YouSaid · the spoken record

Nobilo

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159
first
1992-11-16
most recent
1995-12-15
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18
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un-security-council

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  1. “This may be quite possible, as substantial human and financial resources will be released from Croatia at about that time, given my Government's decision today on the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The UNPROFOR resources would thus be usable for other alternatives. A complete blockade of the border between Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia in this way would further the peace process in Croatia. My Government's decision on the UNPROFOR mandate, which was transmitted to the Secretary-General this morning and to your office, Mr. President, this afternoon, was taken with full regard for the international community's concerns and interests in the region.”

    1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source

  2. “Indeed, the reinforcement of this paragraph represents the Council's commitment to the spirit and the letter of that resolution. The Council's decision is especially welcome at a time when my Government is pursuing implementation of the economic reintegration agreement of 2 December with the same local Serb authorities. This extension of the border blockade, however, is not complete. The border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Croatia's United Nations protected areas Sector East can still be used by Belgrade without consequences. The members of the Council should bear this in mind with regard to the next review of the issue, which will take place in a hundred days' time.”

    1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source

  3. “Should the Belgrade authorities choose to violate paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993) in this way, the Council will be left with no alternative but to reinstate the sanctions that were suspended by its resolution 943 (1994). The Council's decision in this regard is made with the same principles in mind as when paragraph 12 was included in resolution 820 (1993) in the first place - to reiterate Croatia's sovereignty over its entire territory; to promote economic reintegration between the Government and the local Serb authorities in the United Nations protected areas in Croatia; and to protect the Croatian citizens in the protected areas from the sanctions regime imposed on the occupier, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).”

    1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source

  4. “It also contains elements that should enhance the credibility of the Council, following the reports and decisions regarding the illicit transfer of fuel into the occupied territories of Croatia from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This draft resolution alleviates some of our concern that the international community may not be sufficiently determined in its quest for a durable peace in the region. Paragraph 3 of the draft resolution extends the Yugoslav-Bosnian border blockade to affect Croatia. From now on Belgrade will not be able to send non-humanitarian assistance to the occupied territories of Croatia via the Bosnia and Herzegovina border, without consequences.”

    1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source

  5. “Allow me, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month and to assure you that my delegation is fully committed to assisting you on the many important issues that will come before the Council, particularly those that concern Croatia and its neighbours. I also extend my delegation's compliments to the Permanent Representative of Rwanda for the able way in which he led the work of the Council during December. My delegation would also like to take this opportunity to welcome the Foreign Minister of Italy, His Excellency Mr. Antonio Martino, who is a high-ranking representative of a friendly neighbouring State. Croatia welcomes the draft resolution before the Council. It contains elements that will be of great benefit to the peace process in Croatia and the region in general.”

    1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source

  6. “Its implementation is possible only when the relevant borders are sealed and the local Croatian Serb party decides to cooperate with the Croatian Government to satisfy its economic and humanitarian needs. In other words, the Security Council's adoption of the draft resolution would give political support for implementation of the agreement. The economic reintegration package is strictly tied to all Security Council resolutions, including resolution 820 (1993). Resolution 820 (1993), like all the others, will remain in force even if the Council acts negatively on the draft resolution. Over the past few months, the Serbs have defied His Holiness Pope John Paul II; they have discredited the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and they have snubbed the Secretary-General, among many others.”

    1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source

  7. “Moreover, the draft resolution would send a message that strategic resources, such as fuel, directed to the local Croatian Serb party cannot be used for the benefit of Bosnian Serbs nor be used by the local Croatian Serb party to violate the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that all arrangements to supply the local Croatian Serb party must cease unless, of course, this is approved by the Croatian Government beforehand. Some delegations have expressed the view during the prior consultations that the draft resolution would affect negatively the economic reintegration agreement between the Croatian Government and the local Croatian Serb party signed today. I assure members that it would not. On the contrary, the draft resolution would promote the implementation of the agreement.”

    1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source

  8. “The draft resolution will also reinforce the Security Council's clear mandate regarding the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its clear responsibility to protect and secure the welfare of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel in the region. While we are familiar with the trying situation of the brave Bangladeshi battalion in the area, we seem to overlook the fact that humanitarian convoys for civilian needs in Bihac have been blocked for weeks.”

