YouSaid · the spoken record

Powell

lines on the record: 153
first: 2001-11-12
most recent: 2003-03-07
sittings or episodes: 6
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Zarqawi and his network have plotted terrorist actions against countries including France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany and Russia. According to detainees, Abu Atiya, who graduated from Zarqawi's terrorist camp in Afghanistan, tasked at least nine North African extremists in 2001 to travel to Europe to conduct poison and explosive attacks. Since last year, members of this network have been apprehended in France, Britain, Spain and Italy. By our last count, 116 operatives connected to this global web have been arrested. An image was projected on screen. The chart you are looking at shows the network in Europe. We know about this European network and we know about its links to Zarqawi because the detainee who provided the information about the targets also provided the names of members of the network.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Iraqi officials protest that they are not aware of the whereabouts of Zarqawi or of any of his associates. Again, those protests are not credible. We know of Zarqawi's activities in Baghdad. I described them earlier; let me now add one other fact. We asked a friendly security service to approach Baghdad about extraditing Zarqawi and providing information about him and his close associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice, and we passed on details that should have made it easy to find Zarqawi. The network remains in Baghdad. Zarqawi still remains at large to come and go. As my colleagues around this table and the citizens they represent in Europe know, Zarqawi's terrorism is not confined to the Middle East.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“They were linked to associates of the Baghdad cell, and one of them received training in Afghanistan on how to use cyanide. From his terrorist network in Iraq, Zarqawi can direct his network in the Middle East and beyond. We in the United States - all of us at the State Department and the Agency for International Development - lost a dear friend with the cold-blooded murder of Mr. Laurence Foley in Amman, Jordan, last October. A despicable act was committed that day: the assassination of an individual whose sole mission was to assist the people of Jordan. The captured assassin says his cell received money and weapons from Zarqawi for that murder. After the attack, an associate of the assassin left Jordan to go to Iraq to obtain weapons and explosives for further operations.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Those Al Qaeda affiliates based in Baghdad now coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they have now been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months. Iraqi officials deny accusations of ties with Al Qaeda. These denials are simply not credible. Last year an Al Qaeda associate bragged that the situation in Iraq was "good" - that Baghdad could be transited quickly. We know that these affiliates are connected to Zarqawi because they remain, even today, in regular contact with his direct subordinates, including the poison cell plotters. They are involved in moving more than money and materiel: last year, two suspected Al Qaeda operatives were arrested crossing from Iraq into Saudi Arabia.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“But Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization, Ansar al-Islam, that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000, this agent offered Al Qaeda safe haven in the region. After we swept Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, some of its members accepted that safe haven. They remain there today. Zarqawi's activities are not confined to that small corner of north-east Iraq. He travelled to Baghdad in May 2002 for medical treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to fight another day. During his stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of operations there.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“One of his specialties - and one of the specialties of that camp - is poisons. When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zarqawi network helped to establish another poison and explosive training-centre camp. That camp is located in north- eastern Iraq. An image was projected on screen. You are looking at a picture of that camp. The network is teaching its operatives how to produce ricin and other poisons. Let me remind you how ricin works. Eating less than a pinch - imagine a pinch of salt - of ricin in your food would cause shock, followed by circulatory failure. Death comes within 72 hours, and there is no antidote; there is no cure. It is fatal. Those helping to run that camp are Zarqawi lieutenants, operating in the northern Kurdish areas outside Saddam-Hussain-controlled Iraq.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Saddam uses the Arab Liberation Front to funnel money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers in order to prolong the intifada. And it is no secret that Saddam's intelligence service was involved in dozens of attacks and attempted assassinations in the 19905. But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbours a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda lieutenants. Zarqawi, a Palestinian born in Jordan, fought in the Afghan war more than a decade ago. Returning to Afghanistan in 2000, he oversaw a terrorist training camp.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Iraq could use these small UAVs, which have a wingspan of only a few metres, to deliver biological agents to its neighbours or, if transported, to other countries, including the United States. The information I have presented to you about these terrible weapons and about Iraq's continued flouting of its obligations under Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) links to a subject I now want to spend a little bit of time on. That has to do with terrorism. Our concern is not just about these illicit weapons of mass destruction. It is also about the way these illicit weapons can be connected to terrorists and terrorist organizations that have no compunction about using such devices against innocent people around the world. Iraq and terrorism go back decades. Baghdad trains Palestine Liberation Front members in small arms and explosives.