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2008-05-20
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2015-12-23
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un-security-council

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  1. That calls for improvement in coordination and coherence and for the clear delineation of responsibilities between key stakeholders in the United Nations peacebuilding architecture to prevent duplication of efforts and maximize outcomes. In more specific terms, predictable and sustainable financing are essential for recovery activities in the countries on the agenda of the PBC. That requires a larger financial contribution to the Peacebuilding Fund and support for the efforts of the chairs of the country configurations for countries on the PBC agenda. We have learned over the years that national ownership and inclusivity are core principles of post- conflict peacebuilding.

    2014-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7217 (2014) · source

  2. We recall in that regard that the Council, in its resolution 2086 (2013), expressed its desire to utilize the advisory, advocacy and resource mobilization roles of the Commission in peacebuilding activities and to harness those roles to advance a more coherent approach with respect to multidimensional peacekeeping mandates in countries on its agenda. To attain those objectives, the advisory role of the Commission to the Security Council should be enhanced, its expertise should be utilized on all issues within the competence of the PBC, and the Commission should be central to the support for post-conflict countries. In our times, the PBC seems to be operating in a crowded setting.

    2014-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7217 (2014) · source

  3. The convening of the annual session, in our View, represents a significant improvement in the working methods of the PBC, insofar as it allows for extensive discussions of important issues pertaining to the development of policy guidelines for the PBC. Despite those achievements, stakeholders broadly agree that the working methods of the Commission can be further improved. In that regard, we believe that, where appropriate, some of the rules of procedure of the PBC that have been in operation since its inception should be re-examined and reviewed for improvement vis-a-Vis the objectives of the Commission. Indeed, that should be a key priority at the 2015 review. Improved performance by the PBC will, in part, depend on its relations with the principal organs of the United Nations, in particular the Council.

    2014-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7217 (2014) · source

  4. In particular, we applaud the compilation of a compendium covering aspects related to PBC's country-specific engagement and serves as a useful reference for chairs of country configurations and external partners. Equally significant was the decision of the Organizational Committee to convene an annual session of the PBC in order to facilitate closer interaction and engagement among stakeholders in New York and capitals of member States. We are pleased to note that this decision has already been put into effect with the first annual PBC session, which took place on 23 June. That session, which we consider to have been a great success, addressed the challenges to post-conflict peacebuilding and took note of lessons learned so far in enhancing the work of the PBC.

    2014-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7217 (2014) · source

  5. For that reason, we must find sustainable and enduring solutions that address the roots of conflicts and not just their symptoms. Nigeria would like to comment on a few ofthe issues highlighted in the 2014 report of the PBC, including the working methods of the PBC, relations between the PBC and the principal organs of the United Nations, resource mobilization, the importance of forging coherence to coordinate the activities of stakeholders, and the role of the membership. We welcome the PBC's efforts in pursuing improvements to facilitate engagement with and ownership of the Commission's objectives by Member States, the United Nations system and international partners. We take note of the outcomes of the various working-level informal consultations held between February and November 2013.

    2014-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7217 (2014) · source

  6. The annual debate on the report on the work of the PBC, I believe, provides an opportunity not only to review the work of the PBC and its various configurations, but also to reflect on how best to support the efforts of post-conflict countries to avoid a relapse into conflict. In fact, it is instructive that a recent World Bank report entitled "Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace" indicates that 90 per cent of conflicts that have occurred in the past decade took place in countries that had previously experienced civil war. According to that report, the problem with civil war is not the challenge of preventing new conflicts from arising, but that of permanently ending those that have already started.

    2014-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7217 (2014) · source

  7. I want to thank you, Sir, for convening this meeting to discuss the report (S/2014/67) of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) of its seventh session. I would like to thank His Excellency Mr. Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Permanent Representative of Brazil, for his committed leadership of the PBC, and indeed for a very lucid briefing this morning. I also want to thank His Excellency Mr. Vladimir Drobnjak, Permanent Representative of Croatia and former Chair of the PBC for his statement on the seventh session of the Commission. Nigeria commends the chairs of the country-specific configurations and the Peacebuilding Support Office for promoting the work of the Commission. We owe a great debt to Rwanda for chairing the PBC work stream to improve relations between the Security Council and the Commission.

