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Powell

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153
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2001-11-12
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2003-03-07
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un-security-council

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  1. Saddam Hussain and his regime are not just trying to conceal weapons; they are also trying to hide people. You know the basic facts. Iraq has not complied with its obligation to allow immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and private access to all officials and other persons, as required by resolution 1441 (2002). The regime allows only interviews with inspectors in the presence of an Iraqi official - a "minder." The official Iraqi organization charged with facilitating inspections announced publicly, and announced ominously, that "nobody is ready" to leave Iraq to be interviewed. Iraqi Vice-President Ramadan accused the inspectors of conducting espionage - a veiled threat that anyone cooperating with United Nations inspectors was committing treason.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  2. We do not know precisely what Iraq was moving, but the inspectors already knew about these sites, so Iraq knew that they would be coming. We must ask ourselves: Why would Iraq suddenly move equipment of this nature before inspections if it was anxious to demonstrate what it had or did not have? Remember the first intercept, in which two Iraqis talked about the need to hide a "modified vehicle" from the inspectors? Where did Iraq take all of this equipment? Why was it not presented to the inspectors? Iraq also has refused to permit any U-2 reconnaissance flights that would give the inspectors a better sense of what is being moved before, during and after inspections. This refusal to allow this kind of reconnaissance is in direct, specific violation of operative paragraph 7 of our resolution 1441 (2002).

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  3. At this ballistic missile site on 10 November, we saw a cargo truck preparing to move ballistic missile components. An image was projected on screen. At this biological weapons-related facility, on 25 November, just two days before inspections resumed, this truck caravan appeared - something we almost never see at this facility, and we monitor it carefully and regularly. An image was projected on screen. At this ballistic missile facility - again, two days before inspections began - five large cargo trucks appeared, along with the truck-mounted crane to move missiles. We saw this kind of housecleaning at close to 30 sites. Days after this activity, the vehicles and the equipment that I have just highlighted disappeared and the site returned to patterns of normalcy.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  4. As it did throughout the 1990s, Iraq today is, we know, actively using its considerable intelligence capabilities to help hide its illicit activities. From our sources, we know that the inspectors are under constant surveillance by an army of Iraqi intelligence operatives. Iraq is relentlessly attempting to tap all their communications, both voice and electronic. I call my colleagues' attention to the fine paper that the United Kingdom distributed yesterday, which describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities. In this next example, you will see the type of concealment activity Iraq has undertaken in response to the resumption of inspections. Indeed, in November 2002, just when the inspections were about to resume, this type of activity spiked. Here are three examples. An image was projected on screen.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  5. The special security facility and the decontamination vehicle will be in the area; if not at any one or the other of them, it is moving around those four. It moves as needed, as people are working in the different bunkers. Now look at the photo on the right. You are looking at two of those sanitized bunkers. The signature vehicles are gone, the tents are gone. It has been cleaned up. This was done on 22 December as the United Nations inspection team was arriving. You can see the inspection vehicles arriving in the lower portion of the picture on the right. The bunkers were clean when the inspectors got there. They found nothing. This sequence of events raises the worrisome suspicion that Iraq had been tipped off to the forthcoming inspections at Taji.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  6. The four that are in the red squares represent active chemical munitions bunkers. How do I know this? How can I say this? Let me give you a closer look. Look at the image on the left. Two images were projected on screen. On the left is a close-up of one of the four chemical munitions bunkers. The two arrows indicate the presence of sure signs that these bunkers are storing chemical munitions. The arrow at the top that says "Security" points to a facility that is a signature item for this kind of bunker. Inside the facility are special guards and special equipment to monitor any leakage that might come out of the bunker. The truck you also see is a signature item. It is a decontamination vehicle, in case something goes wrong. This is characteristic of those four bunkers.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  7. Let me say a word about satellite images before I show a couple. The photos I am about to show you are sometimes hard for the average person to interpret. Indeed, hard for me. The painstaking work of photo analysis takes experts with years and years of experience poring for hours and hours over light tables. But as I show you these images I will explain what they mean, what they indicate to our imagery specialists. An image was projected on screen. Let us look at this one. It is about a weapons munition facility - a facility that holds ammunition - at a place called Taji. This is one of about 65 such facilities in Iraq. We know that this one has housed chemical munitions. In fact, it is where the Iraqis recently came up with the additional four chemical weapons shells. Here you see 15 munitions bunkers in yellow and red outlines.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  8. There is only one answer to the "why" - it is to deceive, to hide, to keep from the inspectors. Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving not just documents and hard drives but also weapons of mass destruction to keep them from being found by inspectors. We know from sources that while we were here in this Council Chamber debating resolution 1441 (2002) last fall, a missile brigade outside Baghdad was dispersing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent to various locations in western Iraq. Most of the launchers and warheads had been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every one to four weeks to escape detection. We also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi facilities for weapons of mass destruction.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  9. Thanks to intelligence provided to them, the inspectors recently found dramatic confirmation of these reports. When they searched the home of an Iraqi nuclear scientist, they uncovered roughly 2,000 pages of documents. You see them here being brought out of the home and placed in United Nations hands. Some of the material is classified and related to Iraq's nuclear programme. Tell me, answer me: are the inspectors to search the house of every Government official, every Ba'ath party member and every scientist in the country to find the truth and to get the information they need to satisfy the demands of our Council? Our sources tell us that in some cases, the hard drives of computers at Iraqi weapons facilities were replaced. Who took the hard drives? Where did they go? What is being hidden? Why?

