YouSaid · the spoken record

Nobilo

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159
first
1992-11-16
most recent
1995-12-15
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18
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un-security-council

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  1. “The demilitarization period should begin as soon as possible, and therefore we call on the members of the Council to consider and decide on this issue next week, and certainly before 25 December. We believe that any delay in addressing the implementation of the Basic Agreement would minimize the possibility of its success. Croatia, therefore, cannot, under any circumstance, accept a new force that would take more than a month to deploy. The momentum for peace that is evident in implementing the Peace Agreement in Bosnia should be emulated and utilized to secure peace in Croatia as well. This important linkage between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is also noted in the 13 December report of the Secretary-General, which notes the threat that: "failure to implement one would present to implementation of the other". (S/1995/103], para.”

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  2. “Therefore, I should like to use this opportunity to state for the record that the proposals contained in the Secretary-General's report of 13 December regarding the deployment of a large international force to Croatia is unacceptable to my Government. Croatia is still of the view that a force of less than 5,000 is satisfactory for implementation of the Basic Agreement. The size of the force that is at present in the Vukovar region may even be adequate. But if the Council should decide to increase the size of that force, its numbers can again be reduced immediately following the first month of the implementation period. In fact, the military aspect of the new implementation force can be drawn down completely after the 30-day demilitarization period ends. The civilian aspect, meanwhile, can be strengthened.”

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  3. “Let me conclude by briefly presenting the position of my Government on the 12 December report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of another Dayton-related accord, the Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, or the occupied Vukovar region of Croatia. Croatia is concerned that the options outlined in the report put counter- productive emphasis on region-external risks and not enough emphasis on the most important element of the Agreement, namely, rapid dernilitarization. The Croatian Government cannot accept an attempt to build a new and improved safe area in the occupied Vukovar region, nor should the Security Council. This approach would achieve nothing more than to preserve the status quo. This is not in the interest of the parties nor of the international community.”

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  4. “The present situation may allow the earliest repatriation to those Bosnian Croat refugees and displaced persons whose homes of origin are on Federation territory. Their number is by no means small. It may be as high as 200,000. The viability of the Federation and of the multiethnic fabric of Bosnia rests primarily upon the ability of this group of Croats to return home before the elections planned for next autumn. This Bosnian Croat community, which has often weathered severe international criticism - some of which may have been warranted - also deserves enormous praise for its defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its struggle for national rights and autonomy was wholly justified in view of the persecutions and depopulation it has suffered throughout the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  5. “My Government, as members may well know, is greatly burdened by the costs of the care of about 400,000 refugees and displaced persons now in Croatia, costs that are now approaching $2 billion. But we are even more concerned about the welfare of the close to 320,000 Bosnian Croat refugees and displaced persons who are now living throughout Europe. This number represents almost one half of the Whole Bosnian Croat community. They must be provided with an opportunity to return to their homes or must be compensated for their property fairly and in a timely manner. We, of course, would prefer the former. The Bosnian Croat community, but also Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, would be significantly weakened politically if the majority of them did not return to their homes.”

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  6. “We regret that the agreement on normalization of relations between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including mutual recognition, was not signed in Paris. It has always been Croatia's position that unconditional recognition is a prerequisite for the equitable resolution of all outstanding issues between any two sovereign States. Bearing in mind that the present draft resolution is extensive in its content, my delegation would like to emphasize just one paragraph that is of particular importance to my Government. Paragraph 8 recognizes the right of all Bosnian refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes of origin in safety and calls on the United Nations to play a leading role in their repatriation.”

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  7. “Many injustices are yet to be remedied, but we are confident that they will be. The momentum of peace that has carried us through since early autumn gives us hope and confidence. The timely deployment of the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), which will be authorized by the present draft resolution, will continue this momentum. The momentum of peace, however, cannot stop there. The economic and electoral aspects of the Peace Agreement must be implemented with the same commitment and vigour. IFOR alone cannot secure a lasting and just peace in Bosnia. To recall the words of my President spoken at Paris on Wednesday, "All of us participating in this historic act face the responsibility not to allow the peace efforts that have been achieved with such difficulty to fail".”

