YouSaid · the spoken record

President Chiluba

lines on the record
82
first
1999-09-21
most recent
2000-01-31
sittings or episodes
3
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un-security-council

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  1. They are the Abuja Treaty in Nigeria, and of course many other such landmarks that have tended to create structures through which we can collaborate with the international community, realizing that our individual efforts may not be sufficient. If I may talk about Africa, Mr. President, you referred to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group. We have in the southern region the Southern African Development Community; we have the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; we have a few other building blocks that have been formed on the continent of Africa to facilitate our efforts to collaborate with the outside world, be it the European Union or the United States of America or, of course, other parts of the globe.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  2. All we are now trying to say is that after the team of the military liaison personnel has been sent, a technical survey team must go and assess the situation on the ground in order for other efforts to follow. We in the Great Lakes region and in the continent of Africa as a whole have a desire to collaborate, a desire to cooperate. The Council knows that Africa works individually, each country pursuing its own domestic agenda; it took us time to realize that, indeed, even with the differences in our own economic strength between one country and another, we have to move much, much faster. Africa has certain landmarks one can refer to.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  3. It also met to approve its Chairman, who is from Algeria. As the Council knows, Algeria today occupies the Chair of the OAU, and so they had to provide a Chairman. The Chairman could have come from elsewhere, but we are happy that he is from Algeria, which holds the Chair of the OAU for the year. So we have General Rachid Lallali as the Chairman of the Joint Military Commission. Both the joint Political Committee and the Joint Military Commission have met, and they have done their initial work. In fact, we have just received a message that the next Joint Military Commission meeting will be held on 10 October. So a date has already been fixed, things are moving, and I am sure that the procedures for ensuring the peace process as laid out here, which are well known, will be followed. We are not trying to short- circuit or bypass anything.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  4. First and foremost, those of us who have been right there in the Congo see war fatigue in the faces of many people. You might say, "But it is not the ordinary people who are fighting." Indeed, the forces on both sides are realistic today. They know that the Congolese people are war-fatigued and that they want development. They cannot continue to suffer and to see their resources plundered at will. So I believe that even within the fighting forces, this is the spirit that reigns today. I can assure you Mr. President, and the members of Governments here present, and those absent, that there will be security and safety for personnel, both for those in the peacekeeping role as well as for those attending to humanitarian efforts. As I said, the Joint Military Commission has met once. It met first of all to approve the budget.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  5. It will not be used as a bargaining forum for the parties in this joint Political Committee or Joint Military Commission to try to sort out - "Oh, maybe I lost that point in the process, and now I can regain it here." No, their roles are provided for in the modalities; they will be working in order to support and give guidance to the peacekeeping forces on the ground. So there will be safety, because the people who are members of the joint Political Committee and the Joint Military Commission are onetime foes, people who fought but who have now decided to work for peace. They will work to identify the obstacles and areas of concern to make the peace operation exercise successful. I cannot fail to mention that the safety of the peacekeepers, the safety even of those engaged in humanitarian efforts to provide aid will be assured.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  6. I liken the joint Political Committee and the Joint Military Commission to the International Labour Organization. I have been a trade unionist almost all my life, and I know that in most countries where there are stable industrial relations, this is because the spirit of tripartism does work effectively. And when it works, it commits the parties - labourer, employer and Government - to a matter that they may have adopted on their own. I cannot see the Joint Military Commission or even the joint Political Committee working any differently from this. The spirit of collective responsibility is enshrined in it.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  7. I appealed to the United Nations to play a role in ensuring that this is done. There are various levels at which it can be done - technically, by working with the OAU in providing the experts who will help to make internal dialogue successful. The Congo is ravaged by war. The Congo, as we all know, is a country with vast resources which have yet to be exploited. So, indeed, the United Nations will play a role to ensure that the development in the Congo takes a certain path, particularly after the political debate has taken place and succeeded. The safety of those who will be involved in peacekeeping in the Congo and the safety of those who will be attending to humanitarian questions or bringing humanitarian aid to the Congo is assured.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  8. And so, I can safely say that the internal debate or internal dialogue is a matter that all the Congolese people - the Government, the rebels and everybody - will be concerned with. It may have already been heard that President Kabila was trying to contact some former head of State to try and start organizing internal debate, but the Council must have also heard that the rebels said no, they would not accept that. The choice of facilitator or moderator of these discussions is another one that requires the agreement of the parties concerned. We believe that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) will play its very important role in this to ensure that whoever they pick has both the respect and integrity that will make him acceptable to the parties to this conflict.