YouSaid · the spoken record

Perthes

lines on the record: 151
first: 2021-09-14
most recent: 2023-09-13
sittings or episodes: 10
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“In just one incident in Bleil, in South Darfur, last December, intercommunal clashes claimed the lives of at least 15 people, injured another 47 and displaced nearly 13,000. Increasing interventions by the authorities managed to de-escalate such situations and broker a cessation of hostilities. In several instances, investigations were also conducted, which is a welcome development. At the same time, the deployment of the joint security- keeping forces continues to be delayed. In the context of those conflicts, we are also concerned about reports of sexual violence, which must be investigated. The Permanent Ceasefire Committee continues its monitoring. Encouragingly, no ceasefire violations have been reported since my most recent briefing.”
2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source
“Transparent engagement with the public, the youth on the street and those who have not — or not yet — entered the process is necessary to build legitimacy for the future Government. Time is essential. The scale of challenges facing the people and any new Government are enormous. The humanitarian needs in the Sudan are at record levels, with 15.8 million people — about a third of the population — requiring humanitarian assistance this year. High food prices and increasing hunger remain a serious concern. Local conflicts, particularly in Darfur, Blue Nile and South and West Kordofan, and mainly over access to, and control of, resources, continue to result in the killing, injury and displacement of civilians. More than 16,000 people were displaced owing to conflict between December last year and February.”
2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source
“Lieutenant General Al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sovereign Council, and General Hemetti, Vice-Chairman, have repeatedly stressed that they want to see the process through and hand over power to a civilian Government. Their commitment and the cooperation of military and civilian leaders in recent weeks in order to reach a solution are highly commendable. At the same time, we have been alarmed by the rising tensions between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces in recent weeks. I have appealed to both sides for urgent de-escalation, and I was encouraged by their decision to establish a joint security committee last week and their agreement on fundamental aspects of security sector reform and integration. Civilian parties will now have to swiftly finalize discussions on the mechanisms to select a Prime Minister and form a Government.”
2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source
“That includes the leaders of two major armed movements, who are members of the current military-led Government but have not signed the framework agreement and did not participate in yesterday’s meetings. Their main difference with the signatories is not about the structures of the transition or the next Government, but rather that they wish to ensure their own representation in it. Joining the process and voicing their demands through the final political agreement would be the best way to guarantee that. The process has been a truly Sudanese one. We, the United Nations and our partners in the trilateral mechanism, have been actively facilitating it, and we will continue to do so.”
2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source
“Based on their understanding, we, the trilateral mechanism, convened a preparatory meeting at the Republican Palace, where those parties agreed to begin the drafting process for a final political agreement and a transitional constitution. They also established a committee to reach out to non-signatory parties and movements, with a timeline. Their aim is to reach a final political agreement, agree on the constitution and begin on the formation of a civilian Government before mid-April. That is ambitious, but it can be done with the necessary political will. We, the trilateral mechanism, remain encouraged by how few substantive differences there remain among the main actors.”
2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source
“Last Thursday, military and civilian leaders signed a joint paper on the phases and substance of security sector reform. That allows us — the trilateral mechanism — to launch the last workshop by the end of this week. It will focus on feasible options for the reform of the security sector and the integration of the Rapid Support Forces and armed movements into one national professional army. Hopefully, it will also come up with an initial road map for the implementation of those steps in the years to come. Things are moving fast. Yesterday the military and civilian signatories again met the trilateral mechanism, the Quad — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United States and the United Kingdom — and the European Union to confirm their commitment to the process and to speak about the next steps.”
2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source
“Each workshop thus created space for public and transparent discussions among Sudanese citizens from all walks of life, including societal groups who often feel voiceless. While the representation of Sudanese women fell short of the commitment to a 40 per cent minimum, women actively participated in the discussions. Many areas of consensus emerged. During the workshop on the east, for example, important breakthroughs, such as an agreement on a forum that will pave the way for future reconciliation in that region, emerged. The national conference on transitional justice, which concludes today, was instrumental in advancing a common understanding of accountability and reconciliation. The reform of the security sector and the integration of forces are among the most sensitive elements of the current process.”
2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source
“On 9 January, the signatories to the framework agreement, with the facilitation of the trilateral mechanism of the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the United Nations, began broad consultations in the form of workshops convened on five contentious issues: the dismantling of the old regime, the Juba Peace Agreement, the east of the Sudan, transitional justice and security sector reform. Calling those consultations “workshops” is a bit of a misnomer. Each consultation gathered together hundreds of Sudanese women and men, most of whom came from outside the capital, representing a broad social, professional and political spectrum. Even some people who had previously publicly rejected the political process joined the conferences or workshops.”