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  8. “They gave Bosnia the vitality and spirit to fight the ills imbedded in ideologies of the past, ideologies that were intent on destroying it and two of its peoples. To this we can add the people who came to Bosnia and Herzegovina from all corners of the world. The political leaders, the peace-keepers, the journalists and the humanitarian workers: all of them helped Bosnia - some more, some less, but nevertheless, they helped all the same. My delegation, therefore, would like to note with emphasis paragraph 35 of draft resolution S/ 1995/ 1033, which recognizes the good will and sacrifices of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. No matter how difficult and tragic the past four years have been, the peace that was reached in Dayton on 22 November and signed in Paris yesterday will move Bosnia and the whole region forward.”

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  9. “A few months later, at Kupres, the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina took up arms for the first time to defend themselves in an organized way from another long column of advancing JNA tanks. The defenders of Kupres, like the innocent victims of Ravno, paid a heavy price. What followed thereafter in Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia, as we all know, was much worse. However, what made it all somewhat less devastating, if that seems possible, was the people themselves - such as the people of Kupres, who founded the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), which was the first institution to defend Bosnia and Herzegovina and was the first reason why Bosnia and Herzegovina was able to survive; such as the people of Sarajevo, who stood up bravely and relentlessly to defend the principles and ideals that today's civilization holds dear and irreplaceable.”

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  10. “The action by the Security Council today, to establish a multinational implementation force to police a final peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, will show that the Council, in effect, has turned the closing page on the twentieth century. The ending of what we hope is the last European war has yielded not a just peace, but a fair peace based on a balance of power and the reality of scarce resources. A just peace remains attainable, however. It can come about only with the full implementation of all aspects of the Peace Agreement. It was four years ago, on 1 October, that the first Bosnian-Herzegovinian village, Ravno, was "ethnically cleansed" by units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and irregulars that entered Bosnia and Herzegovina from Montenegro.”

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  11. “At the outset, I should like to congratulate the Russian Federation on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month and to assure you, Sir, of my delegation's full cooperation on the two other important regional issues that will come before the Council next week. Likewise, I should like to commend the delegation of Oman for the able way in which it led the work of the Council last month. My delegation welcomes the Security Council's prompt consideration of and action upon the present draft resolution. This timely effort is another demonstration of the international community's firm and resolute commitment to finally rescue Bosnia and Herzegovina and its people from four years of aggression, genocide and suffering. History often tells us that this century began in 1914, with the tragic events in Sarajevo.”

    1995-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3607 (1995) · source

  12. “We therefore wish to stress once again that any exclusion of the question of the remaining occupied territories of Croatia, in the eastern part of my country, from the present comprehensive peace plan, especially de- linking it from the sanctions regime against Belgrade, would inevitably force my Government to consider other legitimate means of restoring its sovereignty over, and bringing order to, its entire territory. However, we remain hopeful, and will continue to cooperate in the present effort to bring lasting peace to my country, to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the entire region.”

    1995-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3578 (1995) · source

  13. “We strongly believe that sanctions are still one of the most effective instruments in the hands of the international community for bringing an end to this tragic and unnecessary war. Eliminating this instrument would undermine the already established balance and the international community's leverage on this conflict. Croatia firmly believes that the gradual lifting of the sanctions against Belgrade must be related to deeds and not to promises. We also remind the Security Council that its resolution 871 (1993) clearly established the linkage between ending Belgrade's economic and political isolation and its cooperation in ending the occupation of parts of my country.”

    1995-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3578 (1995) · source

  14. “We have always advocated the international community's using a careful balance of diplomatic, military and economic pressure on the Serbian side, which had until recently refused to implement the resolutions of this Council and rejected various peace initiatives. My Government welcomes the new signs of cooperation from the Belgrade authorities and their Serbian proxies in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, which are a result of the determined use of the combined instruments at the disposal of the international community, as well as of the newly established military balance between the forces of the Serbian aggressors and those of their Croatian and Bosnian victims.”

    1995-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3578 (1995) · source

  15. “Let me take this opportunity to express once again, Mr. President, my appreciation for the fine manner in which you are guiding the work of the Security Council. The Republic of Croatia welcomes the renewed effort of the international community to bring peace to the war-torn regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, and in particular we welcome the American leadership demonstrated in the current peace initiative, which holds much promise. We have always stated that the end of the aggression and human suffering in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia can be achieved only if the international community is determined to respect the basic principles of international law and to implement the resolutions of the Security Council.”

