate bearing on the work of UNMIN. UNMIN's monitoring of arms and armies and chairmanship of the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee (JMCC) are set out in the Arms Monitoring Agreement itself. UNMIN monitors strictly at the invitation of the parties, and with their agreement. Absent a fresh agreement between the parties, UNMIN cannot continue to monitor one side at the request of the other; neither does it have the authority to introduce fundamental changes to the monitoring regime. The Government's pressure for an end to the international monitoring of the Nepal Army has been accompanied by a flood of criticism directed at UNMIN.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“Whether or not two sides still exist, there are manifestly still two armies. The restrictions on the armies were to be transitional and, as Council members are aware, the Secretary-General has repeatedly argued against the prolonged confinement of the two armies without a long-term solution, calling for early decisions to be addressed in the context of the longer- term reform of the security sector. The changes foreseen to the armies under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have not taken place. It is cause for concern that the Nepal Army now seeks unilaterally to withdraw from and to alter the scope of the Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies. The arms monitoring agreement contains provisions whereby the parties can review or modify it. The Government and the Army have not sought to use this modality.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“These weapons still belong to their respective armies, which retain the keys to the arms storage containers, which are under 24-hour UNMIN surveillance. The barracks, cantonments and activities of the Maoist army and the Nepal Army are lightly monitored by the modest UNMIN contingent of unarmed arms monitors, and each army remains under its own chain of command. In recent months, the caretaker Government, sections of the Nepali Congress and the UML, and the Nepal Army have argued that the Nepal Army should no longer be monitored by UNMIN, citing a provision of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement according to which "the concept of two sides shall cease to exist" upon the establishment of the interim Legislature- Parliament - a development that took place in January 2007.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“Pending the implementation of these forward- looking commitments, the Nepal Army and the Maoist army were made subject to restrictions in order, pursuant to article 4 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, "to hold the election to (the) constituent assembly in (a) free and fair manner and for the democratic restructuring of the army to proceed". The parties negotiated the specifics of these mutual restrictions, under which the Maoist army is 3 cantoned in 28 sites across Nepal and the Nepal Army is confined to barracks other than for a number of routine functions. The storage and monitoring by UNMIN of Maoist army weapons and an equivalent number of Nepal Army weapons were also negotiated between the parties.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“The commitments that were made in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Interim Constitution and other auxiliary agreements formed the negotiated basis for ending Nepal's 10-year war and for responding to Nepal's historically marginalized groups, including Madheshi, indigenous and Dalit populations. These commitments include the integration into the security forces or the social rehabilitation of the Maoist army personnel, who were to be supervised by a special committee, and the democratization of the Nepal Army, defined as the determination of its appropriate size, the development of its democratic structure and national and inclusive character, and training imparted in accordance with the norms and values of democracy and human rights.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“The current void in the peace process illustrates a long-standing reluctance to invest in the kind of sustained and structured negotiations that might drive progress. The proper architecture for this was never put in place, and the once-promising high-level political mechanism was abandoned not long after the death of Girij a Prasad Koirala in March. It is not too late to establish a clear and dependable discussion mechanism with which the parties can also firmly put to rest any fears that they will abandon the path of the constitution and democracy, and demonstrate a new seriousness towards resolving outstanding issues.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“The study committee charged with making recommendations on seven of the eight remaining thematic papers did not present its report as scheduled. Despite plans to present the first draft of the new constitution in November, there are doubts that this 10-50627 timetable can be kept. But the prospect of forming a consensus Government remains equally, if not more remote. As the three-point agreement of late May makes explicit, the issues of power-sharing, completion of the new constitution and solutions for the former Maoist army personnel are now interlinked. All three also form part of the proposed UML consensus platform, but this proposal has received little attention from other party leaders.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“The Madheshi coalition, despite strains, has also stayed largely neutral, and the withholding of roughly 190 votes by these two blocs has prevented both contenders from garnering a majority. There is widespread acknowledgement in principle that a majority Government that leaves any of the three major parties in opposition is unlikely to muster the unity needed to see through the most difficult outstanding peace process commitments. Unfinished constitutional business includes reaching agreement on the form of governance, the judiciary and State restructuring. The State restructuring commission foreseen by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was to have begun its work by the end of July, but has not done so. Madheshi parties in particular wish to see State restructuring addressed by the relevant committee of the Constituent Assembly.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“Negotiations to form a national consensus government failed, and the Legislature-Parliament has voted seven times since 21 July on two candidates: Maoist former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal "Prachanda", and Nepali Congress parliamentary party leader Ram Chandra Poudel. The Maoists have obtained a high of 259 votes, some 42 short of a simple majority, while Nepali Congress has reached a maximum of 124 votes. An eighth round is tentatively scheduled for 26 September. A primary reason for the deadlock is the UML decision to remain neutral in the balloting, which is at least in part a result of internal party tensions. Its Chairman Jhalanath Khanal has put forward a consensus platform grouping the major issues to be resolved for the sake of the peace process.