YouSaid · the spoken record

Pleuger

lines on the record: 791
first: 2003-01-14
most recent: 2006-03-14
sittings or episodes: 125
sources: un-security-council

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“The mission clearly saw how the lack of security - some called it "the rule of the gun" - affected the entire Afghan peace process. According to Afghan interlocutors, the three main sources of insecurity are terrorism, factional fighting and drug production and trafficking. In the provinces of the south, south-east and east, insecurity is greatly exacerbated by terrorist attacks from suspected elements of the Taliban and Al Qaeda and from supporters of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Those elements pose a significant threat to the newly established national police force and to the Afghan National Army, to Afghans supportive of the central Government and also increasingly to the assistance community. These threats have significantly slowed reconstruction by limiting access by Government, international humanitarian and development agencies.”
2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source
“They emphasized that strong support by international forces is necessary to provide an enabling environment for the Bonn process, to build up the national army and police and to extend central governmental authority to the provinces. This view is also shared by Ambassador Brahimi. Lasting peace and security in Afghanistan cannot be achieved by the Afghan authority alone. It also depends upon the international community's continued and coordinated political and financial support for Afghanistan. I should now like to elaborate on some key issues in greater detail. The first and foremost issue in Afghanistan is security. Throughout the visit, security was at the centre of the mission's discussions with all interlocutors.”
2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source
“Successfully addressing the aforementioned challenges, in particular in the security sector, will ultimately depend upon further expansion of the authority of the central Government to ensure its control of all armed forces and weapons as well as national revenues, and the establishment of representative and effective national institutions responsible for ensuring justice and security. In that regard, the recent expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was unanimously welcomed by the Afghans. However, most Afghan interlocutors considered the envisioned deployment of a German provincial reconstruction team to Kunduz as not sufficient and called for a deployment of ISAF contingents throughout Afghanistan.”
2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source
“The mission heard vehement complaints by women's organizations and civil society groups regarding intimidation, harassment and exclusion from social, economic and political activities. Judicial institutions remain weak, and the narcotics economy is largely unchecked. In particular, the narcotics economy, because of its rapid growth in recent months, has the potential to dwarf the legal economy and threaten the small gains in the field of reconstruction and economic stabilization achieved to date. If progress in the fight against narcotic drugs cannot be achieved in the near future, the resulting long-term costs of addressing the consequences of drug trafficking and instability and of the terrorist networks that capitalize on them could potentially be far greater.”
2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source
“That insecurity and the attacks were highlighted again just today by the reports of the very unfortunate attack on the United Nations office in Kandahar. The threats faced by those regions limit access by the Government and development agencies. Such insecurity also poses a direct challenge to the full implementation of the Bonn Agreement, as it constricts the political space necessary for national political processes and blocks access to many areas, threatening to disenfranchise parts of the population, notably in Pashtun-maj ority areas. In too many areas of Afghanistan, individuals and communities suffer from abuses of their basic rights by local commanders and factional leaders.”
2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source
“That overall progress is clearly visible in every corner of Kabul: construction is under way everywhere, the markets are filled with goods, school children can be seen everywhere and, last but not least, the city is jammed and, unfortunately, also polluted by heavy traffic. Notwithstanding those gains, major challenges lie ahead, and much remains to be done if the peace process is to become irreversible and security in Afghanistan is to be realized. Insecurity caused by terrorist activities, factional fighting and drug-related crime remain the major concerns of Afghan society. The south and south-east were singled out by all interlocutors in that regard, where insecurity, including attacks against non-governmental organizations, is contributing to a slowing of reconstruction.”
2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source
“In the last two years, the Afghan Government, with the support of the international community, has made significant progress in implementing the Bonn Agreement and in recovering from the devastation caused by more than two decades of war. The mission noted strides made in many areas, including the successful launch of a new national currency, the ongoing reconstruction of roads, the reopening of schools, progress in the reform of the security sector, the start of a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) campaign, preparations for the constitutional Loya Jirga and the release of a draft constitution during the presence of the mission in Kabul.”
