YouSaid · the spoken record

Mbabazi

lines on the record: 72
first: 1999-03-19
most recent: 2006-04-19
sittings or episodes: 5
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“On behalf of the Political Committee and on my own behalf, I wish to express our gratitude to you, Mr. President, to the members of the Security Council delegation who visited our region last month, and to the Security Council as a whole for the invitation it extended to the Political Committee to come to New York to share information and exchange views on the process of pacification of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We come with the hope and confidence that this interaction will result in greater and faster engagement of the United Nations in this process, for which the people of Congo and the region have waited so long. The Agreement for a ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, popularly known as the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, was freely negotiated, agreed and signed by all the then belligerents.”
2000-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4156 (2000) · source
“Uganda believes that this is possible, and, with more active support from the United Nations, we are very close to finding solutions to these problems which, we believe, are not entirely impracticable.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“It has been condemned by the international community, and we believe that it is the duty of the international community to discourage anyone from giving safe haven to such international outlaws. In conclusion, I would like to register the appreciation of the Government of Uganda at the positive and constructive contributions made by the majority of speakers this morning, and I feel more encouraged that the support for the regional efforts will go a long way in overcoming the few remaining obstacles to peace. What we ask of the Security Council, the United Nations and the international community is to give unqualified support to the region's diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“Measures to this effect must include the discouragement of safe havens for the ge'nocidaires, and those who have committed heinous crimes against humanity must face justice. As all present know, there is a constellation of these criminal elements in the Congo. They have been reorganized into fighting units, and indeed they form part and parcel of the alliance that supports President Kabila in the Congo. Recently - and I am amazed that I have not heard much about it, as only one speaker mentioned it - they managed to enter Uganda and abduct some tourists, whom they killed in the same way they killed millions of Rwandese in 1994, using machetes. This is a crime against humanity.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“Uganda's position on this is that neither of the two sides should disarm, except in accordance with an agreed position on, among other things, army-building by the national conference. In the meantime, both sides should be assembled in camps under the control of the neutral interposition force. They should register their personnel and arms, pending the completion of the process of forming an army that reflects the national character of the Congo. One more point: these discussions have talked about genocide, and these again brought agreement on the issue. The Uganda Government, on the issue of genocide, would like to appeal to the Council and to the international community as a whole to stand firm against the perpetuation of the culture of impunity in the region.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“Uganda's position is that it is better to have direct involvement on the part of the rebels, because it is only then that we can ensure their commitment to the terms of the agreement. No third party can claim to act on their behalf in the delicate give-and-take process required in such negotiations. The second area where there has not been full agreement is on the question of whether the rebels should disarm upon the signing of a cease-fire agreement while the Government forces remain under arms. There has been a suggestion that upon the signature of the parties to the cease-fire agreement, the rebels should immediately disarm and give up the territory they hold today to the Kabila Government.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“But I am happy to learn that President Kabila and his Government have at long last committed themselves to this principle of a national conference for the determination of the political future of the Congo by the Congolese themselves. However, there are two sticking points on which full agreement has not been reached. The first is the question of whether the involvement of the rebel RCD in the negotiations for the final cease- fire agreement should be by direct participation at the official and ministerial level or indirectly, through proximity talks. The principle of involvement has been accepted. The debate now concerns the manner of involvement - whether it should be by proximity talks or by direct talks.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“Fifthly, it has been agreed that all foreign forces in the Congo must withdraw in accordance with a time-table to be worked out by the United Nations and the OAU and under the supervision of the neutral interposition force. Finally, consensus has emerged in the region that a national conference involving all Congolese political stakeholders should be convened in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as soon as possible, with the assistance of the OAU, to determine the political future of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Uganda Government has noted with appreciation the recent position taken by President Kabila to commit his Government to this principle, because, although we had agreed on this point right from the first summit, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had never accepted it.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“That committee has met, its officials have received various recommendations from the countries involved, and we are just waiting for a formal report arising out of that interaction. Thirdly, it has been agreed that the rebels - the Rassemblement Congolais pour la democratic (RCD) - must be involved in the peace process and must be signatories to the cease-fire agreement. This has been accepted by all the parties involved. Fourthly, it has been agreed that a neutral, international peacekeeping force be deployed as an interposition force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and that the United Nations should manage this process.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“The following positions have been agreed in order to enhance the signing of this cease-fire agreement, whose principles we have already adopted at the regional level, in draft form. First, all parties agree that there must be, as soon as possible, a cessation of all hostilities and a troop standstill in the Congo by all those who bear arms. Secondly, it has been agreed that the security concerns of the neighbouring countries and, indeed, of the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself should be addressed. That these concerns exist and are legitimate has been recognized by the region. At the last ministerial meeting we held in Lusaka, a committee was established to work out a mechanism to resolve the question of the destabilization of neighbouring countries from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“Etienne Tshisekedi was condemned to internal exile and was not allowed - I believe that even today he is still not allowed - to travel abroad. That provides an idea why, in reaction to that political situation, the political forces inside the Congo decided to rise up in rebellion. And that is precisely what happened in August 1998. As I said earlier, my original intention had been to seek the Council's support for the regional efforts to find a peaceful solution because, contrary to the pervasive pessimism with regard to the prospects for reaching a negotiated settlement which I heard in this morning's statements, Uganda believes that a lot of progress has already been registered. Allow me to provide some examples. In the various meetings that have taken place, it has been agreed by all the parties that there should be a ceasefire.