YouSaid · the spoken record

Pleuger

lines on the record
791
first
2003-01-14
most recent
2006-03-14
sittings or episodes
125
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. Under those circumstances, we urge the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and the Kosovo Trust Agency board to certify and transfer to private owners, as soon as possible, all those socially- owned enterprises that have been duly screened by the Kosovo Trust Agency. In my remarks to the Council in October (see S/PV.4853), I stressed the importance Germany places on political decentralization in Kosovo. We were pleased that the Council of Europe presented proposals last month that can serve as a good basis to begin work on this issue. As UNMIK works these proposals into a concrete plan, it will have to focus on the special factors that make decentralization so difficult and yet so important in Kosovo.

    2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source

  2. I can only repeat what I have said in previous meetings: in addition to being an essential standard that must be fulfilled, direct dialogue is the best way to build trust between the parties. The approach taken to direct dialogue is one of the earliest indicators on which we and the rest of the international community will judge the sincerity of efforts by Pristina and Belgrade. We strongly urge both parties to ensure that the groups begin meeting in the next few weeks. Another area where we would like to see rapid progress is privatization. Privatization is so important to economic development in Kosovo. We understand that the vast majority of outstanding privatization contracts could be approved, and that another round of privatization tenders could be organized, without great difficulty.

    2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source

  3. We strongly supported the European Union (EU) Council decision this month to endorse the standards. The implementation of the standards will be closely linked to the EU association process, and, conversely, obstruction of efforts to meet the standards will surely have serious consequences for aspirations to draw closer to Europe. The immediate priority now, besides finishing the implementation plan, is starting the direct dialogue at the level of expert working groups. It is very disappointing indeed that months after the official launch of the talks between Pristina and Belgrade, groups from both sides, focused on issues such as energy, transportation and returns, have not yet begun to meet.

    2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source

  4. However, we are disappointed that, despite extensive consultations between UNMIK and Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro seems not to support the document on standards for Kosovo for the time being. A11 sides have much to gain if the blueprint is made into reality and a democratic and tolerant Kosovo that respects the rule of law is created. Only this outcome offers the prospect of economic development and the prospect for the return of refugees to their homes. Only this offers the prospect that members of all ethnic communities can travel wherever they wish without being subjected to humiliation or violence. And most important, only this outcome offers the prospect that the future for both Belgrade and Pristina lies in Europe, rather than in isolation and stagnation.

    2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source

  5. Germany very much appreciates the care the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) took in drafting that document and the close consultations it undertook with the Contact Group as it was put into its final form. Working groups that are focused on achieving these standards have begun to meet, and the drafting of the implementation plan is under way. We hope the plan can be finished in the next few weeks, because the momentum created must be maintained or, even better, accelerated if the Provisional Institutions of Self- Government are to achieve what is necessary before the first possible review date, around the middle of 2005. Germany commends both Pristina and Belgrade for their positive attitude towards the review mechanism and for voicing their acceptance of the underlying rules and the tentative time frame.

    2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source

  6. I would like, Sir, to welcome your presence in the Chair, which underlines the importance that you attach to this meeting. We would also like to thank Under-Secretary-General Guehenno for his very concise and comprehensive briefing. From what we have heard, I feel that, in the future as well, Kosovo will require our full attention. I would like to state at the outset that we fully subscribe to the statement that the Italian presidency of the European Union will shortly make on behalf of the Union. The document on standards for Kosovo that Mr. Holkeri presented in Pristina last week is another major step forward.

    2003-12-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4886 (2003) · source

  7. The peace process, we feel, is now largely self- sustaining. An interim observer mission comprising fewer United Nations personnel would be able to meet the remaining demands. The parties to the peace process have to understand that they have to move on expeditiously and finalize the peace-building process within the coming six months. Elections should follow on as soon as possible. In conclusion, I would like to commend the United Nations specialized agencies and international donor support and to stress the important role they play in returning the region to normalcy and achieving sustainable peace there. In that context, I would like to reiterate that Germany will continue to contribute to the further development of a functioning civil society in Bougainville within the framework of the European Union.

