YouSaid · the spoken record

Mbabazi

lines on the record: 72
first: 1999-03-19
most recent: 2006-04-19
sittings or episodes: 5
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I wish to inform the Council that on 30 March 2006 we had a useful interaction in Kampala with the members of the security group on the LRA, including the core partners group, which includes the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway and South Africa, and representatives of United Nations Department of Political Affairs, MONUC and UNMIS on the question of the LRA. We hope to obtain the engagement of the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the Sudan with respect to our proposals in the very near future. Finally, I wish to call upon the Security Council to support strong measures, including adequate mandates for MONUC and UNMIS to forcefully disarm the LRA, and to send a clear message to LRA supporters that any such support will not be tolerated by the Council.”
2006-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5415 (2006) · source
“Fifthly, against that backdrop, MONUC and UNMIS should be mandated to use all necessary means to disarm LRA terrorists and arrest their indicted leaders. Sixthly, the possibility should be explored of mandating a country or regional power and giving it adequate capacity to deal with the question of the LRA, as was the case with the French-led Artemis operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003 and the Australian-led force in East Timor, also in 2003.”
2006-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5415 (2006) · source
“Thirdly, there should be strong coordination of the operations carried out against the LRA by national and international forces. We believe that the SPLA - the forces of the Government of the Sudan - which occupies the territory where Kony is operating; UNMIS, which is in the Sudan; MONUC, which is in the Congo; and the Government forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo must coordinate operations against the LRA. We must develop a joint operational plan in which we all are involved to get rid of the LRA and its presence in the Congo. Fourthly, a regional mechanism involving the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, the Sudan, MONUC and UNMIS needs to be set up to address the LRA problem. Uganda, on its part, has already set up a team to be part of this proposed mechanism.”
2006-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5415 (2006) · source
“First, the Governments of the Sudan and of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should do all it takes to ensure that the LRA terrorists are disarmed and the indicted leaders arrested. Pressure should also be brought to bear on all other parties and individuals assisting the LRA to stop forthwith. Secondly, a memorandum of understanding should be concluded as soon as possible between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, similar to the one Uganda reached with the Sudan, according to which the UPDF would be allowed to enter the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and hand over LRA terrorists. Such operations should be under the close supervision of international bodies such as MONUC, which already has a presence in the Congo, as I said earlier.”
2006-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5415 (2006) · source
“Kony, using this as his base, has attacked a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees compound and a camp in southern Sudan, and he has continued, as I said earlier, to use this as a base to recruit and build a force from that area. MONUC and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) have therefore not taken resolute action against the LRA, based in both southern Sudan and in northern Congo. It is important, therefore, to develop combined efforts by regional stakeholders, with the support of the international community, to disarm, capture or arrest the indicted LRA terrorist leaders and hand them over to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Uganda would therefore propose the following elements as a way forward.”
2006-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5415 (2006) · source
“Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo attended the meeting, and they did in fact escort the LRA back to the border once it had agreed to return to the Sudan. Unfortunately, the LRA did not keep its word and went back to Garamba. MONUC made an attempt to attack them, which led to the unfortunate death of the eight Guatemalan peacekeepers in January this year. Since that time, MONUC has had two companies - two corps - in that area, only about 50 kilometres away from the location of the LRA forces, in Garamba Park. In addition, the Government forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have a battalion-sized force located about 50 kilometres from where Kony and the LRA are camped. This is the situation as we speak.”
2006-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5415 (2006) · source
“We are therefore very concerned that if Kony is allowed to rebuild his force, he will link up with all these negative forces that are the remnants of the forces that have remained in the Congo, which were the reason for our participation in the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We hope that that will not happen. We have done everything possible to engage the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the Sudan and the international community to prevent that from recurring. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) has had contact with the LRA. Initially, when the LRA went into Garamba National Park, MONUC representatives held a meeting with them and asked them to get out of the Congo and to go back to the Sudan.”
2006-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5415 (2006) · source
“The LRA is likely to link up with the Allied Democratic Forces and other negative forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to attack Uganda. As we have had occasion to say before, and as all members know, Uganda would then be forced to act in self-defence. The 1996 attack carried out in Uganda by the ADF - which originated in the Sudan and was built up and its forces in fact trained by Al-Qaida - was the cause of Uganda's involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1997 and 1998, as the Council is aware and as I have had occasion to say here before.”