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“The political base of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL) - the political alliance that President Kabila led - was narrow, because it was composed of four political groups which all emanated from eastern Congo. That is the alliance that assumed power in Kinshasa. When President Kabila assumed power, he failed - or neglected - to broaden his political base in any way. His alliance of four political parties remained the same; it was not broadened at all. Subsequently, even the four-party alliance collapsed. And now, as I speak, only one of the original four constitutes the Alliance. Furthermore, President Kabila suppressed the established and active political opposition, as the whole world knows.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“To counter the perceived threat of the increased destabilization of Uganda, especially by the Sudan, using Congolese territory as they had done on many previous occasions, Uganda deployed additional forces. I felt constrained to make that clarification in the light of some of the statements that were made this morning. As far as we are concerned, therefore, the external dimension in the Congolese conflict, both in the case of Uganda and - as I know - in the case of Rwanda, has been prompted by activities hostile to those countries emanating from the Congo. Uganda and Rwanda acted in self-defence. There is also, of course, the internal dimension. I do not want to delve much into the internal politics of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A few examples will suffice to provide a picture of what happens there.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“It was given by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, which decided on a unilateral military intervention instead of waiting for a regional, concerted approach, as originally proposed by President Museveni at the previous two summits. The intervention was made on the pretext that the Democratic Republic of the Congo had been invaded by Uganda and Rwanda. I would like to inform this body that, as a matter of fact, Uganda at that time had only the two battalions that I mentioned earlier inside the Congo. While Uganda was primarily concerned about the activities of the Ugandan rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the intervention by Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and, later on, Chad and the Sudan, introduced a new dimension to the conflict.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“That is why President Kabila invited the Ugandan Government to deploy the Ugandan People's Defence Forces inside the Congo to flush out the Allied Democratic Forces, a rebel group that had been infiltrated into Zaire by the Sudan, and that had attacked us in Kasese, an attack to which I referred earlier. A protocol to that effect was signed between the two Governments on 24 April 1998. Uganda deployed two battalions of troops at the invitation of the Kabila Government, and by specific written agreement between us and that Government, on 27 April 1998. In the meantime, because of the internal political contradictions, the rebellion broke out on 2 August 1998. President Kabila's reaction was to look for foreign military assistance.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“It was that act of self-defence against the then-Zairian Government - an act of self-defence which had regional and international understanding and support - that resulted in the fall of President Mobutu and the rise to power of President Kabila. It was hoped that since President Kabila clearly understood our security concerns and as he himself was a by-product of our act of self-defence, he would address those concerns once he assumed power. Unfortunately, that did not happen. At an early stage we appreciated the fact that President Kabila had inherited weak structures from the Mobutu regime. Indeed, President Kabila pleaded incapacity to handle the situation in his own country.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“In fulfilment of that plan, attacks were launched against Uganda on two fronts: from Congolese territory - Zairian territory, as it was then known - Uganda was attacked in the north-west, near its border with the Sudan and Zaire and further south-west, closer to Rwanda, in the district of Kasese. At the same time as we were being attacked in Uganda, the reorganization and rearming of the ge'nocidaires had reached an advanced stage. The Ugandan Government decided to act in self-defence by first recapturing the territory those criminals had captured, following them into Zairian territory in hot pursuit.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“As everyone knows, they then proceeded to hold those refugees hostage inside Zaire. The Mobutu Government then helped these ge'nocidaires to reorganize, retrain and rearm and gave them territorial support to recapture power in Rwanda. The Government of Uganda totally opposed this move and made its position very clear. In preparation for the intended recapture of power by the ge'nocidaires in Rwanda, however, President Mobutu forged an alliance with the National Islamic Front regime in Khartoum, Sudan, not only to aid and abet the crime of genocide in Rwanda but also specifically to destabilize Uganda in the hope that Uganda would then not be in a position to support Rwanda against that aggression.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“As I listened to this morning's statements, however, it became apparent that I need to explain the events in greater detail that I had intended, in order to give a sense of balance with regard to the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has two dimensions: an internal dimension and an external, or regional, dimension. The external or regional dimension began with the war that took place in Rwanda, which resulted in the 1994 genocide. After the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) took power, the genocidaires - those who were responsible for killing hundreds of thousands of Rwandan civilians - and the former Rwandan army and the interaharnwe militia crossed into what was then Zaire with hundreds of thousands of refugees.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“As the Council heard this morning from the representative of Namibia, it was once again President Museveni who initiated the Windhoek summit of January 1999, comprising the core countries that are militarily involved in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I am giving these few examples to show the Ugandan commitment to a diplomatic and peaceful solution to this problem. Uganda firmly believes that the two main causes of this conflict can be resolved through negotiations. Uganda has neither territorial ambitions nor economic interests beyond the normal course of trade between two nations. Therefore, my delegation has essentially come here to seek the support of the Security Council, the United Nations and the international community as a whole towards the achievement of this objective.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“When he met his colleagues at the Southern African Development Community (SADC) summit in Swakopmund, Namibia, President Museveni requested President Mugabe to convene a meeting of heads of State of friends of the Congo to try to find a solution to the political tensions that were evident in the Congo at that time. Unfortunately, by the time the summit took place the political contradictions in the Congo had exploded into violence. When it became obvious that the Victoria Falls summit would not result in an immediate solution to the conflict in the Congo, President Museveni appealed to President Mandela to convene a wider meeting of the SADC region and other affected countries outside SADC, such as Uganda, to try to generate a way of managing the crisis that had already erupted.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source
“On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Uganda, I wish to thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Security Council for this opportunity given to us to address the Council on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Uganda believes in, and is committed to, the peaceful and negotiated resolution of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Indeed, as the Council heard from some of the speakers this morning, President Museveni has been one of the leaders behind most of the initiatives to find a diplomatic solution to the problems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. President Museveni initiated the very first meeting, which took place in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, on 7 and 8 August 1998.”
1999-03-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3987Resumption1 (1999) · source