YouSaid · the spoken record

Prendergast

lines on the record: 716
first: 1999-08-27
most recent: 2018-09-10
sittings or episodes: 36
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I ask the international community please to help ensure that we meet these new targets as we have the ones that now lie behind us. For the moment, I am sure the Council may agree, each success of the Bonn process actually adds to our responsibilities rather than subtracts from them.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“This funding shortfall, moreover, makes it extremely difficult for those agencies, and consequently for the United Nations system as a whole, to prepare the necessary transition towards increased recovery programming later in the year. Allow me to say in conclusion that the plans and hopes mapped out six months ago at Bonn have become the realities of today. Perhaps few people believed then that the Interim Administration would be as effective as it has proven to be, and that the peace process would be as robust as it has been. Now, new challenges face us and new tasks lie ahead in the implementation of the Bonn Agreement. On behalf of the Secretary-General, I would like to urge the international community to continue to assist the Afghans and to support the United Nations, as it has generously done thus far.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“In this regard, I am pleased to report that progress continues to be made by UNAMA and the United Nations agencies in Afghanistan in developing a coherent assistance strategy as well as a productive and cooperative relationship with the Afghan Government. In the near future, I would hope to provide a comprehensive briefing on assistance activities and on progress made by the United Nations in implementing relief and recovery programmes in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, I am compelled to highlight once again the worrying decline in donor funding for Afghanistan. Already, many organizations, most notably the World Food Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Organization for Migration have been forced to scale back, or even halt operations.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“ISAF, in exemplary cooperation with Afghan forces, did a superb job of providing security for the loya jirga. From the diligence and promptness of the members of this Council in authorizing and extending ISAF to the excellent field-level performance of ISAF's troops, the force has been a model of international cooperation, as well as tangible proof of the international commitment to promoting peace and political order in Afghanistan. I can think of no higher tribute to pay than to emphasize, once again, our confidence that ISAF would have an equally positive impact if deployed elsewhere in Afghanistan. A major task of the Transitional Authority, in addition to extending its writ beyond Kabul, will be to address the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. The United Nations has pledged to be an effective partner in this process.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“Given the importance of peace and security in the transitional period, the contributing nations to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Council may wish again to consider the possibility of a limited expansion of ISAF to areas outside Kabul, particularly those where there is a clear pattern of emerging insecurity that, if left to evolve without countervailing pressure, could seriously threaten the further implementation of the Bonn process. As the United Kingdom yesterday completed the hand-over of the ISAF leadership to Turkey, I would like to signal our immense gratitude for the professionalism and dedication of the former, as well as our anticipation of equally effective leadership and cooperation from the latter.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“He noted that if the security situation continues to deteriorate, aid organizations might be forced to cut their operations in the north. This would make it much more difficult to persuade donors to invest in recovery and reconstruction projects in the region, particularly in the light of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1401 (2002). It is clearly vital that, in the weeks and months following the loya jirga, the international community should assist the Afghan Government to bring its authority to bear on insecure areas of the country. Much of this can be done through the continued training of a new Afghan army, which continues to progress. But, inevitably, that army will not be able to provide adequate security for many months to come.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“Aid agencies have appealed to the Special Representative to intervene with national and local authorities to redress this alarming situation. Mr. Brahimi has responded by writing to Chairman Karzai to request strong and urgent intervention with local parties to secure conditions for humanitarian work and to ask him to ensure that those responsible are held accountable under the law. Mr. Brahimi also met with General Abdul Rashid Dostum, General Atta Mohammed, and Mr. Haji Mohammed Muhaqiq, the leaders of the three main northern factions, to make the same demand for intervention. He emphasized that previous United Nations interventions with local authorities had regrettably not resulted in any serious measures being taken to apprehend criminals - many of whom, I regret to say, are in uniform - or to prevent future abuses.