YouSaid · the spoken record

Pobee

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258
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2017-05-15
most recent
2023-11-16
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24
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un-security-council

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  1. I reiterate the Secretary-General’s call on all armed groups to disarm and join the political process of the Nairobi Conclave. I also encourage all countries of the region to take steps conducive to peace and to maintain dialogue with a view to avoiding any further escalation of tensions. Central Africa remains one of the regions in the world that is most severely affected by climate change, which continues to compound peace and security challenges in the subregion, as manifested by the intensifying clashes between farmers and herders in Chad and among farming, fishing and herding communities in Cameroon.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  2. Last week, I briefed the Council (see S/PV.9051) on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I remain concerned about the activity of all armed groups in the eastern part of the country, in particular the heinous attacks against civilians carried out by the Allied Democratic Forces and the Coalition des démocrates congolais and attacks by the Mouvement du 23 mars against Congolese security forces and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Those attacks are exacerbating humanitarian crises, harming bilateral relations at different levels and contributing to the spread of hate speech. In that regard, we welcomed the timely mediation role of President João Lourenço of Angola.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  3. UNOCA has also been working to strengthen the Coalition des organisations de la société civile d’Afrique centrale pour la préservation de la paix, la prévention des conflits, la resolution et la transformation des crises (COPAC). We look forward to hearing Ambassador Gilberto Da Piedade Veríssimo, President of the ECCAS Commission, and Ms. Jeanne-Danielle Nicole Nlate, Vice-President of COPAC, at this morning’s meeting. I welcomed Ambassador Da Piedade Veríssimo’s participation at the meeting of the Heads of United Nations presences in Central Africa earlier this year. UNOCA will continue to mobilize and coordinate United Nations system-wide support for building the capacity of ECCAS. The central Africa region continues to face persistent security challenges that are best addressed through regional cooperation.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  4. Meanwhile, I am concerned about the recent violence among groups of illegal gold miners, some of whom are allegedly from neighbouring countries, in an area of north-western Chad near the border with Libya. Those clashes have resulted in the deaths of at least 100 people, injuries to many persons and a significant number of displaced persons. In coordination with the transitional authorities, we will explore options for humanitarian support, while also remaining cognizant of the need to address the root causes of instability in that area. UNOCA has continued its support for the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in its efforts to implement institutional reform.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  5. In Chad, despite delays in the timeline, the political transition continues to be on course. However, the most important challenges remain ahead. It is our hope that the Doha pre-dialogue with the armed opposition will lead to an inclusive peace agreement, including a viable process for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of Chadian armed groups present in neighbouring countries, particularly Libya. I want to underline here that a DDR process in line with international standards will facilitate the mobilization of support from the international community. The United Nations stands ready to support a donor conference to help mobilize funding for the implementation of the transition road map, as and when the national dialogue process gains further traction.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  6. The challenges that persist in Cameroon include the conflict in its north-west and south-west regions, the crisis generated by Boko Haram-affiliated and splinter groups in the far north and the influx of refugees fleeing conflict in its neighbour to the east, the Central African Republic. During my visit to Cameroon in March with former Special Representative Fall, I engaged in fruitful exchanges with the national authorities and various stakeholders on the country’s peace and security challenges. The situation in the north-west and south-west is particularly worrying, as the violence there is continuing. It will be crucial for the international community to step up its support for national efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully, in line with the conclusions of the Major National Dialogue and international standards.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  7. The United Nations has been clear in its message that all stakeholders must work to create the conditions conducive to credible, inclusive and peaceful elections in line with democratic principles. UNOCA and other presences in the region will exercise their good offices wherever required to encourage inclusive and meaningful political dialogue in countries preparing for elections. The Office will also encourage Governments to widen the democratic space and further democratic gains, including by expanding the participation of women and young people in elections, both as candidates and voters. Some countries in the subregion continue to face political and security challenges. In some instances, those challenges, if not addressed, could risk affecting neighbouring countries and the subregion.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  8. Fall for his service and for his personal dedication to peace. (spoke in English) Several countries in the subregion are preparing for crucial electoral processes. For the current year, legislative and local elections are expected to be held in the Republic of the Congo in July; general elections in Angola in August; legislative, regional and local elections in Sao Tome and Principe in September; and legislative elections in Equatorial Guinea, with a date to be determined. In 2023, presidential elections are expected to be held in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Chad is also expected to hold general elections at the end of its transitional process.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  9. I thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council today on the situation in Central Africa and on the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA). At the outset, I would like to pay tribute to the work of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa, Mr. François Louncény Fall, whose mandate came to an end last week. Over the past five and a half years of his mandate, Mr. Fall has contributed to broadening UNOCA’s activities through his good offices and to strengthening the capacity of the region in conflict prevention and resolution. He has provided support in terms of the coordination and coherence of United Nations actions aimed at restoring peace and security in Central Africa. I want to thank Mr.

