YouSaid · the spoken record

Pobee

lines on the record: 258
first: 2017-05-15
most recent: 2023-11-16
sittings or episodes: 24
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Another key factor that has contributed to that positive trend is the ongoing operationalization of the interregional maritime security mechanism, the Yaoundé Architecture, which was established following the signing of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct in 2013. We welcome the steady progress made by the Gulf of Guinea States and subregional organizations, notably the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, with the active support of international partners, towards operationalizing key pillars of the Architecture over the past 10 years. Specifically, four out of the five Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres have been successfully activated.”
2023-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9355 (2023) · source
“Ms. Pobee: I thank you, Madam President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Since my previous briefing to the Council on this subject in November 2022 (see S/PV.9198), instances of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea have continued to steadily decline. That decrease, which began in April 2021, is due to the significant efforts of national authorities, who bear the primary responsibility for countering piracy and armed robbery at sea in the region, and the support of regional and international partners. Regular naval patrols by Gulf of Guinea coastal States and the systematic deployment of naval assets by international partners have together continued to serve as an effective deterrent against the actions of criminal groups.”
2023-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9355 (2023) · source
“The recent instability in the Sudan, in the eastern part of the Sahel, is yet another cause for concern. The devastating effects of continuing destabilization would be felt far beyond the region and the African continent.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“It was in that spirit that the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the G-5 Sahel and the United Nations established the Independent High-Level Panel on Security and Development in the Sahel. Under the leadership of Mahamadou Issoufou, the former President of the Niger, the Panel is actively working to help us reshape our approaches in the region and maximize our collective impact through innovative, coherent and coordinated action. We desperately need to see resolute advances in the fight against terrorism, violent extremism and organized crime in the Sahel. Without significant gains, it will become increasingly difficult to reverse the security trajectory in the Sahel and the further expansion of insecurity towards the West African coastal countries.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“For its part, the United Nations stands ready to further support the efforts of the G-5 Sahel, including through capacity- building support in areas such as the prevention of violent extremism and radicalization and the promotion of the rule of law and border-security management. Regardless of the support extended to the G-5 Sahel, stabilizing the region hinges on aligning our policies and approaches and putting the people of the region at the forefront of our efforts. The United Nations is committed to working with all partners to ensure that governance structures are more democratic and open and that the people of the Sahel have more confidence in their institutions. If we are to achieve durable peace in the region, we must address its underlying governance, development, human rights and humanitarian challenges.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“Indeed, the G-5 Sahel countries must ensure that their military strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism are fully anchored in respect for human rights and place the protection of every population at their core. That is necessary if the desired results are to be achieved. In that context, the political and operational support of partners remains essential to the stabilization of Mali and the Sahel. It is urgent to address the challenges faced by the Sahel in a sustainable and effective manner and support national actors in their efforts to implement the initiatives that they themselves have devised. Multifaceted support will prevent the crisis in the Sahel from upsetting the fragile political balances in the region, and will help prevent further spillover of insecurity into the coastal countries.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“Through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations has pursued its support to the Joint Force in operationalizing its international human rights and humanitarian law compliance framework. Important institutional, legal and behavioural progress and changes have been recorded. Notably, the Joint Force currently has an internal mechanism that enables it to attribute responsibility for incidents, analyse patterns, take necessary remedial action and adapt its operational conduct. Looking ahead, continued human rights work with regional and national security actors in the Sahel will remain critical in the context of the deteriorating security situation.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“Be that as it may, the end of the tripartite agreement among the European Union, the G-5 Sahel and the United Nations presents an opportunity to reflect on how the international community should renew its approaches to supporting regional security mechanisms. The upcoming deliberations in the Council later this month, on the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) and considerations related to the financing of African Union peace support operations mandated by the Security Council, will undoubtedly provide a timely opportunity for the Council to consider the issue.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“That support helped to fill critical gaps hindering the mobility and operational tempo of the Joint Force. Unfortunately, the international community’s efforts have fallen short of what is required to render the Joint Force fully operational and autonomous, with the capacity to help stabilize the Sahel region. A lack of consensus among partners and donors on the most effective support mechanism for the Joint Force has proved a significant obstacle to its operationalization. The admittedly limited support provided by MINUSMA to the Joint Force did not fundamentally change the situation.