2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source
“The strong signal of support, which was the stated purpose of the mission, was warmly welcomed by the Afghans. The members of the mission were greatly impressed by the eagerness of the Afghans to stand together, rebuild their country and improve their living conditions. In particular and in contrast to other crisis areas, there is, despite continuing ethnic divisions and factional fighting, an Afghan national identity and there do not appear to be any separatist tendencies in Afghanistan. At the same time, in order to give a complete picture, I must mention that the Afghan interlocutors voiced increasing frustration about the lack of a peace dividend and tangible benefits, in particular in the provinces.”
2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source
“The primary purpose of the mission was to send a signal to the Afghan people that Afghanistan remains high on the agenda of the Security Council and that the international community continues to support the peace process in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the mission sent a clear message to the local and provincial authorities that it is imperative that they stop factional fighting, participate in the Bonn process and cooperate with the central Government. Before entering into the details of the political talks, I should like to highlight that the Security Council mission was greatly welcomed and appreciated by all Afghan interlocutors, in Kabul as well as in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. Its members felt that, after decades of war, Afghans are grateful for all assistance from the international community in rebuilding their country.”
2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source
“Mr. Pleuger: Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the floor to report to the Security Council on the trip of the Security Council to Afghanistan. A written report will be distributed shortly. The Security Council mission to Afghanistan, which concluded last Friday, took place almost two years after a United Nations-sponsored conference in Bonn laid the foundations for the peaceful future of Afghanistan. It came at a critical juncture in this process, as it coincided with the release of the draft constitution that represents one of the cornerstones of the Bonn Agreement. The mission thus had an opportunity to canvas first-hand opinions from Afghan interlocutors on the ongoing constitutional process.”
2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source
“The groups of experts will address problems such as shortages of electricity and difficulties in travelling across borders that if eased will make a real difference in the lives of ordinary people. I was glad to hear from Mr. Holkeri that progress is being made in this regard. However, we understand that there is still great mistrust between the parties, which may make them hesitate. We believe they must focus on the many positive achievements they can make for their people by now talking to each other. In conclusion, Germany stands ready to help facilitate this dialogue, but it is, of course, up to the parties themselves to make it work.”
2003-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4853 (2003) · source
“We hope that the United Nations and its legal department will find a solution to this problem soon. Rapid privatization is - and we agree with what Mr. Holkeri said on this - essential for making the best economic use of the assets that Kosovo possesses, and economic progress is essential to creating social and political stability. Therefore, it is necessary for privatization not to lag behind, as it does now, but to make rapid progress. Let me close by returning to the topic of direct dialogue. We hope to see the working group sessions in all areas get under way next month. In addition to being an essential benchmark, direct dialogue is the single best way to build trust between the parties.”
2003-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4853 (2003) · source
“I would like to make some remarks on the legal difficulties that have arisen in connection with privatizing socially owned enterprises in Kosovo, as mentioned in the Secretary-General's report. The board of the privatization agency in Kosovo, the Kosovo Trust Agency, concluded that legal uncertainties prevented further progress on privatization of socially owned firms in Kosovo. It seems that the staff of the Agency - and, indeed, of all UNMIK Pillar IV - are not presently covered by United Nations immunity. Therefore, individual staff members may be exposing themselves, as well as the agency, to unacceptable liability. This problem needs to be resolved quickly. In our understanding, UNMIK Pillar IV, including the Kosovo Trust Agency, is an integral part of the United Nations mission in Kosovo, just as the other Pillars are.”
2003-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4853 (2003) · source
“On the topic of benchmarks, we feel that it will be extremely helpful to have all benchmarks fully operationalized into a more detailed work plan. This will help focus work in Kosovo on what needs to be achieved, and will give the international community a clearer basis on which to judge progress. We hope that the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Kosovo institutions will be able to finish work on the operationalized benchmarks as swiftly as possible. These benchmarks should be closely linked with the measures that need to be taken by the parties in the region to advance their declared ambitions to move forward in the European stabilization and association process.”