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  9. Canada spoke about the participation in the internal debate, among other things, and the United Nations role in this. In this Agreement, there is a provision for that internal debate and even the timetable has been laid. Of course, because of the delay in completing the signing of the Agreement, I can say we are one or almost two months behind, but this does not take away the commitment of the parties to this Agreement. Internal debate, in fact, is a matter that the rebels advanced when they first made known their presence on the scene. They said that they wanted the Government to broaden the political space; they wanted broader participation by all the Congolese people; they wanted the Congolese people to democratize the system of Government; and so on.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  10. I can tell the Council frankly that this Agreement, signed by all the parties to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is a product of many hours spent by them, although chaired by us. If we look back to the signing of the Agreement, not one of the parties to this Agreement has ever expressed concern or even doubt about the contents of the Agreement. This is basically their own Agreement. The peculiar way in which it was negotiated gives me not only hope and optimism, but a tremendous sense of conviction that they, the people who negotiated this Agreement - particularly the Congolese people, the rebels and the countries that assisted either side - will always hold this as their very own home-bred Agreement. I have no doubt that they are committed and they will be committed. No one has expressed concern at all.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  11. It will be appreciated - I am not trying to run away from any responsibility or the mistakes and difficulties that may have been seen in this; I associate myself fully with them - that these are the difficulties I am trying to talk about regarding all such difficult situations. When we got involved in the Angola situation, it had already been dealt with by the United Nations at various forums, at different times with different countries and different facilitators and helpers in the process. The case of the Congo, may I say, is very different in many ways. The first item that was talked about by the representative of Bahrain was the commitment of parties to the Agreement.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  12. I say this to try and tell the Council that it is not only in Africa that we can say that we will not be sure. In 1973, in fact, there was a bit of drama. I was in the General Assembly when the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat, came with an olive branch. He offered it the Israelis and said: "I am ready to negotiate peace with Israel. But if they refuse ..." He touched the pocket where he keeps his gun and said: "I will offer them this gun." Those problems still continue. There have been the Wye River and other agreements in the process, and they still continue. To come down to this problem of the Congo, let me say this one thing. I got involved in the peace negotiation between UNITA and the Government of Angola in what is known today as the Lusaka Protocol.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  13. President Chiluba: In beginning to respond to the many observations and questions posed by the representatives of various Governments, let me say without any sense of pride that I was here 26 years ago. I was a trade unionist, but in the delegation of my Government. I say this to try and state how difficult it is to expect any conflict to end immediately after the signing has taken place. In fact, in some conflicts, other citizens of the world have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize while the conflicts still continue. I would have thought that, after they had been made recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize, those conflicts would have been consigned to history, but they have survived. The Nobel Peace Prizes have gone one way, the peace process another.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  14. There is, regrettably, a perception that the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, is usually a bit slow and reluctant to support peace efforts in Africa. The body is seen to be more forthcoming when dealing with peace efforts in other regions, even though Africa forms the largest component of the membership of the United Nations. I therefore hope that the Security Council will act with due proportion and understanding in dealing with the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  15. In summary, I wish to request the Security Council to, among other things: first, authorize and support the deployment of a peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with an appropriate mandate and size, based on the assessed needs on the ground; secondly, quickly dispatch the technical survey team to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in addition to the team of military liaison personnel which has already been sent to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and some neighbouring countries; thirdly, make available adequate resources for the Democratic Republic of the Congo peacekeeping mission; fourthly, extend necessary and adequate support to facilitate the process of internal Congolese dialogue; fifthly, help in the mobilization of humanitarian assistance to Congolese refugees and internally displaced persons and facilitate their return and resettlement; and, finally, assist with resources for the economic reconstruction and development of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  16. Within the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself many more people have been displaced. They have been subjected to unbearable suffering and indignity. The international community should ensure that the suffering of our Congolese brothers and sisters living as refugees is reduced by making available adequate resources to enable them to return and resettle in their own country.