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“According to Iraq's 7 December declaration, its UAVs have a range of only 80 kilometres, but we detected one of Iraq's newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 kilometres non-stop on autopilot in the racetrack pattern depicted here. Not only is this test well in excess of the 150 kilometres that the United Nations permits; the test was also left out of Iraq's 7 December declaration. The UAV was flown around and around and around in this circle so that its 80-kilometre limit really was 500 kilometres unrefuelled and on autopilot, in violation of all of Iraq's obligations under resolution 1441 (2002). The linkages over the past 10 years between Iraq's UAV programme and biological and chemical warfare agents are of deep concern to us.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“This effort has included attempts to modify for unmanned flight the MIG-21 and, with greater success, an aircraft called the L-29. However, Iraq is now concentrating not on these aeroplanes, but on developing and testing smaller UAVs such as this. UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. There is ample intelligence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that can be adapted for UAVs. And, in the little that Saddam Hussain told us about UAVs, he has not told the truth. One of these lies is graphically and indisputably demonstrated by intelligence we collected on 27 June last year. An image was projected on screen.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“The one on the right is clearly intended for long-range missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometres. This photograph was taken in April 2002. Since then, the test stand has been finished and a roof has been put over it so that it would be harder for satellites to see what is going on underneath the test stand. Saddam Hussain's intentions have never changed. He is not developing these missiles for self-defence. These are missiles that Iraq wants in order to project power, to threaten and to deliver chemical, biological and, if we let him, nuclear warheads. An image was projected on screen. Now, unmanned aerial vehicles. Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for more than a decade. This is just illustrative of what a UAV would look like.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“What I want you to know today is that Iraq has programmes that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly over 1,000 kilometres. One programme is pursuing a liquid-fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200 kilometres and you can see from this map as well as I can who will be in danger of these missiles. An image was projected on screen. As part of this effort - another little piece of evidence -Iraq has built an engine test stand that is larger than anything it has ever had. Notice the dramatic difference in size between the test stand on the left - the old one - and the new one on the right. Note the large exhaust vent; this is where the flame from the engine comes out. The exhaust vent on the right test stand is five times longer than the one on the left. The one on the left was used for short-range missiles.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“We know from intelligence and Iraq's own admissions that Iraq's alleged "permitted" ballistic missiles, the Al-Samoud 2 and the Al-Fatah, violate the ISO-kilometre limit established by this Council in resolution 687 (1991). These are prohibited systems. UNMOVIC also has reported that Iraq has illegally imported 380 SA-2 rocket engines. These are likely for use in the Al-Samoud 2. Their import was illegal on three counts: resolution 687 (1991) prohibited all military shipments into Iraq; UNSCOM specifically prohibited use of these engines in surface- to-surface missiles; and, finally, as we have just noted, they are for a system that exceeds the 150-kilometre range limit. Worst of all, some of these engines were acquired as late as December, after this Council adopted resolution 1441 (2002). An image was projected on screen.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Let me talk now about the systems Iraq is developing to deliver weapons of mass destruction, in particular Iraq's ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). First, missiles. We all remember that, before the Gulf War, Saddam Hussain's goal was missiles that flew not just hundreds, but thousands of kilometres. He wanted to strike not only his neighbours, but also nations far beyond his borders. While inspectors destroyed most of the prohibited ballistic missiles, numerous intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq indicate Saddam Hussain retains a covert force of up to a few dozen SCUD- variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to 900 kilometres.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“People will continue to debate this issue, but there is no doubt in my mind. These illicit procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussain is very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons programme - the ability to produce fissile material. He also has been busy trying to maintain the other key parts of his nuclear programme, particularly his cadre of key scientists. It is noteworthy that, over the last 18 months, Saddam Hussain has paid increasing personal attention to Iraq's top nuclear scientists, a group that the Government-controlled press openly calls his "nuclear mujahideen". He regularly exhorts them and praises their progress. Progress towards what end? Long ago, the Security Council - this Council - required Iraq to halt all nuclear activities of any kind.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Both items can be used in a gas centrifuge programme to enrich uranium. In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials negotiated with firms in Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia for the purchase of a magnet production plant. Iraq wanted the plant to produce magnets weighing 20 to 30 grams. That is the same weight as the magnets used in Iraq's gas centrifuge programme before the Gulf War. This incident, linked with the tubes, is another indicator of Iraq's attempt to reconstitute its nuclear weapons programme. Intercepted communications from mid- 2000 through last summer show that Iraqi front companies sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also had been involved in a failed effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminium tubes into Iraq.