    2003-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4881 (2003) · source

  8. We deeply wish that the tenor of the agreement will be confirmed by the Peace Process Consultative Committee meeting this week. In our View, the weapons have to be destroyed immediately, without any further conditions. As the Government of Papua New Guinea pointed out in its recent letter to the Secretary-General, the progress made in the last half of this year has been slower than expected. Therefore, tasks originally designated to be fulfilled by UNPOB still remain to be done. However, in our view this does not require the extension of the mandate in its current form for another year. We would rather welcome the presence of United Nations personnel on a smaller scale and for a shorter period of time. We therefore endorse and fully support the compromise recommended by Assistant Secretary- General Turk.

    2003-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4881 (2003) · source

  9. The departure of UNPOB, in our opinion, is a logical next step on the way to a self-reliant Bougainville. It is time to further increase the ownership of the peace process by the people of Bougainville and Papua New Guinea and to move the focus from peace-building to post-conflict capacity- building, ensuring the rule of law and social and economic development. Therefore, it is crucial that the remaining tasks of peace-building, in particular the constitutional process leading to the election of an autonomous Government of Bougainville and the destruction of all collected weapons, be completed without further delay. In that context, we warmly welcome the agreement in principle by former combatants to destroy their weapons.

    2003-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4881 (2003) · source

  10. First of all, I would like to thank Assistant Secretary-General Danilo Tiirk for his detailed and very comprehensive report. I would also like to highly commend the personnel of the United Nations Political Office (UNPOB) in Bougainville and its head, Mr. Noel Sinclair, for the outstanding work they have accomplished. I would also like to congratulate the people of Papua New Guinea and Bougainville for the achievements reached thus far. The parties must be aware now that they are fully responsible for the process and thus have to increase their efforts in implementing the provisions of the peace Agreement. The peace process, in our view, is now at a critical turning point. The mandate of the United Nations Political Office in Bougainville and of its head, Ambassador Sinclair, will expire at the end of this year.

    2003-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4881 (2003) · source

  11. We call on all Rwandan parties, and in particular on those factions within the Burundian police force and the military that are disappointed with the Pretoria Protocol, to recognize that Protocol as a real chance for lasting peace, not only for Burundi but also for the entire Great Lakes region.

    2003-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4876 (2003) · source

  12. However, should FNL fail to enter into negotiations with the Government within the three- month period, as set out in the regional initiative, the Council might wish to consider coercive measures against those FNL leaders unwilling to cooperate, as well as a weapons embargo against FNL. As we have heard, especially from Deputy President Zuma, there has been progress in the past, but we have also heard and seen that great challenges lie ahead to bring the peace process to a successful conclusion. Outstanding reform measures must now be tackled energetically, despite remaining resistance.

    2003-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4876 (2003) · source

  13. The African mission in Burundi, the regional initiative, the international conference on the Great Lakes region, the United Nations Office in Burundi and United Nations agencies are all important elements in that respect. But, first and foremost, the commitment of all Burundian parties is needed. The lack of a ceasefire agreement with Rwasa's National Liberation Forces (FNL) poses a problem that needs to be dealt with before an all-inclusive peace agreement can be signed and implemented. In order to deflect attempts from disgruntled individuals and groups to set up FNL as a magnet for elements that oppose the Arusha Agreement, as well as the Pretoria Protocol, the peace dividend must be visible and tangible, brought about by economic and social development.

    2003-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4876 (2003) · source

  14. Germany supports the African mission, both bilaterally, with 400,000 euros, and through our contribution to the 25 million euros that the European Union has pledged. We believe that such strong regional involvement will remain a decisive factor also for the implementation process of the Pretoria Protocol, during which all parties involved will be faced with new and difficult challenges. In our view, the cantonment of former combatants and their integration into the national army is a most pressing task that requires a considered and coordinated approach. The European Union provides an important contribution through the provision and distribution of food aid. My Government favours a multi-track approach to a sustained peace process in Burundi that includes the African region, the United Nations and the donor community.