    1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source

  9. “Our trust in the capacities and intentions of the international community in Croatia has come into question. Therefore, the views expressed by my Defence Minister in this regard should be taken very seriously. Furthermore, the violation of the international border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in respect of the developments in Bihac has not been adequately addressed by the Security Council. Such a state of affairs is promoting and allowing a de facto unification of the local Croatian Serb and Bosnian Serb parties into a single military and territorial entity. The Security Council is obligated to dispel any possibility of such a unification at this critical moment. The draft resolution will accomplish this objective by reinforcing principles already established in resolution 820 (1993).”

    1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source

  10. “For this reason, and because of some recent ideas on patrolling the airspace in the region, my Government will in the future request to study closely any proposals for the use of its airspace, and is now considering closely the present authorization for the use of its airspace altogether. In the case of military use of its airspace by regional arrangements, Croatia will permit the use of its airspace for the sole purpose of implementing Security Council resolutions. At the same time, we are quite aware that the use of multinational air assets may no longer be an option. If, however, the international community chooses to completely withdraw from the problem of Bihac, my Government will draw the obvious conclusions. The lessons of Bihac will have wider implications.”

    1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source

  11. “This is why my delegation has called for the timely adoption of this resolution. In regard to the use of force in the region consistent with existing Security Council resolutions, and the importance my Government attaches to the credible use of this option as a critical element in the peace process, we must note that the way force was recently used in the region may have been counter-productive. It may have served only to embolden the aggressors and demoralize the innocent civilians and defenders in Bihac. My Government had hoped that its permission to use Croatian airspace would serve to deter aggression. It has not.”

    1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source

  12. “Finally, the illegal arrangements made by the co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) to supply the local Croatian Serb party, which is attacking Bihac, with significant amounts of strategic material, fuel, that is being used against the Bihac safe area by both the local Croatian Serb party and the Bosnian Serbs represent a clear violation of Security Council resolution 820 (1993), paragraph 12. My delegation believes that the draft resolution in document S/1994/1358 before us would send the right message - that the international community is not completely caving in to the circumstances in the Bihac region and that, despite its lack of resolve in respect of the use of force option, it is willing to take steps to minimize the suffering of the civilian population in the region.”

    1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source

  13. “Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor, the Ambassador of the United States of America, for her energetic and constructive work during the previous month. The two-week long attack on Bihac is violating six major United Nations principles and decisions: first, the no-fly zone continues to be violated; secondly, the safe area continues to be violated; thirdly, the international border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be violated; fourthly, the mandate regarding delivery of humanitarian aid continues to be violated; fifthly, the mandate regarding the safety of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel continues to be undermined.”

    1994-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3475 (1994) · source

  14. “Croatia demands that the illegal transshipment of fuel and goods stop immediately. In closing, let me once again express my delegation's gratitude for the Council's timely and appropriate action.”

    1994-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3461 (1994) · source

  15. “Croatia will continue to play its constructive role in the peace process so long as the international community continues to uphold its commitment to Croatia in full compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions - but Croatia will not wait for ever. This draft resolution is but one important commitment, like the commitment related to resolution 769 (1992), which would impose mechanisms to control Croatia's international borders. The continued violations of Croatia's borders, such as the grave violation of resolution 820 (1993) and of the border-monitoring mission arrangements of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, contribute to the escalation of activities in the Bihac region by providing fuel for the war machine now attacking Bihac.”

    1994-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3461 (1994) · source

  16. “My delegation is pleased by the important step taken by the Security Council in discussing the draft resolution before it and in appropriately addressing an issue that could have very serious consequences for the region. The actions by the so-called Krajina Serb forces in Croatia can be tolerated no longer; upon its adoption, the draft resolution should be implemented fully and immediately. My delegation is also pleased by the fact that this draft resolution will further strengthen the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia on a day when we have learned that the self-proclaimed Knin authorities have rejected the mini Contact Group plan for the economic integration of Croatia's occupied territories.”