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“I wish to warmly thank the European Union for its invaluable support under that agreement, which provided funding for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to deliver life-support consumables to the Joint Force. With the expiration of the tripartite agreement, MINUSMA’s logistical and operational support to the Joint Force, as part of its mandate, will cease to be in effect. MINUSMA has spared no effort in providing operational and logistic support to the Joint Force whenever it was requested, in accordance with its mandate to support the Joint Force. That included fuel, rations, medical evacuation and engineering support such as building camps. In total, MINUSMA has provided more than 275,000 individual ration packs and 83,000 litres of lubricants and 6 million litres of fuel.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“Although the reconfiguration of the Joint Force has resulted in the cessation of major military operations since January, G-5 Sahel member States seem determined to strengthen intraregional cooperation, including by establishing bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms with the Malian armed forces in the fight against terrorism, as demonstrated by the recent strengthening of bilateral military cooperation between Mali and Burkina Faso and between Mali and the Niger. However, despite those efforts, insecurity in the tri- border area continues to grow. The tripartite agreement between the European Union, the G-5 Sahel and the United Nations is expected to end in June.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“Joint Force units have gained practical experience and developed enhanced efficiency in their operations, particularly in the areas of coordination and responsiveness. Against the background of strategic and operational shifts in the Sahel, including the reconfiguration of the European and French forces, and also in the context of Mali’s withdrawal from the G-5 Sahel and the intensification of threats in the border area, the Joint Force is restructuring in response to those new realities.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“The security crisis is exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation. In Burkina Faso, there are growing humanitarian challenges as a result of the violence, with roughly 4.7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance and more than 2 million people displaced internally this year, compared to the 3.5 million people who needed humanitarian assistance in 2022. In Mali, a staggering 8.8 million people will need humanitarian assistance this year, compared to 7.5 million people who required such assistance in 2022. Women and children still bear the brunt of the violence and the food insecurity. The G-5 Sahel Joint Force has made steady progress in its operationalization.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“Ms. Pobee: I thank you, Madam, for giving me the opportunity to address the Security Council. Since I last briefed the Security Council on the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) (see S/PV.9194), the security situation in the region has remained very worrisome. Non-State armed groups continue to carry out large-scale attacks against civilian and military targets and to engage in confrontations over access to resources, territorial control and influence. Terrorists and violent extremist groups frequently target border areas, in particular the tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger — the Liptako-Gourma. In that regard, we also observed an upsurge in clashes between the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin earlier this year.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“In conclusion, I would like to thank Major General Benjamin Sawyerr and the women and men of UNISFA for their work in the service of peace in Abyei, particularly at a time marked by additional challenges and uncertainty. I would also like to express our appreciation to the troop- and police-contributing countries for their close collaboration and to the members of the Security Council for their continued support to UNISFA.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“During the period under review, UNISFA reported the deployment of South Sudanese military and police personnel in Agok, in southern Abyei, and Sudanese national police in Farouk, in northern Abyei. The mission sent notes verbales to both Governments requesting them to remove their security personnel in line with Abyei’s demilitarized status. I am pleased to report that the United Nations country teams in the Sudan and South Sudan, in collaboration with UNISFA, finalized the administrative arrangements for the Abyei joint programme and began the implementation of projects to create an environment conducive to peaceful coexistence. The first projects include the establishment of a nutrition centre in Amiet market for women and children and the provision of vocational training for young people.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“We note the call of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism on 18 January for a strategy to sensitize the communities along the border, including in Gok Machar, and urge the Government of South Sudan to take the necessary steps to enable the re-establishment of those locations as soon as possible. Due to the non-issuance of visas, there has been no progress on the deployment of the three formed police units and additional individual police officers mandated by the Security Council. In the meantime, United Nations police continued to assist and monitor the community protection and joint protection committees. Needless to say, it is now more critical than ever to provide rule-of-law support to the people of Abyei, and we count on the Security Council to lend its valuable support on that issue.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“The situation in the Sudan has also impacted UNISFA’s logistics. Our mission support colleagues are working to secure the reliable resupply of goods. That includes logistics for the headquarters of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism in Kadugli, in the Sudan, and its two team sites, where restrictions on air and ground movement have created additional challenges for resupply as well as the implementation of mandates. UNISFA continues to face challenges related to force mobility, particularly during the rainy season, which severely restricts ground movement. At the same time, no progress has been made regarding the re-operationalization of the Verification and Monitoring Mechanism’s Sector 1 headquarters in Gok Machar, South Sudan, and its two team sites, following its forced withdrawal in 2021.