YouSaid · the spoken record

Prendergast

lines on the record: 716
first: 1999-08-27
most recent: 2018-09-10
sittings or episodes: 36
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I also thank all Security Council members for considering a more robust action plan for countering the corruption-fueled conflict that is destroying the lives of millions of people around the world today.”
2018-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8346 (2018) · source
“Ultimately, these tools of financial pressure are not an end in themselves, but should be deployed, as the Secretary-General said today, in the context of a comprehensive strategy that intensifies diplomacy, supports Government institutions of accountability and transparency, and gives space to civil society efforts to promote human rights and reconciliation. As it stands now - and this is the kicker - war crimes pay. In order for peace to have any chance, those benefiting from the human misery wrought by conflicts around the world need to pay a price, whether financial, legal or political, and the corrupt systems that underlie them need to be ended. I thank you, Madam President, for inviting me to speak today and for bringing attention to this critical issue.”
2018-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8346 (2018) · source
“The Council could enhance its leverage considerably by expanding its outreach and engagement with banks and other financial institutions to counter corruption-fueled conflict. Certain elements of the private sector could them become allies in support of these objectives. Thirdly and finally, courts must have the mandate to prosecute financial crimes, particularly those rooted in corruption, when connected to conflict and atrocities. The International Criminal Court and other courts of special jurisdiction, such as the Special Criminal Court for the Central African Republic or the Hybrid Court in South Sudan, must have the authority to prosecute these financial crimes.”
2018-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8346 (2018) · source
“Panels of experts must be provided with the support they need to do this work, which includes ensuring accountability for those responsible for the tragic deaths of Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalan. Secondly, the Council should enhance its engagement with anti-money-laundering bodies, such as the Financial Action Task Force and similar regional bodies, and ensure that sanctions regimes include references to the importance of combatting the laundering of corruption proceeds. These organizations need the help of the Security Council to bolster their work. An important component of any effort to strengthen the Security Council's ability to counter corrupt activities that fuel conflict more effective is to move beyond working with Governments alone.”
2018-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8346 (2018) · source
“These network sanctions work because they affect not only the primary target of the sanctions themselves, but also the individuals and companies that play an important role in supporting the targets' activities. By sanctioning the individuals and entities all at once or in close succession, and ensuring robust enforcement, which is key, the primary target's network does not have enough time to recover from the financial impact of being cut off from the global financial system. To implement this, the Council should add "corruption tied to conflict" as a sanctions criterion to its existing sanctions programmes and ensure that panels of experts are mandated to report on corruption related to conflict.”
2018-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8346 (2018) · source
“The policy tools available to the Security Council and other interested parties are threefold: first, a network-focused approach to sanctions that focuses on grand corruption; secondly, anti-money-laundering measures that focus on the illicit movement of money through the international financial system; and thirdly, as the Secretary-General said, prosecutions that, in this case, focus on financial crimes associated with atrocities. Let us go to the first one. Sanctions must be levied against entire networks, not just individuals. That is the approach that the Security Council and others took to propel Iran and North Korea to the negotiating table. Sanctions that target networks in this way are powerful tools for changing behaviour and pressuring individuals to compromise.”
2018-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8346 (2018) · source
“As is obvious, these leaders and their commercial collaborators do not keep their money under the mattress; rather, they launder it through the international financial system and move it offshore into real estate, shell or front companies, and bank accounts. That makes them vulnerable. As a result, the leverage must be laser-focused on going after this specific illicit activity, valued in the billions of dollars. If that activity is disrupted and the vulnerabilities of these kleptocratic networks are exposed and attacked, only then will United Nations envoys and other diplomats be in a position to actually make progress towards brokering and supporting the implementation of peace agreements that lead to lasting peace and that benefit long-suffering populations.”
2018-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8346 (2018) · source
“The sanctions are often too weak, because the mandate does not exist to target those responsible for the corruption that leads to conflict. In other words, we rarely sanction those at the centre of the networks responsible for greed-fueled extreme violence and their commercial collaborators. Over time, and in the absence of meaningful enforcement, warring parties have come to regard these kinds of erratically applied, one-off sanctions as a vague annoyance for their public relations rather than as a serious threat to their power. What is missing is the use of policy tools of financial pressures that actually alter the cost- benefit analysis of those committing atrocities and prolonging war.”