    2014-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7217 (2014) · source

  8. Staffan de Mistura as the new Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and urge the parties to utilize his good offices and wealth of experience towards the attainment of an amicable solution to the impasse. I would like to thank the delegations of Australia, Jordan and Luxembourg for their leadership in driving the negotiation process, which culminated in today's remarkable, unanimous resolution.

    2014-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7216 (2014) · source

  9. It also establishes a monitoring mechanism to ensure that the contents of aid convoys are indeed intended for humanitarian use. The adoption of resolution 2165 (2014) today is a demonstration of the unrelenting commitment of the Security Council to work assiduously in the higher interests of the Syrian people. We expect that this resolute effort will continue to serve as a model in the Council's future efforts. We reiterate the imperative for a political solution to the Syrian crisis and we urge all parties to work towards the implementation of the 30 June 2012 Geneva communique (8/2012/522, annex). It is in that regard that we welcome the appointment of Mr.

    2014-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7216 (2014) · source

  10. Nigeria view the crisis in Syria as an internal conflict that requires a political solution. However, as the fighting remains brutal and intractable and assumes a new dimension with the involvement of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the attendant humanitarian situation calls for concerted international action for effective address. Resolution 2165 (2014) seeks to accomplish that objective. Nigeria voted in favour of the resolution in the collective search for a remedy for the protracted situation being endured by the Syrian people. The resolution authorizes the United Nations and its implementing partners to deliver humanitarian assistance across borders and conflict lines and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian supplies to those in need.