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“The recent outbreak of fighting in the Sudan risks further complicating the humanitarian situation in Abyei. As of 8 May, a total of 535 people from the Sudan have been recorded as arriving in the Area. Humanitarian partners are anticipating and preparing for more population movements. The reconfiguration of UNISFA into a United Nations multinational peacekeeping force is in its final stages. Of the 3,250 military personnel authorized, 3,078 have deployed. Again, the fighting in the Sudan has disrupted deployment routes, meaning that the scheduled arrival of additional personnel and equipment will have to be postponed, which will affect force capacity. Planning is currently under way on alternative arrangements that can minimize the delay while safeguarding the security of personnel and equipment.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“UNISFA and its partners were able to convene a seasonal peace conference in Todach, inside the Abyei Area, in March. In an agreement signed at the meeting, the communities agreed on a cessation of hostilities and on ensuring freedom of movement, among other measures aimed at peaceful coexistence. Women from both communities participated and presented recommendations that helped inform the agreement. The humanitarian environment in Abyei remained challenging, with United Nations and non-governmental organizations aiding some 212,000 vulnerable people in Abyei, including roughly 30,000 internally displaced. Intercommunal violence affected humanitarian efforts, with some organizations withdrawing from the Agok area in February and two aid workers killed in an attack in Rumamier on 2 January.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“Those efforts included a civil-society-led dialogue conducted in Wau in April. Although the dialogue did not result in a formal agreement being signed, it did produce agreement in principle on a cessation of hostilities. The outbreaks of violence between the two communities in Abyei have since become less frequent. A related concern is the proliferation of weapons, particularly in southern Abyei, which has coincided with the emergence of the Ngok Dinka youth self-defence group known as Tit Baai, which was formed after clashes began between the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka in February 2022. UNISFA continues to confiscate weapons and ammunition, in keeping with Abyei’s weapon-free status. Despite the continued trust deficit between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities, the violence between them declined overall.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“On 2 and 3 May, 58 United Nations civilian personnel were evacuated from Kadugli, following a decision by the designated official for the Sudan. Despite the cessation of hostilities agreement signed between the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka in April 2022, intermittent clashes continued to take place in southern Abyei, with reports of incidents on the opposite side of the southern boundary. The tensions also led to protests within the UNISFA headquarters demanding the removal of Twic Dinka contracted staff, compelling the mission to provide physical security for those individuals. UNISFA continued to support efforts led by the Government of South Sudan to reduce tensions between the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka communities, in close coordination with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“With fighting ongoing and mediation efforts under way, the United Nations will continue to support the Sudan and South Sudan when dialogue on Abyei resumes. Special Envoy Tetteh, who will brief the Council today, will provide members with a more comprehensive update on developments related to the Sudan and South Sudan. In Abyei, UNISFA is monitoring the potential impact of the fighting in the Sudan, such as an influx of displaced persons, the entry of armed groups into the Area or the emboldening of spoilers in local intercommunal relations. While none of those risks have materialized in a major way so far, the mission remains alert to their possibility. More immediately, UNISFA has already taken steps to protect the safety of its personnel in the Sudan, with the evacuation of 33 personnel from Khartoum on 23 April.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“Of significance in that regard was a meeting between the President of South Sudan and the Chairperson of the Sovereign Council of the Sudan in Juba in January, at which they discussed Abyei and possible cooperation on their shared border. At a meeting between the chairpersons of the national committees of the two countries, convened on 9 and 10 April in Khartoum, the parties agreed to continue discussing issues related to Abyei, including the final status. I welcome those positive developments and commend the parties for their willingness to engage. Despite the positive momentum created earlier in the reporting period, the outbreak of violence in the Sudan may deeply impact the chance for political progress on Abyei and border issues.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“Ms. Pobee: I thank members for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and the mission’s support to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM). I take this opportunity to update the Council on some of the most recent developments since the publication of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/305), including those related to the outbreak of hostilities in the Sudan. The outbreak of fighting in the Sudan on 15 April capped off a reporting period marked by encouraging signs of engagement between the Sudan and South Sudan on the Abyei issue.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“While the Gulf of Guinea States bear the primary responsibility for countering piracy and armed robbery at sea in the region, Security Council support for that process and its outcome will be invaluable. The United Nations entities, including through the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa and the United Nations Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel, stand ready to provide the necessary political and technical assistance to the Gulf of Guinea States in that endeavour.”