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Maybe the Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I do not think so. Secondly, we actually have examined tubes from several different batches that were seized clandestinely before they reached Baghdad. What we notice in these different batches is a progression to higher and higher levels of specification, including, in the latest batch, an anodized coating on extremely smooth inner and outer surfaces. Why would they continue refining the specifications, go to all that trouble, for something that, if it were a rocket, would soon be blown into shrapnel when it went off? The high-tolerance aluminium tubes are only part of the story. We also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Most United States experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts and the Iraqis themselves argue that they are really to produce the rocket bodies for a conventional weapon - a multiple rocket launcher. Let me tell you what is not controversial about these tubes. First, all the experts who have analysed the tubes in our possession agree that they can be adapted for centrifuge use. Secondly, Iraq had no business buying them for any purpose. They are banned for Iraq. I am no expert on centrifuge tubes, but just as an old army trooper, I can tell you a couple of things. First, it strikes me as odd that these tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds United States requirements for comparable rockets.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Since 1998, his efforts to reconstitute his nuclear programme have been focused on acquiring the third and last component: sufficient fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion. To make the fissile material, he needs to develop an ability to enrich uranium. Saddam Hussain is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so determined that he has made repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminium tubes from 11 different countries - even after inspections resumed. An image was projected on screen. These tubes are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for enriching uranium. By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes and we all know that there are differences of opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Nonetheless, Iraq continued to tell the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it had no nuclear weapons programme. If Saddam had not been stopped, Iraq could have produced a nuclear bomb by 1993, years earlier than most worst-case assessments that had been made before the war. In 1995, as a result of another defector, we found out that, after his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussain had initiated a crash programme to build a crude nuclear weapon in violation of Iraq's United Nations obligations. Saddam Hussain already possesses two out of the three key components needed to build a nuclear bomb. He has a cadre of nuclear scientists with the expertise, and he has a bomb design.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“On the contrary, we have more than a decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons. To fully appreciate the challenge that we face today, remember that, in 1991, the inspectors searched Iraq's primary nuclear weapons facilities for the first time, and they found nothing to conclude that Iraq had a nuclear weapons programme. But, based on defector information, in May of 1991, Saddam Hussain's lie was exposed. In truth, Saddam Hussain had a massive clandestine nuclear weapons programme that covered several different techniques to enrich uranium, including electro-magnetic isotope separation, gas centrifuge and gas diffusion. We estimate that this illicit programme cost the Iraqis several billion dollars.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“And we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them. He would not be passing out the orders if he did not have the weapons or the intent to use them. We also have sources who tell us that, since the 1980s, Saddam's regime has been experimenting on human beings to perfect its biological or chemical weapons. A source said that 1,600 death-row prisoners were transferred in 1995 to a special unit for such experiments. An eyewitness saw prisoners tied down to beds, experiments conducted on them, blood oozing around the victims' mouths, and autopsies performed to confirm the effects on the prisoners. Saddam Hussain's inhumanity has no limits. Let me turn now to nuclear weapons. We have no indication that Saddam Hussain has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons programme.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. Even the low end, of 100 tons of agent, would enable Saddam Hussain to cause mass casualties across more than 100 square miles of territory - an area nearly five times the size of Manhattan. Let me remind you of the 122-millimetre chemical warheads that the United Nations inspectors found recently. That discovery could very well be, as has been noted, the "tip of a submerged iceberg". The question before us all, my friends, is, when will we see the rest of the submerged iceberg? Saddam Hussain has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussain has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussain has no compunction about using them again - against his neighbours and against his own people.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Two officers talking to each other on the radio want to make nothing is misunderstood: "Remove." "Remove." - "The expression." "The expression - I got it." - "Nerve agents." - "Nerve agents." - "Wherever it comes up." - "Got it - wherever it comes up." - "In the wireless instructions." - "In the instructions." - "Correction - no - in the wireless instructions." - "Wireless - I got it." Why does he repeat it that way? Why is he so forceful in making sure this is understood, and why did he focus on wireless instructions? Because the senior officer is concerned that somebody might be listening. Well, somebody was. "Nerve agents - stop talking about it. They are listening to us. Do not give any evidence that we have these horrible agents." But we know that they do, and this kind of conversation confirms it.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“that B: Captain Ibrahim, Sir. A: Captain Ibrahim, how are you? B: u>wu>9uu>w> w [pause] 11> >w>w>w>w>w>w>w>w>w B: God bless you, Sir. : How is your health? : May God preserve you. : How are you? Good, praise God, Sir. : Captain Ibrahim. : Yes, Sir. : Write this down. : Yes, Sir. : Hello? : Hello? Go ahead, Sir. : Hello, Ibrahim? : Yes, Sir. : Captain Ibrahim? : I am with you, Sir. : Remove - : Remove - : The expression - : The expression - : Nerve agents - : Nerve agents - : Whenever it comes up - : Whenever it comes up - : In the wireless instructions - : In the instructions - : Wireless - : Wireless - : Okay, buddy. [Consider it] done, Sir. Mr. Powell (United States of America): Let us review a few selected items of this conversation.