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“Most serious and most contemptible was the gang rape of a female international aid worker. We have also been discouraged by recent incidents in which a clinic run by an international aid organization was fired on during factional fighting in Sholgara, and the vehicle of an international aid non-governmental organization (NGO) was fired upon while travelling to oversee bread distribution at a camp for internally displaced persons near Mazar. These attacks mark a worrying departure from what has been, over the past decade, a generally hospitable attitude by Afghans towards aid workers, as well as from the respect for international norms that is necessary to guarantee a humanitarian space in zones of war.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“One of the essential features of democracy, which is built into the Bonn Agreement, is that there should always be another future occasion to compete for power. Between such periodic occasions, however, is the time for governance. These generally positive developments in Kabul are overshadowed by a deterioration of the security situation in some parts of Afghanistan. On the eve of the final day of the loya jirga, several rockets were launched into the centre of Kabul. Luckily, there were no casualties and not much material damage. But this very serious incident is a reminder that security is not guaranteed and that it will not be guaranteed by luck alone. In the north of Afghanistan, a number of armed attacks and robberies have been carried out against international aid organizations in the last several weeks.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“By the time he appeared before the loya jirga at its final session, he had filled only some of the Cabinet positions. He is finalizing his Cabinet even as the Council meets, and has said that he hopes to announce the final composition of the Cabinet within the next two or three days. Mr. Karzai's submission to the loya jirga was accepted with a show of hands. Mr. Karzai's Cabinet selection could not entirely avoid the political realities of Afghanistan. This imperative seems to have been recognized by the members of the loya jirga. There is, nonetheless, likely to be some discontent. A vast amount of work lies ahead for each ministry, however, and we hope that the Cabinet will focus on its administrative and governance functions. At the same time, we urge other Afghan leaders to support them.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“Karzai also noted the need to ensure that donor aid is disbursed effectively. Another key aspect of Mr. Karzai's vision of government concerns national defence and national security. He noted the need for an ethnically representative national army that is accountable to the Afghan State, for an intelligence service that operates within the boundaries of the law and is respectful of the individual rights of Afghans, and for an independent judicial system that is free from corruption. Most important, in his final speech to the loya jirga Mr. Karzai insisted that all commanders and warlords must come under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. Mr. Karzai explained, however, that forming a lean Cabinet was not easy at this stage in the history of Afghanistan.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“Karzai proposed the creation of a number of national commissions to implement his reforms. These include commissions on national defence, national security, foreign investment, return of property and so forth. The salient aspects of Mr. Karzai's vision include a lean government structure that focuses resources on the people and not on maintaining a heavy bureaucracy. Mr. Karzai emphasized the importance of generating enough income for the Government to be self- sufficient. Customs duties would be used as the prime source of income to fund the civil service and the Government. On economic questions, he stressed the importance of private enterprise, of encouraging investment from foreigners and from the Afghan diaspora, and of cracking down on corruption and bribery. Mr.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“Karzai was required by the rules of the loya jirga to submit for endorsement by the assembly proposals on the structure of the Transitional Authority and its key personalities. Because of flaws in the management of the loya jirga proceedings, there was some confusion among delegates about how their approval for proposals would be secured. For example, many delegates thought that they could become members of the Cabinet if they collected enough signatures from delegates in support of their bid. But the truly contentious issue was the question of how a legislature should be formed, and that issue was left unresolved. Overlooked in the highly publicized disputes and bitterness on this issue, however, was an encouraging reformist vision of government presented by Mr. Karzai in his acceptance speech on 13 June. Mr.