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  10. Orders were issued to Iraq's security organizations, as well as to Saddam Hussain's own office, to hide all correspondence with the Organization of Military Industrialization (OMI), the organization that oversees Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activities: make sure there are no documents left which would connect you to the OMI. We know that Saddam's son Qusay ordered the removal of all prohibited weapons from Saddam's numerous palace complexes. We know that Iraqi Government officials, members of the ruling Ba'ath party and scientists have hidden prohibited items in their homes. Other key files from military and scientific establishments have been placed in cars that are being driven around the countryside by Iraqi intelligence agents to avoid detection. An image was projected on screen.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  11. Everything we have seen and heard indicates that, instead of cooperating actively with the inspectors to ensure the success of their mission, Saddam Hussain and his regime are busy doing all they possibly can to ensure that inspectors succeed in finding absolutely nothing. My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources. Solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. I will cite some examples, and these are from human sources.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  12. Iraq never had any intention of complying with the Council's mandate. Instead, Iraq planned to use the declaration to overwhelm us and to overwhelm the inspectors with useless information about Iraq's permitted weapons, so that we would not have time to pursue its prohibited weapons. Iraq's goal was to give us in this room, to give those of us on this Council, the false impression that the inspection process was working. You saw the result. Mr. Blix pronounced the 12,200-page declaration rich in volume but poor in information and practically devoid of new evidence. Could any member of this Council honestly rise in defence of this false declaration?

