YouSaid · the spoken record

Madeira

lines on the record

377

first

2003-11-20

most recent

2022-05-23

sittings or episodes

24

sources

un-security-council

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1. “A plan has already been adopted and we are about to leave, but we badly need the logistical support that has to be approved by the Council.”

   2016-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7778 (2016) · source

2. “What must be done in that regard is very Clear. The 2016 African Union-AMISOM. concept of operations clearly outlines the steps that have to be taken, and those steps start with us - dislodging Al-Shabaab from the main towns in Lower Shabelle and from the main port cities in the north-east of the country, and to do that we need everyone to cooperate, particularly the Somali National Army. The Commissioner for Peace and Security presented a very detailed letter to the appropriate United Nations bodies in New York. We would like to ask the Council to look at that letter, consider what each point means and aims to achieve and give us a response as quickly as possible, because the rainy season is starting and we need to launch our offensives.”

   2016-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7778 (2016) · source

3. “or any other external forces can bring lasting peace to Somalia unless and until the Somalis themselves are capable of taking over responsibility for the security of their country. We have been given 21,000 uniformed troops, which are presently benefiting from Security Council- approved logistical support. Those forces are still not capable of taking on Al-Shabaab in a sustainable manner because they lack the basics - coordinated training, a common doctrine, uniforms, equipment, rifles and even barracks where they can be housed and trained. We need to address those issues with the required urgency. As was rightly said, AMISOM. is organizing itself in a manner to be able to start leaving Somalia by 2018. It would not be the right thing to do if by that time Somalia is still not capable of taking care of its security responsibilities.”

   2016-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7778 (2016) · source

4. “In that connection, it becomes extremely important that this time the offensive not just be for us to remove Al-Shabaab from its hideouts; we need to effectively occupy the cities and towns that Al-Shabaab presently occupies so that they do not come back to retake them. To that end, we need to work hand in hand with the forces in place, local populations and Somali national forces. For that, those forces and entities need support. Such support is not yet forthcoming. It is important that specific attention be given to this matter; otherwise we will continue to do What we have done many times, removing Al-Shabaab from towns and then having to do it again once they return. Capacity-building for the Somali security forces is a central concern. There is no way that AMISOM.”

   2016-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7778 (2016) · source

5. “In that context, we are currently seeing the movement of various security groups converging onto Mogadishu. That is causing a serious security problem, as Al-Shabaab can just disguise themselves as such a group and do damage. Somali national security forces and AMISOM. are working on this and discussing these matters to see how these specific issues can be handled. An important meeting will take place tomorrow in that regard. Another important aspect is the need to continue the offensives to dislodge Al-Shabaab from its hideouts and to degrade and disrupt their activities and eventually destroy it.”

   2016-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7778 (2016) · source

6. “Participants unanimously concluded that, given the large number of elders, candidates, eminent persons and other entities in need of special protection and security during the electoral period, it was materially impossible to provide dedicated personal security to individual candidates, elsers and eminent persons at their residences or in the form of convoys and escorts, due to reduced capacity and a scarcity of equipment and other resources. However, it was agreed that collective security for them would be possible. That would be provided for a predefined period prior to, during and after the elections, in specifically designated locations, such as election centres, assembly points, polling stations, some public venues and buildings, as well as hotels, residential areas and other duly identified accommodation premises.”

   2016-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7778 (2016) · source

7. “and the United Nations, already foresaw the possibility of requests for personal security, as is already happening. However, the issue was equally widely debated by members of the international community accredited in Somalia and based in Mogadishu and Nairobi, who devoted a specific meeting to discussing the security to be provided to traditional elders, candidates and other eminent persons participating in the electoral process, the electorate, election bodies, observers, election facilities, public venues, accommodation premises and the community in general, so as to ensure an incident-free election.”

   2016-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7778 (2016) · source

8. “Mr. Madeira: I would like to express my full agreement with everything that Ambassador Keating said in his briefing. I shall therefore limit my intervention to security aspects, specifically in relation to security for the election itself, the security of the candiates, the offensives and our exit strategy. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is working hand in hand with the Somali national security forces and the election security task force, and we are making progress. There was an issue with Cadaado, and agreement was recently reached whereby AMISOM. would deploy in Cadaado in the coming days to ensure that the security aspects of the election are well looked after. With regard to the security of the candidates, the election security plan for the 2016 elections, jointly adopted by the Federal Government of Somalia, AMISOM.”