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  17. I have, however, noted with disappointment that whenever the international community is dealing with issues pertaining to Africa cost is always the determining factor and almost an obstacle to the effective involvement of the United Nations. In other regions of the world where conflicts have occurred no expense has been spared in the pursuit of peace. This body needs to do the same now for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and for Africa. Now that the implementation of the agreement has started in earnest, I wish to appeal to the United Nations to make generous contributions towards meeting the humanitarian needs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Hundreds of thousands of Congolese people today are living as refugees in temporary and inadequate shelters in neighbouring countries.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  18. It is with this in mind that I wish to appeal to this body to send a peacekeeping force to the Democratic Republic of the Congo with an appropriate mandate and size to tackle the complex and unique problems in that country. The ceasefire agreement prescribes tasks to be tackled by the United Nations peacekeeping force that include disarmament of Congolese non-statutory forces, as well as foreign militias who will require relocation, reorientation and reintegration into their respective societies. It is, therefore, clear that the tasks of the peacekeeping operation go beyond Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. With the foregoing, it is obvious that cost should not be placed above everything else when determining the mandate and size of the peacekeeping force.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  19. We welcome further the quick reaction by the United Nations in sending a team of military liaison personnel to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and some neighbouring countries. This action confirms the firm commitment of the United Nations to ensuring that peace obtains in that country. It is our sincere hope that other phases with regard to deployment of United Nations personnel, including the sending of a technical survey team to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, will also be undertaken soon. While we acknowledge the need for Africa to take responsibility for its own problems, we also recognize that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security lies with the United Nations Security Council.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  20. I am pleased to report that the parties to the Ceasefire Agreement have so far complied with the Agreement, which can be said to be generally holding. I am confident that, with the support of the international community, the implementation process will proceed smoothly. The fact that the Ceasefire Agreement was signed as a result of extensive consultations between the conflicting parties themselves should serve as a guarantee to security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This, in my opinion, means that no one, including the United Nations, could have any security concerns or fears in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I wish to take this opportunity to commend the United Nations for its participation at all the stages of the mediation process and for the supportive role it gave from the time the mediation process started.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  21. The representative of the OAU also briefed the meeting on the activities of the OAU regarding the organization's support to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Other issues considered included the budget of the Joint Military Commission; the structures; and the programme of work. Furthermore, the meetings accorded Zambia permanent observer status in both the Political Committee and the Joint Military Commission. My country's association with the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is therefore continuing. The holding of meetings by the Political Committee and the Joint Military Commission soon after the last signatures were obtained from the RCD is a clear indication that the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has begun in earnest.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  22. To this effect, the Political Committee and the Joint Military Commission met in Lusaka on 2 and 3 September 1999. The meetings were attended by representatives of all the belligerents to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, except the MLC, whose representatives had been unable to travel to Lusaka due to logistical constraints. Initially the meeting had difficulties relating to representation of the two factions of the RCD, on the Political Committee and the Joint Military Commission. I am pleased to inform the Council that the meetings found a formula which allowed the participation of both factions. At these meetings of the Political Committee and the Joint Military Commission, the appointment of General Rachid Lallali, an Algerian national, as Chairman of the Joint Military Commission, was endorsed.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  23. These consultations, which I carried out with the assistance of other regional leaders, yielded positive results when, on 1 August 1999, Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of the MLC, signed the Agreement on behalf of his group. With regard to the RCD, a unique formula was found involving the signing of the Agreement by 50 founding members of the movement. The signing of the Agreement by the RCD, which took place in Lusaka on 31 August 1999, effectively meant, and means, that the mandate entrusted to Zambia in September 1998 had come to an end and been fulfilled. The Agreement came into full force 24 hours after the last signatures, and so far, the Political Committee and the Joint Military Commission established by the Agreement have already commenced their work.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  24. The Agreement and the modalities also incorporated methods for addressing the security concerns of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighbouring countries. On 10 July 1999, six Heads of State of States parties to the conflict appended their signatures to the Agreement at a signing ceremony held in Lusaka. Unfortunately, due to differences within the RCD over who should represent it, the movement did not append its signature on that occasion. The differences over representation came in the aftermath of a reported split of the RCD into two factions in May 1999. The MLC also elected not to sign the Agreement then. I was entrusted by regional Heads of State to undertake further consultations with the two groups in order to reach an understanding that would enable them to sign the Agreement.