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“With Iraq's well-documented history on biological and chemical weapons, why should any of us give Iraq the benefit of the doubt? I do not, and you will not either after you hear this next intercept. Just a few weeks ago, we intercepted communications between two commanders in Iraq's Second Republican Guard Corps. One commander is going to be giving an instruction to the other. You will hear, as this unfolds, that what he wants to communicate to the other guy he wants to make sure that the other guy hears clearly, to the point of repeating it so that it gets written down and completely understood. Listen: An audio tape, in Arabic, was played in the Council Chamber; an English translation provided by the United States delegation was projected on screen in the Chamber. A: Hello - B: Hello - A: Hello - B: May I help you, Sir? A: Who is this?”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Iraq's procurement efforts include: equipment that can filter and separate micro-organisms and toxins involved in biological weapons; equipment that can be used to concentrate the agent; growth media that can be used to continue producing anthrax and botulinum toxin; sterilization equipment for laboratories; glass-lined reactors and specialty pumps that can handle corrosive chemical weapons agents and precursors; large amounts of thionyl chloride, a precursor for nerve and blister agents; and other chemicals such as sodium sulfide, an important mustard agent precursor. Now, of course, Iraq will argue that these items can also be used for legitimate purposes. But if that is true, why do we have to learn about them by intercepting communications and risking the lives of human agents?”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“The Iraqis literally removed the crust of the Earth from large portions of this site in order to conceal chemical weapons evidence that would be there from years of chemical weapons activity. To support its deadly biological and chemical weapons programmes, Iraq procures needed items from around the world, using an extensive clandestine network. What we know comes largely from intercepted communications and human sources who are in a position to know the facts.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“What makes this picture significant is that we have a human source who has corroborated that movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site at that time. So it is not just the photo, and it is not an individual seeing the photo: it is the photo and the knowledge of an individual being brought together to make the case. An image was projected on screen. This photograph of the site, taken two months later, in July, shows not only the previous site - which is the figure in the middle at the top with the bulldozer sign near it. It shows that the previous site and all of the other sites around that site have been fully bulldozed and graded. The topsoil has been removed.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Tareq includes facilities designed specifically for Iraq's chemical weapons programme and employs key figures from past programmes. That is the production end of Saddam's chemical weapons business. What about the delivery end? I am going to show you a small part of a chemical complex called Al-Musayyib, a site that Iraq has used for at least three years to trans-ship chemical weapons from production facilities out to the field. An image was projected on screen. In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual activity in this picture. Here we see that cargo vehicles are again at this trans-shipment point, and we can see that they are accompanied by a decontamination vehicle associated with biological or chemical weapons activity.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Or, on a dime, this dual-use infrastructure can turn from clandestine to commercial and then back again. These inspections would be unlikely - any inspections of such facilities would be unlikely - to turn up anything prohibited, especially if there is any warning that the inspections are coming. Call it ingenious or evil genius, but the Iraqis deliberately designed their chemical weapons programmes to be inspected. It is infrastructure with a built-in alibi. Under the guise of dual-use infrastructure, Iraq has undertaken an effort to reconstitute facilities that were closely associated with its past programme to develop and produce chemical weapons. For example, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of the Tareq State establishment.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes. Four tons. The admission came out only after inspectors collected documentation as a result of the defection of Hussain Kamal, Saddam Hussain's late son-in-law. UNSCOM. also gained forensic evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put it into weapons for delivery. Yet to this day, Iraq denies it had ever weaponized VX. And on 27 January, UNMOVIC told this Council that it has information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX programme. We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry. To all outward appearances - even to experts - the infrastructure looks like an ordinary civilian operation. Illicit and legitimate production can go on simultaneously.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“If we consider just one category of missing weaponry - 6,500 bombs from the Iran-Iraq war - UNMOVIC says the amount of chemical agent in them would be on the order of 1,000 tons. These quantities of chemical weapons are now unaccounted for. Mr. Blix has quipped that "Mustard gas is not marmalade. You are supposed to know what you did with it." We believe Saddam Hussain knows what he did with it, and he has not come clean with the international community. We have evidence that these weapons existed. What we do not have is evidence from Iraq that they have been destroyed or where they are. That is what we are still waiting for. The third point: Iraq's record on chemical weapons is replete with lies. It took years for Iraq finally to admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve agent VX.