2003-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4853 (2003) · source
“Holkeri, none of the criminals responsible for the murders recently committed have been identified. In addition to an end to the violence, a successful returns policy will require an effective political decentralization plan. The international community must give high priority to elaborating such a plan in the next several months, a plan that provides for the needs of all communities. This will help build confidence and ease the negotiations between the parties. On the other hand, the illegal parallel Government structures, which, as pointed out in the Secretary-General's report and by Mr. Holkeri, are supported by Belgrade, are still in place and are a significant hindrance to progress. We fully share Mr. Holkeri's remarks about parallel courts. These parallel structures must be eliminated immediately.”
2003-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4853 (2003) · source
“Any form of violent revenge and ethnic hatred is absolutely unacceptable. This problem is directly linked to the benchmarks and the question of the future of Kosovo. Unless this violence ends and Kosovars of all ethnic communities feel secure in Kosovo, it will not be possible for displaced persons to return to their homes. The secure return of displaced persons is one of the benchmarks that must be met before progress can be made towards solving the status issue. We call upon politicians in Kosovo to actively work against that climate of hatred, to condemn in unmistakable terms violence when it occurs and also to encourage the best possible cooperation of the various ethnic communities with the police in solving violent crimes. It is disturbing that, as pointed out in the report and by Mr.”
2003-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4853 (2003) · source
“That is why Germany attaches high priority to getting effective working groups for direct dialogue under way as soon as possible. Allow me to highlight some of the developments described in the Secretary-General's report, as also mentioned by the Special Representative. The security situation in Kosovo is still very worrying. It has been reported that continuing violence in Kosovo has, sadly, again led to the deaths of innocent civilians and police. I repeat what has been said in the Council on many previous occasions: this violence is absolutely unacceptable. The horrible experience of the Kosovars in the Kosovo crisis and the atrocities committed against the Kosovo Albanian majority population in the past cannot in any way justify violence against the Kosovo minority population today.”
2003-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4853 (2003) · source
“First, I join other delegations in thanking Special Representative Mr. Holkeri for his very comprehensive briefing. I also commend him for his work in his first few months of duty, and assure him of our continued support for his very difficult and important work. Secondly, I would like to state that Germany fully subscribes to the statement that Italy will make shortly on behalf of the European Union. The opening session of direct dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade in Vienna this month returned Kosovo to the headlines. This is because direct dialogue is rightly seen as pointing the way towards a solution to many of Kosovo's problems. We share the regret of Mr. Holkeri that the Kosovo Government was not represented there. We hope that this will change, because there is simply no alternative to direct dialogue right now.”
2003-10-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4853 (2003) · source
“At the last formal meeting of the 661 Committee, the United Nations Treasury was not in a position to inform us as to when, how many and specifically which funds were to be transferred. We believe that a response to those questions is essential for a transparent termination of the oil-for-food programme. We look forward to receiving the requested information.”
2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source
“I think it would be important for a smooth transition of the programme if we could agree on the principle that all funds allocated to prioritized contracts will remain in the consolidated United Nations escrow account after 21 November irrespective of their status of renegotiation. In general, it is not the supplier's responsibility if his prioritized contract is not amended in time. Therefore, he should not be confronted with modified procedures and uncertainties that he cannot influence and that are not a consequence of his own actions. Lastly but not least, I should like to comment briefly on the problem of the transfer of funds. The volume of the necessary transfer requires maximum transparency.”
2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source
“In the best case, which I understand still forms the basis for the Coalition Provisional Authority's related planning, all prioritized contracts will be amended by 21 November. The funds allocated to all prioritized and amended contracts will then remain in the United Nations escrow account and payments to suppliers will then be executed as in the past. However, if this best case does not materialize - and nobody can exclude that possibility - then not all prioritized contracts will be amended by the end of the programme. We should then proceed in a fair and transparent manner, and that means, in particular, that payment arrangements for suppliers in this case should not depend on the status of renegotiations of their contracts.”