    2014-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7216 (2014) · source

  11. We believe that the time is ripe for a deepening synergy between the Security Council and United Nations Member States, particularly the troop- and police-contributing countries, for a more cohesive mandate design. We take this opportunity to pay tribute to peacekeeping personnel who have lost their lives in United Nations peacekeeping operations. We are in their great debt, and the greatest tribute we believe we can pay them is to attempt to beat our swords into plowshares.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  12. Experience shows that multidimensional peacekeeping operations face challenges in terms of the technical expertise required to comprehensively implement effective peacebuilding programmes. Achieving that will require that efforts are undertaken by troop-contributing countries to conduct specific training and scenario-based exercises aimed at enhancing the capacity of multidimensional peacekeeping missions to deliver on peacebuilding programmes. We endorse the View that there should be a sequencing of tasks in multidimensional missions with the utmost priority accorded to the most important mandate of peacekeepers, which is the protection of civilians.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  13. Those tasks, as we know, range from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to peacebuilding, nation-building, the setting up of institutions of rule of law, the strengthening of human rights protection, the protection of civilians, the promotion of democracy and good governance, as well as promoting security sector reforms. Peacekeeping operations are now staffed with child protection advisers, gender advisers, experts in planning elections and a broad range of other personnel with expertise in various fields. In light of the resource constraints faced by peacekeeping operations, it would seem logical for the United Nations to prioritize the various mandates in a multidimensional operation and accord the greatest priority to the most urgent and attainable tasks.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  14. While acknowledging the progress that has been made by the United Nations, we believe that a coherent standardized training programme for current and prospective peacekeeping contingents on inter-mission cooperation is very essential to overcoming the challenges in inter-mission cooperation and to ensure that all forces have a common understanding of their critical role in the process. United Nations peacekeeping mandates have transformed from simple ceasefire monitoring and have become multidimensional. That in effect requires peacekeeping operations to carry out multiple tasks usually under very challenging circumstances.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  15. Subsequently, the Council approved inter-mission cooperation in resolution 1951 (2010) of November 2010 between the United Nations Mission in Liberia and UNOCI and resolution 1650 (2005) between the United Nations Operation in Burundi and MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In recent times, we have seen units redeployed to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan from United Nations peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Darfur within the framework of inter-mission cooperation.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  16. The benefits derived from the use of drones, in our view, make the case for their sustained application in the context of peacekeeping operations. Inter-mission cooperation has been aptly described as a tool that enables the United Nations to fill critical gaps in personnel and/or equipment in situations, such as humanitarian crisis or other emergencies. That has been the practice since June 2005 when the Security Council adopted resolution 1609 (2005), which authorized the temporary redeployment of personnel between the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  17. UAVs could make it possible to reduce the number of peacekeepers on the ground. The implication of that is that it could also potentially help to reduce the number of peacekeepers and civilians killed in peacekeeping missions. Another critical way in which drones could contribute to making peacekeeping operations more effective is in the area of surveillance. A drone operating silently at several thousand metres above the ground can observe and transmit images in real time to its controllers on the ground. That translates into real-time information, which in certain circumstances could allow for the kind of rapid response that makes the difference between life and death or allow for monitoring the movements of combatants in conflict situations. Drones could also help in the protection of civilians, especially those displaced by conflict.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  18. While some members have concerns about the use of UAVs in peacekeeping missions, we believe that modern technology should rightly be considered as we seek solutions to the evolving challenges of peacekeeping. We share the View of Under-Secretary-General Ladsous that the United Nations cannot continue to work with twentieth- century tools in the twenty-first century. As has been noted, drones could be use to reduce the risk on the ground for United Nations peacekeepers. That is significant when we consider the fact that 106 United Nations peacekeepers died in 2013, and another 22 civilians lost their lives, while serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations. According to the United Nations, an average of one United Nations peacekeeper is killed every 30 days.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  19. Operation Sangaris has been deployed in the Central African Republic since December 2013 with the aim of working with MISCA to restore security, protect civilians and stabilize the humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic. When MINUSCA is eventually deployed, in September 2015, Operation Sangaris will have been on the ground for nine months. The particular situation in Central African Republic is that MINUSCA will also have to work in parallel with another international force, namely the European Union force, which is made up of personnel from France and Estonia. One of the new trends in United Nations peacekeeping operations is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  20. Thus far, MINUSMA and the French forces have worked together to restore peace to areas previously seized by rebel groups, and in the process, they have made very significant progress in the protection of civilians, which is a primary concern for the Council. Another example of where a United Nations peacekeeping operation will be working in parallel with regional forces is in the Central African Republic. In that case, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which was established by resolution 2149 (2014) of April 2014 to replace the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) on 15 September 2014, will work side by side with Operation Sangaris, made up of French forces.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  21. The military forces may be from one country or may be deployed by a regional organization involving personnel from its member States. Examples of that can be seen in Mali, where French forces have been deployed since January 2013 under Operation Serval. The United Nations peacekeeping force MINUSMA was later deployed in July 2013 to replace the African- led International Support Mission in Mali and operates side by side with the French forces under separate commands. Resolution 2100 (2013), which established MINUSMA, authorized the French forces under Operation Serval to intervene, upon the request of the Secretary-General, in support of MINUSMA when the Mission is under serious and imminent threat.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  22. That is illustrated in the adoption of resolutions 1933 (2010), 2098 (2013) and 2100 (2013), which respectively empowered the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to undertake pre-emptive measures to fulfil their mandates, including the use of force. The robust mandates given to peacekeeping missions exemplify the Council's determination to meet the new challenges in peacekeeping operations. One significant new trend in peacekeeping is the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations in parallel with foreign military forces already on the ground.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  23. In several instances, troops and their civilian counterparts have been fired upon, abducted or ambushed. Some have, in the course of carrying out their mandates, had their weapons seized and yet others have been killed by armed groups. Peacekeepers have also been attacked through the use of improvised explosive devices. The changing dynamics in the peacekeeping environment and the concerns of troop- and police-contributing countries for the safety of their personnel have led to the approval of more robust mandates for peacekeeping operations.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  24. As those conflicts often present a threat to international peace and security, the international community cannot be bystanders without taking action. That has led to a situation where, as indicated in the concept note, peacekeeping operations have been deployed in theatres with elevated risks, where there is little or no peace to keep and where peacekeepers face unconventional threats and greater risks to their safety. In such situations, the classical model of peacekeeping would prove inadequate and almost ineffective. A major concern arising from the new trends in United Nations peacekeeping operations relates to the well-being of peacekeepers, who have been increasingly subjected to harsh and risky conditions while they are required to serve as a protective force.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  25. Since the end of the cold war in the 1990s, United Nations peacekeeping operations have undergone substantial changes from the classical concept of peacekeeping, which entailed impartiality, a non-combative posture, intervening with the consent of the warring parties and the prior existence of a peace agreement or ceasefire. That is principally because, in the post-cold-war era, conflicts have moved from being largely inter-State to being intra-State. The nature of those intra-State conflicts is such that there is often no ceasefire or peace agreement in place before a peacekeeping operation is deployed. The dynamics of the conflict make it difficult or indeed impossible to achieve a ceasefire.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  26. President, identifies at least six distinct new trends in peacekeeping, and 1 would like to mention them in their order: the nature of conflicts, which is changing from inter-State to intra-State; robust mandates characterized by the use of pre-emptive force and targeted offensive operations; the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations in parallel with foreign military forces, both national and regional; the technical strengthening of United Nations peacekeeping operations through the use of high- technology equipment; the operational strengthening of United Nations peacekeeping operations through inter-mission cooperation; and the greater complexity of contemporary multidimensional mandates.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  27. The Nigerian delegation thanks the delegation of the Russian Federation for organizing this topical debate. We are especially appreciative of the concept note (S/2014/384, annex) provided to guide our discussions today, and we welcome the opportunity to share our perspectives on this very timely subject. We also want to take this opportunity to thank the Secretary-General, not only for his statement, but especially for his abiding commitment to peacekeeping. The concept note that you have provided, Mr.