   2016-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7778 (2016) · source

9. “Donald Kaberuka as the High Representative for the African Union Peace Fund, responsible for the mobilization of additional resources for AU peace support operations. Immediate steps are also being taken to generate additional funds for AMISOM. However, that is occurring in the context of an economic downturn owing to the drastic decrease in commodity prices. Hence, I would like to urge the Council to consider various funding mechanisms that would sustain the current support for AMISOM, including through increased financial support by the United Nations, individual Council members and other relevant stakeholders, in the interest of global peace and security.”

   2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source

10. “I am pleased to report to the Council that the AU is currently organizing a summit for troop-contributing countries, which is expected to lead to a political commitment by the various stakeholders on how to address, among other issues, command and control, the provision of additional enablers and enhanced overall coordination. The summit will take place in due course later this year. Finally, the decision of the European Union (EU) to cut the allowances to the uniformed personnel of the Mission by 20 per cent, starting this January, has caused great concern. The African Union Commission is making every effort to fill the gap created by the EU decision. In that regard, the AU recently appointed Mr.”

    2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source

11. “However, the tripartite letters of assist between those troop-contributing countries, the AU and the United Nations remain outstanding. We would like to urge the Council to request the Secretary-General to facilitate an expedited negotiation process that takes into account the unique nature of AMISOM's offensive mandate. That would allow for the deployment of those assets, which are urgently required to boost the operational tempo of AMISOM. and to dislodge Al-Shabab from some places throughout Mogadishu. Fourthly, the AU is committed to improving AMISOM's strategy in Somalia.”

    2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source

12. “Keating and myself, we are hopeful that there will be progress in the strengthening and revitalization of the joint senior leadership decision-making framework, and we are already working on that. I also look forward to the joint development of the quantitative compact between the Head of UNSOS and myself, which is expected to enhance the provision of support to AMISOM. Our recent interactions with the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support on the provision of timely and flexible support to AMISOM. has been very positive and encouraging. Thirdly, the provision of additional enablers remains central to AMISOM. operations. It will be recalled that the Governments of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda have pledged helicopters to AMISOM.”

    2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source

13. “The international community also needs to be better coordinated in its support for Somali security forces and otherwise. Secondly,Iwouldliketostressthatbettercoordination between the multiplicity ofpartners - and specifically among AMISOM, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) - remains vital now more than ever before. The Council will recall that resolution 2245 (2015), adopted on 9 November 2015, underscored the need to ensure operational effort and cooperation between UNSOM. and AMISOM. so that they are aligned with a common set of strategic priorities. Under the new leadership of Mr.”

    2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source

14. “In that regard, I should like to urge the Council to consider strengthening our partnership in the following areas in order to further enhance the implementation of the AMISOM. mandate. First, I would like to emphasize that the Somali National Army is central to the conduct of joint operations with AMISOM, as well as to taking over security functions in the recovered areas in order to facilitate continued offensive operations. It is also of note that the only viable process that will lead to the achievement of the AMISOM. mandate in Somalia and its subsequent exit strategy is the standing-up of a capable, legitimate and inclusive Somali National Army. In the same vein, I urge the Council to ensure that the pledges made towards the Guulwade Plan are fulfilled.”

    2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source

15. “Based on the declared principles and time frame of the election, I would like to commend the Federal Government of Somalia for reaffirming its commitment to respecting the constitutionally mandated terms of the legislature and the executive, which expire in August and September, respectively. This is consistent with the African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. While the political progress made is laudable, much more needs to be done in the consolidation of this process, as well as in the rejuvenation of the constitutional review process, which remains a critical pillar of political stability in Somalia. I would like to reassure the Council that the African Union (AU) remains committed to supporting peace and stability in Somalia amid the immense sacrifices made and challenges that the Mission continues to face.”

    2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source

16. “We welcome that initiative and continue to ask the Federal Government of Somalia to take the necessary steps towards achieving a positive outcome that would lead to the establishment of this last regional administration. In the area of elections, as expressed jointly with Mr. Keating, we are very pleased that an electoral model was unanimously agreed by the Government just yesterday, as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General just mentioned. That model is based on a unique balance of representation between clan and constituency and offers a hopeful outlook for an inclusive electoral process. I continue to urge the Council and other partners to support the Federal Government of Somalia in the effective implementation of this electoral model.”