2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source
“Mr. Perthes: I thank the members of the Security Council for the opportunity to brief them once again. When I previously briefed the Council on 7 December 2022 (see S/PV.9211), the Sudanese military leadership and a broad range of civilian actors had just signed a political framework agreement. That was a watershed moment and ushered in a new phase of the political process, which seeks to lead to a new transitional period. Today we are the closest we have been to reaching a solution, although challenges remain. Let me outline where we are.”
2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source
“However, working together with the United Nations, the members of the Security Council and the larger international community in support of those efforts can help the Sudanese to move forward on the path they have chosen.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9211 (2022) · source
“A sufficiently inclusive process can help safeguard against their influence. Concerted advocacy from the international community is also needed to encourage constructive positions on the part of those who are not, or do not want to be, part of the process, as well as those who have yet to join it. In conclusion, let me once again commend those Sudanese who two days ago took the courageous step of agreeing on and signing up to the political framework agreement. That was a truly Sudanese-owned and Sudanese-led process. The framework agreement now offers a path for realizing the aspirations of the Sudan’s young people, women and men.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9211 (2022) · source
“Those issues include security sector reform and the merger of forces, transitional justice, the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, the status of the dismantling committee and the country’s east. We would also deem it useful to have an exchange in this second phase about the economic and developmental priorities of the new Government. UNITAMS and the United Nations country team have already begun to coordinate with the international community on the ground here to ensure the provision of a package of support for a new transitional period. While progress on the political track is encouraging, it can still be derailed by challenges and spoilers. As the Sudan gets closer to reaching a final political agreement, those who do not see their interests advanced by a political settlement may escalate attempts to undermine the process.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9211 (2022) · source
“In mid-November, the trilateral mechanism visited Kassala to listen to various stakeholders, officials, civil society, women, young people and tribal leaders from the east of the Sudan, which arguably is the country’s most marginalized and least represented region. Last week, the trilateral mechanism travelled to Juba to meet with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) leader, Abdelaziz El-Hilu, and SLA leader Abdul Wahid Al-Nur to inform them about the political process and hear their views. While the signing of the framework agreement is an important breakthrough, critical contentious issues still need to be addressed in the final agreement.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9211 (2022) · source
“Türk’s visit. The meaningful participation of women and young people is a critical factor for the success of the political process and the transition. The women’s rights group, a diverse group of non-partisan women from different regions, continues to engage with all parties to ensure women’s rights in any future agreement. The group continues to call for women’s meaningful participation in the process at a minimum of 40 per cent across delegations. I am encouraged that the women’s rights group has gained broader acceptance and that some of women’s demands were included in the framework agreement. In recent months, the trilateral mechanism has exerted substantial efforts to encourage Sudanese stakeholders to participate in the political process. That includes meetings with resistance committees and other civil-society actors.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9211 (2022) · source
“In the latest incident on 24 November, two protesters were killed in Omdurman, bringing the total death toll among protesters since the coup to 121, mainly in the capital. In addition, more than 8,000 people have been injured. As I have stated repeatedly before the Council, it is incumbent on the authorities to respect the right to peaceful assembly and to refrain from the excessive use of force, even when provoked. Equally important is to ensure proper due process for defendants facing trial. In that context, the visit to the Sudan last month by the new United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Volker Türk — his first field visit since assuming his duties — is testament to the unwavering commitment of the United Nations to upholding human rights in the Sudan. I thank the Sudanese authorities for facilitating Mr.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9211 (2022) · source
“That is an increase of 1.5 million as compared to 2022 — the biggest in a decade. In 2022, the number of flood-affected people surpassed that of last year and reached 349,000 across the country. High inflation continues to reduce households’ purchasing power, with people unable to meet their basic needs. While the United Nations and partner organizations managed to aid 9.1 million people in need from January to September, the 2022 humanitarian response plan is funded at only 41.3 per cent. The human rights situation remains concerning. Protests against military rule have continued and largely remained peaceful. However, security forces have more often than not acted or reacted with excessive use of force.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9211 (2022) · source
“The latest episode of violence in Jebel Marra occurred in November and resulted in the deaths of 13 civilians and the displacement of 5,600. The SLA leader, Abdul Wahid Al-Nur, confirmed to me during my recent visit to Juba that he would “neither attack nor escalate”. Let me urge all sides to at least commit to that principle. Across the Sudan, the conflict has displaced more than 260,000 people since the beginning of the year. These are human-made catastrophes, often caused by disputes over access to resources and seemingly exacerbated by political manipulation in more than a few cases. And all of that is compounding natural disasters and growing humanitarian needs. Humanitarian partners estimate that about 15.8 million people — one third of the population — will need humanitarian assistance in 2023.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9211 (2022) · source