2018-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8346 (2018) · source
“United Nations agencies, taxpayers and donor Governments around the world fund peacekeeping forces, State-building programmes, humanitarian assistance, elections and peace processes, but none of this support has been able to keep corrupt leaders and their network of beneficiaries from stealing billions of dollars because the diplomats leading these efforts simply have no leverage to change the systems that perpetuate conflict. This is not about regime change. It is about system change. For years, the tool of choice for building leverage against actors undermining peace or human rights has been to impose targeted sanctions. But the sanctions often imposed by this organ and many Member States in these situations, especially in Africa, have been inadequate. Too few individuals are sanctioned too infrequently.”
2018-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8346 (2018) · source
“Therefore, peace efforts require an emphasis on conflict transformation, where war economies must be dismantled and hijacked State institutions, which have often been predatory dating back to the colonial period, must be completely reformed to fulfil their intended purpose. This is even more difficult in countries where natural resources have provided huge opportunities for plunder and corruption to people all over the world. Remarkably, and regrettably, there is currently no coordinated strategy to disrupt the illicit siphoning of money by leaders and their foreign business partners, or to break the link between corruption and conflict. Every year, billions of aid dollars pour into Africa to clean up these horrific messes.”
2018-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8346 (2018) · source
“Control of the State is the surest way to access these resources. Diverting State budgets into the military and internal security - the primary means of violently suppressing dissent - is how to secure them. Until the Security Council and other interested parties with potential influence can create leverage to change these dynamics, the bottom line is that war will remain more beneficial than peace for those at the centre of conflict and corruption. The same people benefiting from war economies are often the power- brokers in peace talks and have limited incentive - in fact, sometimes no incentive - to reach and implement a negotiated settlement, especially if adhering to such an agreement means losing out economically.”
2018-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8346 (2018) · source
“Arms dealers, ivory traffickers, gold and diamond smugglers, minerals dealers, oil companies, construction firms and others collude with Government officials and rebel warlords - as well as, at times, with terrorist networks - to maximize profit for a narrow few. Technically savvy and skilled at exploiting legitimate systems of finance, trade and transport - utilizing money-laundering, regulatory and sanctions evasion, disguised beneficial ownership, the diversion of State resources and assets, security sector fraud, and offshoring assets - these networks have remained largely untouched by law enforcement, regulation or international sanctions imposed by this organ or others. At their core, these conflicts are battles over the control of hijacked States and the natural resources that enrich the countries involved.”
2018-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8346 (2018) · source
“Violence becomes self-financing from pillaging, natural-resource looting and stealing State assets, with banking and business connections that extend from right here in New York to London, Dubai and many other global financial centres. In these hijacked African States, the dynamics of which are certainly similar to those in other war-torn countries around the world, such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, military and civilian leaders use networks of commercial collaborators and financiers from inside and outside their countries to enrich themselves, to benefit the commercial and political networks, and usually to maintain an iron grip on power.”
2018-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8346 (2018) · source
“Mr. Prendergast: Throughout history, war may have been hell, but for small groups of conflict profiteers it has also been very lucrative. Today's deadliest conflicts in Africa - such as those in South Sudan, Somalia, northern Nigeria, the Sudan, the Central African Republic and, perhaps most importantly, the Democratic Republic of Congo - are sustained by extraordinary opportunities for illicit self- enrichment that emerge in war economies, where there is a visible nexus between grand corruption and mass atrocities. State armies and rebels use extreme violence to control natural resources, labour and smuggling networks, including those trafficking in wildlife.”