2006-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5415 (2006) · source
“As I said, when they left southern Sudan, they were really running for dear life. But in Garamba National Park they have had time to regroup, to rest and to recruit afresh. Therefore, we are very concerned that the LRA is using Garamba National Park in northern Democratic Republic of the Congo as a safe haven to achieve that. Kony has capacity; in fact he has started recruiting through abductions as is his tradition - not in Uganda this time, but in southern Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Kony therefore can grow, reorganize and become a stronger potential threat to regional peace and security in Uganda, the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and possibly even the Central African Republic.”
2006-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5415 (2006) · source
“We know that the LRA is now operating mainly in the Garamba National Park of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the Faradje-Morobo-Aba area. In a speech that I presented at a meeting held in March with the core countries and other stakeholders, I outlined the details of that area and the LRA's activities from Garamba National Park. We will be distributing a copy of that speech with a map showing the area I am discussing. It is between Juba and Yei, in southern Sudan, and Faradje-Morobo-Aba, in northern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Uganda's key concerns are the following. While the LRA terrorist group has been severely degraded and is on the verge of defeat at the hands of the UPDF, Uganda is very concerned that the LRA is slowly rebuilding its capacity, largely in this area.”
2006-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5415 (2006) · source
“Since the launch of Operation Iron Fist in 2002, the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) has sustained military pressure against the LRA and has degraded its strength from the approximately 5,000 personnel - between 2,500 and 3,000 of them armed - who were in southern Sudan in March 2002 to an estimated current strength of about 500 - 120 to 150 of them armed - in the Democratic Republic of the Congo under the command of Kony and his deputy, Vincent Otti. There are also a few remnants in Uganda scattered in the Acholi region in the mid-north. The LRA has moved to the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a fugitive force hiding from the UPDF in Uganda and from the combined efforts of the UPDF, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Eastern Equatoria, southern Sudan.”
2006-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5415 (2006) · source
“I also wish to share with the Council our analysis of the LRA as a threat to regional peace and security in Uganda, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to outline our proposals on the way forward to ensure the support of the international community for the disarmament and demobilization of the LRA and for the arrest of its leadership, which has been indicted by the International Criminal Court. Uganda's struggle against the LRA and other foreign-supported negative forces - including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADP) and the Popular Resistance Army (PRA) - operating against Uganda from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan has been long and tedious. The LRA is part of the tail end of our post-colonial history covering the period of the Idi Amin and Milton Obote Governments.”
2006-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5415 (2006) · source
“It is a great honour for me to address the Security Council on the security situation in northern Uganda and on the role that the international community, especially the United Nations, can play to achieve the complete eradication of the activities of terrorism visited upon the population of northern Uganda by the so-called Lord's Resistance Army. The Government of Uganda appreciates the condemnation of the LRA and its terrorist activities against the people of Uganda and the region by the Council in its resolutions, especially resolutions 1653 (2006) and 1663 (2006). We hope that the Secretary-General, in his report to the Council on the LRA, will present a comprehensive action plan to totally eliminate the scourge of terrorism, of which our country and the region have been victims for some time.”
2006-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5415 (2006) · source
“Allow me, Sir, to join my colleague, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uganda, in congratulating the People's Republic of China on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April 2006. My colleague talked about the relationship between the establishment of the joint monitoring committee to deal with the emergency humanitarian situation and the need for a regional security mechanism on the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) as a threat to regional peace and security in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan.”