    2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source

17. “In that regard, we have seen an incremental growth of guerrilla warfare as well as the use of improvised explosive devices in their attacks. Overall, the security situation in Somalia has remained somewhat fluid, volatile and unpredictable in some aspects, despite the territorial gains that we have achieved so far. On the political front, I am encouraged by the progress that the people and the Government of Somalia continue to make in the state formation process, the revision of their Constitution, and the preparation for the holding of elections later this year. With regard to state formation, earlier this month the Government embarked on the process for the formation of the final regional administration for Hiraan and Shabelle Dhexe, to which my colleague alluded earlier.”

    2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source

18. “These joint operations are currently in their third phase and are expected to be completed by March. The overall strategic objective of the current operations remains to considerably degrade the capabilities of Al-Shabaab in each remaining stronghold. That would provide the enabling environment for the advancement of the much-needed political process. The dislodging of Al-Shabaab from towns and villages under its control has overstretched AMISOM capacity, with the attendant security implications, which Al-Shabaab is trying to exploit, as the attacks in El-Ade and similar attacks in Lego and Janale suggest. Al-Shabaab has changed tactics by launching a combination of asymmetrical and direct attacks on AMISOM. bases.”

    2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source

19. “I pay tribute to all the AMISOM. uniformed personnel who continue to exhibit professionalism, tenacity and courage in the campaign to degrade Al-Shabaab's capacity. I would also like to make special mention of the troop- and police-contributing countries. Once again, I would like to express my grief and condolences to the families of all our fallen heroes who have paid the ultimate price not only in the service of Africa but also in the preservation of global peace and security. My briefing today will focus on the recent security and political developments in Somalia. Since my predecessor last briefed the Council in May 2015 (see S/PV.7445), we have continued to make considerable security gains. AMISOM. and the Somali National Army commenced renewed offensive operations, code-named Operation Juba Corridor, in July 2015.”

    2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source

20. “Mr. Madeira: I thank you, Mr. President, most sincerely for the opportunity to brief the Security Council alongside the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General, my colleague and brother Mr. Michael Keating. I welcome him to Somalia since he has admitted that I am his senior, having arrived there one week earlier than he did. It is my belief that we shall continue to build together on the good working relations already established by our predecessors in the delivery of our shared mandates. I am briefing the Council barely two weeks after the deadly attack on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) El-Ade base in the Gedo region and the Lido attack. The attack in Gedo and previous attacks on AMISOM. forward operating bases illustrate the continuing threats that we all face in the fight against Al-Shabaab.”

    2016-01-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7614 (2016) · source

21. “I would like to take this opportunity to thank Luxembourg for its very generous gesture to help the headquarters become more operational. I would also like to take this opportunity to convey the appreciation of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Ms. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, to the LRA-affected countries, the United States Administration, the European Union and the United Nations for their active engagement on ensuring success on the LRA issue.”

    2013-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7065 (2013) · source

22. “The Regional Task Force will therefore not relent on the military pressure against the LRA until Kony and his top commanders, particularly those wanted by the International Criminal Court, surrender or are removed from the battlefield and taken to the Court. The current momentum needs to be sustained with adequate funding and logistical support to enhance our objective of eliminating the LRA. I am happy to know that all the members of the Security Council have stressed that aspect. Funding and equipping the Regional Task Force headquarters with robust communications remains a critical requirement in facilitating its ability to effectively plan, coordinate and monitor the ongoing operations in all sectors.”

    2013-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7065 (2013) · source

23. “The operations are ongoing, on a high tempo and with intense intelligence collection, including the destruction of LRA camps and denying them permanent bases in all sectors. The current military pressure has kept the LRA on the run, including its leader Joseph Kony. That heightened pressure has forced the LRA to try his time-tested tricks of buying time by duping the authorities of the Central African Republic into negotiations to purportedly allow Kony and his LRA to surrender and resettle in Nzako. According to Task Force reports we have received, Kony only used that window of opportunity to move many of his fighters and relocate them further up to the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic.”

    2013-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7065 (2013) · source

24. “I am happy to inform the Council that the developments to which I have referred, together with the extension of United States training and logistical support to all the Task Force contingents, paved way for the resumption of its military operations in the Central African Republic on 9 August, as well as the operationalization of the Congolese and the South Sudanese contingents in September. Henceforth, the Task Force, with a current total strength of 3,114 men, made up of 29 headquarters staff, 2,000 Ugandan soldiers, 500 South Sudanese, 500 Congolese, and 85 Central Africans who are not members of the Se'le'ka, resumed operations against LRA in the Central African Republic on 9 August.”