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“This was the first time in Afghan history that a woman had ever run for such a high position, and her second-place finish is a credit to her and to the assembly. I would like to note here that the Ministry of Women's Affairs and UNAMA conducted an induction course for the 150 female delegates. A core group has been created from among those delegates to continue to promote common issues affecting Afghan women. And while it would have been gratifying to be able to announce the election of a female head of State in Afghanistan, Mr. Karzai's victory has been widely acknowledged to be well deserved. It reflects the leadership he has exercised, both nationally and internationally, as Chairman of the Interim Administration during the past six months. As the new head of State, Mr.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“Lakdhar Brahimi, also made a statement, in which he congratulated Afghans and the Interim Administration on successfully opening the loya jirga. Mr. Brahimi took note of the intimidation that had occurred during the process but - properly, I believe - insisted that more remarkable were the cases of resistance to intimidation and the clearly manifested popular support for the process. The substantive results of the emergency loya jirga are as follows. On 13 June, Mr. Hamid Karzai was overwhelmingly elected - by 1,295 out of the 1,575 delegates who cast their votes - to be the head of State of the Transitional Administration. One of Mr. Karzai's two opponents, Massouda Jalal, was a woman.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“In fact - and this is important to underline - the reports of intimidation reflected the feeling of fear and insecurity that remains predominant in many parts of the country because the rule of law is not yet firmly established and because far too often force is the only source of authority. Moving from the general to the specific, the emergency loya jirga was convened in Kabul on ll June with the participation of 1,656 voting delegates from all over the country and abroad. As per the Bonn Agreement, the assembly was opened by former King Zahir Shah, who stressed that he had returned to Afghanistan to be a servant of his people and not to restore the monarchy. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“I would not want this generally positive assessment to give comfort to those who employed tactics of intimidation and fear during the loya jirga process. The Bureau of the loya jirga and UNAMA have documented various cases of intimidation, which have been brought to the attention of the Afghan Government. I am aware that other organizations present in Afghanistan are compiling their own reports on intimidation. For the sake of the next loya jirga and to secure the foundations of democracy in Afghanistan, it is vital that the Afghan authorities highlight and address, as much as possible, the instances where democratic rights have been abused by those who still equate power with force and violence. Having said that, I must add that intimidation was actually confirmed in only a small number of cases.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“The Bonn Agreement called on the loya jirga to elect a head of State for the Transitional Administration and to approve proposals for the structure and key personnel of the Transitional Administration. As the Council knows, Mr. Karzai was elected as the head of State, and his cabinet was approved by the assembly. Finally, the fact that Afghans from every region, ethnicity, educational level and occupation were able to gather together peacefully, to debate heatedly, yet ultimately to agree on fundamental questions regarding their common political future is the third - and surely the most important - success of the emergency loya jirga. The gathering offered a truly representative sample of Afghan society in 2002, even if quite a few people might have had some doubts about the legitimacy of the presence of certain delegates.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“I have already detailed to the Council the immense challenges faced in conducting the election and selection of delegates, in organizing and securing the site, and in transporting delegates to Kabul on time and in secure conditions. The generosity of the international community was a major factor in this achievement, and on behalf of the Secretary- General I thank all those States that contributed. I fear, however, that the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) will have to go back to donors and ask for their understanding, since not all the sums that were pledged to the budget of the Special Independent Commission have actually been paid into the loya jirga trust fund. The fact that the loya jirga accomplished what it was mandated to accomplish under the Bonn Agreement is its second success.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“Mr. Prendergast: When I briefed members of the Council in informal consultations two weeks ago, I concluded with the hope that today I would be able to bring the Council welcome news about the results of the emergency loya jirga. This morning I am pleased to be able to say that that hope was well founded. In view of the importance of the loya jirga for the political future of Afghanistan and the intense global interest in its outcome, my briefing today will pay primary attention to that event. The emergency loya jirga can be counted as a success for a number of reasons. The fact that it was held is the first success.”