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“The three-point agreement that extended the Assembly also committed the parties to moving ahead in consensus and cooperation in the remaining tasks to bring the peace process to its logical conclusion, and clarified that the Prime Minister was ready to resign 10-50627 without delay to pave the way for the formation of a national consensus Government. This agreement averted a potential collapse of the peace process, but the critical extension of the deadline for completing the constitution has not moved matters forward. Since then, the Constituent Assembly has met only to adopt the calendar for constitution-drafting. Prime Minister Nepal stepped down on 30 June, but continues to head a caretaker Government pending the election of a new Prime Minister by the Legislature- Parliament.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“Fresh national anxiety arose within weeks with the imminent expiry of the two-year tenure of the Constituent Assembly with the new constitution still far from complete. The country was on the brink of an uncertain and dangerous constitutional dilemma. After intensive negotiation and an eleventh-hour threat of revolt within the third- largest party, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (UML), all but five parliamentarians supported a year-long extension of the Assembly until 28 May 2011.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“Ms. Landgren: The present report of the Secretary-General (S/2010/453) presents a discouraging picture of the state of Nepal's peace process and of the failure of the political parties to invest in its revival. The disagreement between the Government and the opposition over the continued role of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) in the peace process is also reported. At the time of my most recent briefing to the Council (see S/PV.6308), Nepal was in the fourth day of a national strike called by the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) seeking to compel the resignation of Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal. Party supporters thronged Kathmandu and other urban centres, raising fears of confrontation. After six days, the strike was called off and the demonstrators made an orderly retreat.”
2010-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6377 (2010) · source
“With the strong encouragement of all supporters of the peace process, Nepal's political parties can and must pull the process back from its present disarray and animosity.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“Serious challenges remain, such as the exclusion of marginalized groups, the lack of basic services and adequate security for all, and the search for justice, as is particularly evident in the consistent impunity granted to Maoist and Government actors alike for past and current human rights violations. Many Nepalese are disappointed, their expectations of the peace process still unfulfilled. There is no room in this peace process for violence, and addressing the role of armed actors is a high priority and a cornerstone of a sustained peace. The parties, too, can demonstrate greater seriousness in monitoring and being held to their prior commitments. During his visit to Nepal in March, Under-Secretary- General Lynn Pascoe warned that fully half of all peace processes fail within a decade.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“The process has progressed with relative speed, notably in its early stages, but also with dramatic setbacks. It is a year today since the Council met to the news of the resignation of then- Prime Minister Prachanda, following his unsuccessful attempt to sack the Chief of Army Staff. Despite a number of fragile moments, the parties have kept the peace. It is imperative that their commitment to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement be reinforced, as there is considerable distance still to travel. The political parties speak of the logical conclusion of the peace process in the near term as being attained when the Maoist army personnel are integrated and rehabilitated, or when the new constitution is adopted. But this process is ultimately about resolving long-term underlying causes of the conflict.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“As the Council is well aware, UNMIN is set up to operate in an environment of relative confidence and relative compliance by the parties with the agreements they themselves have negotiated. The Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, which placed restrictions on both armies and assigned to UNMIN a light monitoring role, was foreseen as a short-term arrangement. Between the April 2008 election and January 2009, the number of arms monitors was reduced from 186 to 90, and then to 73, the minimum requirement, which also presupposed that the need for UNMIN monitoring would soon come to an end. 10-34793 Through the many challenges of Nepal's peace process, the Security Council has often underlined its understanding and support.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“In successive letters requesting the extension of UNMIN'S mandate, the Government of Nepal has referred to the important role played by UNMIN in providing support and facilitation within its mandate to Nepal's nationally-driven peace process. As the report now before the Council notes, the issues on which the parties expressed agreement in our consultations are also issues to which UNMIN can strengthen support within its existing mandate. There is manifest logic in linking the departure of UNMIN to the resolution of the matter of the Maoist army personnel. And, in a separate development, UNMIN recently facilitated a high-level but low-key resolution of a disagreement between the Maoists and the Government on the issue of payments to Maoist army personnel in the cantonments.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“They recommended that UNMIN's role be relevant to the current state of the peace process and, in particular, that UNMIN assist the Special Committee on the planning and implementation of integration and rehabilitation. The group also asked that UNMIN be ready to facilitate other aspects of the peace process, as might be requested. Disagreement emerged over the nature of UNMIN monitoring, with some suggesting that UNMIN should no longer monitor the Nepal Army due to changed circumstances, but focus exclusively on the Maoist army, while others proposed that UNMIN monitor the integration process itself, as well as the democratization of the Nepal Army.