2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source
“The United Nations agencies could complete the amendment of contracts in coordination with the Coalition Provisional Authority after 21 November, as, by the way, the Treasury will do anyway with regard to the necessary amendments to letters of credit. Remaining paperwork would thus not have to be transferred to the Coalition Provisional Authority, thus avoiding further probable delays. The OIP, of course, would no longer be involved in this. As regards authentication after 21 November, from our point of View and again for reasons of continuity, we would also encourage the Coalition Provisional Authority to continue using the services of Cotecna and the newly established alternative entry points after the termination of the programme. As regards payment arrangements as of 21 November, here we see two possible developments.”
2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source
“In the last meeting of the 661 Committee, the United Nations Treasury informed members of the Committee that it will continue to also amend letters of credit of amended contracts after 21 November. I wonder why we should not give the United Nations agencies the same flexibility to complete the process of renegotiation and amendment of contracts if necessary. Such flexibility would not require an extension of the deadline set by resolution 1483 (2003). Nor would it be in contradiction with the concept of transfer of operational responsibility to the Coalition Provisional Authority. But it would allow us to execute this transfer in an economical manner.”
2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source
“If we do not want to risk delivery disruptions, the Coalition Provisional Authority will have to come forward with clear information in the very near future, rather than waiting until the end of the programme. We have heard from Mr. Sevan that the OIP has internally decided to already stop the amendment of prioritized contracts in general on 3 November and in exceptional cases on 10 November. Given the relatively low rate of amended contracts so far, we have strong doubts that this decision will allow us to complete the amendment process. We would like to raise the question as to whether it would not be much better to show more flexibility towards the internal deadline for renegotiations by United Nations agencies.”
2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source
“In saying this, I do not mean to criticize the involved United Nations agencies, which are, to our knowledge, doing everything possible to complete this task on time. However, given that there are only three weeks remaining until 21 November and taking into account the need for suppliers to make arrangements for deliveries in a timely manner, we have to inform now all concerned on how to proceed as of 22 November. Maintaining continuity in the delivery pipeline and having clarity about procedures vis-a-vis suppliers are different sides of the same coin. Only if the suppliers know in time which procedures to follow can disruptions be avoided. Obviously, deliveries for 22 November are being prepared now, not on 21 November.”
2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source
“We would suggest publishing such non-prioritized contracts by early November because it is only fair to tell the suppliers whose contracts have not been prioritized, so they can know about this as early as possible. Secondly, we also feel there should be clear-cut criteria as to why contracts have not been determined to be of relative utility. This is of particular importance for high-priority sectors and I think this is also a priority for transparency, to tell people what the criteria are for relative utility and for not giving contracts this stamp of approval with respect to relative utility. Thirdly, the renegotiation of all contracts and their amendments might well not be completed by 21 November. Only 52 per cent of the prioritized contracts have been amended so far.”
2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source
“Whereas the programme will be terminated on 21 November, everything possible has to be done to enable a maximum of continuity in order to avoid disrupting deliveries and creating a difficult situation for the people in Iraq. Taking into consideration the high importance of transparency and continuity in the transition of the oil- for-food programme, I would like to encourage the parties involved to consider the following steps to be included in the exit strategy, as we have discussed this many times in the 661 Committee and also with the Office of the Iraq Programme (OIP). First of all, we feel that the OIP should define a mechanism for early information to suppliers of non- prioritized contracts.”
2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source
“First of all, I would like to thank Mr. Sevan for the very complex and comprehensive information that he provided to the Council, and I would also like to take this opportunity to thank him and his team for the very good cooperation that he has extended to the committee established pursuant to resolution 661 (1990), to me personally and to my team. I also thank him for the friendly words addressed to me and to my team. Mr. Sevan started by quoting paragraph 16 (f) of resolution 1483 (2003). This paragraph aims at maximum transparency and continuity in the process of transition. This is the goal that we are trying to achieve in these last few weeks of the oil-for-food programme.”