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  13. In case this name isn't immediately familiar to you, General Sa'di has been the Iraqi regime's primary point of contact for Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei. It was General Sa'di who last fall publicly pledged that Iraq was prepared to cooperate unconditionally with inspectors. Quite the contrary, Sa'di's job is not to cooperate. It is to deceive - not to disarm, but to undermine the inspectors; not to support them, but to frustrate them and to make sure they learn nothing. We have learned a lot about the work of this special committee. We learned that, just prior to the return of inspectors last November, the regime had decided to resume what we heard called "the old game of cat-and-mouse". For example, let me focus on the now famous declaration that Iraq submitted to this Council on 7 December.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  14. This effort to hide things from the inspectors is not one or two isolated events. Quite the contrary, this is part and parcel of a policy of evasion and deception that goes back 12 years - a policy set at the highest levels of the Iraqi regime. We know that Saddam Hussain has what is called "a Higher Committee for Monitoring the Inspection Teams". Think about that - Iraq has a high-level committee to monitor the inspectors who were sent in to monitor Iraq's disarmament. Not to cooperate with them, not to assist them, but to spy on them and keep them from doing their jobs. The committee reports directly to Saddam Hussain. It is headed by Iraq's Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan. Its members include Saddam Hussain's son, Qusay. This Committee also includes Lieutenant-General Amir Al-Sa'di, an advisor to Saddam.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  15. Remember the first message: "Evacuate it." This is all part of a system of hiding things, moving things out of the way and making sure they have left nothing behind. You go a little further into this message and you see the specific instructions from headquarters: "After you have carried out what is contained in this message, destroy the message; because I don't want anyone to see this message." - "OK. OK." Why? Why? That message would have verified to the inspectors that they have been trying to turn over things. They were looking for things, but they do not want that message seen, because they were trying to clean up the area and leave no evidence behind of the presence of weapons of mass destruction; and they can claim that nothing was there, and the inspectors can look all they want and they will find nothing.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  16. Headquarters officer: And we sent you a message to inspect the scrap areas and the abandoned areas. Officer in the field: Yes. Headquarters officer: After you have carried out what is contained in the message destroy the message. Officer in the field: Yes. Headquarters officer: Because I don't want anyone to see this message. Officer in the field: OK. OK. Headquarters officer: Thanks. Officer in the field: Goodbye. Mr. Powell (United States of America): Let me pause again and review the elements of that message: "They are inspecting the ammunition you have." - "Yes." - "For the possibility there are forbidden ammo. For the possibility there is by chance forbidden ammo?" - "Yes." - "We sent you a message yesterday to clear out all of the areas. The scrap areas. The abandoned areas. Make sure there is nothing there".

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  17. You will now hear an officer from Republican Guard headquarters issuing an instruction to an officer in the field. Their conversation took place just last week, on 30 January. An audio tape, in Arabic, was played in the Council Chamber; an English translation provided by the United States delegation was projected on screen in the Chamber. Headquarters officer: Sir Officer in the field: Yes. Headquarters officer: There is a directive of the [Republican] Guard chief of staff at the conference today Officer in the field: Yes. Headquarters officer: They are inspecting the ammunition you have. Officer in the field: Yes. Headquarters officer: for the possibility there are forbidden ammo. Officer in the field: Yes? Headquarters officer: For the possibility there is by chance forbidden ammo. Officer in the field: Yes.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  18. From the Al-Kindi Company." - "What?" - "From Al-Kindi." - "I'll come to see you in the morning. I'm worried you all have something left." - "We evacuated everything. We don't have anything left." Note what he says: - "We evacuated everything." We didn't destroy it. We didn't line it up for inspection. We didn't turn it into the inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the inspectors showed up. "I will come to you tomorrow." The Al-Kindi Company: This is a company that is well known to have been involved in prohibited weapons systems activity. Let me play another tape for you. As you will recall, the inspectors found 12 empty chemical warheads on 16 January. On 20 January, four days later, Iraq promised the inspectors it would search for more.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  19. Powell (United States of America): Let me pause to review some of the key elements of the conversation you have just heard between the two officers. First, they acknowledge that our colleague, Mohamed ElBaradei is coming. They know what he is coming for and they know he is coming the next day. He is coming to look for things that are prohibited. He is expecting those gentlemen to cooperate with him and not hide things. But they are worried: "We have this modified vehicle. What do we say if one of them sees it?" What is their concern? Their concern is that it is something they should not have, something that should not be seen. The General is incredulous: "You didn't get a modified - you don't have one of those, do you?" - "I have one." - "Which? From where?" - "From the workshop.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  20. Colonel: with Mohamed ElBaradei. Brigadier General: Yeah. Yeah. Colonel: Yeah. Brigadier General: Yeah? Colonel: We have this modified vehicle. Brigadier General: Yeah. Colonel: What do we say if one of them sees it? Brigadier General: You didn't get a modified you don't have a modified Colonel: By God, I have one. Brigadier General: Which? From the workshop ? Colonel: From the Al-Kindi Company. Brigadier General: What? Colonel: From Al-Kindi. Brigadier General: Yeah, yeah. I'll come to you in the morning. I have some comments. I'm worried you all have something left. Colonel: We evacuated everything. We don't have anything left. Brigadier General: I will come to you tomorrow. Colonel: OK. Brigadier General: I have a conference at headquarters. Before I attend the conference I will come to you. Mr.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  21. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behaviour show that Saddam Hussain and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction. Let me begin by playing a tape for you. What you are about to hear is a conversation that my Government monitored. It took place on 26 November 2002, on the day before United Nations teams resumed inspections in Iraq. The conversation involves two senior officers, a colonel and a brigadier general from Iraq's elite military unit, the Republican Guard. An audio tape, in Arabic, was played in the Council Chamber; an English translation provided by the United States delegation was projected on screen in the Chamber. Colonel: Peace. We just have a small question. Brigadier General: Yeah. Colonel: About this committee that is coming. Brigadier General: Yeah, yeah.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  22. The material I will present to you comes from a variety of sources. Some are United States sources and some are those of other countries. Some of the sources are technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other sources are people who have risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussain is really up to. I cannot tell you everything that we know. But what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling. What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behaviour. The facts and Iraq's behaviour demonstrate that Saddam Hussain and his regime have made no effort to disarm as required by the international community.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  23. Blix reported to the Council on 27 January, " Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance - not even today - of the disarmament that was demanded of it". (S/PV.4692, p. 3) And as Mr. ElBaradei reported, Iraq's declaration of 7 December " did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998". (ibid., p. 10) My second purpose today is to provide you with additional information and to share with you what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction as well Iraq's involvement in terrorism, which is also the subject of resolution 1441 (2002) and other, earlier, resolutions. I might add, at this point, that we are providing all the relevant information we can to the inspections teams, for them to do their work.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  24. No Council member present and voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or about what "serious consequences" meant if Iraq did not comply. To assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperate with returning inspectors from the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet, to allow the inspectors to do their job. The Council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm, and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives. I asked for this meeting today for two purposes: first, to support the core assessments made by Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei. As Mr.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  25. I would like to begin by expressing my thanks for the special effort that each of you made to be here today. This is an important day for us all as we review the situation with respect to Iraq and its disarmament obligations under Security Council resolution 1441 (2002). Last 8 November, the Council passed resolution 1441 (2002) by a unanimous vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its obligations stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years. Resolution 1441 (2002) was not dealing with an innocent party, but with a regime that the Council had repeatedly convicted over the years. Resolution 1441 (2002) gave Iraq one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences.