    1994-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3461 (1994) · source

  17. “The lifting of the arms embargo against the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, representing the two parties that accepted the Contact Group's territorial plan, should be a logical next step, as clearly stipulated in the 6 July paper on incentives and disincentives by the presidency of the European Union. If it was a sensible mechanism back then, it should be no different now, and certainly not in six months. The latter date should also permit the creation of a sensible mechanism for achieving the desired balance in Croatia and hence in the region in general.”

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source

  18. “This is important, because, as the Security Council chose to act positively on the sovereign request of that Member State, it should apply the same rule to the sovereign requests of the successor States of the former Member. The Foreign Minister could not have been more wrong about the consequences of his Government's decision. The Council, however, should not perpetuate this grave mistake for ever, but should seriously consider how the decision to lift the embargo could contribute to creating a new desirable balance of power in the region - a balance which certainly would have a decisive impact on all parties that reject the fair and just peace offered by the international community.”

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source

  19. “Earlier this year we emphasized in the Security Council that it might not be possible for the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina alone to achieve the desired balance of power in the region. We must recall that the Bosnian Serb party and the Yugoslav Army are the consolidated remnants of the fourth largest army in Europe. More than three years ago, on 25 September 1991, the Security Council, by resolution 713 (1991), imposed the arms embargo on the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the request of its Foreign Minister, who recalled the principle of "the sovereign right of all to decide freely on their own future". (S/PV.3009, p. 6) Since then that Member State has ceased to exist, and new successor States have become Members of the United Nations.”

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source

  20. “As the preliminary draft resolution defers the lifting of the arms embargo for six months, and in view of the wholly unacceptable situation in the occupied territories of Croatia and the expected Contact Group plan for those territories, it is logical and necessary to make the Croatian Government, too, eligible for a lifting of the arms embargo in six months, along with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, consistent with the principles of unconditional acceptance outlined in paragraph 1 of that preliminary draft resolution. The importance of Croatia in creating and maintaining the desired balance of power in the region cannot be overlooked or minimized. As we stated in the General Assembly last week, the necessary balance in Bosnia cannot be achieved by taking a detour around croatia.”

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source

  21. “The imbalance in Croatia cannot continue either, and, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community must find new mechanisms to correct the imbalance. For this reason, we particularly welcome the eighth preambular paragraph of the preliminary draft resolution the Council will be considering, which reads: "Convinced also that the continued refusal of the Croatian Serb authorities to implement key elements of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for Croatia and relevant Security Council resolutions calls into question the continued application of the embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment to the Republic of Croatia".”

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source

  22. “Three years of complete cooperation with the international community by my Government has resulted in the de facto occupation of a quarter of Croatia's territory by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Vance plan and almost all the Security Council resolutions have yet to be implemented because of the consistent obstruction and refusal by the remnants of the Yugoslav Army and by the Belgrade proxy authorities in the occupied territories of Croatia. Clearly, they have not been faced with the necessary outside pressure - the necessary pressure the international community pursues as a substitute for taking away the right of my Government to impose pressure of its own.”

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source

  23. “One of those mechanisms should include the lifting of the arms embargo against the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lifting the arms embargo, in my Government's view, would be not a step towards war, but, rather, a leap towards peace. It would move us towards a new, desirable balance in the region. Creating and maintaining a balance of power between parties and States has a long history and proven effectiveness in promoting peace and deterring war. As we have stated once before in this Chamber, the fact that the cold war never got hot is a testimonial to the benefits of creating and keeping a desirable balance of power. Like that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation in Croatia has become disturbingly unacceptable.”

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source

  24. “That imbalance could be the precursor of an even more costly war, and new steps should now be pursued to correct it. The imbalance in Bosnia and Herzegovina is clearly evident in the shocking arrogance of the Bosnian Serb party in respect of the Contact Group's territorial plan for the country, and in its continuing actions directed against civilians in Banja Luka and Bijeljina, not to mention its continuing strangulation of the safe areas declared by the 26 Security Council and the ever-increasing blockage of humanitarian aid deliveries. The Council cannot afford to give itself any more room for compromise with respect to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb party. It must plan for new mechanisms that would impose peace in that country.”