2003-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4851 (2003) · source
“We are not here to offer ready-made solutions. But my Government is convinced that the credibility of United Nations counter-terrorism efforts depends on their ability to make a difference on the ground. It seems worthwhile to reflect on new ways to strengthen the United Nations - including the CTC - in order to fight terrorism even more effectively. We think the time has come to increase the effectiveness of United Nations and CTC action, within existing means and, of course, while respecting the framework of the United Nations Charter and international law.”
2003-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4845 (2003) · source
“For instance, one step forward might be for CTC experts to form joint teams with members of specialized international organizations and actively assist countries in key areas of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1456 (2003), such as professionalizing their financial control, border protection, weapons control and law enforcement sectors. Another idea might be to consider the creation of a high-level authority - such as a United Nations counter-terrorism coordinator- who might help to better focus and streamline enhanced United Nations activities to counter terrorism in all its aspects and on a global basis. Discussing such steps or similar ideas more thoroughly would be in line with many suggestions voiced during the General Assembly's recent general debate calling for the strengthening of United Nations counter-terrorism organs.”
2003-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4845 (2003) · source
“We appreciate the ever-increasing links that the CTC has established with international organizations and specialized agencies, as demonstrated recently during the meeting in Washington organized jointly by the CTC and the Organization of American States. Most important of all, the CTC has established a continuous dialogue with all United Nations Member States on key counter-terrorism issues under resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1456 (2003). The quality and intensity of that dialogue are unprecedented in United Nations history, and are an asset that we can build on. Under the new work programme, the Chairman plans to submit a report on the strengths and weaknesses of international counter-terrorism efforts. Such an evaluation could help us in further intensifying cooperation by adopting a more operative approach.”
2003-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4845 (2003) · source
“First of all, we should like to thank the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), Ambassador Arias, for his report and for the good work that he is producing in the CTC. The fight against terrorism within the broadest possible international coalition remains one of Germany's most important policy objectives. While we fully subscribe to the forthcoming statement by the presidency of the European Union, we should like to highlight the following points. The Counter-Terrorism Committee has done impressive work, and its Chairman, its experts and the United Nations Secretariat deserve our recognition and thanks. We support the CTC's new work programme.”
2003-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4845 (2003) · source
“The role of the United Nations, and in particular of the Secretary-General, could have been strengthened even more. The Council, too, is incorporated rather sparingly into the development. Finally, we would have wished for clearer guidelines also with regard to timing. The latter seems important to us because only in this way can it be made clear that the current political status of Iraq is a temporary one. In this context, I refer to the joint statement of Russia, France and Germany explaining our common position. We therefore cannot envisage any military commitment. We remain, however, firmly optimistic that an even broader involvement of the United Nations - and in particular of the Secretary-General - the Iraqi people and the neighbours in the region in the reconstruction process in Iraq will succeed.”
2003-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4844 (2003) · source
“Another factor was that we and the sponsors share the same goals in Iraq: to contribute to a swift stabilization of the conditions in Iraq, to support the political and economic reconstruction process in Iraq, and to promote the restoration of the Iraqi people's sovereignty through a Government democratically elected by them. That can succeed only when the Security Council appears as unified as possible. We therefore did not want to stand in the way of Council unity. Although we consider the resolution to be an important step in the right direction, we remain of the View that integration of the amendments presented by Germany, France and the Russian Federation could have led to a better resolution. We miss the clear signal that the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis will be accelerated.”
2003-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4844 (2003) · source
“I, too, would like to welcome the presence of the Secretary-General at this meeting. We would like to make a few comments relating to our vote. The resolution just adopted takes up important concerns of the post-war order in Iraq. It further develops the preceding resolutions 1483 (2003) and 1500 (2003), on Iraq, and contains new emphases. In our view, the sponsors of resolution 1511 (2003) have undertaken commendable efforts to reach a text that accommodates important claims we have made. That we expressly recognize, and that was one of the factors for our approval.”