    2003-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4876 (2003) · source

  15. First of all, I would like to thank Deputy President Zuma and the President of the Economic and Social Council, Ambassador Gert Rosenthal, for their very comprehensive and encouraging statements. Allow me to commend South Africa for its successful mediation efforts in Burundi. After the unsuccessful summit in Dar es Salaam in September 2003, it is doubtful that agreement between the Burundian Transitional Government and the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) could have been brought about without sustained South African involvement at the highest political level. My Government also warmly welcomes the exemplary engagement of the African Union, especially of the countries contributing troops to the African mission in Burundi.

    2003-12-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4876 (2003) · source

  16. But while MDRP follows a pragmatic and flexible approach, national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes are a prerequisite. We urge the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi to establish their national programmes. In this respect, it is an encouraging sign that the transitional Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has formed a technical coordination and planning committee to this end.

    2003-11-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4871 (2003) · source

  17. Cross-cutting issues are trafficking in small arms and light weapons, the proliferation of armed groups and programmes for disarmament, demobilization and the successful reintegration of former combatants into regular armies or civilian life. These are all key issues for most of the countries emerging from conflict. The Multicountry Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) is an initiative to address that multifaceted problem. Germany's contribution to the programme amounts to 30 million euros, which is roughly $35 million. MDRP has substantial means at its disposal and stands ready to fund projects in addition to the quick impact projects for demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers that have already been put into place.

    2003-11-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4871 (2003) · source

  18. A clear division of labour and responsibilities between the regional organizations, as well as between them and the African Union, would be most useful. Also cooperation between the subregional organizations and the United Nations would undoubtedly benefit from such streamlining efforts. Likewise, the United Nations itself must avoid duplication of mechanisms. It is difficult to see how a mandate for an additional special envoy for Central Africa could avoid overlapping with the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, which the Security Council has just renewed for another year. We would therefore prefer for the United Nations missions in the Central African subregion to identify possible areas of cooperation aimed at effectively addressing cross- cutting issues.

    2003-11-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4871 (2003) · source

  19. Another example is the lack of effective regional capacities for conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region. The United Nations, the African Union and individual African countries play an important role in mediating between parties to conflicts and in peacekeeping in the Great Lakes region mainly because there are no adequate subregional structures in place. One of the outcomes of the Great Lakes region conference will be programmes and action plans for regional cooperation and development. We believe that such initiatives should also aim at strengthening existing mechanisms and organizations and at furthering cooperation between them. It is for the countries in the Central African subregion itself to establish clear guidelines and to avoid duplication of efforts.

    2003-11-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4871 (2003) · source

  20. In that respect, we regret that the multidisciplinary assessment mission to the Central African subregion was unable to Visit the Central African Republic. Despite some steps in the right direction, the situation there remains fragile and requires the Security Council's continued attention. The subregional approach, in our View, means, first and foremost, strengthening existing subregional mechanisms. Let me highlight that with two examples. The first is the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which enjoys the broadest membership of countries in the subregion and should therefore be in an ideal position to develop regional strategies. Like other subregional organizations however, ECCAS suffers from inadequate capacities.

    2003-11-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4871 (2003) · source

  21. First, I would like to thank Mr. Kalomoh for his briefing. I would also like to associate myself with the statement to be made later in this discussion by the European Union presidency. The informative report of the Secretary-General underscores the fact that despite encouraging developments, the Central African region is still affected by crises and conflicts. We share the Secretary-General's analysis that a subregional approach offers the best chance for a comprehensive strategy that takes into account the complex and diverse root causes of the conflicts. The peace processes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi will, hopefully, have an impact on regional stabilization, despite the many challenges that need to be met.