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“Conducting the discussions under Chatham House rules contributed to frank and productive debate. In accordance with the request of the Security Council, UNMIN proposed several options that would reduce or eliminate entirely our monitoring role, including its replacement or supplementation by a mixed military body, by a national civilian body, or by 10-34793 consolidating cantonments or weapons storage containers, making clear that our suggestions were not exhaustive. The parties conveyed unanimously that UNMIN's departure at this point in the peace process would not be beneficial. They also conveyed that alternative monitoring arrangements were not feasible.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“In response to our expectations of a detailed discussion of options that would permit the transfer of monitoring, the parties designated senior members familiar with the peace process and with the role of UNMIN. Five of the six participants were current or former ministers, three are members of the Special Committee on integration and rehabilitation, and three had either been part of the original peace process negotiating teams or otherwise engaged in peace initiatives. Four of the six are now part of the task force seeking to resolve the current crisis. Between 14 March and 26 April, we engaged in some 12 hours of collective discussion during three review meetings, considering alternatives to UNMIN and the expectations the major political actors hold of the Mission.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“Earlier in the year, Nepali commentators voiced concern at the discharge of disqualified personnel with training and educational possibilities that are strictly optional. I urge the parties to invest adequately in the planning, design, implementation, monitoring and oversight of all phases of the integration and rehabilitation exercise, with which the United Nations remains available to assist. Resolution 1909 (2010) of last January called on UNMIN, working with the parties, to make arrangements for its withdrawal and for the handing- over of its residual monitoring responsibilities. As the report before the Council notes, UNMIN proceeded to conduct extensive consultations with the parties, both bilaterally and jointly.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“Since March, however, the Maoist members have not taken part in meetings of the Special Committee. Negotiators in the present impasse report that the Nepali Congress and UML are pressing for an agreement on the numbers to be integrated, while UCPN-M. wishes first to agree on the modalities for integration. The former Maoist combatants urgently need solutions, as individuals and as a key to the peace process of Nepal. As the recent experience of discharging the disqualified personnel shows on a far smaller scale, the integration and rehabilitation of the larger number of verified personnel requires a carefully planned and managed process, with details worked out well in advance of implementation. Poorly-executed social rehabilitation or an excessive reliance on cash packages can sow the seeds of future problems.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“Extending the term of the Constituent Assembly is among the issues now under negotiation. Also under negotiation is how to resolve the future of nearly 20,000 Maoist army personnel, which lies at the heart of the peace process. Under the peace agreements, they are to be integrated into the security forces or rehabilitated. The question of how many might be integrated has only recently become the subject of open discussion and negotiation among the parties. At the initial stages, the Government proposed that 3,000, or some 15 per cent of the verified total Maoist army personnel, be brought into the country's security forces, while the UCPN-M. asserted that all their members should be accommodated. The Technical Committee has undertaken some planning for rehabilitation packages, including a cash component, for the remainder.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“Although the drafting of a new federal constitution was the primary task of the Constituent Assembly, the parties have not agreed on either the appropriate federal structure for Nepal or the future form of Government. In mid-April, the leaders of the governing coalition parties - the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist- Leninist) - said that the constitution could not be drafted by the deadline. In response to widespread alarm over a political vacuum being created on 29 May, the Speaker of the Constituent Assembly, Subas Nembang, recently advised that there is no legal or constitutional impediment to extending the tenure of the Constituent Assembly, as all provisions of the Interim Constitution can be amended except those on Nepal's republican and federal nature.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“has reportedly seized a few Nepal Army officers in civilian dress and handed them over to the security forces while publicly accusing them of spying. The overall level of control and restraint shown by the Government and the Maoists is commendable. All the same, the risks grow from one day to the next. This situation should not be allowed to continue, and 3 all encouragement is needed for both sides to deepen their discussion, come to agreement and resolve the crisis speedily. In 10 days, UNMIN will conclude its current mandate, extended at the requested of the Government of Nepal in January on the basis that the Mission's remaining activities would be completed at least two weeks before 28 May, the date on which Nepal's new constitution was to be promulgated, according to the Interim Constitution.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“However, one member of the Maoist army was found in possession of a hand grenade while travelling on a public bus, a reckless act which UNMIN immediately condemned; and Maoist supporters were arrested in Kathmandu with five homemade socket bombs. Ingredients used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices were reportedly seized from a Kathmandu hotel. By the conclusion of the fourth day of the general strike, several clashes had occurred between Maoists and local residents in different localities, and there are reports that counter-campaigns may be organized, which can be expected to exacerbate tensions. Economic losses from the strike are significant. Party workers have started to suffer from waterborne diseases, and temperatures are high in Kathmandu and the Terai. The UCPN-M.