2003-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4844 (2003) · source
“However, Germany recognizes that even after the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) has successfully concluded its mandate in May 2004, the international community will have to provide continued support to Timor-Leste. Therefore, we fully agree with the Secretary- General and with Mr. Sharma that it is timely to take stock of what has been achieved so far and to begin considering the best means through which the country's needs can be met after the UNMISET withdrawal and how best to preserve the success story which Timor- Leste represents for the international community. In that respect, we look forward to the Secretary- General's report and proposals to the Security Council to be issued in early 2004.”
2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source
“We should also like to highlight the importance of an adequate judicial system and of the enhanced promotion of the rule of law as essential elements of the new democracy. We fully share Kamalesh Sharma's analysis, given to us today. We feel that an adequate judicial system is the basis for all: for progress in peace-building and in political, social and economic development. In spite of the achievements of the past three years and in spite of continued progress, there are still major tasks to be accomplished in the months and years ahead. Our clear objective remains a stable democratic Timor-Leste, independent of international assistance.”
2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source
“We salute the recent joint statement instructing the joint border committee to finalize agreement on the international land boundary by 30 November 2003, and we urge all concerned to ensure that this time line is met. In our view, the establishment of good- neighbourly relations with Indonesia is a key prerequisite for the successful development of the young State of Timor-Leste. Germany welcomes the progress made in strengthening the political and administrative institutions of Timor-Leste, as outlined in the Secretary-General's report (S/2003/944). We concur with the Secretary-General that special focus should be placed on the speedy resolution of the question of past serious crimes, and that continued international assistance is necessary for the building of an effective civil administration.”
2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source
“In this context, we welcome the fact that the build-up of the national police of Timor-Leste is broadly on track and that the national police, although its capabilities and resources remain limited, has assumed responsibility for routine policing in all districts except Dili, where the handover is scheduled to take place in January 2004. We take this as confirmation that the downsizing plan, as laid out in resolution 1473 (2003), has proved to be realistic. Germany welcomes the continued strengthening of relations between Timor-Leste and Indonesia, particularly regarding the important question of demarcation and regulation of the common border.”
2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source
“Ijoin other delegations in thanking the Secretary-General for his latest report on the situation in Timor-Leste. Our thanks also go to Mr. Kamalesh Sharma for today's excellent and very informative briefing and to him and his team for his very important and dedicated work. Germany fully endorses the statement to be made later in this discussion by Italy as the presidency of the European Union. Germany welcomes and fully supports the efforts of the Government of Timor-Leste under President Gusmao, assisted by the United Nations, to consolidate the young political institutions and to ensure and uphold democratic institutions and the rule of law, while building the new nation. We note with appreciation the stabilization of the overall security environment in Timor-Leste, as confirmed by the Secretary-General's latest report.”
2003-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4843 (2003) · source
“We call upon both the Israeli and Palestinian Governments to continue to implement the road map in good faith, because we feel there is no alternative to the road map as the way to peace.”
2003-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4841 (2003) · source
“All of that entails serious humanitarian and economic consequences for the Palestinian population. At the same time, we urge the Palestinian Authority to take all necessary measures to end violence and terror by militant groups against Israeli targets. The suicide bombing in Haifa, which took the lives of many innocent civilians, has shown that the Palestinian leadership must do its utmost to prevent such atrocities. Germany calls on the new emergency cabinet of Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia to crack down on violent groups and to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. The members of the Quartet continue to back the road map for peace as accepted by both sides at the Aqaba summit, held on 4 June 2003.”
2003-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4841 (2003) · source
“We call upon both the Israeli and Palestinian Governments to refrain from any action that might endanger the two-State solution, as laid out in the road map. Thus Germany urges the Government of Israel to halt its continuing settlement activities and stop the construction of the so-called security fence. While recognizing Israel's need for security, we consider the security fence to be detrimental to the implementation of the road map. We believe that the fence might become an obstacle to the peaceful resolution of the conflict and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state, living alongside Israel in peace and security. The path of the Israeli fence departs from the Green Line, cutting deep into Palestinian land, sometimes on the basis of the confiscation of land.”