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“If biological weapons seem too terrible to contemplate, chemical weapons are equally chilling. UNMOVIC already laid out much of this, and it is documented for all of us to read in UNSCOM's 1999 report on the subject. Let me set the stage with three key points that all of us need to keep in mind. First, Saddam Hussain has used these horrific weapons on another country and on his own people. In fact, in the history of chemical warfare no country has had more battlefield experience with chemical weapons since the First World War than Saddam Hussain's Iraq. Secondly, as with biological weapons, Saddam Hussain has never accounted for vast amounts of chemical weaponry: 550 artillery shells with mustard, 30,000 empty munitions and enough precursors to increase his stockpile to as much as 500 tons of chemical agents.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“That is 2,000 litres of simulated anthrax that a jet is spraying. A video was projected on screen. In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Saleh Abdul Latif, told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG-21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons. Iraq admitted to producing four spray tanks, but to this day it has provided no credible evidence that they were destroyed - evidence that was required by the international community. There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussain has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“We know from Iraq's past admissions that it has successfully weaponized not only anthrax but also other biological agents, including botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. But Iraq's research efforts did not stop there. Saddam Hussain has investigated dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gas gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, camelpox and haemorrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox. The Iraqi regime has also developed ways to disperse lethal biological agents - widely, indiscriminately. Into the water supply. Into the air. For example, Iraq had a programme to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets. This video of an Iraqi test flight, obtained by UNSCOM. some years ago, shows an Iraqi F-l Mirage jet aircraft. Note the spray coming from beneath the Mirage.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“How long do you think it will take the inspectors to find even one of these 18 trucks, without Iraq coming forward as they are supposed to with the information about these kinds of capabilities? These are sophisticated facilities. For example, they can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they can produce enough dry biological agent in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of people. Dry agent of this type is the most lethal form for human beings. By 1998, United Nations experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected drying techniques for their biological weapons programmes. Now, Iraq has incorporated this drying expertise into these mobile production facilities.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“As shown in this diagram, these factories can be concealed easily, either by moving ordinary looking trucks and railcars along Iraq's thousands of miles of highway or track or by parking them in a garage or warehouse, or somewhere in Iraq's extensive system of underground tunnels and bunkers. We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile biological agent factories. The truck-mounted ones have at least two or three trucks each. That means that the mobile production facilities are very few - perhaps 18 trucks that we know of. There may be more, but perhaps 18 that we know of. Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the thousands and thousands of trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every single day. It took the inspectors four years to find out that Iraq was making biological agents.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“We have diagrammed what our sources reported about these mobile facilities. Here you see both truck- mounted and railcar-mounted mobile factories. The descriptions our sources gave us of the technical features required by such facilities are highly detailed and extremely accurate. An image was projected on screen. As these drawings based on their descriptions show, we know what the fermentors look like. We know what the tanks, pumps, compressors and other parts look like. We know how they fit together. We know how they work. And we know a great deal about the platforms on which they are mounted.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“This defector is currently hiding in another country, with the certain knowledge that Saddam Hussain will kill him if he finds him. His eyewitness account of these mobile production facilities has been corroborated by other sources. A second source, an Iraqi civil engineer in a position to know the details of the programme, confirmed the existence of transportable facilities moving on trailers. A third source, also in a position to know, reported in the summer of 2002 that Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems mounted on road-trailer units and on rail cars. Finally, a fourth source, an Iraqi major who defected, confirmed that Iraq has mobile biological research laboratories in addition to the production facilities I mentioned earlier. An image was projected on screen.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“The source was an eyewitness: an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these facilities. He actually was present during biological agent production runs. He also was at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. Twelve technicians died from exposure to biological agents. He reported that, when UNSCOM. was in-country and inspecting, the biological weapons agent production always began on Thursdays at midnight because Iraq thought UNSCOM. would not inspect on the Muslim holy day - Thursday night through Friday. He added that this was important because the units could not be broken down in the middle of a production run, which had to be completed by Friday evening, before the inspectors might arrive again.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq's biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents. Let me take you inside that intelligence file and share with you what we know from eyewitness accounts. We have firsthand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails. The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are designed to evade detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they can produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf war. Although Iraq's mobile production programme began in the mid-1990s, United Nations inspectors at the time had only vague hints of such programmes. Confirmation came later, in the year 2000.