    2014-06-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7196 (2014) · source

  28. We owe a great debt to the delegation of the Republic of Korea for its leadership of the 1540 (2004) Committee, and pledge our continued support to the Committee.

    2014-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7169 (2014) · source

  29. As we respond to the challenges of today, we must bear in mind that a proactive approach is needed if we are to develop a long-term strategy to deal with potential avenues for the illicit acquisition and use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by terrorists and other non-State actors. We must be particularly vigilant with dual-use technologies that can be readily applied in ways that may threaten international peace and security. To ensure this, Member States must be kept abreast of emerging issues and maintain their commitment to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Nigeria welcomes the adoption today ofpresidential statement S/PRST/2014/7. It is indeed a suitable outcome of this important debate. It sends a strong message of commitment on the part of the Security Council to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

    2014-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7169 (2014) · source

  30. All these efforts demonstrate the genuine desire of the African Union to play a leading role in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). While we note the encouraging figures reflected in the voluntary submission of national reports by 172 Member States, we still see aneedto consolidate the gains of the first decade by developing a viable Government and civil society partnership to aid various national action plans. An appraisal of the implementation of the mandate of resolution 1540 (2004) shows a measure of commitment on the part of Member States. It is worthy of note that numerous countries have adopted laws and regulations that comply with a substantial number of obligations contained in the resolution. These measures provide reference points and useful mechanisms for confidence-building measures.

    2014-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7169 (2014) · source

  31. The workshop discussed how best to meet the obligations of African States to implement the resolution, given the constraints they faced, linked to their limited capacities and resources. Following the workshop, the African Union, at the twentieth ordinary session of its Assembly in January 2013, underlined the relevance of resolution 1540 (2004) and highlighted the challenges to its full and effective implementation in Africa. In December 2013, the AU held another workshop on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). One of the objectives of the event was to discuss challenges and identify opportunities to address practical issues relating to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), with the aim of equipping African States with the practical tools to enable them to achieve concrete progress in meeting their obligations.