2002-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4557 (2002) · source
“We look forward to its successful conclusion, and we look forward to a smooth transition to the next phase of the Bonn process, a phase in which, we hope, reconstruction activities will pick up in earnest.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“Following the conference, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan signed an agreement that established a tripartite commission to develop private-sector development and trade between the three countries. We have often emphasized the importance of political cooperation among Afghanistan's neighbours. It is appropriate here to note the importance of economic cooperation as well. In conclusion, let me say that more progress has occurred in Afghanistan in the past six months than anyone would or could have predicted a year ago. It is too early to take the Bonn process for granted. It is too early to assume that it is cemented firmly into the destiny of the country. At the same time, each day of progress seems to make the process more and more irreversible. We will be following events closely in the lead-up to the loya jirga.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“At present, millions of people continue to depend on United Nations and non- governmental organization programmes. For the immediate future, therefore, a large-scale presence and funding requirement will continue to be necessary. In the medium-term, however, the United Nations will progressively reduce its presence. We will assign more funding to recovery and reconstruction projects, and, above all, we will support the Government in meeting its challenges and its responsibilities. I am also pleased to report on the conference recently held in Tehran on trade and private-sector cooperation between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The conference also addressed the rebuilding of Afghanistan through the creation of a vibrant private sector, and it emphasized the need to expand trading opportunities as a key driver of this rebuilding.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“It is incumbent on the United Nations to support Government objectives in improving the lives of millions of war-affected Afghans by bringing real change in villages and towns across the country. A strong element of decentralization will be critical in ensuring that the new area development programmes are successful. These programmes have already been launched in both Kandahar and Herat, tailored specifically to the needs of those areas. This model is being rapidly replicated in all priority areas around the country. The partnership between the Government and the United Nations must be based on a shared vision of transition and recovery and Afghan self-reliance. The United Nations and the Government must work together to address common problems and to produce durable common solutions.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“Secondly, we will work in partnership in programming, particularly to ensure that equitable and needs-based programming is applied across the entire country. In cooperation with UNAMA, the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority has drafted a national development framework that sets out a broad strategy for economic reconstruction and development. The next step, which we expect to be completed by the end of this month, is the elaboration of a national development budget that articulates priority needs and ensures that different programme areas inform each other. This budget will also help the United Nations to identify and support optimal levels of funding for both humanitarian and development work. The third key area of partnership can be found in our work in the provinces.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“The United Nations continues to make progress in reconstruction and development assistance. In this endeavour, it is the philosophy of the Organization to work closely with the Interim Authority, in particular with the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority. The United Nations intends, in the coming weeks, to articulate clearly to the Interim Authority and its successor Transitional Administration its transition strategy for national and sub-national capacity- building. This strategy will be based on genuine partnership between the Government and the United Nations on a number of levels. First, we will focus on Government and civil society capacity-building at all levels of our regular operations, but also with regard to a series of projects to support the Interim Administration's capacity in specific areas.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“However, due to insufficient funds, WFP deliveries in April and May have fallen short of targets by about 80,000 metric tons. All donors are urged to continue funding this and other vital life-saving operations. I can also report good progress on refugee returns. On 16 May, the number of Afghans returning in a single day from both Iran and Pakistan topped 20,000 for the first time. The total number of refugees whom the United Nations has assisted in returning since the start of this year now stands at 625,000, with an undetermined number of others who have returned on their own. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is working with non-governmental organizations to rebuild 7,400 houses for the neediest returnees and is continuing to provide repatriation packages to ease the difficulties of the transition.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“I am sure that the international community is fully aware that all its political and financial efforts in support of a new Afghanistan would be seriously compromised by a lack of tangible progress in the security environment. For example, we cannot expect a sustained reconstruction process to be launched in Afghanistan without real improvements in security outside Kabul and its environs. I turn now to the issue of relief and recovery. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations continue to deliver on the relief operation, but they are also giving increasing emphasis to programming for recovery and reconstruction. Since last September, the World Food Programme (WFP) has provided more than 455,000 metric tons of food to more than nine million Afghans, many of whom will be dependent on food aid for some time.