    2003-11-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4871 (2003) · source

  22. The fourth element is that we should consider convening an international conference - which has already been proposed - that rallies the Iraqis, the neighbours and others in a common effort to stabilize the political and economic process. We have done so quite successfully in another case - Afghanistan. Why should we not repeat that model if it can help to stabilize and advance the process that is now going to begin? In conclusion, I should like to say that, in the face of growing violence and terrorism - not just in Iraq, but also in other countries, as the past few days have so cruelly demonstrated - it is imperative to create an international order based on cooperation and inclusiveness, with the United Nations as its centre. I think that that is the way to a stable Iraq and the way to return sovereignty to the Iraqi people.

    2003-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4869 (2003) · source

  23. SANA-869 I feel that, in the political process, there are four important elements we should look at. First, we think that a strong United Nations role is imperative to provide the necessary legitimacy to the process until we have an Iraqi Government that has been legitimized by democratic elections. Secondly, I believe we must consider broadening the basis of the political process in order to include all political and societal forces in Iraq that are willing to cooperate in a peaceful manner and to reject violence and terrorism. The third important element is to define and consider the role of the neighbours, because if want to successfully stabilize Iraq politically, economically and in terms of security, we must ensure that Iraq is reintegrated into the region as a new and democratic State.

    2003-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4869 (2003) · source

  24. If we look at the three problems we now face in Iraq - security, reconstruction and the political process - it is obvious, I think, that at present the security and reconstruction business must be dealt with primarily by the CPA. The CPA has a leading role here for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, of course, security and reconstruction are linked to the political process, and that process should provide the signal necessary to facilitate security and reconstruction in the country. I believe that when we discussed resolution 1511 (2003), the creation of such a political signal was the main gist of the French-German amendment. The change of strategy, as it appears in the agreement between Mr. Bremer and the Governing Council, reflects to a certain extent what we have said in this discussion.

    2003-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4869 (2003) · source

  25. Of course, this plan needs to be evaluated against the background of evolving security conditions. It also needs to be clarified in certain aspects, and it deserves a thorough evaluation. We will also have to examine how the legitimacy of this process of transferring sovereignty can be strengthened. It is important to ask how to create the necessary momentum for the reversed political sequence in order to contribute to a stabilization of the security situation in the country. Therefore, we think that putting the agreement between Mr. Bremer and the Governing Council in a wider international context would help to send the necessary signal to the Iraqis. That signal should be that the process has indeed fundamentally changed.

    2003-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4869 (2003) · source

  26. First of all, I would like to thank our colleagues from the United States and the United Kingdom for the update on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1483 (2003), in particular for their assessment of the security conditions and the progress reported in the humanitarian and economic sectors, as well as for their report on the political developments. As regards the political developments, we take note of the recent conclusion of the agreement on the political process by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). We are encouraged by the decision to introduce a timetable for the transfer of sovereignty to a transitional Iraqi Government and for the reversal of the sequence of the political process. We believe it is an important step forward.

    2003-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4869 (2003) · source

  27. One of the most important tasks of the Mine- Action Support Group is to help ensure adequate funding of mine-action projects. As Chair of that Group for the current year, I wish to seize this opportunity to appeal to all Member States inside and outside the Security Council that have the means to do so to lend their generous support to the cause of mine action.

    2003-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4858 (2003) · source

  28. Together, the report and the draft resolution on assistance in mine action which is to be submitted in the General Assembly within the next few weeks form an important basis for this discussion. Germany has, from the outset, supported the concept of mine action. Former German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, together with his Canadian colleague Lloyd Axworthy, was one of the promoters of the Ottawa Convention. The German contribution to mine action, since 1992, has reached almost $106 million. Germany is a founding member of the Mine- Action Support Group formed by donor countries in 1997 with the objective of establishing a regular exchange of information and views with one another and with United Nations bodies such as UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF on mine-action activities worldwide.