“The resurgence of large-scale violence demonstrates the increasing fragility at the State level, exacerbated by the continued Government vacuum. The local authorities simply lack the capacity and resources to protect civilians where the root causes of fundamental grievances have yet to be addressed. Since my previous briefing to the Council on the Blue Nile in September, a state of emergency has been imposed in that region. While the levels of violence have subsided, the situation remains precarious. Intercommunal violence also occurred in Lagawa locality, in West Kordofan, in mid-October, killing at least 19 people and displacing 65,000 people. In central Darfur, the past two months have witnessed intense fighting between the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), led by Abdul Wahid Al-Nur, and the Rapid Support Forces.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9211 (2022) · source
“It will also enable a resumption of peace talks with movements that have yet to make peace with the Government and for the restoration of broad-based international support to the Sudan. The fact that we are approaching the end of the year makes this an opportune moment to reflect on the challenges of the past 13 months. The coup and the subsequent political impasse plunged the country into a state of uncertainty and insecurity. Tensions escalated into violence in areas that had previously been calm. More than 900 people have reportedly been killed and many more injured in violent conflict since the beginning of this year. In the past month there were significant clashes in Blue Nile, West Kordofan and Central Darfur.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9211 (2022) · source
“The second phase is about to begin, and the events of the past two days are the reason that I am not in New York today but talking to the Council from Khartoum. Encouragingly, both the civilian and the military stakeholders have become more transparent about preliminary understandings and have increased their efforts to reach out to other actors and to the public. A final political agreement, once reached, should result in a civilian Government that should be in a better position to address the security, humanitarian and economic situations, pave the way towards building a democratic State based on human rights, the rule of law and gender equality, and provide a future for the young men and women of the Sudan.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9211 (2022) · source
“On 24 October, the trilateral mechanism, that is, the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan, received a document from the military leadership with their comments and amendments to the draft constitutional document, which had earlier been prepared under the auspices of the Sudanese Bar Association’s steering committee. That represented a significant first break. Concurrently, the civilian signatories to the draft formed a coalition to engage collectively in talks with the military. That coalition and the military then agreed on a two-phase political process to return to a civilian- led transition. The first phase has now been concluded with the signing of the political framework agreement.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9211 (2022) · source
“It was supposed to lay the ground, after a further round of talks on substance, for a final political accord and the formation of a new civilian Government, leading the country towards recovery and democratic elections over a two-year transitional phase. I would like to commend the efforts by all the Sudanese sides. The military and civilian stakeholders have come a long way from the coup one year ago, and from the military’s announcement in July that it would withdraw from politics, to the latest developments.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9211 (2022) · source
“Mr. Perthes: I would like to thank the Security Council members for the opportunity to speak with them today. They may recall that the last time I briefed the Council (see S/PV.9129) I told them that we might have some good news when I came back in December, and for more than a year now, positive news has been in short supply in the Sudan. Since the military takeover of 25 October 2021, the country has found itself in a multidimensional political, economic and security crisis. The dynamics have continued for more than a couple of weeks, however, in spite of hopes that the Sudan may find a way out of the crisis and embark on a more sustainable new transitional phase. Let me explain those dynamics. Last Monday, 5 December, the military leadership and a broad range of civilian actors signed up to a political framework agreement.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9211 (2022) · source
“The longer the political paralysis lasts, the more difficult it will be to return to the transition that UNITAMS is mandated to assist. I urge all actors to seize this opportunity and reach agreement on a solution that enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of Sudanese women and men. We in the United Nations and our partners in the trilateral mechanism remain steadfast in our efforts in that direction. I count on the Security Council and the broader international community to back our efforts and offer coordinated support to the Sudan at this critical time.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“The Permanent Ceasefire Committee, chaired by UNITAMS, has continued to engage in order to de-escalate tensions, resolve disputes between signatory parties to the Juba Peace Agreement and undertake capacity-building activities with local authorities. It has conducted investigations following formal requests from the parties, including after the conflict in Kerenik and El Geneina in April. To sum up, nearly a year after the military takeover of 25 October, the Sudan still lacks a fully functional and legitimate Government. The decision of the military to withdraw from politics and the recent initiatives by civilian forces offer a window of opportunity for both the military and political forces to reach an agreement on the way forward. However, time is of the essence.