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“I would therefore like to take this opportunity to remind the Council that the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular outside Kabul, remains a major concern. Last week during informal consultations, I briefed the Council about the worrying situation in Mazar-e-Sharif where UNAMA has successfully brokered a separation of forces agreement between rival warlords. The situation there remains fragile. So does the overall security environment in other parts of the country, in particular in the east and south of Afghanistan. In view of the absence of an expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul, the United Nations and the Interim Administration continue to believe that the international community should address these legitimate security issues as quickly as possible.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“As was reiterated several times at the Geneva conference, the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the creation of a viable political system there requires the development of an Afghan security sector that is controlled by and responsible to the State. In the long run, this is the cheapest option for the donors. In terms of ensuring sustainability, it is the only option. We would therefore want to urge donors to consider the initiatives presented at the Geneva conference and to consider how they might contribute to their financing and implementation. While the outcome of the Geneva conference is very encouraging, the creation of new Afghan security institutions is going to take time.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“Both the Interim Administration and the United Kingdom agreed that this year's poppy eradication programme had demonstrated the determination of the Interim Administration to address this problem, which affects the entire international community in a serious way. Finally, UNAMA presented a paper on demobilization and reintegration, estimating that a programme addressing 200,000 combatants would cost around $80 million. Japan agreed to join the United Nations as the lead actor in this sector. Overall, the Geneva conference was viewed positively by its participants. A number of countries other than those already mentioned pledged funds and other support or said they were actively considering doing so. This moment in Afghanistan's history presents an unusual challenge to the international community.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“Germany stressed that it was essential to create a functioning judicial system at the same time as the police was rebuilt. Otherwise, the police would operate in an institutional vacuum. Italy and UNAMA presented papers on the judicial sector. It is clear, however, that faster progress is required in this area. We hope that the imminent establishment of the Judicial Commission by the Interim Administration, which is something that needs to happen before 10 June to comply with the Bonn Agreement, will help speed up movement in this sector. UNAMA is working closely on this with the Administration. At the Geneva conference, the United Kingdom presented a strategy paper for coordinating assistance to combat illegal narcotics in Afghanistan.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“Some, like Bacha Khan Zadran in Gardez, actively oppose the Interim Administration. The Administration is therefore in a position of having to assert its authority with little capacity to do so. Helping the Afghans develop that capacity was the subject of the recent security donors conference in Geneva on 17 May. This meeting brought together around 40 potential donors. Its purpose was to secure real financial commitments for security-sector reform. The delegation of the Interim Administration, headed by Foreign Minister Abdullah, presented an operational paper on the new Afghan Armed Forces. This new army would be 80,000 strong and would cost around $300 million in the first year. It would be overseen by a civilian-controlled National Security Council. The German Government presented proposals for rebuilding the police force.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“It is our belief that the process so far has demonstrated the capacity for reconciliation and compromise among Afghans, as they realize the importance of not losing this opportunity for peace and reconstruction. There is a general understanding that the loya jirga is an important event for Afghanistan's future and, above all, that it is too important to be discarded for its imperfections. Many of the obstacles in Phase I of the loya jirga process were caused by the uncertain security situation. It is clear that different parts of the country remain under the sway of different commanders. Some are loyal to members of the Interim Administration, which does not necessarily make them loyal to the Interim Administration itself, and this is an important distinction.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“Although Phase I has so far not been perfect, it has, nevertheless, in many ways, been better than expected. For example, turnout at most assemblies was in the thousands. Often, this compelling popular support was sufficient to resist intimidation or to successfully contest pre-rigged outcomes. While the process in some districts heightened tension, as had been predicted, in most cases this tension was contained. In at least one case - Qarabagh district in Ghazni province - rival factions that had been vying for control of a district agreed to withdraw from their positions in order to hold the assembly. They also agreed to the establishment of a neutral security force in the centre of the district. So, in this case, the loya jirga process actually improved security.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“We are pleased with the progress and are confident that the loya jirga will proceed on schedule. As expected, Phase I has been less than perfect. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and international monitoring teams have heard of many cases of intimidation by local military or political leaders. In some districts, the inability to conduct a minimally fair selection exercise may lead either to the Loya Jirga Commission selecting the district representatives, as it is empowered to do under article 7 of the rules and procedures that were adopted by the Commission itself, or, in the worst case - that is to say, if selection under article 7 might put in personal danger the person who is selected - to declare the district "unelectable", in which case it will not be represented at all.