2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source
“In conclusion, I want to highlight that, while the Yaoundé Architecture for maritime security has been functioning with increased efficiency, several significant challenges continue to impede its full operationalization. One key challenge is the lack of predictable and sustainable financing. The forthcoming tenth anniversary of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct provides an opportunity to the signatory States, together with ECCAS, ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, to comprehensively assess the status of implementation of the maritime security architecture. That assessment will help to identify priority areas for support and develop a strategic outlook and road map for the next decade to complete the operationalization of the Yaoundé Architecture.”
2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source
“That requires a holistic and long-term approach, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, to address poverty, the lack of alternative livelihoods, youth unemployment and underemployment. Inclusive strategies would need to be underpinned by sex-disaggregated data on the impact of maritime crime on women, girls, men and boys. The development of the Gulf of Guinea’s blue economy provides further opportunities for sustainable economic growth for littoral communities. Effective national and regional strategies to tackle governance and security challenges, especially those bordering on illicit financial flows and illegal and unregulated fishing, will be critical.”
2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source
“In Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, since early 2022, the United Nations and the World Bank have deepened their cooperation through shared analysis, the alignment of strategic priorities and joint advocacy with the Government in an effort to enhance the coherence of efforts and better address key drivers of fragility, such as poverty and unequal access to basic services. I would like to underscore that, in order to effectively eradicate the menace posed by piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, national stakeholders, regional structures and the international community must work in close collaboration to address the underlying social, economic and environmental challenges that underpin the recruitment of individuals into maritime crime networks.”
2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source
“The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Maritime Organization continued to provide assistance to the Gulf of Guinea States towards the ratification of the relevant maritime security instruments and their incorporation into national legislation. At present, there is no firm evidence to suggest any potential or possible linkages between terrorists and pirate groups, However, addressing the underlying social, economic and environmental challenges faced by communities in the region will ultimately serve to contain both threats. In that respect, the United Nations system continues to strengthen its collaboration with international financial institutions towards supporting the region in effectively addressing the underlying causes of fragility and insecurity.”
2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source
“The exercise included two real cases relating to the relocation of a boat suspected of drug trafficking and the rendering of assistance to a fishing vessel in distress. The United Nations system continues to provide the necessary political and technical assistance to the Gulf of Guinea States in their efforts to fully implement the Yaoundé Architecture. On 15 September, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel held a workshop on maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. An important outcome of the workshop was a call to the Member States concerned to adopt the required legal frameworks to criminalize piracy.”
2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source
“Indeed, once the Maritime Coordination Centre becomes functional, it will complete the operationalization of the Yaoundé Architecture in the ECOWAS maritime domain. The MMCC zone E, in Cotonou, and the MMCC zone F, in Accra, are already active. Another important event in the period since the Secretary-General’s report was issued is the multinational maritime exercise Grand African Nemo 2022, which was jointly organized by the Interregional Coordination Centre in Yaoundé and the French navy from 11 to 18 October. The exercise covered a wide area, stretching from Senegal to Angola, and involved 17 of the 19 countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea, as well as eight international partners. Participants were trained to tackle illegal fishing, piracy, marine pollution, illegal trafficking and rescue at sea.”
2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source
“The conference, which is scheduled to take place in Kinshasa before the end of the year, is intended to develop strategies for maritime governance, security and safety and the development of a sustainable blue economy in the ECCAS space. As we approach the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct in 2023, the Gulf of Guinea States have continued to demonstrate their commitment to the full operationalization of the Yaoundé Architecture for maritime security. An important milestone was reached on 26 October this year with the signing of a headquarters agreement by the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States and the Government of Cabo Verde for the establishment of the Multinational Maritime Coordination Centre (MMCC) for zone G, comprising Cabo Verde, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Senegal.”