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  25. The documents were subjected to considerable scrutiny and consultations in order to obtain the necessary concessions and eventual agreement. Let me at this stage acknowledge the magnanimity of President Laurent-Desire Kabila, the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose support contributed in no small measure to facilitating the peace process. From March 1999 on, the Congolese rebels were directly involved in the negotiations. On 7 July 1999, after an intensive two weeks of meetings of officials and representatives of the two Congolese rebel groups, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the RCD, the regional Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence finally adopted agreed texts of the Ceasefire Agreement; the modalities for the implementation of the Agreement; and the calendar for implementation.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  26. The consultations took cognizance of the two dimensions to the conflict: the internal aspect of the rebellion and the external aspect addressing security concerns, particularly those of Rwanda and Uganda. In order to ensure that both dimensions of the conflict were addressed, the regional ministerial meeting which was held in Lusaka on 15 and 16 January 1999 established two working groups of experts. The first, comprising the belligerents, the United Nations, the OAU and SADC and chaired by Zambia, considered the three documents drafted in Addis Ababa. The second working group, also chaired by Zambia, addressed the issue of the security concerns of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of neighbouring countries.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  27. A number of meetings to negotiate and finalize the draft documents were subsequently held in Lusaka, chaired by Zambia and comprising officials and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of States parties to the conflict, namely, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, as well as the OAU, SADC and, of course, the United Nations. The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), which was the only non-State party at the time, was consulted through the proximity mechanism, which had been enlarged at this stage to include Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania. As Chairman of the mediation process, I undertook numerous consultations in Zambia and outside, with leaders of the region, in an effort to harmonize the different positions of the parties.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  28. It was recognized at the Summit that there was a need to engage the Congolese rebel movement in the mediation process if it was to succeed. To this effect, a proximity mechanism was established comprising Zambia as Chairman and the OAU Secretary-General. Also at the meeting, the Heads of State charged their Ministers of Defence and military experts to meet in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the headquarters of the OAU, to work out a draft ceasefire agreement and modalities for implementing the agreement and to suggest a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire. The meeting in Addis Ababa took place from 10 to 12 September 1998.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  29. To this end, the regional heads of State agreed upon the following five basic principles as the basis of the solution to the conflict: an immediate cessation of hostilities; respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the need to address the security concerns of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and those of the neighbouring countries; and the need to broaden the political space in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and facilitate an internal political dialogue which would take into account the interests of all Congolese people. At the second Victoria Falls summit, I was mandated to chair the regional mediation effort and was assisted in this regard by the OAU, SADC and the United Nations.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  30. Among these efforts were the first Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, summit of 7 and 8 August 1998; the Pretoria, South Africa, Southern African Development Community summit of 23 August 1998; the Durban, South Africa, regional leaders' consultations of 3 September 1998; and the second Victoria Falls summit of 7 and 8 September 1998. The heads of State realized that the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had both an internal and an external dimension to it. Its resolution would, therefore, have to take into account both dimensions as a matter of necessity.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  31. Among the worst hit recently is the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has been at war since August 1998. I am, however, pleased to report that after a full year of mediation by Governments of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the combatants in the Congo have chosen the way of peace to resolve their differences. As a result, guns are falling silent. The carnage is coming to an end. There is now hope for peace in the Congo. When the rebellion started in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 2 August 1998, heads of State of the region and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) immediately undertook efforts aimed at finding a speedy and peaceful settlement to the conflict.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source

  32. President Chiluba: First of all I would like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of September. I also wish to express Zambia's appreciation for the support that your country, through the European Union, has rendered to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is a great honour and pleasure for me to address the Security Council this afternoon, for I come as the bearer of a message of hope and peace from the people of the Great Lakes region in general and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular. This is a region that in recent times has been ravaged by wars in which thousands of people have died and hundreds of thousands of others have been made homeless and forced to flee to neighbouring countries.

    1999-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4047 (1999) · source