    2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source

  10. I want to express my gratitude and appreciation to MONUSCO’s leadership, and to the brave men and women on both the military and civilian sides of the Mission who continue to demonstrate an unwavering commitment to advancing their cause under the most trying circumstances.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  11. The full launching of the operational cell of the Contact and Coordination Group, as a complement to the Nairobi process and the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization programme, remains an essential component in the efforts to find viable solutions for foreign armed-group elements who are ready to be disarmed and repatriated to their countries of origin. Special Envoy Xia will provide further details on the important work that has already been undertaken within the framework of that critical mechanism. I would like to conclude by thanking the Council for its steadfast support for peace and stabilization efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  12. MONUSCO and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region are working hand in hand to support the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Kenyan facilitation in their consultations with Congolese armed groups, through the provision of logistical support and expert advice. The continued support of the Council and international partners for this ambitious undertaking, aimed at removing the security-related obstacles that have prevented the Democratic Republic of the Congo from realizing its full economic potential, will remain critical as the process unfolds over the coming weeks and months.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  13. I want to echo the Secretary-General in commending the leadership of Presidents Kenyatta and Tshisekedi in that process and encouraging them to spare no effort to achieve a successful outcome. I reiterate the Secretary- General’s call to local armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to participate in the political process without preconditions, and to all foreign armed groups to disarm unconditionally and immediately return to their countries of origin, in accordance with the decisions of the Nairobi Conclave. I also want to underscore the importance of involving women, including civil-society representatives and those affiliated with armed groups, in the ongoing efforts so as to ensure that their specific needs and perspectives are considered in the search for inclusive and durable solutions.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  14. We cannot lose sight of the fact that armed violence remains widespread throughout the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Whether in Ituri, South Kivu or other parts of North Kivu, a multitude of armed groups continue to prey on the civilian population, undermining efforts to achieve lasting peace, stability and development in those regions and indeed the whole country. The two-track process launched in Nairobi on 21 April at the second Regional Heads of State Conclave on the Democratic Republic of the Congo has given fresh impetus to the Government’s efforts to bring local Congolese armed groups into the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization programme and find durable solutions to the continued presence of foreign armed groups on Congolese soil.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  15. Indeed, every effort should be made to ensure that the parties make full use of existing mechanisms such as the EJVM, which play an essential role in maintaining the climate of trust and cooperation that continues to be crucial to effectively tackling the security challenges facing both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours. Continued dialogue between the Governments concerned remains indispensable to preventing a further escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Special Representative Keita and Special Envoy Xia have been actively engaged in efforts to de-escalate tensions through their good offices, and Mr. Xia will be elaborating on his ongoing and planned activities in that regard.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  16. It is imperative that the Council lend its full weight to the ongoing regional efforts to defuse the situation and bring an end to the M-23 insurgency once and for all. I am encouraged by the fact that Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have decided to refer to the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM) of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to investigate reported instances of human and material damage caused by explosive ordnance originating from behind their respective borders on 23 May. I am also encouraged by the calls that President Macky Sall of Senegal, Chairperson of the African Union, has made to Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame to urge for calm and the peaceful resolution of any disagreements.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  17. On 28 May, the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator, together with other humanitarian actors, visited internally displaced persons sites in Nyiragongo territory with a view to assessing the situation and ensuring the mobilization of additional support for the growing humanitarian needs there. Urgent action is required to de-escalate the current situation. The M-23’s resumption of hostilities has been roundly condemned by Special Representative of the Secretary-General Keita, Special Envoy Xia, the Council and key regional and international partners. They have called unanimously for the M-23 to immediately lay down its arms and enter the disarmament process within the framework of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization programme.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  18. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that as of 30 May, at least 75,000 persons had been internally displaced and another 11,557 had crossed the border into Uganda. While there is no immediate threat assessed to the population and United Nations personnel in Goma, the situation remains fluid and is highly volatile. MONUSCO and humanitarian actors are monitoring the situation and ensuring the mapping of displacement areas. United Nations agencies and partners immediately started distributing assistance to 35,000 people in the areas affected.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  19. As of now, the situation is reportedly calm in the territories of Nyiragongo and Rutshuru, including in the Tchanzu and Runyoni hills, as the FARDC and the M-23 continue to hold their positions. Two MONUSCO peacekeepers sustained minor injuries over the course of the hostilities, and there was limited damage to the Mission’s materiel. The FARDC reports having suffered at least 16 fatalities and 22 injured to date. I want to take this opportunity to extend my heartfelt condolences to the families of the victims and to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as to wish a speedy recovery to the injured. The humanitarian impact of the M-23 attacks has been significant.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  20. What was already a dire situation is growing worse, specifically owing to the recent resurgence of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23) and its hostile activity in North Kivu against the Congolese armed forces and the peacekeepers of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability in the region. (spoke in English) The Council has already received two factual updates since 22 May on the operational developments in Rutshuru, so I will not touch on those developments. As of 30 May, the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) had secured route nationale 2, which remains open to traffic.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  21. I am grateful for the opportunity to update the Security Council on recent developments in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the actions taken by the United Nations in that regard. Despite the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to combat insecurity in the eastern part of the country, violence committed by armed groups continues to inflict a heavy toll on the civilian population in several areas in the provinces.