2018-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8346 (2018) · source
“As he does so, he will want to take full account of the reaction of the Council to this report. He will also be closely observing developments on the ground and, in particular, any evolution in the position of the parties in the light of the assessment and the observations I have just made. Depending on the evolution of events and attitudes on the island, it may become appropriate to consider appointing a special adviser, on a when actually employed basis, who would engage the parties and explore whether the necessary common ground existed or could be built to enable full-scale negotiations to resume. For, ultimately, it is only through negotiations between them on the basis of the plan that a settlement will be achieved.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“The Secretary-General is mindful of his own responsibilities, and he remains committed to assisting the parties to achieve a settlement. As a general proposition, the Secretary- General's good offices ought to be available to parties who request them. Moreover, the persistence of the status quo on the island is unacceptable, as the Council has made clear on many occasions. At the same time, launching an intensive new process prematurely would be inadvisable. I hope the Council would agree that nothing positive would be served by a new effort that ended - as the previous two efforts did - in high-profile failure or else in a frustrating stalemate. As things stand, the Secretary-General believes that it would be prudent to proceed very carefully. He intends to reflect on the future of his mission of good offices in the period ahead.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“A settlement will become possible only if the parties act towards each other in a way that conveys respect, understanding for the other's concerns and a desire for an early settlement. Responsibilities also fall on the Governments of Greece and Turkey. They must keep in mind that the Cyprus problem should be settled on its own merits, in the interests, first and foremost, of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. The strong support of Greece and Turkey for the mission of good offices, for which the Secretary-General is grateful, will need to be matched by a readiness to think afresh on certain aspects of the problem so that a solution can be achieved on the basis of a revised United Nations plan. So, where to from here?”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“It is natural for each party to seek to protect its own interests with regard to both procedure and substance. But it is important to encourage both sides to focus on their overriding common interest, namely, the need to agree on revisions so that the United Nations plan can command majority support not only in their own communities, but in each other's too. In that regard, the Secretary-General wishes to stress the obligations of the parties themselves. Outsiders can help, but it is the parties who must summon the vision, courage and political will needed to make a settlement, with all that that implies by way of compromise. Leaders have to lead, not just follow, their supporters.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“At the same time, it would not help the search for a solution if Greek Cypriot concerns were met in a way that caused the loss of majority support for the United Nations plan on the Turkish Cypriot side, and the Turkish Cypriot electorate in turn must have confidence that that, too, would be borne in mind in any renewed process. Meanwhile, confidence on the Turkish Cypriot side and in Turkey - whose role will be critical - is diminished by the fact that, although a clear majority among those who voted on the Turkish Cypriot side supported a compromise United Nations plan finalized by an agreed procedure, Turkish Cypriots see little acknowledgement of their efforts to achieve a solution and little or no improvement in their situation in the period since the referendum.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“While the United Nations could not countenance a solution other than the kind envisaged in the resolutions of the Council, the highest-priority concerns which led Greek Cypriots to vote the way they did would most certainly have to be addressed in any future process based on the United Nations plan, and the Greek Cypriot electorate must have confidence that this would be borne in mind in a renewed process. In that context, a prioritized and exhaustive list of concrete proposals for negotiation would be an important advance, because it is very hard to address a long list of concerns in an ordered way if they are expressed without modulation or indication of their relative importance.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“In the end, the Secretary-General was left with extremely difficult judgements to make on many contentious matters, since there were continuing and persistent deadlocks between the parties on nearly all substantive issues on the table, and he had been tasked by the parties to use his discretion to resolve them, so that a plan could be submitted to referendum. The plan, as finalized by the Secretary-General, is fully in accordance with the vision of a settlement contained in Security Council resolutions. Yet, as I mentioned earlier in this briefing, on the Greek Cypriot side, more than three quarters of those who voted rejected the finalized United Nations plan. That is a fact that cannot be wished away.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“These two factors, especially in combination, make efforts to establish common ground extremely difficult. As the Secretary-General considers what course of action to take, there are a number of additional factors that he will bear in mind. He believes that the starting point for the United Nations must and should be full respect for the decision of the voters on each side in the referendum of 24 April 2004 and an approach that is guided by that full respect. Last year, the Secretary-General and his team exerted extraordinary efforts to work with the parties and finalize a plan that we hoped would be acceptable to the people on each side - a plan that had been developed over a four-and-a-half-year process of negotiation and consultation unprecedented in the history of the Cyprus problem.