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“Integrated approaches supported by the Peacebuilding Fund have been put in place to address the risks created by climate change and food insecurity in Darfur. UNITAMS and the United Nations family continue to offer support to national and state authorities in the implementation of the National Plan on the Protection of Civilians. UNITAMS also continues to advise and train the Sudanese Police Force in community policing, addressing sexual and gender-based violence and the protection of civilians. The workshops and trainings over the past few months have involved more than 400 police personnel and 1,100 community members, usually in cooperation with the Sudanese Police Force, other United Nations agencies, civil society and the respective state prosecutors’ offices.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“I urge the authorities to begin deploying them and thereby improve the protection of the population. Humanitarian needs are now at record levels owing to a combination of ongoing political instability, economic crises, a rise in intercommunal violence, poor harvests and now floods. Some 11.7 million people are facing acute hunger, and the number is growing. While United Nations and partner organizations have managed to reach 7.1 million people in need since January, the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan is funded only at 32 per cent — less than a third of what is needed. In that challenging context, the United Nations has been working with partners to strengthen community stabilization efforts and resilience-building.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“Protocols addressing the drivers of the conflict in Darfur, including wealth-sharing, justice, the resolution of land issues and ensuring the return of internally displaced persons, remain unfulfilled. In the absence of a political agreement, it will be difficult to advance them. One positive step, as mentioned by the Permanent Representative of the Sudan during our previous meeting, was the graduation on 3 July of the first batch of 2,000 fighters for the joint security-keeping force in Darfur, as provided for in the Juba Peace Agreement. The United Nations has contributed to training them in human rights and international humanitarian law. But the graduation was only a first step. The joint security- keeping force has not actually been fully established to match the number of soldiers from regular forces and has yet to be deployed.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“National and local authorities, including the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, leaders of the signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement, regional and state governors, native administrations and civil-society leaders have all made attempts to broker reconciliation and agreements in Darfur and Blue Nile, but the sustainability of those agreements remains uncertain in the absence of effective State authority. I urge all communities to refrain from hate speech, which is increasingly fuelling communal tensions. I urge the authorities to urgently address protection gaps. There should be no doubt that the responsibility for the protection of civilians rests on their shoulders. The lack of implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement continues to contribute to instability.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“Since my last briefing (see S/PV.9041), 20 protesters have been killed and at least 1,700 injured. I have more than once felt it necessary to publicly condemn the excessive use of force by security forces as well as their targeting of health facilities and medical staff. The political crisis in Khartoum is also contributing to instability in the rest of the country. The peace talks between the Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North that were paused in the summer of 2021 have not resumed. The surge of violence in Darfur and Blue Nile is particularly worrying. From 24 May to 28 August, UNITAMS documented 40 incidents of intercommunal violence resulting in the deaths of more than 300 civilians.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“There are no doubt important differences about the institutional division of powers, particularly the role of the military. But the gaps have narrowed, and there is now a wide-ranging consensus on, among other things, the need for a civilian Head of State, an independent Prime Minister and a Cabinet composed of experts and technocrats, not party leaders. There is also consensus that the issue of transitional justice should be high on the list of priorities. There is therefore an opportunity to end the crisis, and both the military and civilian forces must grasp it. While any political agreement must be Sudanese-owned, the trilateral mechanism stands ready to convene the parties around one text so as to bridge the remaining differences. As the political stalemate continues, the human rights situation has not improved either.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“The trilateral mechanism, consisting of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS), the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, has engaged with all initiatives. We have facilitated a meaningful participation of women; we have provided constitutional expertise to those who have requested such assistance; and we are currently in the process of comparing the constitutional and political visions that have been issued. Almost all stakeholders — including, notably, the military — have expressed that they want the trilateral mechanism to play a role either in bringing the different initiatives together, coming up with bridging proposals or eventually mediating an agreement with the military. I am actually encouraged by the degree of commonality in the current debate in the Sudan.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“Last Saturday, the initiative of the Bar Association presented to the trilateral mechanism the outcome of its work on a draft constitutional framework. The draft was explicitly endorsed by the parties behind two other major initiatives, which means that the Bar Association initiative now gathers a broad spectrum of civilian forces around one vision, including the parties of the Forces for Freedom and Change; the Central Committee, on which the Government of former Prime Minister Hamdok had relied; relevant parties not included in that Government, like the Democratic Unionist Party; and Juba Peace Agreement signatories still present in today’s Sovereign Council.