    2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source

  22. We look forward to the outcomes of that independent assessment and remain convinced that working together is crucial to overcoming the challenges facing the Sahel.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  23. That is why the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission have committed the African Union Commission and the United Nations Secretariat to jointly carrying out a strategic assessment of security and governance initiatives in the Sahel, with the objective of strengthening support to the G-5 Sahel, its Joint Force and other security and governance initiatives in the region. That assessment will be conducted in close collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States and the G-5 Sahel and will also focus on innovative ways to mobilize sustainable resourcing for those regional initiatives. An independent high-level panel on security and development in the Sahel, to be chaired by a former President of the Niger, His Excellency Mr. Mahamadou Issoufou, will oversee the independent strategic assessment.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  24. For the past five years, the international community, donors and partners have struggled to reach a consensus on the most effective support mechanism for a collective security response in the Sahel. That has proved to be a significant obstacle to the operationalization of the Joint Force. And the lack of consensus persists, despite the recognition by all that the terrorist onslaught in the Sahel constitutes a slow-burning mortal threat to international peace and security. In the light of the growing complexity of the crisis facing the Sahel, it is now more urgent than ever to act.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  25. In the coming months, it will be crucial for stakeholders in the region to come to a consensus on how best to bring the transitions in Mali and Burkina Faso to a swift conclusion and in a manner that addresses the grievances of the populations of both countries. At the same time, the countries of the region will have to come together, bridge their differences and maintain dialogue to pursue their common security objectives. We remain deeply committed to supporting the region and the G-5 Sahel in that endeavour. Beyond our continued support to the existing efforts to stabilize the Sahel, it is perhaps time to rethink our approaches and change the way we do our work. We need innovative approaches in the face of the constantly evolving tactics of terrorist groups, whose influence keeps expanding.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  26. But if civilians fall victim to such operations, those very efforts will be pointless. Not only can they cause immeasurable human suffering, they also seriously undermine trust in the State and fuel the vicious cycle of further radicalization. All of this goes to show that security efforts alone are not sufficient to address the crisis in the Sahel. A holistic approach is required — one that honours the primacy of politics, addresses the root causes of poverty and exclusion and seeks to provide opportunities and fulfilling lives for the many young people in the region. For that to happen, the State must be closer to the people and at one with them, while providing security and basic services to communities on the periphery as well.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  27. Against the backdrop of the protracted political and security crises in the region, protecting the most vulnerable has become ever more important. However, and as the Secretary-General notes in his report, we are deeply concerned about the deteriorating human rights situation in the region and the reports of serious violations committed against civilians, both by terrorist armed groups and also reportedly by armed and security forces in the region. Now more than ever, the countries in the region need to step up their efforts to uphold and protect human rights. Uprooting terrorist groups that are often deeply enmeshed or embedded within communities is uniquely challenging in the Sahel and has made it immensely difficult to carry out counter-terrorism operations.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  28. It remains to be seen how Mali’s decision to leave the G-5 Sahel and its Joint Force will further affect the organization and dynamics in the region. It is certainly a step backward for the Sahel. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has provided support to the Joint Force and will continue that as long as it is mandated to do so by the Council. The Mission has been working with contractors to deliver life-support consumables to the Joint Force contingents and will honour support requests received by the other four contingents outside Mali. I would also like to express gratitude for the European Union’s continued financial support, which has made the work of MINUSMA possible.