    1995-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3578 (1995) · source

  16. “The Croatian Government is of the firm View that the latest developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina are also a consequence of the international community's turning a blind eye to the serious increase in Serbia's interference in the occupied territories of Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This development must be reconsidered with the utmost seriousness and urgency lest the whole peace process in the region come to a tragic end.”

    1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source

  17. “The Republic of Croatia would consider the displacement of this population to be a serious threat to its internal security and therefore its citizens, and may be compelled to undertake measures to secure the status of Bihac as a safe area, if that status ever becomes threatened. The Government and the citizens of Croatia will most certainly also have to draw additional conclusions in respect of the developments in Srebrenica and the lack of response from the international community regarding the United Nations mandate in Croatia and the ability and willingness of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) to achieve its objectives, the control of Croatia's relevant international borders in particular.”

    1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source

  18. “The likely exodus of tens of thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands, of Bosnian Muslim refugees from Srebrenica and the other safe areas could create serious problems for the delicate political and economic balance in the already-impoverished federation's territory. The Republic of Croatia, which already cares for close to 200,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina - more than any other Member State - and where every eleventh person is a displaced person or a refugee, is also seriously concerned about its ability to care for additional refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this light, Croatia is especially concerned about the situation in the safe area of Bihac, which is home to more than 60,000 people.”

    1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source

  19. “Allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the responsible duties of presidency of the Security Council for the month of July and to wish you success in your endeavours. The Croatian Government is extremely worried by the latest development in the six Security Council- declared safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and extremely disturbed by the developments in Srebrenica. The decision by the Bosnian Serb leadership, with the assistance of the Belgrade authorities, to renew their advances in the safe areas and the lack of an appropriate response by the international community pose serious risks for Croatia and the Bosnian Croat federation.”

    1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source

  20. “If the Security Council decides that its mandate is indeed for a partial closure of the border, my Government will have to re-evaluate its position in the peace process and its position on the likelihood of the successful implementation of the UNCRO mandate that also calls for border control - in this case, between Croatia and Serbia, and the relevant borders between Croatia and Bosnia.”

    1995-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3551 (1995) · source

  21. “My Foreign Minister wrote to the Security Council on 28 June, giving concrete and detailed evidence on how and where the border had been violated. The Minister's letter was followed by numerous independent reports, even including reports from the independent media from Serbia and Montenegro, effectively confirming the evidence presented by my Government. The Croatian Government therefore considers the present ICFY border mission report and certification erroneous and factually wrong, and therefore null and void. We call on the Security Council thoroughly to review the work of the ICFY mission and to clarify whether its mandate means partial or effective closure of the border.”

    1995-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3551 (1995) · source

  22. “The peace process has also been derailed by the unfortunate devaluation of the Security Council mandate for the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) border mission on the Serbia and Montenegro/Bosnia and Herzegovina border. The ICFY has clearly reinterpreted its mandate to mean partial closing of the border, and not effective closing, as was originally envisaged by the Security Council. The ICFY report concerning 688 incidents of border crossings by military personnel for the period, which do not indicate whether these involve one soldier per incident or an entire bus-load, best illustrates the depreciation of the mission's mandate and effectiveness. My Government has given ample evidence that the relevant border is not effectively closed.”

    1995-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3551 (1995) · source

  23. “It is the strong position of our two Governments that the only way out of this impasse is for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to recognize not only the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also the Republic of Croatia, and for the international community to establish the Security Council- mandated effective border closure of the relevant borders of Serbia and Montenegro with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, and the relevant borders between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. The present situation in the region does not bode well for the peace process in general, for the continued presence of the United Nations peace-keepers in the region, and for the necessary end to renewed hostilities in some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

    1995-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3551 (1995) · source

  24. “I should like first of all to reiterate the words of my Foreign Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who joins us today, as expressed in their letter to you this morning, that the peace process in the region has become deadlocked by, first, the refusal of the Serbs in Pale to accept the Contact Group plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina; secondly, the refusal of the Serbs in Knin to accept the mandate of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) and, thirdly, the intensified interference by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.”

    1995-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3551 (1995) · source

  25. “At the outset, Mr. President, I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of July and to assure you of my delegation's full support and cooperation on the many important issues involving our region and other matters now before the Security Council. Allow me also to express my delegation's sincere congratulations to the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany for the exemplary way in which they led the work of the Council last month.”