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“The members of the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga are currently deployed in all eight regions of the country to organize and supervise the Phase I district assemblies. They are supported by five two-person teams per region. Twenty-three international monitors of five different nationalities are also deployed across the country to follow the assemblies. A complex air operation involving five helicopters and two fixed- wing aircraft has been set up to assist the members of the Commission and the monitors. As we meet, Phase I has been completed in about 300 of 380 districts. Preparations continue for Phases II and III. In Kabul intense preparation is ongoing for Phase III. This includes the physical rehabilitation of the site and the coordination of security arrangements.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“Many of those districts are remote. Many are under the control of commanders or are split between armed factions that continue to fight each other. The village assemblies will select electoral colleges of between 20 and 60 members, depending on the size of the district. In Phase II, these colleges will elect by secret ballot representatives to the loya jirga. Phase III will be the holding of the loya jirga itself. The loya jirga members will be the approximately 1,000 representatives elected in Phase II, as well as about 500 representatives of special interest groups, such as intellectuals, women, refugees, nomads and the diaspora, who will be selected by their peers and confirmed by the Loya Jirga Commission.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“Mr. Prendergast: Mr. President, I thank you for this opportunity to provide an update on recent events in Afghanistan at an open meeting of the Council. The emergency loya jirga process, which is to take place in less than three weeks, is the most important political event in Afghanistan since the formation of the Interim Administration last December. The loya jirga constitutes a pivotal test for the Bonn process. The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), especially pillar I of the Mission, has been focusing most of its resources on ensuring that the loya jirga is held on time and under as free and fair conditions as circumstances allow. Those circumstances are difficult, both logistically and politically. Phase I of the loya jirga process requires the holding of about 380 district assemblies around the country.”
2002-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4541 (2002) · source
“Security remains a major challenge in many parts of the country, and substantial financial assistance is going to be required. I would therefore like to conclude with an appeal to international community to speed up the delivery of its assistance and to broaden its scope to include still unmet needs related to security.”
2002-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4521 (2002) · source
“These vaccination efforts are expected to succeed in stopping the transmission of polio in Afghanistan by the end of 2002. I have tried to describe a picture of the United Nations working with greater coordination among its constituent parts, as well as hand in hand with the Interim Authority created by the Bonn Agreement. International support for the Bonn process has been generous so far, and instrumental in the progress that has been made. At the same time, I would not want to leave any illusions about the obstacles ahead, the scale of the resources still required or the pressures that the Interim Administration continues to face. After so many years of war and civil war in Afghanistan, the political and humanitarian progress of the past several months is very encouraging. However, this progress is still by no means assured.”
2002-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4521 (2002) · source
“As we have seen so often in Afghanistan, humanitarian emergencies succeed each other, and their damaging effects are exacerbated by destroyed infrastructure and weakened social coping mechanisms. After great efforts were made to provide assistance to the victims of two earthquakes near Nahrin in northern Afghanistan, reports emerged of a massive plague of locusts in the north. This plague directly threatens crops in Balkh, Kunduz, Baghlan and Samanghan provinces, which are already suffering from drought. FAO has deployed its existing stocks of pesticides and is expecting additional stocks in the next three weeks to address the locust plague. In the health sector, a nationwide polio immunization campaign was launched on 16 April, targeting 6 million Afghan children and mobilizing the support of 60,000 volunteers.”
2002-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4521 (2002) · source
“In the area of food assistance, efforts by the World Food Programme to meet the immediate food needs of more than 6 million Afghans are increasingly jeopardized by a serious depletion of cash and commodity resources. On 18 April, confirmed donor pledges for food assistance amounted to less than half of what is required to sustain current operations. Furthermore, recent vulnerability assessments have shown that the food needs in Afghanistan are greater than originally estimated. United Nations efforts to mitigate food insecurity have been constrained by inter-factional fighting and demonstrations against the poppy eradication campaign in the south and east of the country.”
2002-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4521 (2002) · source
“Many donors congratulated the Administration on its ability to produce a clear and realistic budget, an impressive national development framework draft, and a list of quick-impact projects to be implemented immediately. Mr. Karzai told the group that donor disbursements must be urgently accelerated to meet the operating budget and emergency needs. The pace of return of refugees from neighbouring countries has exceeded expectations. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has estimated that in the first eight weeks of its facilitated repatriation programme, more than 300,000 refugees have returned to Afghanistan. This represents the fastest return of refugees anywhere since the end of the Kosovo war in 1999.”