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source

  25. “In regard to the resolution of this crisis, my Government has always favoured a policy based on the objective of a political settlement brokered by the international community and implemented through the use of established diplomatic mechanisms, international law, and relevant United Nations resolutions, in conjunction with a credible threat of force. Croatia will continue to support this policy, while looking for mechanisms which would reinforce it and increase its probability of success. The balance of power which is a prerequisite for such a political settlement and for a just and lasting peace, has not, however, been achieved through the measures thus far taken by the international community. The imbalance that now exists in the region should be of critical concern to the international community.”

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source

  26. “We must also take this occasion to recall some of the positive elements of the international community's policy in respect of this crisis, such as the sanctions regime, and remind ourselves not to tamper with those successes in order to achieve dubious short-term political changes, while we are still searching for the right balance of power in the region and while the State responsible for these tragic consequences refuses to make amends even in a nominal way, by mutual recognition between the successor States of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within their internationally recognized borders, as called for by the international community.”

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source

  27. “We must recall that this conflict would not have developed had it not been for the tragic actions of one State with grand territorial designs, and that State's use of its overwhelming military superiority and exploitation of elements of its national minority outside its borders as proxies, to achieve those goals. In the process, that State has occupied 70 per cent of one country and 25 per cent of another, resulting in a loss of over 200,000 innocent lives in a campaign of mass murder, concentration camps, rape and expulsion that constitutes nothing short of genocide.”

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source

  28. “Madam President, allow me at the outset to join other delegations in welcoming your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month, and in congratulating your predecessor on the highly able manner in which he led the Council last month. In considering the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina today, we must remind ourselves once again about the source of the whole crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and its consequences, lest the pressure to find a quick solution compel us to accept answers lacking in both moral and legal substance, thereby eroding the accepted international norms of behaviour and 25 well-being, over and above the credibility of this Organization alone.”

    1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source

  29. “Mutual recognition will secure the best possible alternative for the protection of minority rights in respect of the Serbian minority in Croatia and the Croat minority in Serbia and Montenegro - reciprocity. Finally, I must express discontent and regret that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has been given the.right to address the Council. It is the firm position of my Government that the UNPROFOR mandate is taking place only on the territories of the three sovereign United Nations Member States, the Republic of. Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and therefore the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as an occupier should not be given any special status regarding this issue,”

    1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source

  30. “We must emphasize that the decision to accept the new UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia was made in large part with the view that the Contact Group will immediately commence work on the comprehensive reintegration plan for Croatia which would provide local autonomy in pre-war Serbian majority areas in Croatia, with the same acceptance/rejection measures that should be applied to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and their proxies in Knin if necessary. My Government must also emphasize the importance of the mutual recognition of existing borders between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), consistent with the final documents of the G-7 plus | summit held at Naples from 8 to 10 July, as the essential next step for the Contact Group's activities.”

    1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source

  31. “One aspect of a positive linkage involves the eventual lifting of the arms embargo against the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. My President informed the members of the Security Council in the meeting on 27 September that Croatia expected to be treated in the same way in this regard. Most importantly, the situation in the occupied territories in Croatia must be linked to the negotiating process pursued by the Contact Group in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

    1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source

  32. “We firmly believe that this draft resolution sets the solution-seeking process in the right direction and hope that the Contact Group and the United Nations will immediately begin to pursue measures which are consistent with the letter and spirit of the draft resolution so that the relevant parties will not be compelled to consider a new UNPROFOR mandate after 100 days as provided for by this draft resolution and the resolution of Croatia's Parliament. Croatia cannot continue to tolerate a situation in which it bears the brunt of the cost owing to the lack of progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not only in respect of UNPROFOR but also in other areas such as the care of Bosnian refugees. The linkage of Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina in this regard must be compensated for by the international community in a positive way.”

    1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source

  33. “My Government remains bound by the decision of Croatia's Parliament on the UNPROFOR mandate and it welcomes the elements of those decisions which have been incorporated in resolution 947 (1994), especially in respect of the "pink zones", the border monitors and the pilot projects for the return of displaced persons to their homes in the occupied areas. Similarly, we welcome the Security Council's support for the mutual recognition between the successor States of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within their internationally recognized borders. My Government views that as the essential next step in the solution-seeking process in the region.”