2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source
“I welcome the recent meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the Gulf of Guinea Commission held on 13 October to review the progress made in addressing regional maritime challenges. In addition, I would like to note the election of Ghana’s President, Mr. Nana Akufo-Addo, as the rotating President of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, succeeding his Nigerian counterpart, President Muhammadu Buhari. I would also like to take note of the ongoing preparations for the first maritime conference of the Economic Community of Central African States on the theme of the governance and security of the ECCAS maritime space and the development of a sustainable blue economy in Central Africa.”
2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source
“It is therefore imperative that States in the Gulf of Guinea and regional structures, such as the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, supported by the international community, enhance and accelerate their efforts to establish a stable and secure maritime environment in the Gulf by fully operationalizing the maritime security architecture set out in the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa. At the same time, the underlying causes, such as youth unemployment and inadequate access to public services, which render coastal communities vulnerable to being drawn into illicit and criminal activities, must also be addressed.”
2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source
“In that respect, the recent decrease in instances of piracy may in part be attributable to the shift by criminal networks to other forms of maritime and riverine crime, such as oil bunkering and theft, which they likely view as both less risky and more profitable.”
2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source
“(spoke in English) The steady decline in instances of piracy and armed robbery at sea, which began around April 2021, is the result of concerted efforts by national authorities, who bear the primary responsibility for countering piracy and armed robbery at sea in the region, with the support of regional and international partners. Increased naval patrols by coastal States of the Gulf of Guinea and the regular deployment of naval assets by international partners have together successfully served as a deterrent. Enhanced regional coordination and the convictions for piracy and maritime crimes in Nigeria and Togo in 2021 are important factors in bringing about this positive development. However, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea morphed over the past decade. Pirate groups are adapting to changing dynamics, both at sea and in coastal areas.”
2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source
“I thank the Security Council for giving me this opportunity to present the report of the Secretary-General on the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its underlying causes (S/2022/818). Since the end of the reporting period covered by the report, cases of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea continued to decrease. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that it is still too early to draw definitive conclusions as to a long-term decline in this singular threat to stability in the Gulf of Guinea.”
2022-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9198 (2022) · source
“The initiative will also reach out to national stakeholders and the region’s bilateral and multilateral partners to address that shared responsibility. As we await the recommendations of that independent assessment, we look forward to the continued support of the Security Council in working towards a stable, secure, peaceful and prosperous Sahel. Faced with the growing threats to the region and beyond, we urge the international community to remain engaged in a spirit of shared responsibility and solidarity with the populations of the region.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“The Secretariat remains committed to supporting the region as well as the G-5 Sahel. We firmly believe that it is only by working together in a coordinated and complementary manner that we can effectively address the multiple challenges before us. It is in that spirit that the United Nations and the African Union, along with ECOWAS and the G-5 Sahel, are supporting the work of the Independent High-Level Panel on Security and Development in the Sahel led by former President Mahamadou Issoufou of the Niger. At the behest of the Secretary-General and the AU Chairperson, that exercise aims to marshal greater attention and resources at the national, subregional, regional and international levels and propose innovative ways to address the security, governance and development challenges in the region.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“The northern regions of the coastal States of the Gulf of Guinea are being increasingly exposed to a spillover of violence and insecurity. In that regard, international partners have indicated their willingness to actively consider extending their support to neighbouring countries in the Gulf of Guinea and West Africa, based on their demands. That is a positive development that will bolster the relevant regional organizations in their counter-terrorism efforts, support initiatives such as the Accra Initiative and strengthen national strategies for improving living conditions, security and resilience in the most vulnerable regions. It will necessitate a continuing dialogue between the concerned Governments and international partners to ensure that the support is aligned with national and regional priorities.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“We need to rethink our collective approach and be creative, going beyond existing efforts. In the coming months, it will be crucial for stakeholders in the region to maintain a political dialogue in pursuing their common security objectives. We remain deeply committed to supporting them in that endeavour, working closely with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union as they lead in resolving the current tensions in the region. Meanwhile, progress can be made at a bilateral level. For instance, we have recently seen national authorities in Burkina Faso and Mali seeking to strengthen their bilateral cooperation in the area of security and defence. As the security situation worsens in the Sahel, armed groups are tightening their destructive grip on the broader region.