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  29. Its Defence and Security Committee, the body that provides immediate strategic guidance to the Joint Force leadership, has also not met in more than six months. Considering that, we commend the efforts by the Joint Force Commander, General Bikimo, to continue planning and conducting Joint Force operations, particularly in the central sector, which encompasses the Liptako-Gourma countries and is most affected by the spread of terrorism. Since the Security Council last met to discuss this issue, in November 2021, the Joint Force has been able to carry out operations in all three of its sectors, thanks to its commander’s commitment and leadership. However, it has been without the participation of the Malian battalions.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  30. (spoke in English) Against that backdrop, the Malian transition authorities’ decision on 15 May to withdraw from the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) and its Joint Force is both unfortunate and regrettable. The Joint Force was created in 2017 by the Heads of State of the G-5 Sahel, born of a shared vision and their desire to take their fate into their own hands and combat terrorism in the Sahel head-on. However, and as the Secretary-General notes in his report (S/2022/382), the current challenging political and security dynamics in the Sahel in general, and the uncertain outcomes of the transitions in Mali and Burkina Faso in particular, had already affected the operationalization of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force, which has significantly slowed. The G-5 Sahel has not convened a high-level political meeting since November 2021.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  31. I thank members for giving me the opportunity to address the Council. Since the last meeting of the Security Council on the Sahel (see S/PV.8903), the security situation in the region has deteriorated. Terrorism and insecurity continue to spread, devastating the lives of millions of people. The main victims of these acts of terrorism are often civilians, and the suffering and losses that they have endured at the hands of terrorist groups are indescribable. However, future generations are also paying a price. Food insecurity, school closures and the disintegration of entire communities are all direct consequences of this protracted instability and have a lasting impact, especially on young people, who are finding themselves without opportunities or prospects.

    2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source

  32. For their part, MONUSCO and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region will continue to ensure the participation of women and young people in local political and peace processes and work with the United Nations country team to support peacebuilding and stabilization efforts within the framework of the peace-development- humanitarian nexus. As I conclude, I wish to reaffirm the continued engagement of the United Nations with countries of the region to support efforts towards peace, security and development. The region counts on the Security Council’s full support to put an end to the recurring cycle of violence and to provide the necessary resources to reach that goal.

    2021-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8884 (2021) · source

  33. The recent workshop on natural resources hosted in Khartoum, co-hosted by the Office of the Special Envoy, is a testament to the commitment of countries of the region to addressing this issue through the strengthening of border controls, the extension of State authority and improvement of joint border-management cooperation in their common border areas. The path towards sustainable peace and development in the region also requires the meaningful participation of women, youth and the private sector. From that perspective, the Action Plan for the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region provides an opportunity to make progress in that area.

    2021-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8884 (2021) · source

  34. I call on international partners and donors to also support these efforts while ensuring that the participating member States remain committed to, and in charge of, this process. While armed group activity is a symptom of insecurity in the region, the enabling conditions should be addressed upstream. Among the main root causes of conflict, as we all know, are the illegal exploitation and regional trafficking of natural resources, which not only contribute to financing armed group networks but also create parallel economies at the expense of States’ budgets whose revenues continue to diminish.