2006-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5415 (2006) · source
“This is very close to the place where, in 1999 - in March, I believe - eight tourists and a Ugandan game park warden were killed by the same forces. I felt that I should give this Council that information so that it may be informed about the situation in the border area. Finally, I would simply want to say that I will not respond to the statement made by the gentleman from Sudan, for fear that people may not be able to tell the difference between us.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317Resumption1 (2001) · source
“I wish, belatedly, to pass on our condolences to the bereaved families of the six workers of the International Committee of the Red Cross who died in eastern Congo and to inform this Council that the Uganda People's Defence Forces have undertaken to help in the effort to investigate and trace those who are responsible for committing this crime. I would also like to inform this Council that, two days ago, on 1 May, at the border of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, at about 6 pm. local time, a truck full of local people was coming from the market on the other side and was attacked, presumably by the Interahamwe. The local Muslim leader and his wife were killed, as were two businessmen, while three others were wounded.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The withdrawal of all foreign forces and the emergence of a strong and stable State are the only guarantee of an end to the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“1 have been much more pleased than I was the last time I visited this Council by its level of involvement. Everybody is happy that the peace process at long last appears to be moving towards disengagement. The Political Committee has adopted a schedule of withdrawal of foreign forces. National dialogue is on the move. Forces have moved. Uganda has moved seven battalions and will be moving another two within the next few days, and we are considering completely moving out. The Lusaka peace process provides a unique opportunity to address the security concerns of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours and to create favourable conditions for an internal dialogue on a new democratic dispensation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“Therefore, we believe that the primary focus should be on creating peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This can be only through the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. In this context, we would expect the Security Council to handle this matter with the utmost care, because - and members have heard the language used this morning - this report and what has been said have seriously poisoned the atmosphere in the region and have the potential of being diversionary from the cause of pursuing peace through Lusaka. The exploitation of natural resources is not the cause, but the consequence of the war and the absence of a strong State. Our view therefore is that the Security Council should remain determined to play a leadership role in the search for peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“Abuse of the President and recommendations of sanctions against the people of Uganda. What evidence is there that Uganda was institutionally involved in the illegal exploitation of resources? Some individuals, numbering approximately 10, were involved, yet this Panel recommends that the United Nations impose sanctions on 23 million Ugandans. Why not ask for the arrest of those individuals? On the other hand, countries that are suspected of actually being illegally involved in the exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have had their dubious interests legitimized, if this report does so. Who has said that a sovereign State cannot commit a crime? Uganda believes that the cause of all this is war in the Congo. It is the absence of a stable, strong State in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“In this connection, Uganda would recommend that a new panel be put in place or that the current one be expanded, with a new chairperson, to inject some level of professional competence, impartiality and serious leadership into the investigation process. We believe that it is also important to achieve a level of balance in the new panel of experts in order to make sure that bias and prejudice are avoided. Uganda has also learned one lesson, an important lesson: it pays not to cooperate with this United Nations Panel of Experts. The Panel of Experts acknowledges, as the Chairperson did this morning, the maximum cooperation that Uganda rendered. This ranged from meeting the President himself, the Vice- President and others to giving the Panel all the data it requested. There was nothing that was not given. What reward do we get?”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“Obviously, all these allegations against the name of the President are calculated to injure the reputation of President Museveni without cause. We demand an apology, we demand that they be withdrawn and we request that this Council look into this matter and take appropriate action. When we meet with the Secretary-General, we know that this Panel, as a body of the United Nations, enjoys criminal and civil immunities, but our view is that the manner in which it has treated the name of President Museveni is an abuse of privilege. Uganda therefore feels that the quality of the report is so low that its value and credibility are seriously diminished and undermined. That is why we support the extension of the mandate of the Panel, in the hope that a better job will be done.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“The casual manner in which the name of the President has been handled is totally unacceptable to the people of Uganda. President Museveni is the head of State of a Member country of the United Nations. If you are to call him names, surely you must have evidence. They call him an accomplice to crime. Why? Paragraphs 201 to 206 say that some rebel in the Congo is alleged to have stolen money. The report was given to President Museveni and he did not act against that rebel; and therefore President Museveni qualifies as an accomplice to crime. We find this despicable, we do not accept it and we do not know how you will handle this, Mr. President, because it is setting a very serious precedent. Even ordinary people's reputations are protected.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“The only time they mention the name of President Museveni is to say that he has a blood brother called General Saleh, who is said to have shares in a company that is dealing in business in the eastern Congo; that he has a son who has shares in a business suspected to be doing business in the eastern Congo; and that he has a sister-in-law who has shares in a company that is dealing in business in the Congo, all of which, of course, is, by that other definition, termed illegal. But even if it were true that these relatives of the President were in fact engaged in that business, is it logical, is it normal to call the President, or anyone for that matter, names; to give him a label for the acts of relatives without showing any evidence that he was party to those actions?”