    1995-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3551 (1995) · source

  26. “Regarding the possible use of the rapid reaction force outside that theatre, the Croatian Government is of the firm View that any operational use of the rapid reaction force on the territory of the Republic of Croatia may proceed only after consultations with my Government, and with its prior approval and consent.”

    1995-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3543 (1995) · source

  27. “With this in mind, we support the draft resolution before us now in the sincere hope that it will benefit the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia welcomes the establishment of the rapid reaction force and is ready to provide all the logistical support required for its successful deployment. It is our understanding that, while the rapid reaction force will use some command and logistic facilities on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, its theatre of operation will be exclusively on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

    1995-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3543 (1995) · source

  28. “Mr. President, my delegation is pleased to see you presiding over the proceedings of the Security Council this month. We are confident that your understanding of the problems in our region and your generally recognized diplomatic skills will greatly contribute to the current and forthcoming deliberations of the Council. I should also like to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to Ambassador Jean-Bernard Merimee of France, under whose prudent guidance the Council deliberated during the month of May. Croatia welcomes the efforts of the Security Council and the international community to bring about a just and peaceful solution to the crisis in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and will continue to contribute to this as much as possible under the circumstances.”

    1995-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3543 (1995) · source

  29. “We are especially concerned that the draft resolution does not give enough consideration to the imperative right of the hundreds of thousands displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes. We hope that the upcoming report of the Secretary-General will mitigate these concerns. Finally, we should like to express our expectation that the new arrangement will be successful, because, unlike the case of UNPROFOR, it will have a precise political foundation. We hope that the mistakes of UNPROFOR will not be repeated, and that UNCRO will, in a reasonable time, achieve its goals of border control, confidence- building and reintegration of the occupied territories and their impoverished people into Croatia.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  30. “If there were no rule that a host country cannot co- sponsor draft resolutions regarding operations on its own territory, my delegation would consider co-sponsoring the draft resolution, as amended today, because of its political significance: it firmly and indisputably confirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia and clearly states that the new operation will be carried out in its entirety on Croatian soil. This does not mean that we are satisfied with all parts of the draft resolution. On the contrary, my delegation has already expressed its reservations in regard to the wording of some paragraphs, due to lack of clarity and the way in which some prior resolutions are interpreted.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  31. “We should also like to emphasize my Government's satisfaction that the Council came to support our demands that the name of the operation should confirm that the new operation will be carried out in its entirety on the territory of Croatia. The name of the new arrangement - the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia - meets the demands of Croatia's Parliament and my Government. Furthermore, for my Government, the acronym UNCRO cannot mean anything but United Nations Croatia.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  32. “Croatia especially welcomes operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, which clearly states that the final political solution in regard to the rights of the Croatian Serb minority, whatever form it may take, must be consistent with the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Croatia. This paragraph, as well as the third and fourth preambular paragraphs, in no uncertain terms confirms and supports the territorial integrity of Croatia in its internationally recognized borders. We sincerely hope that both Knin and Belgrade will understand this message and finally accept the only possible way in which the solution to the occupied territories can be achieved: for Belgrade through recognition of Croatia, and for Knin through peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories into the legal and administrative system of Croatia.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  33. “We attach the utmost importance to paragraph 3(d), which should be thoroughly planned and effectively executed. We firmly believe that a peaceful settlement in Croatia is possible only if this paragraph is strictly implemented. This border mechanism can be made effective by undertaking measures beyond those expressed in the Vance plan alone and by imposing punitive measures against violators, in the form of sanctions. We should take note in this regard that the Council has already established in resolution 871 (1993) that the sanctions regime imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) can be linked to developments in the occupied territories of Croatia.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  34. “This, we believe, also harms the image and potential of the United Nations in the long run. Therefore, it is also in the interest of this Organization to address these problems in regard to the operation in Croatia and all others. Croatia will continue to insist on this element in particular, as we work with the Secretariat on finding the appropriate structure for the new operation. My Government welcomes the draft resolution, as amended today, which not only recognizes Croatia's sovereignty over its occupied territories and defines its international borders, but calls for control and demarcation of these borders. The draft resolution gives the United Nations ample legal ground to fully control the relevant international borders of Croatia.