    2014-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7169 (2014) · source

  32. That position was reaffirmed in 2006 when the African Union Commission signed a memorandum of understanding with the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons so as to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Africa. As of today, 51 African countries have signed and ratified the Convention. Similarly, in collaboration with South Africa as the then-Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the African Union, assisted by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, in 2012 organized a workshop for African States on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

    2014-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7169 (2014) · source

  33. It thus represents a significant step towards strengthening nuclear non-proliferation. As of today, all 53 members of the African Union (AU) have signed the Treaty. Morocco, which is not a member of the AU, signed the Treaty in April 1996. This implies that the Treaty of Pelindaba enjoys universal membership in Africa. The African Commission on Nuclear Energy is the body mandated to monitor compliance by States parties, and has worked assiduously to transform the compliance architecture of the Treaty of Pelindaba. In July 2002, at its thirty-eighth ordinary session, the Assembly of the Organization of African Unity took a decisive step in support of the global chemical weapons disarmament and non-proliferation regime by encouraging the universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Africa.

    2014-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7169 (2014) · source

  34. Success in that direction would provide crucial components of transparency in the overall goal of achieving the objectives of the second pillar of the NPT, in pursuance of non-proliferation obligations. The ongoing third session of the Preparatory Committee for the ninth Review Conference, to take place in 2015, provides another opportunity to stridently deepen our resolve to extend the establishment of similar zones in parts of the world where they currently do not exist. Africa became a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 2009 when the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, better known as the Treaty of Pelindaba, entered into force. Among its other aims, the Treaty of Pelindaba seeks to prohibit the development, production, stationing and testing of nuclear explosive devices in Africa.

    2014-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7169 (2014) · source

  35. The link between resolution 1540 (2004) and compliance with regimes such as those of the CWC, the BWC and the NPT, and in particular the contents of articles 1 and 2 of the NPT, cannot be overemphasized. It becomes compelling to forestall abuses in the exercise of article 4 ofthe NPT by calling on States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accede to the Treaty and bring such facilities under the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones across all remaining regions of the world is, we believe, important to preventing the vertical and horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

    2014-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7169 (2014) · source

  36. We should strive to develop assets and resources at the national, regional and international levels to sustain the long-term vision of the resolution. As demonstrated through its extension in the adoption of resolution 1977 (2011), we should incrementally build on what has already been achieved while remaining adaptive to developing new strategies and a dynamic global security architecture, to meet new proliferation challenges. Resolution 1977 (2011), for example, emphasized cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations. Such cooperation, we believe, presents an avenue for enhancing global engagement on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

    2014-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7169 (2014) · source

  37. The resolution obliges all States to do three key things: to put in place internal controls to prevent the proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, their means of delivery and related materiel; to refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors attempting to develop or possess weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and to adopt effective laws prohibiting non-State actors from possessing weapons of mass destruction, in particular for terrorist activities. In furtherance of these objectives, it is pertinent to say that resolution 1540 (2004) should not be seen as a stand-alone instrument. The increasing threat to global peace and security compels us to act in unison, including through the consolidation of existing non-proliferation mechanisms.

    2014-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7169 (2014) · source

  38. Indeed, while the three main treaties pertaining to weapons of mass destruction - the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) - address non-proliferation, they do not take into account the possibility of such weapons falling into the hands of non-State actors, especially terrorists. Therein lies the significance of resolution 1540 (2004), which can be said to complement the three global treaties.

    2014-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7169 (2014) · source

  39. The tenth anniversary should also serve as a reminder of the key security challenges of our time and the need to strengthen the use of this binding instrument to address the potential threat to international peace and security if terrorists and other non-State actors were to acquire weapons of mass destruction. As the second Council resolution to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations outside a country-specific context, resolution 1540 (2004) has been aptly described as filling a gap in international law by addressing the risk that terrorists might obtain and use weapons of mass destruction.

    2014-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7169 (2014) · source

  40. We warmly welcome you, Sir, to the Council. I also wish to thank the Korean delegation for convening this debate on a matter of profound importance to international peace and security and for the excellent concept note (S/2014/313, annex) that has provided a good guide for our discussions today. I also thank Deputy Secretary-General Eliasson for his very succinct statement. Ten years after the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 (2004), it is appropriate that we take stock of the journey so far in its implementation, and indeed the way forward in terms of what remains to be done.