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“It is important to ensure that the Joint Force integrates human rights and international humanitarian law into the core of its operations. Otherwise it risks fostering further breeding grounds for violent extremist groups, causing ever-increasing suffering for the populations. Similarly, at a national level, G-5 Sahel countries should ensure that their military strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism are fully anchored in human rights and put the protection of all populations at their core, including when they partner with non-State actors to operate alongside national armies. A coordinated breakthrough in our response to violent extremism is urgently needed. If we fail in that effort, the effects of terrorism, violent extremism and organized crime will be felt far beyond the Sahel region and, indeed, the African continent.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“The technical and operational challenges remain a matter of concern, while insecurity and a lack of infrastructure along supply routes continue to pose multiple challenges. As detailed in the Secretary- General’s report, divergences among the G-5 Sahel member States, which culminated in the withdrawal of Mali from the organization, further complicated the implementation of MINUSMA’s support to the Joint Force. Through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Organization also supports the Joint Force in operationalizing its human rights and international humanitarian law compliance framework. Defeating terrorism and violent extremism requires a comprehensive response and will not be attained through military gains alone.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“Several United Nations agencies, funds and programmes continued to implement their programmes in support of the G-5 Sahel, including those involving regional capacity-building in the areas of criminal justice, border security management and the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism. In line with its Security Council mandate, and as provided for by the technical agreement between the United Nations, the European Union and the G-5 Sahel, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) continues to provide support to the Joint Force. The Mission works with contractors to deliver life-support consumables to the four contingents of the Force outside Mali.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“Looking forward, the development of a new concept of operations for the Joint Force is being considered. The new concept of operations would address the challenges resulting from the evolving security and humanitarian situation and the withdrawal of Mali, while acknowledging the bilateral operations undertaken by neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, the Executive Secretariat and other components of the G-5 Sahel continued their activities, including the operationalization of its gender policy and training for women leaders on dialogue, in conjunction with the African Union (AU) and the West African Network for Peacebuilding. Other activities were organized jointly by G-5 Sahel entities and donors to strengthen the prevention of violent extremism and empower local authorities in the area of security governance.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“The initiative complements the multifaceted engagement by the United Nations and other regional and international partners. It is therefore regrettable that, in addition to its financial difficulties, the G-5 Sahel Joint Force was weakened by the withdrawal of Mali in May. The second coup d’état in Burkina Faso, in September, also had a negative impact on the Force’s operational capacity and further undermined regional cohesion. Despite those challenges, the Joint Force continued to conduct military operations across the three sectors of the Joint Force, namely, the central sector in the tri- border area, the western sector at the border between Mali and Mauritania and the eastern sector at the border between Chad and the Niger. In total, seven major military operations have been conducted since May.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“I thank the Security Council for the opportunity to present the report of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel). Since the most recent Security Council meeting on the Sahel (see S/PV.9147), the security situation in the region has continued to deteriorate. The indiscriminate use of violence by terrorist groups means that thousands of innocent civilians are suffering, while millions more are forced to leave their homes. Insecurity is exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation. Women and children in particular suffer from the lack of access to basic services and are the primary victims of the violence and increasing inequality. (spoke in English) Against that backdrop, the G-5 Sahel Joint Force remains an important regionally led component of the response to insecurity in the Sahel.”
2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source
“The recent World Bank Gulf of Guinea Northern Regions Social Cohesion Project is a good example of how they can bring resources to bear while complementing United Nations prevention and peacebuilding efforts. As we develop those partnerships and innovative approaches, I look forward to the continued support of the Security Council in orienting collective efforts and resources to build resilience in the countries and regions where United Nations peace operations are deployed, and beyond.”
2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181 (2022) · source
“United Nations country teams play a critical role in supporting countries with a long-term perspective, and they are an integral part of our efforts to sustain peace. That is especially important during United Nations transitions, such as in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Guinea-Bissau in the recent past, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the near future. Furthermore, to achieve sustaining peace and sustainable development, we need to engage in strong collective action and enhance collaboration and partnerships with regional and subregional organizations, financial institutions, civil society and the business community. Working more closely with international and regional financial institutions is particularly important.”
2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181 (2022) · source