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“Political figures on both sides in Cyprus are maintaining cordial contacts with one another in an effort to promote mutual understanding. There are useful contacts at other levels, too, whether among experts on particular subjects or among ordinary people now that they are able to cross to the other side. I was interested to learn that an independent bi-communal survey that polled attitudes to potential changes to the United Nations plan found the encouraging result among grass-roots opinion on both sides that it might be possible to make certain changes that would secure majority support for the plan in both communities. But there are negatives, too. The gap between the stated positions of the parties on substance appears to be wide, while confidence between them does not seem high; rather the contrary.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“Talat and in Ankara, our surprise and disappointment at the fact that the Council had not reacted to the report or to last year's developments. Also, both the Turkish Cypriots and Turks expressed disillusion as well as disappointment at what they perceive as inadequate steps by the European Union to ease Turkish Cypriot isolation, an outcome which they feel they had been led to expect. This concludes my summary of United Nations consultations with the parties. I should like now, if I may, to move to an assessment of the situation. First of all, there are some important positives to acknowledge. All of the parties want to see some sort of resumption of active United Nations good offices. All the parties accept that the United Nations plan should serve as the document on which the negotiations would resume.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“For that to happen, the Turkish Government believed that it was important for the Greek Cypriot side to furnish a clear and exhaustive list of changes it would like to see to the plan. The Turkish Government stressed the sense of frustration in Turkey at the Security Council's lack of response to the Secretary-General's report of 28 May 2004, saying that this made it difficult to persuade people that Turkish and Turkish Cypriot efforts for a solution were adequately acknowledged. Those views were also conveyed to the Secretary- General by Prime Minister Erdogan at a working lunch in New York on 9 June, shortly after my return from the region. The Secretary-General conveyed to Prime Minister Erdogan, as I had to Mr.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“In that context, Greek representatives said that the United Nations plan was the first comprehensive solution framework ever put forward and that it had come very close to delivering a settlement. However, Greece believed that, on certain aspects, the plan reflected the fears of the past more than it did the challenges of the future with Cyprus as a member of the European Union. The Greek Government would want to see the two sides in cooperative negotiations based on the United Nations plan so that outstanding concerns could be addressed and a settlement achieved. In Ankara, the Turkish Government said that they wished to see a settlement based on the United Nations plan and that Turkey would welcome an intensive process under the Secretary-General's auspices.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“I should add that I discussed with both leaders the obvious lack of confidence that exists between the two sides and measures that might be taken, either by agreement or, perhaps better still, unilaterally, to build confidence. Both leaders said that, while efforts to build confidence were important, they should not be a substitute for the search for a settlement. There are certain points on which follow-up from one or other of the parties is anticipated. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), Mr. Wlosowicz, remains at the disposal of the parties to pursue these matters. In Athens, the Greek Government said that it wished to see a resumption of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“Talat that 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots who voted last year had rejected the finalized United Nations plan, and that this was a problem not just for the Greek Cypriots but for both sides. Mr. Talat said that, to address Greek Cypriot concerns, he would be prepared to entertain minor changes within the parameters of the plan, but he believed that it was very important to have a clear and final list of demands from the Greek Cypriot side. I conveyed orally the areas of concern that the Greek Cypriot side had elaborated to me. Mr. Talat said that he regarded these as lying well outside the parameters of the United Nations plan and as unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot public.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“Talat said that his people had been prepared to accept the United Nations plan not because it was ideal, but as a compromise. He stressed that certain key features - political equality, partnership, bi-zonality, bi-communality, the treaties of guarantee and alliance - were the essence of the plan and should not be eroded. He added that there were also real points of Turkish Cypriot concern about the plan that he would like to discuss in any future negotiations. They included territory, property, resettlement of dislocated Turkish Cypriots, financing, and guarantees against usurpation of the settlement arrangements by either side. I said that the Secretary-General had been surprised at the lack of any response by the Security Council to his report. However, I reminded Mr.