    2003-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4701 (2003) · source

  26. We must rise to the challenge. We must rise to the challenge with actions that will rid the globe of terrorism and create a world in which all God's children can live without fear.

    2003-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4688 (2003) · source

  27. That Committee has become even more important with the unanimous passage of resolution 1455 (2003). But we all need to do more, and we need to coordinate our efforts better. Many international organizations at the regional and subregional level are already working to counter the terrorist threat. These organizations have an important role to play in helping their member States fulfil their counter-terrorism obligations. Now is the time for these groups to talk to one another, to exchange information and to coordinate their activities for maximum effect. The Counter- Terrorism Committee is taking a good first step by convening a meeting this March to bring many of these organizations together. The challenge before us is to weave counter- terrorism into the very fabric of our national institutions and our international institutions.

    2003-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4688 (2003) · source

  28. In addition, Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1390 (2002) laid a strong foundation for halting the flow of money to terrorists associated with the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. We are particularly pleased that just last Friday the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1455 (2003). This important new resolution is aimed at improving Member State implementation of these sanctions that are targeted at terrorists and are without time limits. The international community could not have sent a stronger message of its determination to stamp out terrorism. We look forward to working with Ambassador Valdes of Chile as he assumes the chairmanship of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) to implement the Al Qaeda sanctions regime.

    2003-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4688 (2003) · source

  29. Last year alone, our anti- terrorism assistance programme trained nearly 4,800 security personnel from 60 countries in everything from bomb detection to hostage negotiations, crime- scene investigations and the protection of dignitaries. We are also devoting $10 million in the coming year to help strengthen the ability of 18 countries to deny terrorists the funds that they need to kill innocent people. Indeed, the international community has already made impressive progress in freezing terrorist assets. The United Nations has played the leading role in this unprecedented effort. For example, the United Nations has designated 324 names for asset freezing.