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“The Maoists brought large numbers of supporters to Kathmandu for May Day, followed by an indefinite general strike, from 2 May, calling on the Government of Madhav Kumar Nepal to step down and pave the way for a Government of national unity. The Prime Minister has rejected calls for his immediate resignation, but has said that he will not be an obstacle if an understanding is reached among the parties. UNMIN has warned of the grave risks to the peace process should the stand-off persist. The Government has said that the Nepal Army will intervene if the Maoist protest should turn violent, and has placed the national security forces on high alert. The Maoists have insisted that their protest will remain peaceful.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“The initiative itself became the subject of numerous preconditions, but the mechanism 10-34793 was finally established in January and met a few times before Mr. Koirala's death on 20 March. The high-level political mechanism was a step towards addressing one of the long-term deficits of the peace process, namely, the weak architecture of negotiation, consultation and monitoring of the implementation of past agreements. But it may turn out to have been too little and too late. In recent days, the Government and the Maoists have accused one another of actual or imminent breaches of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a reminder that no overall monitoring mechanism exists.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“The security situation in the Terai remains a concern, and across the country chief district officers feel increasingly beleaguered. Those events, combined with the lack of decisive progress on the constitution and on the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel, have stoked public unease over a possible return to open conflict or of an autocratic pre-emption of Nepal's democratic transition. The death of Nepali Congress President Girija Prasad Koirala has prompted a tripartite leadership struggle within the party. Along with continued deep factionalism within the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (UML), has exacerbated the political stalemate. Last July, G. P. Koirala proposed the establishment of the high-level political mechanism to break that stalemate.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“Since early March, clashes among political parties, especially their youth wings, have increased. Localities began reporting renewed extortion or forced donations by the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M), calling to mind wartime practices. According to reliable reports, Maoist cadres were told to prepare for revolt. Meanwhile, the Defence Ministry announced that fresh recruitment to the Nepal Army would begin, in breach of the peace agreements. Overt challenges have grown to the federal, secular and republican basis of the Interim Constitution. Madheshi leaders have expressed deep frustration at their sense of exclusion from the centre of policymaking and from the high- level political mechanism.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“In that polarized climate, the Maoists - the largest political party - have remained in opposition for the past year. Other parties have challenged the Maoists' commitment to multiparty democracy and the rule of law and have called on them to abandon recourse to violence. The Maoists, for their part, have expressed doubts about the commitment of other major parties to the socio-political changes foreseen by the peace agreements, to the new constitution and to the fresh elections that would follow. Several other current risks to the peace process are touched on in the report before the Council (8/2010/214), including the looming deadline for the promulgation of a new constitution. Tensions have worsened since my last report to the Council in January (see S/PV.6260).”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“All the elements of a solution to this impasse are acknowledged by the major parties. The main stumbling blocks in the negotiations are, reportedly, the timing and leadership of a proposed new national unity Government and the modalities for the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel. If crisis is averted through a deal in the coming days, it will be vital to put in place effective machinery for its monitoring and oversight. The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) has long warned of the dangerous slide in the peace process. The process remains marked by profound 10-34793 mutual mistrust, with majority Governments having reinforced the divisions between the Maoist and non-Maoist parties for nearly two years.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“Soon after the 2008 election, the Interim Constitution, which emphasized the importance of governing through consensus, was amended to permit an opposition, eliminating a vital element in managing Nepal's post-conflict transition. For much of the past year, the major parties have identified the establishment of a consensus Government as the path to greater confidence, and thereby to the conclusion of the peace process. As part of a possible package agreement, the parties are also discussing a handful of other long- standing issues, including ending the paramilitary function and activities of the Maoist Young Communist League and the return by the Maoists of all seized property, both of which were addressed by earlier agreements but never implemented. Extending the imminent deadline of the Constituent Assembly is also under discussion.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“Ms. Landgren: Nepal's peace process is at a delicate and critical moment, as negotiators work to resolve the current stand-off between Maoist supporters and the Government, primarily over Maoist demands for a national unity Government. As the general strike in Nepal enters its fifth day, negotiations among the major parties are dealing squarely with the major and contentious governance and other peace process issues that have long been side-stepped, including critical constitutional questions concerning Nepal's proposed federal structure and form of governance and the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel.”
2010-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6308 (2010) · source
“Along with my colleagues in the Department of Political Affairs, I look forward to continuing the warm relationship and good communication that we have enjoyed.”
2010-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6260 (2010) · source