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  35. “My Government has expressed its View - which is entirely justified from the point of view of operational efficiency and sovereign rights - that it should have some say in the structure of the new peace-keeping force on its territory. There have been many comments regarding this position of my Government. Some have been negative - implying the imposition of unacceptable criteria for selection. My Government's motivation on this issue concerns the problem of illegal and unprofessional activity of some UNPROFOR units, which cannot be described as other than criminal. This has been a serious problem in some instances and has caused a lot of consternation in Croatia's public opinion, thus harming the image and lessening the potential of the present peace-keeping operation.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  36. “If these two aspects of the new operation are complemented by successful implementation of confidence-building measures, outlined in resolutions 871 (1993) and 947 (1994), by timely implementation of the economic agreement of 2 December 1994, and by the creation of new confidence-building programmes, it may be possible to significantly change the present situation in Croatia by the time the mandate of the new arrangement would expire, and avoid the eventual possibility of war. Confidence-building measures alone, however, will not bring us closer to peace in Croatia. The new arrangement will require the number of international troops presently in Croatia to be significantly scaled back. Some troops will have to leave Croatia; the others may be relocated elsewhere in the region.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  37. “The tasks will focus on restoration of cooperation; redirection of economic relations; reintegration of people, by promoting confidence-building programmes; prevention of foreign interference, by controlling relevant international borders of Croatia; and normalization of relations between States in the region. The success of this operation will be measured by the effectiveness of the border control mechanisms, as mandated in paragraph 3(d) of the draft resolution in document S/1995/242, and by implementation of paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993), as affirmed in the fourth preambular paragraph. Without effective deterrence of military support from Serbia and Montenegro, and redefinition of international trade for the occupied territories of Croatia from Belgrade to Zagreb, the new operation will also fall short.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  38. “My Government sincerely hopes that the consequent misgivings will come to naught and that the upcoming period, during which the operational aspects of the new arrangement will be defined, will show that the international community stands united in protecting the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a United Nations Member State. The name of the new operation itself, the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), implies that this will be not merely a static peace-keeping operation, but an active, task-specific operation. The billions of dollars spent on a static UNPROFOR operation will be turned into a less costly, effective arrangement, with emphasis on civilian experts and specialists and less reliance on infantry soldiers alone.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  39. “During the work on the new arrangement and the present draft resolution, which will be adopted today, one Member State, regrettably, expressed low tolerance for the legitimate interests of Croatia, a Member State, and instead directed efforts into forms of short-term political pragmatism, at the expense of legal and operative logic of the relevant United Nations documents. This development puts my Government in a position to begin questioning the role of that Member State in the peace process, a role which was positive until recently. Yesterday's official and media reports that confirmed my Government's earlier information about the transfer of Yugoslav Army personnel and materiel into eastern Croatia add to our concerns.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  40. “The international community and the Secretariat cannot deny this right, granted to Croatia by the Charter of the United Nations and by the relevant resolutions. By accepting a new United Nations operation in Croatia, my Government is reaffirming its constructive role in the region, with a policy focused on a peaceful settlement of outstanding problems. This does not mean that Croatia will accept the shortcomings of the new arrangement implied in the 22 March report of the Secretary-General. Croatia expects that the new report by the Secretary-General will define the operational aspects of the new arrangement, in substance and tone, respecting the sovereign rights of Croatia and the resolutions of this Council and the General Assembly, while creating active and efficient operational mechanisms.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  41. “The Vance plan has become obsolete in the political and legal senses. It was introduced prior to Croatia's becoming a Member State, and, moreover, the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions I mentioned earlier have become the relevant legal and political framework for a solution to the problem of the occupied territories in Croatia. Croatia's sovereign rights cannot be compromised by the outdated, Vance-plan definition of "concerned parties". Nevertheless, Croatia remains committed to the unfulfilled humanitarian elements of the Vance plan. We will continue to promote the plan's spirit of cooperation and good will, but the Croatian Government must emphasize that it has an exclusive right of veto in the upcoming negotiations over the operational definitions for the new arrangements within its sovereign territory.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  42. “As I mentioned earlier, our objectives in defining the new arrangements should be focused on mitigating and overcoming the effects of the Croatian Serbs' intransigence and protecting the sovereign rights of Croatia, which have been clearly established in this Chamber and by the General Assembly, and are strongly reaffirmed in the draft resolution the Council is about to adopt. In this regard, I should like to emphasize the letter from my President of 22 March addressed to the Secretary- General (S/1995/221) regarding the so-called Vance plan. The Vance plan has, in many critical ways, become an obstacle to progress in Croatia. We dispute the Vance plan per se as a legal basis for the new arrangement, since its legal ambiguity has inspired the Croatian Serbs' intransigence.