    2003-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4688 (2003) · source

  30. Some countries are eager to implement resolution 1373 (2001) and to take other measures against terrorists, but they lack the necessary skills and resources to do so effectively. We must help them build up their capabilities. I challenge all nations with counter-terrorism expertise to help our willing partners. Many countries have already stepped up to the challenge. For example, the Commonwealth Secretariat, France, Australia, Germany, New Zealand and Norway are all providing assistance in areas such as drafting anti-terrorist legislation. For our part, we have more than tripled our capacity-building assistance.

    2003-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4688 (2003) · source

  31. Resolution 1373 (2001) said that if you are a member of the community of civilized nations, you must do your part to eliminate terrorist networks and terrorist activities. As we have seen and as we have discussed here today, resolution 1373 (2001) is starting to have an impact. Most Member States have submitted reports to the CTC describing the measures that they have taken to implement resolution 1373 (2001) and identifying what more needs to be done. This is a very important step, and, as Ambassador Greenstock noted earlier, countries that have not taken this step should comply as quickly as possible. Those that have should continue to be responsive to requests from the Counter- Terrorism Committee.

    2003-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4688 (2003) · source

  32. For example, as we have noted here this morning, there are 12 counter-terrorism conventions and protocols negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations and its affiliated agencies. It is vital that all States become parties to all of these Conventions and Protocols and fully implement them as soon as possible. With the passage of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) in September 2001, the United Nations fundamentally changed the way the international community responds to terrorism. Resolution 1373 (2001) created an obligation for all Member States to work together to deny terrorists the ability to solicit and move funds, find safe haven, acquire weapons, or cross international borders.

    2003-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4688 (2003) · source

  33. Hopefully, there will be a peaceful solution, but if Iraq does not come into full compliance, we must not shrink from the responsibilities that we set before ourselves when we adopted resolution 1441 (2002) on a unanimous basis; and so many other nations expressed their support for resolution 1441 (2002). Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists or States that support terrorists would represent a mortal danger to us all. We must make the United Nations even more effective and we must build even closer international cooperation to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists. The United Nations has long worked to marshal the international community against terrorism.

    2003-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4688 (2003) · source

  34. We cannot be shocked into impotence because we are afraid of the difficult choices that are ahead of us. So we will have much work to do, difficult work, in the days ahead, but we cannot shrink from the responsibilities of dealing with a regime that has gone about the development, the acquiring and the stocking of weapons of mass destruction, that has committed terrorist attacks against its neighbours and against its own people and that has trampled the human rights of its own people and its neighbours. S0 however difficult the road ahead may be with respect to Iraq, we must not shrink from the need to travel down that road.

    2003-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4688 (2003) · source

  35. We must get every one of these terrorists and bring them to justice or destroy them. I also note that a number of my colleagues have made reference to the situation with respect to Iraq and to resolution 1441 (2002). In the very near future, the Council will meet again to determine what to do about this situation. Iraq was given a last chance with resolution 1441 (2002). I am pleased that it was President Bush who brought this situation to the attention of the Council in the most forceful way last September to give Iraq this one last chance. We must not shrink from our duties and our responsibilities when the material comes before us next week and as we consider Iraq's response to resolution 1441 (2002). We cannot fail to take the action that may be necessary because we are afraid of what others might do.

    2003-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4688 (2003) · source

  36. We must rid the civilized world of this cancer. We must wage our campaign at every level with every tool of statecraft for as long as it takes. President Bush has stressed that "we will win this conflict by the patient accumulation of successes, by meeting a series of challenges with determination and will and purpose". The declaration that we will adopt today makes clear that this war has many fronts: from money laundering and the illicit drug trade to arms trafficking and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We must fight terrorism on all of these fronts. I am very impressed by a number of the comments that I have heard today from various colleagues. I thank my colleague from Pakistan for Pakistan's commitment to continue going after Al Qaeda.