2002-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4521 (2002) · source
“In anticipation of the funding pledged at Tokyo, UNAMA has begun to plan recovery and development activities in cooperation with the Interim Authority. At the request of the Authority, UNAMA is leading efforts to design and implement a series of integrated area development programmes in ten priority regions of the country. On a related matter, the first meeting of the Implementation Group was held in Kabul on 10 and 11 April. The Council will recall that the Implementation Group was formed during the Tokyo conference to oversee the use of funds pledged for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. At the meeting, the Interim Administration presented its current operating budget.”
2002-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4521 (2002) · source
“It is therefore a matter of great concern that funds pledged at Tokyo for such activities have been extremely slow to arrive. While donors may, understandably, want to wait for more stability before disbursing funds, we must also recognize that implementing rehabilitation and reconstruction projects will greatly help bring about that stability. It is a chicken-and-egg situation. As resolution 1401 (2002)- which was adopted unanimously by the Council - recognizes, the provision of reconstruction assistance can, under certain conditions, promote conditions of law and order. We would therefore urge Member States to meet their pledges so that reconstruction and development funding can be used to help promote a secure environment for political and economic change.”
2002-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4521 (2002) · source
“This mission will take place later in the month. Also, during his Visit to Mazar-i-Sharif on 14 and 15 April, Mr. Brahimi raised with local leaders, including Mr. Rashid Dostum and Mr. Mohammad Atta, the issue of ongoing attacks on Pashtun minorities in the north. Mr. Brahimi gave them copies of the Human Rights Watch report that documented such incidents. He emphasized the need to take effective steps quickly to end the attacks. The leaders gave assurances that they would do so. I turn now to issues of relief and reconstruction. In the past few months there have been signs that the economy has begun to recover and that this recovery is reaching many Afghans. While the international community must remain focused on meeting basic human needs, there is growing scope for rehabilitation and reconstruction activities as well.”
2002-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4521 (2002) · source
“At that conference, the Interim Administration presented comprehensive papers on the formation of an Afghan national police force and army. A follow-up conference will be held next month. The need for an effective police and corrections system is demonstrated by recent allegations of human rights abuses, which I would like to address now. In early April, a member of the Loya Jirga Commission and representatives of the Hazara community approached UNAMA with allegations that mass graves had been found in Bamiyan province. UNAMA fielded a preliminary mission to the area and, based on the findings of that mission, Mr. Brahimi has asked the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to identify forensic experts in the human rights field who could travel to Bamiyan to conduct a more thorough investigation.”
2002-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4521 (2002) · source
“The Administration has asked for international assistance to help farmers plant and market alternative crops. We urge the international community to respond to these appeals. If the Administration is successful, this will not only help to improve security in Afghanistan, but it will also reduce problems stemming from the illegal drug trade in consuming countries as well. Members of the Council have often noted the need for Afghans to take charge of their own security. In this regard, the Interim Administration has outlined a coherent Vision for its future security sector and a plan to bring about that vision. In his briefing during informal consultations on 5 April, the Secretary- General noted the very positive results of the Geneva conference of security donors.”
2002-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4521 (2002) · source
“With the financial assistance of the United Kingdom, the Administration has given farmers a choice between accepting financial compensation for each hectare destroyed and facing the forcible eradication of their crop. This policy has provoked fierce opposition from the farmers. The Administration has nonetheless managed to destroy more than 2,000 hectares and has paid $3 million in compensation. I might mention here that the European wholesale value of the eradicated crop is in excess of $300 million. There are, however, 65,000 hectares which are still estimated to be under poppy cultivation, and harvesting of the crop has already begun in some provinces. The Interim Administration faces active resistance and lacks the means to carry out a comprehensive destruction of the crop.”
2002-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4521 (2002) · source