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“That is my third point, and it is key. The Iraqis have never accounted for all of the biological agents they admitted they had and we know they had. They have never accounted for all the organic material used to make them. They have not accounted for many of the weapons filled with these agents, such as their R-400 bombs. This is evidence, not conjecture. This is true. This is all well documented. Mr. Blix told the Council that Iraq has provided little evidence to verify anthrax production and no convincing evidence of its destruction. It should come as no shock, then, that since Saddam Hussain forced out the last inspectors in 1998, we have amassed much intelligence indicating that Iraq is continuing to make these weapons.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“four long and frustrating years to pry - to pry - an admission out of Iraq that it had biological weapons. Secondly, when Iraq finally admitted having these weapons in 1995, the quantities were vast. Less than a teaspoonful of dry anthrax in an envelope shut down the United States Senate in the fall of 2001. This forced several hundred people to undergo emergency medical treatment and killed two postal workers, just from that amount - just the quantity I am indicating - that was inside an envelope. Iraq declared 8,500 litres of anthrax, but UNSCOM. estimates that Saddam Hussain could have produced 25,000 litres. If concentrated into this dry form, that amount would be enough to fill tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of teaspoons - and Saddam Hussain has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoonful of this deadly material.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“The issue before us is not how much time we are willing to give the inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction, but how much longer are we willing to put up with Iraq's non-compliance before we, as the Council, we, as the United Nations, say: "Enough. Enough." The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction pose to the world. Let me now turn to those deadly weapons programmes and describe why they are real and present dangers to the region and to the world. First, biological weapons. We have talked frequently here about biological weapons. By way of introduction and history, I think there are just three quick points I need to make. First, you will recall that it took UNSCOM.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“We wrote it this way to give Iraq an early test - would they give an honest declaration, and would they early on indicate a willingness to cooperate with the inspectors? It was designed to be an early test. They failed that test. By this standard - the standard of this operative paragraph - I believe that Iraq is now in further material breach of its obligations. I believe that this conclusion is irrefutable and undeniable. Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious consequences called for in resolution 1441 (2002). This body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding effectively and immediately.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“As the examples I have just presented show, the information and intelligence we have gathered point to an active and systematic effort on the part of the Iraqi regime to keep key materials and people from the inspectors, in direct violation of resolution 1441 (2002). The pattern is not just one of reluctant cooperation. Nor is it merely a lack of cooperation. What we see is a deliberate campaign to prevent any meaningful inspection work. Operative paragraph 4 of resolution 1441 (2002), which we lingered over so long last fall, clearly states that "false statements or omissions" in the declaration and a "failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute" - and the facts speak for themselves - "a further material breach of Iraq's obligations".”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“On orders from Saddam Hussain, Iraqi officials issued a false death certificate for one scientist, and he was sent into hiding. In the middle of January, experts at one facility that was related to weapons of mass destruction were ordered to stay home from work to avoid the inspectors. Workers from other Iraqi military facilities not engaged in illicit weapons projects were to replace the workers who had been sent home. A dozen experts have been placed under house arrest - not in their own houses, but as a group, at one of Saddam Hussain's "guest houses". It goes on and on and on.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Saddam Hussain also said that scientists should be told not to agree to leave Iraq. Anyone who agreed to be interviewed outside Iraq would be treated as a spy. This violates resolution 1441 (2002). In mid-November, just before the inspectors returned, Iraqi experts were ordered to report to the headquarters of the special security organization to receive counter-intelligence training. The training focused on evasion methods, interrogation resistance techniques, and how to mislead inspectors. These are not assertions. These are facts, corroborated by many sources - some of them sources of the intelligence services of other countries. For example, in mid-December, weapons experts at one facility were replaced by Iraqi intelligence agents, who were to deceive inspectors about the work that was being done there.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source
“Iraq did not meet its obligations under resolution 1441 (2002) to provide a comprehensive list of scientists associated with its weapons of mass destruction programmes. Iraq's list was out of date and contained only about 500 names, despite the fact that the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) had earlier put together a list of about 3,500 names. Let me just tell you what a number of human sources have told us. Saddam Hussain has directly participated in the effort to prevent interviews. In early December, Saddam Hussain had all Iraqi scientists warned of the serious consequences that they and their families would face if they revealed any sensitive information to the inspectors. They were forced to sign documents acknowledging that divulging information is punishable by death.”
2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source