    2014-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7169 (2014) · source

  41. The international community, including the United Nations and the relevant regional organizations, must remain engaged and committed to finding a peaceful solution that takes into consideration the interests of all people of Ukraine. We would like to see Ukraine return to peace, security and stability, and its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity respected in accordance with the Charter of United Nations. The alternative would resemble falling dominoes - not only in the region but in every other region in the world. Perhaps we should all study the domino theory. We would be mortified by what we saw. The current scenario is for us simply mortifying. It is our collective responsibility to prevent the domino theory from being replayed out in our times.

    2014-05-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7167 (2014) · source

  42. We acknowledge the responsibility of the Government to maintain public order and the rule of law. It is also possible to restore public order in a measured manner to avoid degeneration into a full-blown conflict. Our call on all parties to de-escalate tensions could not be more urgent. We reiterate our position that the outcome of the Geneva meeting of 17 April among Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the European Union and the United States provides the path to the resolution of the conflict. There are, however, prerequisites to that. All sides must refrain from violence, intimidation or provocative action. All armed groups must disarm and vacate illegally seized buildings. The doors to a diplomatic solution must remain open.

    2014-05-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7167 (2014) · source

  43. I want to thank you, Madam President, for accepting to shepherd the Security Council in the month of May. My delegation wishes you green pastures. I thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman for his update. The delicate nature of the situation in Ukraine impels us to urge great circumspection by the contending parties in order to avoid a degeneration of the crisis into full-blown military confrontation. That consideration is even more pertinent today, as developments on the ground have assumed an anarchical dimension. The reported downing of two Ukrainian military helicopters yesterday and the seizure of a local railway control centre near Donetsk by unidentified armed groups amplify our concerns. The brazen takeover and control of public establishments by armed groups has led to the recent response by the Government of Ukraine.

    2014-05-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7167 (2014) · source

  44. There are no more names inscribed on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The meeting rose at 7.35 pm.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7165 (2014) · source

  45. We believe that the Geneva agreement provides a strong surgical procedure that can mend those veins. The clock is ticking. Ukraine is the patient. The Security Council and the international community constitute the surgical team. Let us stabilize and restore the patient to health, or many more may bleed. That is our collective responsibility. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the representative of Ukraine.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7165 (2014) · source

  46. The capture and detention of monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), who are designated and expected to play a leading role in implementing the de-escalation measures agreed on at the Geneva talks is, in our view, an affront to the international community. We support the position of the Secretary-General that international missions working in Ukraine must be allowed to perform their duties unimpeded. We call for the immediate release of the OSCE monitors and urge those with influence in the capitals to use it to that end. As in every conflict, the way forward to lasting peace, security and stability in Ukraine lies in dialogue between all the parties concerned. The alternative of a military option would only bleed Ukraine's already open veins.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7165 (2014) · source

  47. It was decided that all sides must refrain from violence, intimidation and provocative actions. The meeting specifically called for the disarmament of all illegal armed groups and the return of all illegally seized buildings to the legitimate owners. Significantly, it was agreed that protesters who laid down their arms and vacated the buildings they occupied would be granted amnesty. We believe that the agreement reached in Geneva constitutes the basis for the peaceful resolution of the crisis in Ukraine. That scenario offered a glimmer of hope, as Under-Secretary-General Feltman has aptly characterized it. That glimmer of hope, I am afraid, is fast fading before our eyes. Armed men continue to occupy buildings in cities across eastern Ukraine, and the level of violence is escalating.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7165 (2014) · source

  48. I shall now make a statement in my national capacity. I want to join other Council members in thanking Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Feltman, for his update on the situation in Ukraine. The situation in Ukraine remains tense, and the risk of further escalation remains a matter of grave concern to the international community. Utmost care needs to be taken to ensure that the crisis does not degenerate into a civil war. Ifit does, it might become an internationalized conflict, with attendant reverberations everywhere. We followed with keen interest the talks held about two weeks ago in Geneva between Ukraine, the European Union, the United States and the Russian Federation. At the meeting, they agreed on initial concrete steps to de-escalate tensions and restore security for all citizens.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7165 (2014) · source

  49. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Ukraine to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7165 (2014) · source

  50. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The meeting rose at 10.15 am.

    2014-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7163 (2014) · source