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“I will read out a sentence: "Presidents Kagame and Museveni are on the verge of becoming the godfathers of the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the continuation of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." Godfathers are Mafia. Godfathers are those who control criminal cartels, criminal syndicates. Therefore, to call President Museveni a godfather is a very, very serious matter. Or to call President Kagame a godfather is a very, very serious matter. There must be evidence for them to justify this label. What evidence is there in this report? None, absolutely none.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“So to report that they requested these people - presumably they made these requests to the Government of Uganda and the Government of Uganda turned them down - when they know this is false is totally unacceptable. On 6 March this year, we communicated with the Chairperson of the Panel on the follow-up to the interim report, reconfirming our continued support for its work and inviting any questions, clarifications or additional data, as well as extending another welcome to the Panel to revisit Uganda before the finalization of the report. The Panel did not respond to this. What we find most despicable is the attack by the Panel on the person of President Museveni. Let us look at paragraph 211.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“But regarding what they say in paragraph 11 and paragraph 89, that they asked for individuals and their request was turned down - they named this specific individual as Brigadier General Kazini - I would like to inform this Council that this is not true. First of all, they never asked for Kazini. I saw this for the first time in their report. Secondly, in fact, General Kazini met them, not once, but twice. Thirdly, when they met the military commander, General Odongo, he offered the Panel specifically that if they passed out questionnaires or asked for any officers in the Congo they wanted to interview, he was ready to make these officers available. Up to this moment, they have not made such a request.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“But if a panel of experts is going to make recommendations that sanctions be imposed against a country of 23 million people, surely it must present evidence that is credible, that leaves no one in doubt that what they are saying is true. The Panel of Experts has made statements in its report that the members of the Panel know to be false. They acknowledged maximum cooperation received from the Government of Uganda. They were received by the President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Transport, the Minister of Energy and Minerals, the Minister of Forestry and all sorts of other officials. Everyone they asked for they met.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“These reasons not only were accepted by the belligerents in Congo, but the security concerns are actually contained in the Lusaka Agreement. Indeed, the Lusaka formula proposes to handle that specific problem. So, if the United Nations Panel of Experts is to contradict that position, to contradict what you, the Council, have accepted in various resolutions, surely it must present clear evidence that leaves no one in doubt about its truthfulness and credibility - not numerous accounts in Kampala. If you go to Kampala, Mr. President, you will find a lot of street gossip about what is happening in the Congo and about what is happening in the Security Council today.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“As I said earlier, in our response we tackled the report paragraph by paragraph to show that most of the evidence on which it is based is, in fact, hearsay. I will pick out one example to illustrate the point. Paragraph 27 of the report states that "Numerous accounts in Kampala suggest that the decision to enter the conflict in August 1998 was defended by some top military officials who had served in eastern Zaire and who had had a taste of the business potential of the region." It does not give us the sources. However, we know that these stories are abundantly available in the public domain in Uganda. They are in newspapers; they are on the streets. We think this is a very serious matter. Uganda has given its reasons why it got involved in the Congo.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“We think that that is erroneous; it is an incorrect definition of illegality, and we do not believe that that was the meaning conveyed to the Panel by this Council. Of course, the results are obvious; they are self- evident. Although the report says that the Panel did not receive cooperation from the Government side and its allies, there is no indication that there was actually a serious attempt to carry out an investigation. Indeed, the report clearly discloses that the Panel acted on the assumption that whatever happened on the Side controlled by the Government was legal and therefore not subject to investigation. The second flaw in this report is the quality of the evidence presented. Most of the evidence is either hearsay or falsehoods, and the Panel makes statements which are not attributed.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“It would not, therefore, have been necessary to establish a Panel to investigate something that everyone accepted: the fact that the central Government in Kinshasa had no authority and was therefore not consenting to the activities that were taking place in 60 per cent of Congo, which would, therefore, have been declared illegal straight away. The importance of this point lies in the fact that the rest of the report, and the rest of the investigation, was based on the understanding that every activity - the extraction of minerals, production of any kind and any commerce or export in areas not controlled by the Government - was illegal and therefore defined as looting and plundering of the resources of the Congo.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“I therefore have no reason to believe the Panel when it says that this definition was the understanding of the Security Council. Secondly, if, indeed, that definition as stipulated by the Panel in the report had been intended, there would have been no need to have an investigation. It is public knowledge that 40 per cent of the country is under the control of the Government in Kinshasa and that the other 60 per cent is under the control of rebel authorities. It is also common knowledge that normal life - normal in the context of a war situation - goes on in the areas controlled by the rebels.