    2003-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4858 (2003) · source

  29. To the extent that the number of parties involved in mine action is increasing, coordination is of the essence, and the role of each player must be clearly defined. Another aspect is the distribution of roles between the Security Council and the General Assembly with reference to mine action. It is not my intention to prejudge the blue-ribbon Panel of eminent persons on the reform of the United Nations, but as I see it, the Council's role is basically to ensure that mine action is considered and, as the case may require, included in peacekeeping mandates. The General Assembly, on the other hand, deals with mine action in all its aspects, thus responding to the report of the Secretary-General on that matter (A/58/260).

    2003-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4858 (2003) · source

  30. It is essential that peacekeeping missions be mandated and subsequently organized in such a way as to ensure that the necessary mine-action measures are taken from the outset. In other words, mine action needs to be on the checklist of items to be considered in any peacekeeping mandate issued by the Security Council. However, as peace begins to be consolidated, the whole array of mine-action features is brought to bear. It is at that stage that, gradually and increasingly, actors from outside the United Nations come into the picture. These include NGOs as well as local and national authorities of the affected country. The role of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is to help build local and national capacity to take over the role of coordinating the various actors in the minefields.

    2003-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4858 (2003) · source

  31. The authors of the Ottawa Convention were wise to establish a broad- based approach to mine action that also includes the humanitarian aspect. When dealing with mine action, the Security Council needs to ask where the Council comes into play. The hybrid nature of mine action does not seem to supply an easy answer. In broad terms, after armed conflict the peacekeeping phase calls for demining in the interest of the resurgence of basic civilian life in former war zones, and in the interest of the security of the peacekeepers themselves. Demining and mine awareness may at that stage be the essential elements of mine action. And at that stage, the United Nations, especially the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), plays a key role in organizing and coordinating mine action.

    2003-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4858 (2003) · source

  32. It is a great relief that the number of States signing and ratifying the Ottawa Convention is steadily increasing, thus enlarging the commitment to the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and the commitment to their destruction. However, even if the load of new mine-related problems may be decreasing, the burden of existing mine problems remains staggering. You and your fellow citizens, Mr. President, know best what I am talking about, because Angola is considered to be one of the most heavily mine-affected States in the world. Mine action, which addresses a variety of mine- related issues, is a new concept that goes beyond the mere military and disarmament aspects.

    2003-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4858 (2003) · source

  33. Mines make life unbearable for all: not just for those injured or mutilated, but also for those who have to live with the constant fear of falling victim to them. Mines hamper the resurgence of civilian life after conflict and thus prolong the war situation for the civilian population, sometimes long after hostilities have ceased. Laying mines is one of the easiest things in the world to do. Finding and removing them safely, however, is a Herculean task that absorbs resources far exceeding the value of the mine itself. I have read expert estimates that an anti-personnel mine costs $3 to produce, but that its removal costs roughly $3,000. That is an unacceptable relationship - as mine laying is unacceptable anyway.

    2003-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4858 (2003) · source

  34. As I have not yet had the opportunity to do so, I too, Sir, would like to welcome your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council and to pledge the full support of my delegation. I would also like to thank you for convening this very important meeting. Mines are truly a scourge and are killing people every day. I just learned that today, six citizens of Chad and one German citizen working for a German non- governmental organization (NGO) were killed in an explosion related to unexploded ordnance disposal. We deplore the loss of life, and our condolences go to the bereaved families. A few days ago we had the opportunity to learn of - and to see - the cruelties mines cause to human beings, when we met with mine-action experts in Kabul as part of the Security Council mission to Afghanistan.