    2003-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4688 (2003) · source

  37. I would also like to thank our Spanish colleagues for agreeing to assume the chairmanship of the Counter-Terrorism Committee in April. They will have our full support as they build on Ambassador Greenstock's work to make the Committee an even more potent weapon in the anti-terrorist arsenal. We need an effective Counter-Terrorism Committee for, despite the progress of the past year, there is still much that we have to do. As the murderous attacks in Bali and Moscow and Mombasa and elsewhere have so tragically reminded us, the terrorist threat continues, and no countries' citizens are safe. Innocent people from some 90 countries perished on 11 September 2001. The Bali victims called at least 25 different countries home. No cause justifies the murder of innocent people. We totally reject terrorists and terrorism.

    2003-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4688 (2003) · source

  38. Thank you, Mr. President, for bringing us together today to reaffirm our commitment to the fight against terrorism. I thank the Secretary-General for his excellent remarks earlier. It is so fitting that this body meet at the ministerial level to take stock of our campaign against terrorists and to help chart the way forward. And it is fitting that we meet here in New York, the site of the bloodiest of the attacks of 11 September 2001. Let me begin my remarks by joining all my other colleagues in thanking Ambassador Greenstock for his tireless efforts as Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). Ambassador Greenstock's vision, his energy and his commitment have transformed the Committee from an idea into a powerful weapon against terrorism, and we all owe him a big debt of gratitude. Thank you, Jeremy.

    2003-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4688 (2003) · source

  39. We join all other Members of the United Nations in the effort to build a world of peace, prosperity and freedom where terrorism cannot thrive.

    2002-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4607 (2002) · source

  40. It is about eliminating terrorism as a global menace. We must be prepared for a long, hard effort measured in years, not in months. For our part, the people of the United States understand that, long after the void in New York City's skyline has been filled by a fitting monument, long after it is possible to tell where the rebuilt walls of the Pentagon meet the old, long after nature has mended the gash in that Pennsylvania field, our country must still remain vigilant and resolute, not just for our own sake but for the well-being of people everywhere. Terrorism is antithetical to the better world for which we have worked since the United Nations was founded. We are all in this together. So, on behalf of President Bush and the American people, I solemnly recommit the United States to our common fight against terrorism.

    2002-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4607 (2002) · source

  41. For the first time in over two decades, the men and women of Afghanistan look to the future with hope. Elsewhere in the world the international community is making it harder by the day for terrorists to support their operations, acquire weapons of mass destruction, move about freely, find sanctuary, communicate and plot. Thanks to our combined efforts, every day somewhere in the world terrorists are being arrested, their cells are being broken up, their financial bloodlines are being severed, their plans are being disrupted and their attacks are being foiled. Indeed, the actions we have taken to date against terrorism have shown the power of our collective will. But from the beginning all of us recognized that our fight has to be more than a response to the particular events of 11 September.

    2002-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4607 (2002) · source

  42. Together we have taken decisive steps to weaken terrorism's deadly grip on various parts of the globe, not least on Afghanistan. Coalition forces, led by the United Sates, have liberated the Afghan people from the dual tyranny of Al Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban. With the assistance of the international community, Afghanistan now has an interim governing authority, an agreed path to a representative Government. The world community is working with Afghanistan's new leadership to meet the humanitarian needs ofthe Afghan people, including the needs of millions of returning refugees and internally displaced persons. With the contribution of donor nations across the globe, the international community is helping the Afghan people begin the enormous task of recovery and reconstruction.

    2002-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4607 (2002) · source

  43. It was clear that the terrorists did not just strike America. They attacked the values of the civilized world that are enshrined in the United Nations Charter. It was clear that terrorism is a threat to international peace and security; and it was clear that all the world's nations had to take concerted action if this menace was to be eradicated once and for all. And so, in defence of shared values and out of a sense of shared vulnerability, the world answered President Bush's call for a great global coalition against terrorism. The Security Council, the General Assembly and every single regional and subregional organization represented at this world body condemned the attacks. Members of the United Nations made binding commitments to combat terrorism, and in the past 12 months much has been accomplished.