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“It was agreed that for that period, as provided for in the Lusaka accord, the three Congolese parties signatories to that accord - the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), as it was then known- would each be charged with the responsibility of administering the area that it controlled until State administration was re-established after the national dialogue resulted in a new political dispensation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This argument was presented to this Council and, obviously, the Council, it its wisdom, decided that the investigation should therefore cover the whole of the Congo, not just part of it.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“First of all, as the Council knows, Uganda fully participated in the debate when the resolution establishing the Panel to investigate this matter was adopted by the Security Council. This question of legality or illegality was, indeed, debated in the context of whether the investigation should cover the whole of the Congo or part of the Congo. The argument that the investigation should cover only the eastern Congo was based precisely on the question of legality and legitimacy. But there was an argument, clearly presented by my colleague from Rwanda, that, in fact, the Lusaka Agreement clearly took care of this point, because it defined the question of legality during the period of the implementation of the Lusaka accord.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“The Panel defines illegality as meaning the violation of sovereignty, and says that, according to this Council's understanding of the definition, all activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo which are taking place without the consent of the Government in Kinshasa are illegal. It goes further, saying that that interpretation suggests that only non-invited forces and their nationals are carrying out illegal activities in the Congo. Finally, the Panel deems illegality to be the carrying out of an activity in violation of regulations established by the Government in Kinshasa, stating that that definition is based on the Security Council's understanding of the term illegality. We have a very serious problem with that definition in many ways.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“In the case of the military officers and civilians who are mentioned in the report, and in the case of the Department of Forestry, which is alleged to have colluded with private companies in a scheme to facilitate the certification of timber from the Democratic Republic of the Congo illegally, I am happy to inform the Security Council that the Government of Uganda has decided to establish a judicial commission of inquiry on this matter. The commission will be independent; it will work openly and transparently. The actual composition will be announced in due course in Kampala. Having said that, I should like to say that Uganda has serious problems with this report. The report has fundamental flaws in it. The first flaw is the very basis on which it is founded: the definition of illegality.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“We take note of the Panel's serious allegations that, although the Ugandan Government is not institutionally involved, as the report states in paragraphs and 7 and 85, top Ugandan military officers and civilians are involved in the illegal exploitation of resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This is the first time that allegations of illegal exploitation have been specified, and we welcome the opportunity to put these matters to rest.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“At the summit held in Kampala in October 1998, a decision was made to establish a ministerial probe committee - which I was privileged to co-chair, along with my colleague the head of delegation of Rwanda - to look into those allegations. It was as a result of those allegations that President Museveni, in his capacity as Commander-in- Chief of the Ugandan People's Defence Forces, issued an order dated 5 December 1998 to all Ugandan troops in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Government officials prohibiting them and their families from engaging in any trade in the Congo. It will be of interest to the Council to know that since that time, that order has been actively enforced and that some people who have fallen afoul of it have suffered disciplinary consequences. We therefore support and welcome the principle of investigation.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“Allow me therefore, in the short time I have, to give the Council a summary of this response. My summary, like the response itself, will cover three areas. First, we will talk about the principle itself of investigating these allegations. Secondly, we will make comments on the contents of the report, and especially on the quality of the evidence presented. Finally, we will talk about the way forward. The report of the Panel raises important issues to be investigated which are of interest to Uganda. In 1998, Uganda and Rwanda heard of some allegations made against some officers of our armies operating in the Congo.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“The Government of Uganda is most obliged to all of the members of the Security Council for the onerous task of the maintenance of international peace and security, which they all render to the world on behalf of the United Nations. The Government of Uganda welcomes the release of this report. I wish to thank you once again, Mr. President, as well as the Council, for giving us the opportunity to respond to its contents. I will present to the Council Uganda's response in full. This response covers all of the allegations against Uganda in the report. I have also attached the personal response of President Museveni of Uganda, a copy of which he has already sent to the Secretary-General and which has, I hope, already been circulated to Council members.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“It is an honour for me, on behalf of the delegation I lead and of my country, to address this important meeting of the Security Council on the final report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 1 am particularly happy to see the presidency of the United States once again taking an interest in the search for a lasting peace in the Great Lakes region. We can only assure you, Sir, of our readiness to render Uganda's full cooperation to enable you to achieve this noble objective. We are equally grateful to Her Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom for the able leadership of Her Majesty's Permanent Representative, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, whose presidency last month made the necessary preparations for this meeting.”