    2003-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4858 (2003) · source

  35. And lastly but not least, I should like to thank the members of the Security Council for their cooperation and team spirit, which made it a pleasure to chair this mission.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  36. Fifthly, the Afghan Transitional Administration should initiate a process of national reconciliation directed at all Afghans willing to help rebuild the country, irrespective of past events, in order to strengthen the central Government and the basic institutions of the State. Furthermore, it should ensure broad and universal participation in the peace process, in particular with regard to the role of women. In conclusion, I should like to thank the members of the Afghan Transitional Administration and UNAMA for their hospitality during the visit. I should also like to thank UNAMA and the members of the Secretariat for their valuable support in the organization of the mission and to commend all UNAMA staff for their dedicated work to the benefit of Afghanistan in an extremely challenging and insecure environment.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  37. Secondly, the international community should urgently commit further funds to the Law and Order Trust Fund and should enhance assistance activities in the security sector. Thirdly, the Afghan Transitional Administration should follow through and extend to other key institutions the recent reform of the Ministry of Defence. Fourthly, the mission supports the Afghan President's wish to convene a follow-up conference to the Bonn process early next year and invites the Secretary-General to study the possibility of such a conference in order to ensure the necessary financial support and political momentum for peace and stability in Afghanistan.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  38. The mission was shocked to learn about the frequent death threats against women's rights activists and that the rate of suicide among women was very high: in the past six months alone, there were more than 40 cases, often as women were reacting in desperation against forced marriages. Civil society representatives underlined the need for women's issues to receive serious and immediate attention. In particular, they were concerned about the present draft of the constitution, which in their View does not provide sufficiently explicit guarantees for women's rights. As a concrete outcome of the mission, we recommend the following. First, all factional forces should be withdrawn from Kabul as a matter of urgency and in accordance with Annex I of the Bonn Agreement.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  39. However, senior officials of the Afghan Government and other interlocutors suggested that, at present, Afghanistan was too weak to face the challenges of the past and that the focus should rather be on the establishment of good governance practices. Furthermore, the mission had an opportunity to exchange views with the Minister of Women's Affairs and received briefings from civil society representatives on gender issues. The rights of women - particularly their active participation in the social, political and economic spheres - continue to be seriously hampered by culture, custom and the lack of security.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  40. Many of the representatives described vividly the general situation in their areas, which was characterized by pervasive abuse of a broad range of human rights. In response to those claims, the mission emphasized in all talks with regional leaders the importance of a Vibrant civil society and respect for human rights for the stability of Afghanistan. Representatives of non-governmental organizations and civil society called for an end to impunity and for the establishment of a mechanism for transitional justice and the deployment of human rights monitors. They stressed that it was unacceptable that perpetrators of grave human rights violations in the past continued to hold high public office.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  41. The mission noted that the draft constitution - which was released during the mission's Visit - provides for a transitional arrangement that allows a gap of up to 12 months between the convening of presidential elections and that of parliamentary elections. That time gap was particularly welcomed by Special Representative Brahimi, who was of the View that holding parliamentary elections too early could lead to a consolidation of the present political situation in the provinces. In that context, the mission underscored the need to hold parliamentary elections as soon as possible after the envisaged presidential elections. The mission met with representatives of civil society and of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission in Kabul, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  42. In Afghanistan, the conditions necessary for a credible national political process are not yet in place: national reconciliation requires greater focus; political parties need time to develop; national institutions must undergo reform; and the power of the factional leaders must be diminished. Furthermore, some local commanders continue to ignore the demands of the central Government vis-a-vis appointments of provincial officials and the remittance of customs revenue. The mission, following discussions with the head of the Electoral Unit of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), is of the view that, notwithstanding the substantial efforts of UNAMA and the Afghan electoral authorities, the ability to undertake registration is made precarious not only by the lack of security, but also by the dearth of funding.