    1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source

  34. “Mr. President, at the beginning allow me.to extend to you my congratulations on your able presidency of this body for this month. My Government has accepted a new United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mandate for the Republic of Croatia with the clear understanding of the serious consequences arising from the decision to the country in respect of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the overall peace process, and on the basis of firm assurances from the highest representatives of the international community that the situation in the occupied territories in Croatia shall immediately come under consideration in the work of the Contact Group.”

    1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source

  35. “Should the Council decide in favour of this draft resolution, we must emphasize the importance of the ICFY monitoring Mission, which is operating with meagre resources and has been organized in hasty circumstances. The Mission must not be allowed to be used to satisfy short-term political goals. It would seriously jeopardize the viability of the present peace plan pursued by the Contact Group and put into question the credibility not only of the Contact Group but of this noble body as well and its executive role in the whole process.”

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  36. “The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ample capacity to impose necessary measures on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the occupied territories of Croatia, and the international community should insist that Belgrade pursues this type of pressure as well. Croatia cannot accept mere political declarations as a basis for suspending the most efficient mechanism the international community has used to pursue a peaceful solution to the problems in the region. We must emphasize that even this declaration is a political half- measure, because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has slightly altered relations with a certain proxy, but continues to recognize the entity the proxy represents.”

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  37. “Belgrade has continued its programme of integration of the occupied territories in Croatia into the legal, administrative and military systems of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Yet it is being rewarded solely for a half-political gesture in respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina. My Government would support the suspension of the sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under a clear programme that would take into consideration real progress on the ground and resolution 871 (1993). The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's recognition of the new States on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, within their internationally recognized borders, would be an essential first step in such a programme.”

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  38. “This policy presents the obvious problems of "leakage" which neither the draft resolution nor the Monitoring Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia will consider. We hope that the Council will take steps so that this serious problem can be addressed by the Monitoring Mission, and that the Mission will take steps consistent with resolution 820 (1993), which prohibits transshipments to the occupied territories in Croatia. My delegation cannot overlook the fact that this draft resolution may not follow the spirit of resolution 871 (1993), which links the sanction regime imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to implementation of "all relevant resolutions of the Security Council including those relating to the United Nations peace- keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia" (resolution 871 (1993), para. 5).”

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  39. “My delegation has already brought to the attention of the Council, in a letter dated 19 September 1994, one very likely way in which the border blockade is being violated: by air - violations which were reported by the Secretary-General on 13 September. We hope that the Council will not condone this new type of "no-fly zone" violations, as it already has a legal capacity to observe and prevent such violations. Another vehicle of replenishment of the Bosnian Serbs will be the proxies in the occupied territories of Croatia. Belgrade has not imposed a blockade against the latter, and some high-ranking Belgrade officials have publicly stated that the latter group will continue to be supplied through the crossing points on the Bosnia/Serbia border.”

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  40. “A telling example of this cooperation is the recent offensive against the Council-declared safe area of Bihac. The offensive was coordinated "in-progress" from Belgrade, as was pointed out in the letter dated 16 September 1994 from my Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General, using assets from the occupied territories of Croatia and from the paramilitary units under the control of the Bosnian Serb authorities. Some members of the Council may have additional information in this regard. The Bosnian Serb authorities and the Serbs in the occupied territories of Croatia will continue replenishing their war machine in several ways.”

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  41. “The sanctions regime should be suspended only after the Council receives concrete and undisputed evidence about real progress on the ground, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in Croatia. The members of the Council should not be deceived by mere political declarations when the Council has seen three years of empty or broken promises from the same party. The draft resolution can set a dangerous precedent in the region. Belgrade would be rewarded for altering relations with certain proxies, while still recognizing the illegal entities that the proxies control, and while those illegal entities continue to use materiel and personnel previously deployed by Belgrade and, further, while those assets and personnel continue to cooperate in one way or another and to be replenished by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  42. “It is the only viable political solution that would avoid more horrific human suffering for all of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia also welcomes the decision of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to give its support to the Contact Group plan, and its decision to take measures against the Bosnia Serb party. However, it is still too early to judge whether this decision is genuine and whether the measures undertaken are viable or sufficient, especially in view of the capacities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, political and real, in this regard. Therefore, my Government must express serious reservations about the draft resolution that would suspend some of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at this time.”