    2021-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8884 (2021) · source

  35. A comprehensive and coordinated regional approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration will also be also an important tool for creating incentives for former combatants not to rejoin the ranks of armed groups, while excluding the possibility for the latter to automatically join the armed forces, and for preventing the recruitment of youth in vulnerable communities and curbing the illicit flows of weapons in the region. In this context, I commend the Congolese authorities for their commitment to providing adequate resources for the functioning of the disarmament, demobilization, community recovery and stabilization programme that was recently established. Success of this national programme will contribute tremendously to sustainable peace and security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2021-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8884 (2021) · source

  36. However, it is also important that the primacy of politics remains the umbrella under which all initiatives translate into actions. In that regard, I wish to welcome the adoption of a three-year action plan of the Contact and Coordination Group aimed at neutralizing the “negative forces” through a non-military approach. MONUSCO and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region have collaborated well in this approach and will continue to provide their support for the operationalization of this Contact and Coordination Group through the establishment of an operational cell hosted in Goma, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2021-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8884 (2021) · source

  37. We therefore welcome President Tshisekedi Tshilombo’s decision to establish an operational centre in Goma, with a view to further enhancing cooperation between the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo in the conduct of intelligence-driven operations against armed groups in Ituri and North Kivu provinces, where the state of siege remains in place. I would like to underscore in this regard that these military operations should be conducted in strict compliance with the human rights due-diligence policy and ensure civilian- harm mitigation, so as to avoid additional suffering for the population we aim to protect.

    2021-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8884 (2021) · source

  38. As we move forward, we welcome the holding in the coming months of the tenth summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism, which will be hosted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as an opportunity for countries in the region to reaffirm their commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and take concrete actions to advance peace and security in the region. Governments of the region continue to prioritize military operations as part of their efforts aimed at addressing the threat posed by armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2021-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8884 (2021) · source

  39. Addressing the various challenges facing countries of the Great Lakes region requires a comprehensive approach rooted in an enhanced political engagement that encompasses military and non-military interventions, fosters economic cooperation across the borders and builds trust between neighbours and among communities. In this regard, we are encouraged by the improvement of bilateral relations between the neighbouring countries and the signing of agreements at the regional level in such various areas as security, trade and economic cooperation. This rapprochement creates a momentum for the evaluation and revitalization of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, enabling us to refocus our efforts on supporting member States of the region.

    2021-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8884 (2021) · source

  40. The insecurity in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo shed light on underlying causes of the conflicts in the region, ranging from the presence of foreign armed groups, the illegal exploitation of natural resources, land and border disputes, intercommunal tensions, limited State presence in remote areas to persistent inequalities borne out of marginalization and exclusion, youth unemployment and poverty. The central question of our debate today is how we can support the countries of the region in their efforts to harness the full potential of their human and natural resources to build sustainable peace and development.

    2021-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8884 (2021) · source

  41. First and foremost, persistent insecurity in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remains one of the main challenges facing the region today. National and foreign armed groups still operate in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and continue to perpetrate deadly attacks against civilians, further deteriorating the already dire humanitarian situation. Since the beginning of this year, at least 1,043 civilians have been killed, including 233 women and 52 children.

    2021-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8884 (2021) · source

  42. Mrs. Pobee: I wish to begin by expressing thanks to the Kenyan presidency of the Security Council for convening today’s high-level debate on supporting the renewed commitment of the Great Lakes countries in seeking sustainable solutions to the root causes and drivers of conflict. Today’s meeting takes place at a time when the United Nations has taken steps to reconfigure its presence in the region to best address remaining challenges to peace and security in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region. My briefing today will focus on a few priority areas where the Council’s support would be most needed. As Special Envoy Huang Xia has provided elements of the broader picture, I would like to devote particular attention to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    2021-10-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8884 (2021) · source

  43. Victims' fear of reprisals and rejection, as well as a lack of access to justice systems and other structural barriers to reporting, should not be underestimated and must be addressed. The Group of Friends urges Governments to reinforce the capacity of their justice and security sectors to deal effectively with these challenges, working in close partnership with community and faith-based based organizations. We advocate the sensitization of national security agencies and an increase in the representation of women. In addition, gender-sensitive transitional justice should be an integral part of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction processes.