    2002-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4607 (2002) · source

  44. On this day of remembrance, we extend to the family members all over the world our deepest condolences for their sorrow. Here in the United States, 11 September is scared deeply into our national consciousness. The attacks on our soil drew us closer as a people. They also drew us closer to people of kindness and good will across the globe. We will never forget the outpouring of sympathy and solidarity we received from throughout the international community. On behalf of President Bush and on behalf of the American people, I wish to express my country's abiding gratitude to all those who reached out to us at our time of national trial. Amidst the fire and smoke, amidst the confusion and shock, some things became very clear to us in the United States, and to the entire international community.

    2002-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4607 (2002) · source

  45. I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting of the Security Council. We gather on this solemn anniversary as representatives of our own countries, and also as representatives of the international community. Together we honour the dead of 90 nations who were murdered on this day one year ago: men and women of every continent, culture and creed; of every region, race and religion. The full cycle of seasons has come and gone for the loved ones of the victims. Their grief is still fresh. For them, the past 12 months have been a chronicle of absences, a calendar filled with daily reminders of loss - missing faces, missing voices, missing embraces - absences as poignant and palpable as the twin towers missing from the New York skyline.

    2002-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4607 (2002) · source

  46. We must consider the essential nature of the Internet when telephones and mail fail. A few weeks ago, such subjects might have elicited little attention. Today, we can understand that inaction can have grave consequences. In each of these areas, there are important roles for the United Nations and for each of our countries to play. We are grateful for the help of the many that have joined in the fight. We believe that out of this great tragedy, a new, common purpose has arisen. No greater threat to international peace and security exists in the world today. And through this body, we have established and are establishing the tools to build a more robust defence. It is time now to put those tools to work.

    2001-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4413 (2001) · source

  47. But the war on terrorism starts within each of our respective, sovereign borders. It will be fought with increased support for democracy programmes, judicial reform, conflict resolution, poverty alleviation, economic reform and health and education programmes. All of these together deny the reasons for terrorists to exist or to find safe havens within those borders. The United States stands ready to provide technical assistance, ranging from aviation security to financial tracking measures and law enforcement. We welcome initiatives by others in these fields, and we are ready at any time to exchange information about terrorism and to cooperate in other ways to combat the common enemy and the common threats that we all face. There is more. We must consider the integrity of international transmission systems, such as the mail system.

    2001-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4413 (2001) · source

  48. The Security Council has already got off to an excellent start by setting up a Committee under able chairmanship to make the call for concerted action a reality. States are starting to work together to cut off the financial resources that are the oxygen of terrorist groups. We have already seen Council members support the immediate freezing of the assets of over 120 persons and entities that the United States identified to the United Nations Afghan sanctions Committee. The Council is well situated to coordinate specialized training and assistance to help countries deal with rapid financial flows and regulatory loopholes. To be effective, resolution 1373 (2001) demands a new resolve. As President Bush said, its obligations are urgent and binding. States must now work together, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

    2001-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4413 (2001) · source

  49. The Security Council took a critical step forward by its adoption of resolution 1373 (2001) a little over two weeks after the attacks. Resolution 1373 (2001) is a mandate to change fundamentally how the international community responds to terrorism. It requires us to cooperate to target terrorists' ability to solicit and move funds, to find safe haven, to acquire weapons and to move across international borders. For many, implementation will involve complicated and difficult challenges to their financial and legal systems, changes to the established ways of doing things, changes aimed at choking off the funding and weaponry that sustain these terrorist groups, changes in the way we cooperate to find and bring terrorists to justice and to safeguard borders.

    2001-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4413 (2001) · source

  50. As President Bush made clear to the General Assembly, because these organizations are global, we need the support of all of our partners in the international community. Specifically, we need the help of police forces, intelligence services and banking systems around the world to isolate and eradicate our common enemies wherever they may hide. The United States is grateful that so many nations and so many international organizations have responded so quickly and so forcefully. The American people were heartened by worldwide solidarity after the attacks. The swift action taken by this body and by the General Assembly on 12 September made it clear that the perpetrators and supporters of terrorism will be held accountable.

    2001-11-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4413 (2001) · source