2001-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4317 (2001) · source
“The Committee expressed its concern over this regrettable development, and, while welcoming the efforts to bring the situation in Kisangani back to normal, called on Rwanda and Uganda to immediately bring an end to the fighting and to implement the agreement between them for the demilitarization of Kisangani. I am glad to inform the Council that the fighting has since stopped. The Political Committee restates the reaffirmation by our leaders last January of our strong commitment to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and reiterates our determination for its full and expeditious implementation. All we ask of the United Nations and the international community as a whole is that they lend us their unqualified support in the implementation of this accord, which we freely reached among ourselves.”
2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source
“The Political Committee, however, welcomed the holding of the preparatory meeting in Cotonou, Benin, on 6 June, as a positive step in the right direction. The Committee expressed its appreciation to Sir Ketumile Masire for his efforts in facilitating the national dialogue and called on all of the Congolese to honour their obligations under the Agreement. It is clear that the implementation of Lusaka has not gone according to the plan we originally worked out. Indeed, the Political Committee recognizes that there are enormous challenges to the implementation of this accord. The most recent challenge - which you referred to, Mr. President - was the fighting in Kisangani between the Rwandan and Ugandan forces.”
2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source
“The Political Committee, at its last meeting in Lusaka, considered and adopted mechanisms for the disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of members of all of the armed groups. On the question of the release and exchange of prisoners of war, the Political Committee requested the parties concerned to expedite the process by quickly complying with the requirements of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. I have reliable information that all of the parties have since done so. I should expect the release and exchange of prisoners of war to commence by the end of this week. I share the Council's optimism that this could begin even in the course of our deliberations here in New York. On the issue of the inter-Congolese political negotiations, the national dialogue has not commenced.”
2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source
“Although its timetable has not been fully met, sub-plans for the disengagement of forces in each area were prepared, but they could not be finalized because the JMC and MONUC lack the resources required to carry out verification of the information given by each party. We look forward to discussing this question of lack of resources with the Council during our visit here, so that we can overcome this debilitating limitation to the process of implementation. We expect that when the planning teams of the JMC and MONUC have verified the information given to them by each party and new defensive positions have been agreed, then the forces will begin to disengage to create the 30- kilometre-wide disengagement zone.”
2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source
“We therefore have come to New York in that spirit of partnership in the continuing dialogue, begun on 6 May in Lusaka, on how to quickly and realistically achieve our commonly shared desire to bring peace not only to the Democratic Republic of the Congo but to the region as a whole. The Political Committee, working together with the Joint Military Commission and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), under the able and dedicated leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Kamel Morjane, and his staff, has laid the groundwork for the implementation of the Lusaka accord. We adopted on 8 April last in Kampala the plan for the disengagement and redeployment of forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source
“These violations occurred largely because the mechanism the Agreement put in place to manage the implementation process has to date not been fully operationalized. The United Nations initially adopted what appeared to be a very cautious approach to its involvement in this implementation process. The Political Committee was therefore delighted when last January the Security Council decided to pay great attention to the conflict in the Congo, a process that has culminated in our meeting with the Council today. We appreciated very deeply the visit of the Security Council delegation, led by Richard Holbrooke, to the region last month. For the first time we felt that, as a result of that visit, a partnership between us and the United Nations had begun in earnest.”
2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source
“It further provides for the normalization of the situation at the borders of the Congo with a view to stopping any illicit trafficking of arms and the infiltration of armed groups across the borders. The United Nations was requested, in pursuance of its duty to maintain international peace and security, to take charge of the implementation of the Agreement. The parties also created the Joint Military Commission (JMC), where they are all represented, to develop this process of implementation. Although, as you correctly observed, Mr. President, the timetable for the implementation of the Agreement, signed on 10 July 1999 by the States parties and in August by the armed Congolese rebellion, has not been met, the Agreement has held, the various violations, many of which you referred to, Mr. President, notwithstanding.”
2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source
“It was welcomed and adopted by the international community, including the United Nations, as the best formula for the resolution of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Agreement addresses the two dimensions of the conflict - that is, the internal Congolese political question and the regional security concerns of the Congo itself and those of its neighbours. It provides, among other things, for the cessation of hostilities; the creation of a new political dispensation in the Congo through inter-Congolese political negotiations; the disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of all of the armed groups in the Congo; and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.”
2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source