    2019-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8514 (2019) · source

  44. Fourthly, protection, relief and rehabilitation efforts must be complemented by the urgent creation of an enabling environment for women's participation and leadership in prevention, peace, security and governance processes. Lastly, the Group of Friends of the African Women Leaders Network wishes to stress the need for zero- tolerance in dealing with incidence of sexual violence in conflict, as they constitute a violation of human rights and a crime under international humanitarian and human rights law. While it is widely acknowledged that perpetrators must be held accountable, criminal accountability in the face of those violations remains elusive, with little chance for survivors to see their offenders face justice.

    2019-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8514 (2019) · source

  45. We must engage religious and traditional leaders within affected communities to mitigate stigma and the reintegration of victims and their children in society. Women-led organizations, especially in Africa, have demonstrated a real potential for impact in those interventions and, with predictable funding and capacity-building, they can also be mobilized to provide a reliable vehicle to enhance informal community-level protection and response mechanisms. In that regard, the Group of Friends is pleased to report that members of the African Women Leaders Network initiative are being proactive on the ground in that direction by providing health services, psychological support, legal aid, economic opportunities and other forms of support to victims and survivors of sexual violence in conflict.

    2019-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8514 (2019) · source

  46. The high-level United Nations-African Union-African Women Leaders Network joint fact- finding missions to conflict zones in Africa in 2017 and 2018 provided significant outcomes to better target appropriate responses in those situations. We wish to advocate continuing support for that unique partnership and collaborative effort between the United Nations, the African Union and the African Women Leaders Network for African conflict situations. Thirdly, it is critical that the international community supports a survivor-centred and community- led approach in prevention efforts and responses to sexual violence in conflict situations. Enhanced support for survivors must include strengthening medical, psychosocial, physiological and rehabilitation platforms that prioritize the rights and needs of survivors.

    2019-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8514 (2019) · source

  47. We also call upon the international community to continue providing strong support to Member States, particularly in conflict and post-conflict situations, to enable them to fulfil their national responsibilities and deliver on their commitments in response to the scourge of sexual violence in conflict. Secondly, the Group is of the view that the nexus between sexual Violence, human trafficking, terrorism and violent extremism is critical and must be clearly understood in order to inform strategies in dealing with that scourge and to better address specific vulnerabilities in specific conflict situations. We share the View that victims are not a homogeneous group and that a better appreciation ofthe scope, patterns and emerging trends in the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war would enhance our responses and preventive mechanisms.

    2019-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8514 (2019) · source

  48. The Group of Friends of the African Women Leaders Network wishes to focus this intervention on five major areas of this issue. First and foremost, we share the view that structural gender inequality and discrimination are at the heart of conflict-related sexual violence and must be given due primacy in our collective and national preventive efforts. Addressing the imbalances in power relations between men and women and promoting gender equality and women's full inclusion in all aspects of national life cannot be discounted in that effort. We encourage Member States to pursue the necessary national policies, legislation, education and advocacy at all levels of society in that regard.

    2019-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8514 (2019) · source

  49. It is even more disheartening that, in spite of the landmark Security Council resolutions that condemn such horrific crimes and acknowledge the threats they pose to international peace and security, sexual violence continues to be a common feature of armed conflicts around the world. It is significant, therefore, that this debate is taking place in the tenth year of the establishment of the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on Sexual Violence and in the lead-up to the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). It is an opportune moment to explore the root causes and effects of conflict-related sexual Violence and how to enhance preventive mechanisms, promote survivor-centred responses and ensure justice and accountability.

    2019-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8514 (2019) · source

  50. It is an honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the Group of Friends of the African Women Leaders Network to the United Nations, which is co-chaired by Ghana and Germany. At the outset, the Group of Friends of the African Women Leaders Network wishes to thank the Federal Republic of Germany for convening today's open debate on the women and peace and security agenda, with a focus on sexual violence in conflict. I also wish to express the Group's appreciation to the Secretary- General for his comprehensive report on the subject (S/2019/280) and to all the briefers for their informative briefings and contributions. It is a sad fact that, throughout history, sexual violence has been used as a weapon of war, often employed as a deliberate strategy by State and non-State actors.

    2019-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8514 (2019) · source