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“He mentioned, in particular, insufficient acknowledgement by the international community of the fact that a majority of those who had voted on the Turkish Cypriot side in the referendum had accepted a compromise United Nations plan, and, secondly, the lack of action by the Security Council to help ease unnecessary restrictions that, he insisted, had the effect of unjustifiably isolating and punishing the Turkish Cypriots. Mr. Talat said that this lack of response should be remedied. He added that, were negotiations to resume, he believed that there should be some sort of mechanism in place so that each side would know what its fate would be should the negotiations end in failure as a result of the actions of the other side. On substance, Mr.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“He stressed the desire of his people for an urgent settlement. On procedure, Mr. Talat favoured a process with United Nations arbitration and clear time limits for negotiations, since he was concerned that negotiations might otherwise drag on indefinitely. He stressed, in this context, that Turkish Cypriots were disappointed at the failure of the Security Council to react to the Secretary-General's good offices report of 28 May 2004.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“Papadopoulos if the concerns outlined by his envoy were an exhaustive or only an illustrative list of the areas in which he sought changes. Mr. Papadopoulos replied that he had no intention of raising further concerns, but he reserved the right to do so during negotiations, depending on the demands made by the other side. Despite my encouragement, Mr. Papadopoulos declined to indicate any hierarchy in his demands or any priority within them, saying that he believed those could emerge only during negotiations. On the Turkish Cypriot side, Mr. Talat said that he wanted to see a settlement as soon as possible based on the United Nations plan and that he would like to see intensive negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General to achieve such a settlement within a reasonably short period of time.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“The substantive points the Greek Cypriot side would like to pursue in resumed negotiations touch on most of the main issues dealt with in the plan, including governance, security, citizenship, residency, property, territory, economic and financial issues, transition periods and guarantees of implementation. Asked by the Greek Cypriot side to give initial reactions to their ideas, I indicated that the United Nations understood that the Greek Cypriots have concerns and that those would need to be addressed in a mutually acceptable manner between the parties. But at the same time, I said that I thought the other side would find daunting the breadth and depth of what the Greek Cypriot side had elaborated, and I encouraged them to produce a list of focused, finite, manageable and prioritized proposals. I also asked Mr.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“Papadopoulos said that he believed the plan finalized by the Secretary-General last year gave the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey, in his words, nearly everything they wanted, more than they needed, and more than was fair. In his view, that is why a large majority of Greek Cypriots had rejected the plan while a large majority of Turkish Cypriots had accepted it. He believes that future negotiations can be successful only if the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey understand that and if they are prepared to meet outstanding Greek Cypriot concerns during the course of negotiations.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“He said that his people were suffering from occupation and uncertainty and that they wanted a solution, and he confirmed both the procedural and substantive points that his envoy had made to me in New York. On procedure, Mr. Papadopoulos said that new negotiations should be carefully prepared. His position was that, in any resumed negotiations, there should be no deadlines, no arbitration of substantive issues by the United Nations or third parties, and only a settlement plan agreed by the parties should be submitted to referendum. At the same time, he accepted that negotiations should not be open-ended. On substance, Mr.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“My mission was preceded by a week of preliminary, informal, non-binding discussions in New York with a Greek Cypriot envoy, during which he elaborated Greek Cypriot views on both procedure and substance, and also sought the feedback of the United Nations. In Cyprus, I met Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, the Greek Cypriot leader, three times. I met Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat, the Turkish Cypriot leader, twice. I also saw political leaders on both sides. In Greece and Turkey, I met the foreign minister of each country and senior foreign ministry officials, as well as other prominent Greek and Turkish personalities. I would like today to convey to the Council a summary of the views expressed and the discussions held. On the Greek Cypriot side, Mr. Papadopoulos said that he was eager for negotiations to resume under the auspices of the Secretary-General.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“Mr. Prendergast: On the Secretary-General's instructions, I visited Cyprus, Greece and Turkey between 30 May and 7 June for consultations on the future of his mission of good offices in Cyprus. The Secretary-General's aim in asking me to travel to the region was to "take the pulse" - to find out where the parties stand, to seek their views on what, if anything, the United Nations should be doing in current circumstances, and to come back and report those views to him, along with options and advice regarding the priority, intensity and resources that he might wish to assign to the good offices.”