2003-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4841 (2003) · source
“I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this important meeting. Given the latest developments in the region, it is my View that it is timely to have an open debate in the Security Council on the situation in the Middle East. I therefore welcome the opportunity to share views on the issue with Council members as well as with all other interested delegations. I would like to point out that I associate myself with the statement that will be made by the Italian presidency of the European Union at a later stage of the meeting. Germany deplores the recent surge in violence between Israelis and Palestinians. We must not allow this bloodshed to undermine the implementation of the road map, which we still consider to be the relevant document for a just and lasting peace in the region.”
2003-10-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4841 (2003) · source
“The establishment of a special War Crimes Chamber within the Bosnian State Court will contribute towards decongesting the agenda of the ICTY, which is important in the interests of compliance with the completion strategy. This strategy is important, also, in other instances. My first question, to President Meron and Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, concerns the prospects for a comparable process in Croatia and in Serbia and Montenegro to devolve cases from the ICTY to specialized national courts in those countries. My second question goes to President Mase and Prosecutor Jallow. According to the report, 40 Rwandese cases have been handed over by the ICTR Prosecutor to Rwandese judicial authorities. Beyond that, can they imagine an even broader process of devolving cases from the ICTR to national Rwandese courts?”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“Secondly, the Council should encourage the various actors of international justice to cross-fertilize and to exchange information, expertise and personnel. Thirdly, the Council should set up an expert group to examine the performance of the various actors, which would also serve to check their comparative advantages. Fourthly, the Council should take into account in its future plans that we can now include the ICC. For example, if Mr. Mladic is arrested only in 2007, that is one year before the supposed end of the ICTY trials, why would we extend the ICTY with all the costs involved, provided we could refer the case to the ICC for less than half the cost? After these general remarks, I would like to address two questions to today's speakers.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“Of course, we must stick to the ad hoc tribunals and make sure that the completion strategies are adhered to as much as possible. This might mean that we need, first, more ad litem judges, secondly, more flexibility in using the ad litem judges, and thirdly, increased pressure for cooperation with the court. We feel it is a scandal that Mladic, Karadzic and Gotovina are still at large. Let us also look at the broader picture, now that we have various options at hand. We should promote the devolution of cases to national justice whenever there are sufficient guarantees for judicial standards and fairness of trial, and the Council should take up the proposal we recently made here. This proposal contains four elements. First, the Council should take a realistic look at the various international and national judiciaries.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“Thirdly, we have national courts or chambers that receive international assistance, such as has been proposed for Bosnia, and finally, of course, we have the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ad hoc tribunals have been important precedents and they were the only reasonable choice at the time they were created. Now, we are faced with a dilemma. It is not quite clear whether the tribunals will be able to finish their work within the timeframe set by the completion strategies. At the same time, we are increasingly aware that these tribunals are tremendously costly. The operation of the ICTY will soon have reached an expenditure of one billion dollars for trying a limited number of people. What does this mean?”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“I would first like to thank Judge Meron, Judge Mase and Prosecutors Del Ponte and Jallow for the very impressive and comprehensive briefing they have given us. Please allow me to make one remark and to ask two questions. The remark pertains to the broader picture of the juridical institutions that we now have in the international field. There are now various types of institutions in the field of criminal justice. First, we have the ad hoc tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Secondly, we have mixed tribunals, such as in Sierra Leone and possibly soon in Cambodia.”
2003-10-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4838 (2003) · source
“As far as international mechanisms of criminal justice are concerned, the Council should henceforth take into account the fact that, since the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), there is an instrument of international justice that is permanently available, not just ad hoc, and that holds the promise to match, or even to exceed, the two ad hoc tribunals, in terms of judicial standards, public acceptance and effectiveness. In conclusion, I would like to say that Germany would be very pleased to see ongoing cooperation and cross-fertilization between the various actors who operate in the sphere of international justice. We strongly suggest that in the future, the Council give increased consideration to the possibility of referring situations to the ICC whenever there is a need for international criminal justice.”
2003-10-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4837 (2003) · source