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“At the same time, elements of the former regime that were displaced by the revolution are gradually returning to the political scene, to the Administration and to public space. With regard to the political process, some important decisions have been taken by the military and some promising developments have happened among civilians. On 4 July, the President of the Sovereign Council, General Abdelfattah Burhan, announced the military’s intention to withdraw from politics. While large parts of the public doubted that the military leadership meant what it said, the announcement did generate momentum among civilian forces, and several major initiatives aimed at reaching a common civilian vision have emerged in response.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“Next month, on 25 October, the military coup in the Sudan will be one year old. The past 10 months have been marked by recurrent protests against the coup. There have been 117 people killed and thousands more injured in the context of those protests. At the same time, efforts to realize the goals of the revolution of 2018 have continued, particularly among youth, women, trade unions and professional associations. A recent noteworthy event was the formation of a new independent journalists’ syndicate, whose members not only asserted their right to form an association but also elected their council and president through competitive voting for the first time in 33 years.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“Mr. Perthes: Since my previous briefing in May (see S/PV.9041), the Sudan has seen new political developments, but also a continued deterioration of the socioeconomic situation. Security incidents affecting civilians have increased across the country. Humanitarian needs are growing exponentially. The overall situation will continue to worsen unless a political solution is found to restore a credible, fully functioning civilian-led Government, one that can re-establish the authority of the State across the country and create conditions for the resumption of international cooperation, including debt relief. Such a solution is by no means guaranteed, but there is a chance to reach a political agreement that would inaugurate a new transitional period towards democratic governance.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“I remain grateful for the support of the international community, and particularly the members of the Council, for our efforts.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“If a solution to the current impasse is not found, the consequences will be felt beyond the Sudan’s borders and for an entire generation. That is a message that I and the two Envoys continue to convey to Sudanese interlocutors. Ultimately, it is up to the Sudanese to agree on a way out of the crisis. The crisis facing the Sudan is home-grown and can be resolved only by the Sudanese. A solution is needed. Most Sudanese stakeholders realize that the geopolitical environment is becoming more challenging and that the gaze of the international community has been deflected from the Sudan. They therefore expect the trilateral mechanism to facilitate the difficult process of finding a consensus on a path out of the crisis. Too much is at stake, and too many hopes and aspirations are affected. I urge the Sudanese to seize this opportunity.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“While the primary responsibility for changing those dynamics lies with the Sudanese stakeholders, I am concerned about the long-term consequences as we watch the further erosion of the Sudan’s already fragile State capacity and human capital. The Sudan also runs the risk that critical assistance from the International Development Association’s 19 funding programme, which had been allocated to the Sudan as part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, will be reallocated to other countries by the end of June if a political solution to the crisis is not reached. Additionally, some donor States have warned that international financial support for the Sudanese Government, including debt relief, will not resume without a credible civilian Government.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“The number of Sudanese facing acute hunger is projected to double to about 18 million by September this year. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has allocated $20 million for this from its Central Emergency Response Fund, and donors continue to provide humanitarian assistance. However, the 2022 humanitarian response plan has been funded at only an abysmal 13 per cent. In the absence of a political agreement to restore constitutional legitimacy, much international development assistance and engagement by international financial institutions has remained on pause. Some donors have also placed restrictions on assistance that goes through State systems to reach public-sector workers such as teachers and health-care providers.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“Once a political agreement is reached, additional material support will be required from the international community to implement other aspects of the Juba Peace Agreement, including key protocols that address the root causes of the conflict. The political stalemate continues to exact a heavy socioeconomic toll. Humanitarian needs are growing, and they are having a significant impact on the most vulnerable. That, coupled with global geopolitical factors, continues to drive up prices for basic goods in the Sudan. In April, staple food prices increased by an average of 15 per cent compared to the previous month and remained 250 per cent higher than last year. The combined effects of political instability, economic crisis, poor harvests and global supply shocks are having a disastrous impact on inflation and the affordability of food.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“A first batch of 2,000 personnel from signatory armed movements will complete their 90-day training at the end of this month and be deployed to North, West and South Darfur. The Government has agreed to give them a regular salary on a par with that of the soldiers of the Sudanese Armed Forces once they graduate. In addition, a group of 80 officers has been selected from that batch to receive further training and then be integrated into the regular forces. My Mission is currently providing training to non-commissioned officers from that group on human rights, international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians. Going forward, adequate logistical support will be required to operationalize the assembly areas for armed groups and make further progress on the deployment of the joint security-keeping forces.