2005-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5211 (2005) · source
“Building mutual confidence is crucial if the parties are to walk together the path that is laid out for them in the road map, which remains the most broadly accepted peace plan. The objective must remain an end to the occupation that began in 1967, the realization of the two-State solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive regional peace in the Middle East. We cannot afford to lose sight of that objective, no matter how long and hard the path is towards it.”
2005-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5206 (2005) · source
“Therefore, to ensure their successful conclusion, we call on all concerned parties to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and to cease any actions that could be destabilizing. The summer of 2005 will mark an important crossroads. As we have stated consistently here over the past year, we hope that the road that leads towards peace and security for all will be chosen, rather than the one that leads back into despair, confrontation and conflict. But for that to happen, the parties need, as a first step, to intensify their efforts to ensure that Israeli withdrawal is implemented successfully and peacefully. Cooperation in that effort would not only be of value in and of itself; it could also help to build confidence between the parties so that they can tackle the issues that face them in the broader process of negotiations that must follow.”
2005-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5206 (2005) · source
“Meanwhile, since early May, United Nations electoral experts from the Electoral Assistance Division have been providing technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities for the current parliamentary elections as well as support to ensure coordination among international electoral observers. Their assessment is that, from a technical perspective, the elections have been well conducted. This coming Sunday, the parliamentary electoral process in Lebanon will be completed. It is a major achievement for Lebanon to have held elections on time. As the Secretary-General has pointed out, those elections constitute a major opportunity for the Lebanese people to shape their own future, to strengthen political institutions and to restore their full sovereignty.”
2005-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5206 (2005) · source
“Detlev Mehlis, head of the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission, arrived in Beirut on 26 May. He immediately began discussions with the Lebanese authorities regarding the operations of the Commission and concluded with them this week a memorandum of understanding. Since his arrival, Mr. Mehlis and his team have been reviewing the materials and evidence collected by other investigations and inquiries. Yesterday, as members know, the Secretary-General wrote to the Security Council informing it that the Commission was fully operational as of today. As requested in resolution 1595 (2005), we will keep the Council informed of the progress of the Commission's work.”
2005-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5206 (2005) · source
“We commend the vigilance of the authorities in that respect, and we trust that it will continue. Meanwhile, Israeli warplanes have continued to violate the Blue Line and Lebanese airspace, although such violations appear to have been less frequent. I would like to say that during this very delicate period, not just in Lebanon, but also in the wider region, it is imperative that all concerned exercise the utmost restraint and maintain calm along the Blue Line. The danger of escalation remains very real so long as violations of the Blue Line continue. We wish to remind all parties that all hostile acts must stop and that one violation does not justify another. In the past month, the United Nations has continued its assistance to Lebanon. Mr.”
2005-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5206 (2005) · source
“On 21 May, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) opened small-arms fire to warn off Lebanese shepherds who had violated the Blue Line in the Shaba'a farms area. Local Lebanese reported that three houses in Shaba'a village had been hit. Subsequently, Hizbullah fired several artillery and mortar rounds towards IDF positions in the area, stating that it was in retaliation for the IDF fire. The IDF responded with artillery, tank and mortar fire, with rounds impacting in the area between Abbasiyah and Kafr Shuba. No casualties were reported. On 4 June, the Lebanese security forces reported that they had discovered and removed a Katyusha rocket in the vicinity of Addaysseh village. The rocket was reportedly set in a firing position and was located only about two kilometres from the Blue Line.”