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  43. The mission invites the Afghan Government to build on those initial measures to complete the reform process and extend it to other key institutions - starting with the Ministry of the Interior and the intelligence services - to ensure that they are both broadly representative and professional. To date, the benchmarks of the Bonn peace process have been attained, largely on schedule. However, Afghanistan has now entered the most critical phase in the peace process: the Constitutional Loya Jirga and election processes. By their nature, those processes bring to the forefront issues that divide society.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  44. In that context, the Minister of the Interior highlighted the importance of providing regular funding to the Law and Order Trust Fund, which is used in particular for the salaries of police officers. With the appointment of 22 new senior-level officials, the first step in the reform of the Ministry of Defence has been implemented. The Afghan interlocutors and their international partners underscored that, while much more is required to transform the Ministry into a truly representative body, that progress allowed the pilot phase of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercise to commence in Kunduz.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  45. The mission was impressed by the positive contribution of ISAF to security in Kabul and by the role of the United Kingdom provincial reconstruction team in Mazar-i-Sharif. It looks forward to ISAF's further contribution to the Bonn process, in particular in support of the Constitutional Loya Jirga and the electoral process. Furthermore, the mission was briefed on initiatives to accelerate security sector reform. Efforts aimed at the development of the national police received a significant boost with the recent provision of additional assistance from the United States. These initiatives are of particular importance in providing the necessary environment in which the Constitutional Loya Jirga and electoral processes can be successfully conducted.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  46. The mission commended the initial efforts undertaken by the Afghan Government, assisted by the United Kingdom as the lead nation, in counter- narcotics, and called for a sustained, coordinated and comprehensive effort to combat drug production and trafficking. Regarding international assistance in the security sector, the mission reiterated that, ultimately, the Afghans themselves must assume responsibility. However, until Afghan security institutions can be developed there will be a continued need for international forces. In that regard, all interlocutors warmly welcomed Security Council resolution 1510 (2003) and requested international deployments throughout Afghanistan.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  47. As described by Finance Minister Ghani, the production of opium is draining resources from Afghanistan, as it results in larger defence, health and economic costs. He urged the international community to provide prosecutable evidence, which would contribute to the isolation of the perpetrators. Senior officials of the Afghan Government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) emphasized the need for a comprehensive programme of action to combat drug production and trafficking. Furthermore, they highlighted the need for increased cooperation from neighbouring States in this regard. As drugs originating in Afghanistan have a significant impact on end-user markets, there is a need to strengthen drug control efforts beyond Afghanistan, including along the borders.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  48. It also emphasized the need for the respect of human rights and the creation of a civil society. In particular, in the meeting with Atta Mohammad and Abdul Rashid Dostum, the mission underlined in strong terms the need to implement the reforms outlined for the north. These reforms include, in particular, the integration of the local forces into a national army, the demilitarization of Mazar-i-Sharif and the appointment of professionals to key positions in the local administration. Many interlocutors, including President Karzai and Foreign Minister Abdullah, listed drug production and trafficking as a major source of instability. They claimed that drug production and trafficking feeds terrorism, criminality and corruption. Ambassador Brahimi stressed that the magnitude of the problem could lead to Afghanistan becoming a narco-State.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  49. However, in briefings by the Foreign Ministry in Islamabad, during a necessary stopover, and by the Ambassador of Pakistan to Afghanistan, they assured the mission that Pakistan is doing its utmost to control its border with Afghanistan and emphasized the need for further international assistance in this regard. In too many areas of the country, the arbitrary control exercised by local commanders and factional armies has resulted in heavy casualties. Last month, the heaviest factional fighting since the signing of the Bonn peace process took place in Mazar-i-Sharif. In meetings with provincial officials and factional leaders in Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif, the mission emphasized the vital importance of cooperation between the provinces and the central Government.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source

  50. This, in turn, increases the risk that the predominately Pashtun population - already frustrated by its relatively low representation in the Government - will become marginalized. In that regard, the mission was encouraged to learn about and welcomed plans by the coalition forces to deploy pilot provincial reconstruction teams in the south and south-east and to consider pilot projects for regional development zones. Long-term stability for Afghanistan cannot be achieved without the cooperation of the neighbouring States. Many of the Afghan interlocutors consistently spoke of instability caused by Taliban and Al Qaeda elements believed to be crossing the border into Afghanistan.

    2003-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4855 (2003) · source