    2013-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7065 (2013) · source

25. “Michel Djotodia, for the continued implementation of the Regional Cooperation Initiative, including the resumption of the Regional Task Force military operations in the country. Meanwhile, between July and August, the various contingents of the Regional Task Force underwent retraining and counter-LRA combat rehearsals, facilitated by United States special forces. On the diplomatic front, working in close cooperation and coordination with the United States of America, I managed to obtain a green light from the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the Regional Task Force to conduct cross-border operations against the LRA on Congolese territory - something that was not happening before. That was a major breakthrough.”

    2013-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7065 (2013) · source

26. “By July, the Regional Task Force had repatriated 80 civilians, including the Arrow Boys. The Obo situation regenerated the tension between Se'le'ka and the Regional Task Force, commanded by the African Union, with the authorities in Bangui agitating to deploy Seleka troops in the Obo, Haut- Mbomou prefecture, which was being controlled by the Regional Task Force. However, through my joint diplomatic efforts with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, mutual trust and confidence were built between the new leadership of the Central African Republic and the African Union, and the tension was diffused. We also obtained an official commitment from the head of the National Transition Council in the Central African Republic, Mr.”

    2013-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7065 (2013) · source

27. “The then prevailing situation generated tension between Sele'ka and the Regional Task Force, forcing the latter and United States special forces to suspend operations in the Central African Republic. Meanwhile the LRA exploited the lull in operations to reorganize, step up cross-border movements between Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African Republic and carry out attacks on villages and displace civilians in the Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou prefectures of the Central African Republic. The situation was further complicated by the attack in Obo town on 24 May by a group of 87 armed Arrow Boys from Tumbura,Western Equatoria state of South Sudan. The Regional Task Force apprehended 42 of the attackers and handed them over to the International Committee of the Red Cross for repatriation to South Sudan.”

    2013-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7065 (2013) · source

28. “However, it was difficult to enter into the second phase, which consisted of the commencement of a military operation, due to serious logistical challenges faced by the contingents, particularly those from the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. That left the Ugandan contingent, supported by United States special forces, to continue conducting counter-LRA operations in the Central African Republic until July. They nonetheless achieved several major successes, which included the killing of 9 LRA fighters, the reception of 14 defectors and the recovery of 17 modern fire arms, 4 traditional weapons, 1,429 pieces of ammunition and 6 pieces of ivory. That momentum suffered a major setback following the coup d'etat that took place in Bangui on 24 March.”

    2013-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7065 (2013) · source

29. “The Council may recall that, in January, the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism adopted the key mission documents for the African Union Regional Task Force, namely, the strategic directives, the concept of operations, standard operating procedures for the handling of persons suspected ofinvolvement in LRA activities, and the rules of engagement. Later, on 13 February, the Congolese armed forces handed over to the Task Force a contingent of 500 troops, in a ceremony that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and I witnessed in Dungu. Those two events marked the end of the first phase of the operationalization of the Regional Task Force, the military component of the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the elimination of the LRA.”

    2013-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7065 (2013) · source

30. “Further to my statement in the Council in June 2012 (see S/PV.6796) on the progress by the African Union in the operationalization of its Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army, I would like to highlight for the Council the subsequent progress made in the region by the African Union (AU) in coordination with troop-contributing countries, with the support of United States special rorces, the European Union and the United Nations offices and missions on the ground, very particularly the efforts deployed by my colleague Mr. Abou Moussa and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA).”

    2013-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7065 (2013) · source

31. “Mr. Madeira: Let me first of all thank you, Mr. President, for allowing me to address this body. Let me also thank all the members of the Security Council for their unanimous support and encouragement for the efforts that are being made to put an end to the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).”

    2013-11-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7065 (2013) · source

32. “That support has proven to be essential in the operationalization of the different structures of the initiative. We also recognize and appreciate the efforts of the Members of Parliament of the United Kingdom who debated the LRA issue and urged their Government to do everything in its power to arrest Kony. We welcome those efforts and request more from other States Members of the United Nations, so as to further enhance the current global momentum against Kony and the LRA. In that regard, I urge the Security Council to help us deny the LRA any external sources of support, including safe haven for their sympathizers who continue to issue statements from the diaspora in support of the terrorist group.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