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  43. “We wish to thank His Excellency, Mr. Yuliy Vorontsov, for the excellent way in which he steered the work of the Council during his presidency last month. We also wish to commend you, Mr. President, for your wise leadership in guiding the Council's work this month. From the very outset of the conflict in the region, Croatia has consistently pursued a policy which favoured political process over any other solution. My Government remains steadfast in its support of this policy. We are firmly committed to the present peace process under the auspices of the Contact Group and we welcome the Group's plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federation established between Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs has the full support of Croatia, and we call on the Bosnian Serb party to join these two parties in accepting the Contact Group peace plan as well.”

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  44. “The Bosnian safe area of Bihac, for instance, is being attacked by rebel Serb forces in the occupied territories in Croatia, while conversely, Zupanja, a Croatian town, is being shelled by the Bosnian Serb militia from the Tuzla region in Bosnia. Heavier involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and new high-level leadership in the negotiating process can bring peace to the region, a peace which the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, but also of Serbia and Montenegro, finally deserve. Sixty-five thousand desperate citizens of Gorazde appeal to the Council today to recognize that their fate is in its hands. Millions of people around the world would plead likewise. The Council cannot disregard these calls for decisive action. There is too much at stake.”

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  45. “My Government will continue to support any initiative that would impose peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina - which is indeed possible and justified - after two years of tragic bloodletting that has shamefully culminated in Gorazde today. However, my Government would support the use of the Sarajevo ultimatum model in the implementation of the Security Council's resolutions and the peace agreements for the occupied territories in Croatia. Similarly, my Government would seriously consider the extension of the exclusion zones for certain safe areas, such as Bihac and Tuzla, into the territory of the Republic of Croatia.”

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  46. “If the international community is not able to impose peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the resolute use of substantive force and assertive diplomatic progress, the Security Council will have to consider other ways to achieve the desired balance of power in the region, including the right of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, to defend themselves. We must emphasize in this regard that the capacity to defend oneself does not increase violence. On the contrary, an increased capacity of self-defence creates a balance of power which decreases violence and promotes non-military solutions to conflicts. The fact that the cold war never turned "hot", and was eventually defused, attests to this.”

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  47. “That is why my delegation was very pleased to learn that a new major diplomatic initiative involving the highest political leadership of the United States, the Russian Federation and the European Union may soon become a reality. We also hope that the leadership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference will be able to play a major role in this initiative. Their participation at this point in the negotiating process may be very constructive.”

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  48. “The success of the Washington agreements for Bosnia and Herzegovina can best be confirmed on the ground. The battlefields in central Bosnia have become very quiet, and the Bosnian Muslim and Croat leaderships are working intensively to form a new government for the proposed federation. Progress in this regard will be significantly affected by the willingness of the international community to support the agreements it assisted in brokering. The assistance of political leadership at the highest level was a major factor in the success of the Washington agreements. It is the view of my delegation that the Washington agreements would have come with much greater difficulty had it not been for the personal involvement of President Clinton.”

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  49. “Croatia is genuinely committed to continuing to play a constructive role in the peace process, and the Council must consider our forbearance with respect to the United Nations protected areas as well as our enormous contribution to the care of Bosnian refugees to date. But the patience of the Croatian people regarding reintegration of United Nations protected areas and our ability to care effectively for an increasing number of Bosnian refugees is limited. In such circumstances, my delegation must insist on more vigorous engagement by the Council, lest, without decisive action now, the conflict spill over east and west of Gorazde. An even more detrimental consequence of inaction is the possible indefinite stifling of the negotiating process, which has been very successful recently.”

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  50. “The strengthening of the sanctions regime against Serbia and Montenegro, instead of promises that the sanctions regime might be revoked, is indeed a telling sign that the international community is willing to stand by its principles and its objectives in the region. My Government cannot emphasize enough the value of such a policy message. Moreover, the conditions for the lifting of the sanctions regime must be firmly linked not only with the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also with implementation of the agreements and resolutions in Croatia, consistent with resolution 871 (1993).”

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source