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“Ultimately, the protection of civilians requires that the root causes of the conflict be addressed, including problems related to decades-long marginalization, land issues and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees. In the meantime, however, physical protection must be provided, and must be a priority for the Sudanese Government and for the regional and state Governments in Darfur. UNITAMS continues to regularly advise and train members of the Sudanese Police Force in community policing, sexual and gender-based violence protection and the protection of civilians more generally. The Sudanese authorities have also made significant progress in setting up the joint security-keeping force in Darfur, as provided for in the Juba Peace Agreement.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“The Permanent Ceasefire Committee, chaired by the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS), has engaged to de-escalate tensions and has launched an investigation into possible ceasefire violations in the context of those events following the submission of formal complaints by the parties. The risk of a new outbreak of violence nonetheless remains high. Despite the tragic nature of those events and the heinous crimes committed against civilians, it was encouraging to see that armed groups and the regular forces have accepted the notion of using the Permanent Ceasefire Committee as a joint institution to resolve the conflict.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“The lack of a political agreement and of a fully functional Government so far is also affecting the security situation. Recent events in Darfur, including the destruction and displacement in Kreinik locality and the ongoing violence in El Geneina between 22 and 26 April, have once again exposed the deficiencies in the State’s ability to provide security and protection for civilians. I briefed this Council on those events in closed consultations on 27 April. Since that briefing, relative calm has been restored to the area. Government forces and several high-level delegations were deployed to address the violence, and a cessation of hostilities agreement was signed in El Geneina on 29 April between the conflicting Arab and Masalit communities.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“The Sudanese parties should not allow them to undermine the opportunity of finding a negotiated exit to the crisis and thereby enabling an agreed-upon Government to be appointed with a work programme for the remainder of the transition period. I also want to say that the trilateral mechanism is robustly supporting the inclusion of women in the political process. We strongly encourage the parties to include at least 40 per cent women in their delegations, which is in line with the Sudan’s Constitutional Document. At the same time, via a Sudanese-led process, we have facilitated the inclusion of a delegation of women from all over the Sudan, who bring together expertise, legitimacy from their own communities and diversity in terms of age, regional background and political orientation.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“Core issues include the terms and composition of key constitutional organs, the future relationship between the military and civilian components and the mechanism and criteria for the selection of a Prime Minister. Forging shared understandings around those issues will help chart a way out of the crisis and address the institutional vacuum left in the wake of the coup. Once a sufficiently conducive environment is in place, the trilateral mechanism will convene the key stakeholders around a negotiating table. That can and should happen without further delay. But I want to make it clear that there are also spoilers who do not want a transition to democracy or who refuse a solution through dialogue.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“That included political parties and coalitions, representatives from resistance committees, youth, the military, armed groups, Sufi leaders, women’s groups and academics. The aim was to canvass the views of the stakeholders on the substance and format of a Sudanese-led and -owned talks. Almost all components have shown willingness to engage positively with our facilitation efforts. At the same time, some key stakeholders continue to reject face-to-face talks with other counterparts or prefer to participate indirectly. In the aftermath of the initial release of detainees and a reduction in violence, we therefore began a process of indirect substantive talks between the parties on 12 May.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“Moreover, a growing number of Sudanese parties and political coalitions have come forward with initiatives to solve the political crisis. The resistance committees in Khartoum state have completed their political charter and are engaging in dialogue with committees in the other states. As the Sudan continues to confront further uncertainty, there is a shared sense of urgency, and many parties are seeking common ground and are increasingly open to dialogue. There is also growing recognition of the need for civilian-military dialogue on a way out of the crisis, and there is more public debate around this issue. Against that backdrop, the trilateral mechanism of the AU, the United Nations and IGAD held initial talks with key components of Sudanese society and the political scene throughout April, the month of Ramadan.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“If the authorities want to build trust, it is essential that those responsible for violence against protesters be held to account. It is time for all violence to end. We have urged the authorities to reach out to the public and make clear that they support dialogue as the only way to a reach a political solution. Let me use this forum to call on the military leadership and the Sovereign Council to make an announcement that, in order to make this dialogue happen, they will release the remaining detainees, cease arbitrary arrests and, importantly, lift the state of emergency, without limitations. Demands for change and for the restoration of the democratic transitional process continue, with largely peaceful protests.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source