33. “I wish to appeal further to the Security Council for support for resources to mitigate the aforementioned challenges to the effective functioning of the Joint Coordination Mechanism secretariat and Office of the African Union Special Envoy for the LRA Issue in Bangui, operations of the regional task force/joint operations centre headquarters in Yambio as well as the sector headquarters and their operational units in Nzara, Dungu and Obo. We applaud the continued political engagement of the United States on the LRA issue, particularly for having deployed the approximately 100 military personnel to the region in October 2011 to provide logistical assistance, planning and intelligence. We thank the European Union for the substantial and sustained support to the African Union-led regional cooperation initiative against LRA.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

34. “I wish to inform the Security Council that, on 22 November 2011, the African Union Peace and Security Council declared the LRA a terrorist organization and requested the Security Council to do likewise. I take this opportunity to formally request the Security Council, through you, Mr. President, to consider the request ofthe African Union Peace and Security Council and declare the LRA a terrorist organization. I also wish to echo the African Union Peace and Security Council request of 22 May 2012 to the Security Council to consider modalities for enhancing its support to the African Union-led international efforts, inter alia, by adjusting the mandates of the United Nations peacekeeping missions in the LRA-affected countries. In that regard, I wish to reiterate the need to make available an air mobility network within the three sectors.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

35. “Those challenges include predictability of financial and material resources and logistical support for the Joint Coordination Mechanism secretariat and the Office of the Special Envoy for the LRA Issue, the regional task force headquarters operations and the operational units tracking the LRA in the respective sectors. The operational units require concrete support in terms of appropriate training, harmonized communication systems, food rations, medical support, air and ground mobility, munitions, fuel and lubricants, inter alia, to enable them to undertake robust military operations against the LRA so as to induce defections or the surrender and capture of LRA combatants as well as the rescue of LRA abductees.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

36. “We also undertook a joint mission to N'Djamena in April, within our strategic objective of seeking the diplomatic support ofthe neighbours of the LRA-affected countries to block the possible escape of the LRA members into new areas in those countries. Consultations are ongoing with authorities of the Republic of the Sudan for a similar mission to Khartoum. The effective implementation of the African Union-led initiative is, however, being undermined by certain critical challenges, for which we appeal for international support.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

37. “The process for the adoption of major technical support documents, notably standard operating procedures, rules of engagement, common measures on the treatment of LRA combatants and victims, and policy on civilian protection are on track. On the political and diplomatic front, I have undertaken jointly with my colleague the Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, Mr. Abou Moussa, to encourage the missions to engage the leadership of the LRA-affected countries to maintain their commitment or, where necessary, urge them to renew cooperation on the LRA issue. At the sidelines of those missions, we have often engaged representatives of cooperating international partners to galvanize international support for the regional cooperation initiative against LRA.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

38. “The regional task force headquarters has been fully staffed with 30 officers, including a civilian humanitarian adviser, a civilian human rights adviser and a police officer to provide advice on the rule of law and ensure that the activities of our soldiers in the LRA-affected areas and their interaction with the affected communities and LRA elements are conducted in strict respect of human rights and the rule of law. They have all undergone induction. A joint team comprising military officers from the African Union regional task force headquarters, the UNOAU, the European Union and the United States of America are currently conducting a technical assessment mission in the sectors to evaluate their capabilities, challenges and needs for effective operations.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

39. “Regarding the status of the implementation of the Regional Cooperation Initiative, we can state that since the authorization in November 2011 of the African Union-led Initiative by the African Union Peace and Security Council, the following efforts have been accomplished. The command and control architecture of the regional task force, which had not been upon decided and thus remained a potential impediment to operations, was adopted on 8 May at the first ministerial meeting of the Joint Coordination Mechanism.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

40. “The key components and structures of the initiative are the joint coordination mechanism - an ad hoc political body composed of the Ministers of Defence of the four LRA-affected countries, with a secretariat in Bangui and chaired by the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security - whose task is dealing with the general political aspects, providing strategic direction and coordinating with all stakeholders in the fight against the LRA; a 5,000-strong force with its headquarters in Yambio, South Sudan; and three operational sectors, in Nzara in South Sudan, Dungu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Obo in the Central African Republic.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

41. “The major objectives of the African Union-led Initiative are strengthening the capacity of the affected countries to effectively respond to and neutralize the LRA threat; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the affected communities and creating an environment conducive to the stabilization and rehabilitation of the affected areas. Those objectives, particularly the latter two - relating to humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians, support to former combatants for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration, and the long-term recovery needs of those affected - resonate with those of the United Nations system on the ground and have thus been well articulated in the comprehensive regional strategy on the LRA.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