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  43. “The UNPROFOR mission has fallen short, not because of UNPROFOR itself, but because of the uncompromising resistance of the local Croatian Serbs and Belgrade. Consequently, my Government had to make a decision, as it did. Our objective now should be to define a new arrangement that would limit the costs of Serbian intransigence in the occupied territories of Croatia and in the region in general. Following the adoption of the draft resolution, as amended today, we will proceed to define the operational aspects of the new United Nations arrangements for Croatia.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  44. “As a result, the international community has passed binding decisions that, in Security Council resolution 815 (1993), effectively recognize Croatia's international borders by declaring that the United Nations Protected Areas are an integral part of Croatia; that, in paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 820 (1993), recognize Croatia's sovereignty over Serb-controlled areas in practical terms by deciding that all international trade in respect of those areas needs prior approval from the Croatian Government; that, in Security Council resolution 871 (1993), recognize the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for the costly situation in Croatia by linking the international rehabilitation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to developments in the occupied territories of Croatia; and that, in General Assembly resolution 49/43, furthermore declare that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) must relinquish its illegal hold over the territories it occupies in Croatia.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  45. “By its presence in Croatia over the past three years, UNPROFOR has contributed positively by keeping relative peace in Croatia and has given the international community time to establish a political framework and binding legal decisions that will assist in reintegrating the occupied territories and their residents into Croatia peacefully and in a manner consistent with Croatia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The relative peace has enabled the international community to consider more closely the origins and consequences of the war in Croatia.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  46. “Too many of these young men and women have lost their lives, especially over the past few weeks, in serving the citizens of Croatia honourably. Their sacrifice will always be remembered by my Government and by the people of Croatia. We should like to reflect also on both the gains and the shortcomings of the UNPROFOR operation. In evaluating UNPROFOR, it is important to distinguish between its role and the outcome of its presence in Croatia. Its role has been positive, but its mission has fallen short.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  47. “Allow me to congratulate the delegation and the people of the Republic of China for the able manner in which the delegation has discharged its duties of presidency throughout the month on the many important issues before the Council, in particular the issue of terminating the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia. I should also like to commend the delegation of Botswana for its work in the presidency during the last month. As the Council decides, at the request of my Government, to end UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia effective 5 pm. New York time, my delegation should like, most of all, to express its deep gratitude to all Member States that participated in UNPROFOR operations in Croatia and to the thousands of brave young men and women from around the world who saved many innocent lives and improved many others in Croatia.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

  48. “By addressing the situation in Croatia first, however, the international community can help Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the short term, by reallocating the necessary additional UNPROFOR resources into Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, in the long term, by creating conditions of balance favourable to continuing with the Contact Group plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. This draft resolution is a small but important step in that direction.”

    1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source

  49. “We hope that the international community will be able, in the coming months, to seize the opportunity to assist Croatia to reintegrate its occupied territories in a timely and peaceful way. The draft resolution gives us great hope. I should like to take this opportunity to praise the sponsors of the draft resolution for their serious and skilful work. A viable Croatia will as such also be able to play a more significant role in achieving the desired balance of power in the region - a balance that is still needed because of one party's rejection of the Contact Group plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. A political solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina does not appear likely in the near future.”

    1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source

  50. “On this occasion I shall simply emphasize the words of my President - that the Security Council can continue to count, in full confidence, on Croatia's acting in a manner consistent with its long-standing constructive policy in the region. Croatia will continue to support the work of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and to look for a political solution consistent with Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, in a reasonable time-frame. We shall continue to negotiate the 2-4 political plan for Croatia with the Contact Group. We shall continue to work to implement the economic agreement of 2 December, with the assistance of the international community. But we shall not allow the annexation of any part of our sovereign territory.”

    1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source