2005-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5206 (2005) · source
“The United Nations and others continue to assist the Central Elections Commission in preparing for what, it is hoped, will be a free and fair process. I turn now to the situation in Lebanon. On 2 June, the prominent Lebanese journalist Samir Qassir was brutally murdered by a car bomb. The Secretary- General condemned the act and called on the Lebanese Government to bring to justice the perpetrators and the instigators of that terrible crime and to ensure the continuation of press freedom and an end to impunity. In addition, the Council, as members will recall, issued a statement (S/PRST/2005/22) condemning the heinous killing of Mr. Qassir. Over the past month, there has been one significant incident involving an exchange of fire across the Blue Line.”
2005-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5206 (2005) · source
“We were therefore relieved to note press reports that demolition orders issued for 88 houses in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Silwan would not be carried out. Democracy is a key ingredient of a strong and legitimate Palestinian Authority. On 17 May, the Palestinian Legislative Council passed a new election law, enlarging the body to 132 members and envisaging their election according to a 2-to-1 ratio from districts and from national lists. However, on 3 June, President Abbas issued a decree postponing sine die the legislative elections set earlier for 17 July and referring to the need for a new electoral law that would introduce at least 50 per cent proportional representation. It is still intended to hold the elections before the end of this year.”
2005-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5206 (2005) · source
“The route it follows encroaches upon Palestinian land and interests and threatens to prejudge unilaterally eventual bilateral negotiations between the parties. I should mention in that connection that the Secretary-General is now in the process of administrative and budgetary preparations to establish the register of damage, as he outlined in his letter of 17 January to the President of the General Assembly. We hope to report further on the establishment of that registry in the coming weeks. We understand that both sides have domestic concerns and demands to address. But that cannot distract our attention from the parties' responsibilities to each other. On the contrary: failure to build mutual trust now would only compound the already existing difficulties.”
2005-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5206 (2005) · source
“The Palestinian Authority must act to fulfil its obligations to end violence and terror, but full support is needed from Israel and the international community. Like the Palestinian Authority, Israel has road map obligations to meet. One of its primary obligations - and an important confidence-building measure - is the requirement to halt all settlement activity, including natural growth, and to dismantle settlement outposts erected since March 2001. We repeat our concern at the fact that Israel is not living up to its obligations in that respect. In that connection, we take note with regret of the publication on 2 June of tenders for the construction of 22 housing units in the West Bank settlement of Maale Adumim. As with continued settlement activity, Israel's ongoing construction of the barrier remains a source of deep concern.”
2005-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5206 (2005) · source
“It is our hope that the Palestinian Authority, despite recent statements by Palestinian officials suggesting otherwise, will not waver in its commitment to end all violence and institute calm as well as law and order, as it is obliged to do under the road map and the Sharm el-Sheikh understandings. At the same time, and as the Palestinians point out, Israel could and should do more to strengthen the ability of the Palestinian Authority to carry out its responsibilities. Frequent and direct security coordination, in addition to the implementation of confidence-building measures, would assist President Abbas in his efforts to establish control and exercise the effective monopoly on the use of force that is a chief characteristic of State and proto-State authorities.”
2005-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5206 (2005) · source
“There is evidence of a serious effort on the Palestinian side to maintain the calm and, on the Israeli side, of determination not to overreact to isolated incidents. We are concerned, however, by the statements of Palestinian factions that they might see themselves as no longer bound by their earlier pledge to maintain a ceasefire. We expect the Palestinian Authority to exert greater efforts to impose its authority on all Palestinian groups, including the militants, to establish law and order, to ensure the endurance of the current ceasefire and to guarantee an end to all violence.”
2005-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5206 (2005) · source
“On 7 June, a Palestinian militant and an unarmed Palestinian policeman were shot and killed in an exchange of fire that erupted in a village near the West Bank city of Jenin as Israeli troops were trying to arrest the militant. One Israeli soldier and six Palestinians were wounded during the operation. During the reporting period, there has been a resumption of the Israeli practice of targeting from the air Palestinian militants engaged in suspicious activity. I would like to remind both sides of the need to take special care to protect innocent civilians, in accordance with international and humanitarian law. To date, despite the serious nature of these various incidents, a prolonged breakdown of the calm of the past four months has been averted.”
2005-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5206 (2005) · source