42. “The first ministerial meeting of the joint coordination mechanism on the LRA, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 8 May, adopted concrete measures and made important decisions on the next steps to be taken in implementing the African Union-led Regional Cooperation Initiative. They include the full operationalization of the regional task force headquarters and the three sectors; coordination between the task force and the United Nations missions and offices on the ground; and the convening of a support forum to mobilize resources for the Cooperation Initiative. In addition, the 321st meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, held in Addis Ababa on 22 May, extended authorization for the implementation of the Initiative for 12 months.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

43. “When it becomes fully operational, the African Union-led Regional Cooperation Initiative is expected to bolster those efforts, particularly through military operations, so as to heighten pressure on the LRA, leading to more captures, surrenders, defections and the eventual elimination of the entire group. At this juncture, allow me to acknowledge the enormous support and commitment the European Union has demonstrated towards the Regional Cooperation Initiative on the LRA. The European Union has been providing funds to support the African Union (AU) efforts to eliminate the LRA since 2010. This meeting gives me the opportunity to apprise the Council of some key issues concerning the Regional Cooperation Initiative on the LRA.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

44. “Those operations contributed to the capture by Ugandan troops on 12 May of the self-styled Major General Caesar Acellam Otto, a one-time number four in the LRA command hierarchy; the capture by Central African Republic troops on 22 May of two LRA combatants; and the killing on 16 June of two other LRA combatants by Ugandan troops, who also rescued seven civilians who had been abducted. Furthermore, MONUSCO, the United States Government and various non-governmental organizations are supporting these actions with psychological operations in the form of come-home radio messages and air-dropped leaflets in local languages, aimed at encouraging mass defections by LRA elements.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

45. “That support has effectively enhanced implementation of the African Union-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army. I wish to stress that although successive military operations have largely disabled the LRA command, the rebels' ability to commit atrocities against civilians has remained undiminished. The 11 June report of the Secretary-General on the activities of UNOCA and on areas affected by the LRA (S/2012/421) accurately depicts the current situation vis-a-vis the LRA. However, I wish to underline the efforts made so far by some key partners of the African Union in the fight against the LRA. The ongoing United States-backed military operations, especially in the Central African Republic, have sustained pressure on the LRA, keeping the rebels constantly on the run.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

46. “I also wish to express our gratitude for the concrete United Nations support being channeled through its missions, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); its offices - the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic; and humanitarian agencies in order to respond to the threat of the LRA and its impact on the countries affected, particularly the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of South Sudan.”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

47. “Mr. Madeira: I greet the Security Council on behalf of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Mr. Jean Ping, and wish to thank the United Nations, particularly the Security Council and the Secretary-General, for their continued commitment to supporting the African Union and other international efforts aimed at eliminating the threat of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).”

    2012-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6796 (2012) · source

48. “Over the past few years, various studies and research have been conducted and many more reports written on the growing threat of transnational organized crime in West Africa, the Sahel region and Africa as a whole. Now we need to start talking about what we can do, in the spirit of shared responsibilities, to confront this menace. In Africa, efforts should focus on the implementation of and effective follow-up to the numerous instruments that have already been adopted. I would therefore like to thank you, Mr. President, once again for your leadership and for providing us with this forum to discuss this critical issue.”

    2012-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6717 (2012) · source

49. “As we redouble our efforts to confront transnational crime, we need to enhance the effectiveness of our action through institution-building and reform. Of equal importance, we must strengthen the rule of law and accountability, in order to curb crime in a sustainable manner. We also need to realize that confronting crime is not only about patrolling borders and waters. We must also commit ourselves to creating alternative economic opportunities for the most vulnerable sections of our populations by addressing the underlying socio-economic conditions that give rise to crime, poverty, environmental degradation and social exclusion.”

    2012-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6717 (2012) · source

50. “As recently as 29 January, at the initiative of the African Union, ministers and other senior officials of the countries of the Sahel region met in Addis Ababa to discuss common security challenges, on the basis of the report and recommendations of the joint AU-United Nations mission on the impact of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel region that visited the region in December 2011. I am pleased to inform the Council that in a few weeks' time an expert-level meeting will be convened by the African Union, in collaboration with United Nations, to agree on the required follow-up measures. That will be followed by a meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council on the situation in the Sahel region.”

    2012-02-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6717 (2012) · source